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Archive for the ‘Regulation’ Category

In the ongoing Santa Ynez Unit production restart saga, John Smith informs that a California Appellate Court ruled against Sable Offshore by a vote of 2-1, with a strong dissent from one of the three judges.

The decision (attached) affirms the California Coastal Commission’s regulatory authority over Sable’s Los Flores Canyon pipeline repairs, meaning that Sable could be ordered to cease operating the pipeline. However, this is just one element of a complex legal maze. An important case regarding PHMSA’s emergency special permit for the pipeline will be heard by the Federal 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in July.

The dissenting judge’s opinion beginning on p.15 of the attachment sets the stage for the upcoming arguments in the 9th Circuit. Excerpt:

“But first, a dose of reality. The repair work has been done. It is a “fait accompli.” And, pursuant to federal intervention, oil is now flowing in the pipeline without incident. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution takes precedence. The federal Government trumped the state’s Commission “cease and desist” order and it trumps the preliminary injunction order. Based upon these events, the trial court should vacate the preliminary injunction, dismiss the matter as moot, and nullify the civil penalties.”

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Meanwhile, the California Coastal Commission notified Sable Offshore that it intends to issue a cease and desist order aimed at shutting down crude oil extraction in the Santa Barbara Channel.

Sable responds: “Sable Offshore Corp. (“Sable”) through its subsidiary, Pacific Pipeline Company (“PPC”), continues to lawfully operate through its existing coastal development permits which were issued in 1986.”

California cage fight! Who ya’ got?

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DOT and others shouldn’t make statements they can’t back up (see the X post below).

As a supporter of responsible offshore oil and gas operations, I find statements like this to be irresponsible and embarrassing. Sable Offshore is not using newer or safer drilling technology than is used in many other areas.

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Jennette Barnes/CAI

Pointing to the potential financial implications for GE Vernova, Recharge News cites this serious fraud accusation by Vineyard Wind (VW):

“This exceptional misconduct includes [GE Vernova’s] intentional scheme to falsify critical quality assurance data… and to intentionally misrepresent the quality of those blades to [Vineyard Wind] in a brazen fraudulent, and willful breach of the TSA, ultimately resulting in the catastrophic blade failure…”

Recharge also discusses the findings of the Project Engineer appointed by VW to resolve claims between parties. Under the terms of the contract, the engineer’s determinations are binding unless overturned in arbitration.

  • The engineer determined that GE Vernova was liable for project delays, blade defects, vessel costs, and a $185m rescission of previously certified payments.
  • The damage claims issued by the project engineer total $853m.
  • On the basis of those determinations, VW withheld 100% of the outstanding invoices issued by GE Vernova. Even netted against sums allegedly owed to GE Vernova, VW says the turbine maker owes around $545m.
  • Per the contract, there are no limitations on liability in cases of “fraud, gross negligence, deliberate default or willful misconduct.”

My take: VW’s charges against GE Vernova will be resolved in the courts. However, VW is the lessee and operator, and is thus the party responsible to the Federal govt for project safety and environmental protection.

  • Operator responsibility is a fundamental tenet of the OCS regulatory program. As lessee/operator, VW bears ultimate responsibility for project safety and environmental protection.
  • VW is responsible for contractor selection, management, and oversight.
  • If a contractor violates a regulation, the violation notice is given to the operator. If a contractor causes pollution, the operator is responsible for the cleanup.
  • DNV, the Certified Verification Agent (CVA) hired by VW, was required to verify the design, fabrication, and installation procedures. Did they raise any issues to VW and the regulators?
  • At VW’s request, BOEM waived a Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR) requirement so the project could stay on schedule. The FIR addresses quality assurance measures, so the waiver is highly relevant and concerning.
  • Did the division of responsibilities between BOEM and BSEE weaken regulatory oversight? BOEM, ostensibly just the leasing bureau, should not have been authorized to grant departures that could affect structural integrity and operational safety.
  • It’s surprising that VW has not been cited for civil penalties resulting from the blade failure and the resulting environmental damage.
  • How can a judge prevent a contractor from stopping work for an operator that has filed serious fraud allegations against the contractor, has stopped making payments, and has, along with the Governor, declared the project to be complete?

Lastly, nearly two years after the blade failure, we are still awaiting BSEE’s investigation report.

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SYU near-term workover plan; estimated reserve additions exceed production.

Those who have been following the Santa Ynez Unit saga should take a look at Sable’s informative PowerPoint update (attached). The presentation includes reserve data, well operation plans, production forecasts, financial and legal updates, and regional energy supply information.

Also, Sable CEO Jim Flores has announced that Energy Secretary Wright and Interior Secretary Burgum will be visiting the project this week. Transportation Secretary Duffy was also expected, but he will not be attending.

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The subject IEc report for the US Coast Guard may be of interest to BOE followers. The Coast Guard is requesting comments by July 28, 2026. You can download the full report (129 pages) here.

The report is intended to update the Coast Guard’s methodology for estimating the cost savings resulting from spill prevention regulations. The paragraph pasted below is a good summary of the objective.

The offshore industry could benefit from this report, because the estimated cost of spills >100 gallons is reduced, dramatically so when the DWH/Macondo blowout is excluded (see the second table below). That reduction would support regulatory reform initiatives, and could thus generate some controversy.

