Pointing to the potential financial implications for GE Vernova, Recharge News cites this serious fraud accusation by Vineyard Wind (VW):
“This exceptional misconduct includes [GE Vernova’s] intentional scheme to falsify critical quality assurance data… and to intentionally misrepresent the quality of those blades to [Vineyard Wind] in a brazen fraudulent, and willful breach of the TSA, ultimately resulting in the catastrophic blade failure…”
Recharge also discusses the findings of the Project Engineer appointed by VW to resolve claims between parties. Under the terms of the contract, the engineer’s determinations are binding unless overturned in arbitration.
- The engineer determined that GE Vernova was liable for project delays, blade defects, vessel costs, and a $185m rescission of previously certified payments.
- The damage claims issued by the project engineer total $853m.
- On the basis of those determinations, VW withheld 100% of the outstanding invoices issued by GE Vernova. Even netted against sums allegedly owed to GE Vernova, VW says the turbine maker owes around $545m.
- Per the contract, there are no limitations on liability in cases of “fraud, gross negligence, deliberate default or willful misconduct.”
My take: VW’s charges against GE Vernova will be resolved in the courts. However, VW is the lessee and operator, and is thus the party responsible to the Federal govt for project safety and environmental protection.
- Operator responsibility is a fundamental tenet of the OCS regulatory program. As lessee/operator, VW bears ultimate responsibility for project safety and environmental protection.
- VW is responsible for contractor selection, management, and oversight.
- If a contractor violates a regulation, the violation notice is given to the operator. If a contractor causes pollution, the operator is responsible for the cleanup.
- DNV, the Certified Verification Agent (CVA) hired by VW, was required to verify the design, fabrication, and installation procedures. Did they raise any issues to VW and the regulators?
- At VW’s request, BOEM waived a Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR) requirement so the project could stay on schedule. The FIR addresses quality assurance measures, so the waiver is highly relevant and concerning.
- Did the division of responsibilities between BOEM and BSEE weaken regulatory oversight? BOEM, ostensibly just the leasing bureau, should not have been authorized to grant departures that could affect structural integrity and operational safety.
- It’s surprising that VW has not been cited for civil penalties resulting from the blade failure and the resulting environmental damage.
- How can a judge prevent a contractor from stopping work for an operator that has filed serious fraud allegations against the contractor, has stopped making payments, and has, along with the Governor, declared the project to be complete?
Lastly, nearly two years after the blade failure, we are still awaiting BSEE’s investigation report.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 
Restart seems likely for decommissioning financial assurance rule
Posted in Regulation, decommissioning, energy policy, tagged API, BOEM, Chevron, comments, decommissioning, financial assurance, NEFSA, proposed regulation, Shell on May 18, 2026| Leave a Comment »
Thankfully, from the standpoint of those of us whose primary concerns are the integrity of the OCS program and protecting taxpayers from decommissioning liabilities, the API comments (attached), along with those submitted by Shell and Chevron, have exposed the folly of eliminating financial assurance whenever there is a financially strong company somewhere in the lease chain of custody.
Mindful of ongoing and anticipated decommissioning liability battles, API effectively challenges the BOEM proposal on legal grounds. API also demonstrates why revisions intended to improve regulatory efficiency and increase production would do exactly the opposite. Excerpts from the API comments (emphasis added):
Further, foisting financial assurance obligations on predecessors will not achieve BOEM’s stated aims of financial “savings” and increased OCS oil and gas production; it more likely will do the opposite. The Proposed Rule would just shift financial assurance burdens to financially stronger predecessors, many of which remain engaged in the majority of leasing and production across the OCS and are far more likely to be future investors in increased OCS development and production. By contrast, nothing ensures that entities standing to benefit from the Proposed Rule will reinvest saved financial assurance premium dollars into OCS production; in fact, such entities largely do not explore or increase reserves, but merely buy pre-discovered reserves and produce them to a lower economic limit.
Nor would the Proposed Rule promote or save costs for future OCS transactions since, in the absence of any option for BOEM-demanded financial assurance from current interest holders, assignors will demand financial assurance at sufficiently conservative levels to address the risk of residual liability if assignees default on their obligations.
Even more problematically, the Proposed Rule would retroactively impose this new regulatory burden on entities that divested their OCS property interests years (or decades) earlier—in reliance on BOEM’s regulations that required their assignees to provide any supplemental financial assurance. Such entities are no longer in privity with BOEM, and have no control over current operations on those OCS properties. The Proposed Rule would reach back even to impose these obligations on predecessors that divested their interests before the 1997 regulatory imposition of joint and several liability for assignors (a time period on which the Proposed Rule is silent).
This novel and misguided approach allows, and even encourages, current interest holders to eschew their lease and grant obligations, and instead freely operate on the backs of predecessors and taxpayers. Meanwhile, current interest holders could choose to allocate little or no funding for end-of-life obligations like decommissioning whenever they desire to conclude production, file for bankruptcy, and leave BOEM to eventually issue decommissioning orders to predecessors that have not operated the grants and leases for years or even decades. This would create higher administrative and financial burdens for the government and system as a whole, including where no viable predecessor had accrued liability for decommissioning all facilities present on the lease or grant, and potential operational impacts that a predecessor has no obligation to cure.
This new proposed obligation on predecessors is arbitrary and capricious and unlawful on multiple grounds. It violates the rule against retroactivity by creating new federal liability stemming from already-completed transactions. It violates the agency change in position doctrine, particularly given that BOEM on multiple occasions has rejected precisely the same approach as in the Proposed Rule. It is unsupported, as it overstates the burdens under the discretionary Existing Rule, disregards repeated U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and BOEM findings calling for more robust financial assurance by current interest holders, cites only anecdotal prior comments while ignoring the bulk of countervailing comments detailing reality on the OCS, and identifies no means by which BOEM can compel collect, and assess adequate financial information for all predecessor entities. And it is self contradictory, including by tying up more capital among entities producing the vast majority of oil and natural gas on the OCS.
Chevron points to their potential liability balance of ~ $2 billion for satisfying the decommissioning obligations of default owners:
John Smith and I do not agree with the industry support for the use of reserves as financial assurance. The margin of error in reserve, oil price, and decommissioning cost estimates, not to mention the potential for facility damage, the ever-changing political environment, and the administration challenges, present an unacceptably high risk for taxpayers. If companies want to guarantee decommissioning based on reserves, let them do so. Shell makes a good point about why it is especially important to prohibit the use of reserve estimates on a company-wide basis:
Lastly, kudos to the New England Fisherman’s Stewardship Association for raising the concern about financial assurance for decommissioning offshore wind facilities
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