My main concern is that there is only a single distance-from-shore category for offshore spills (see text below). The natural resources damage from a spill 3 miles from shore will almost always be much greater than from an equivalent volume spill 100 miles from shore.

The single-offshore-category issue is illustrated in the 2 tables pasted below. The first table presents a summary of expert opinions on the smallest spill size that is likely to result in measurable natural resource damages. The mean response to Question 3 (offshore) is 7782 gallons. A spill of that size occurring 3 miles from shore is much more likely to result in resource damage than a spill originating 50 or 100 miles from shore.

In the second table, note the new methodology results in the same cost estimates for large nearshore/coastal spills as for offshore spills. Again, this is presumably because there is only a single offshore category.

The public comments on this report should be interesting.

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Santa Barbara Channel, Dos Cuadras Field platforms (L to R): Hillhouse, A, B, and C; Antandrus Wiki photo

As part of the recent focus on decommissioning and financial assurance requirements, I looked at borehole data for platforms A, B, and C on Lease OCS-P 0241 in the Santa Barbara Channel. Platform “A” is where a well blew out in 1969, permanently scarring the US offshore program. Observations:

  • There are 140 completed and unplugged wells on the 3 platforms. None of the wells on these platforms have been permanently plugged and only one is temporarily abandoned.
  • The latest available production information (2024 data) indicates ave. daily oil production of 3791 bopd for the lease, including 1901 bopd from Platform A, the highest production for any platform in the region in 2024.
  • 41 of the lease’s completed (unplugged) wells are on Platform A.
    • The number of these wells that are currently producing is not publicly available.
    • 30 of the completed Platform A wells were drilled prior to 1985.
    • The blowout well was the 5th well drilled from platform A. All 4 of the wells drilled prior to the 1/28/1969 blowout are still unplugged:
      • well A-20: spudded on 11/19/1968, reached total depth on 12/2/1968
      • well A-41: spudded on 11/27/1968, TD on 12/19/1968
      • well A-25: spudded on 12/18/1968, TD on 12/28/1969
      • well A-38: spudded on 1/12/1969, TD on 1/24/1969
      • Note how quickly the wells were drilled. The wells were shallow (2299-4051′ true vertical depth), and the operator (Union Oil) saved time by omitting a casing string. (This decision was a root cause of the blowout and thus changed history 😡)

Lease documents and regulations at 30 CFR § 250.1710 require that all wells be permanently plugged within one year of lease termination. For leases like 0241 that are still active, 30 CFR § 250.1711 stipulates that BSEE will order a well to be permanently plugged if the well poses a hazard to safety or the environment, or is not useful for lease operations and is not capable of oil, gas, or sulphur production in paying quantities. In the Gulf of America Region, the policy is to require wells that have not been used in the past 5 years to be permanently plugged. Allowing old wells to remain unplugged is neither prudent nor consistent with the regulations.

Platform A during 1969 blowout

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Sable Offshore (SOC) surged 12% on Thursday. Here’s why:

Judge Stephen V. Wilson, US District Court for the Central District of California ruled that Sable’s pipeline doesn’t imminently harm Gaviota Park. Judge Wilson said the state “is grasping at straws,” for evidence of real environmental harm, and the federal consent decree governing the terms of the system’s restart is controlled by the California Office of the State Fire Marshall, not the parks department.

The judge didn’t rule on the larger question of whether the Defense Production Act order to restart the Las Flores pipeline system was lawful.

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John Smith’s update on California OCS Decommissioning Obligations is attached. His comments:

Chevron and FMC hold joint and several liability responsibilities for many platforms and all of those operated by DCOR. This reflects Chevron’s long history in developing CA onshore and offshore oil and gas resources. A 2020 report issued by BSEE estimated the nine platforms operated by DCOR had a combined decommissioning cost of $397 million. The actual cost could be 2-3-fold higher based on estimates for decommissioning California state water platforms prepared by experienced decommissioning consultants.

Chevron may be checking out of California by moving its corporate offices to Houston, but as someone once said about decommissioning – referring to the popular Eagles Hotel California song “You can check out but you can never leave.”

Official decommissioning anthem 😉: Hotel California

Excerpt from the lyrics – Hotel California, Eagles, 1976

Last thing I remember
I was running for the door
I had to find the passage back
To the place I was before
“Relax, ” said the night man
“We are programmed to receive
You can check out any time you like
But you can never leave”

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On 5/14/2026, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint filed by the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) against the Dept. of the Interior. This was one of the less prominent cases challenging Sable Offshore’s oil and gas operations in the Santa Ynez Unit. 

The CBD had challenged an April 2025 BOEM decision concluding that Sable was not required to revise its development and production plan for the SYU. They sought a court order requiring a revised plan. This suit seemed to be a stretch, so its dismissal is not a surprise.

Per the Dept. of Justice, the court dismissed the lawsuit because the plaintiffs’ asserted procedural injury had no basis in the statute, was not traceable to any action by BOEM, and could not be redressed by an order of the court. (Other than that, it was just fine. 😉)

Among other problems the court identified with the plaintiffs’ case, they invoked a provision of the statute that governs “approval of a development and production plan,” not revision of an already-existing plan. It will be interesting to see the full decision so that we can better understand the context for that statement. Distinguishing revised plans in that manner could have significant policy implications.

For a full update on Sable litigation, see the section of their Quarterly Report beginning on p. 12.

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