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Archive for the ‘oil spill response’ Category

Capping stack for Guyana – prudent requirement

Posted in Gulf of Mexico, Guyana, Offshore Energy - General, oil spill response, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , on May 6, 2024| 1 Comment »

The government’s decision to require that a capping stack be located in Guyana is prudent. Although the need for a capping stack is dependent on multiple barrier failures and is thus extremely low, the environmental and economic consequences of a prolonged well blowout warrant timely access to this tertiary well control option.

A capping stack must be properly maintained and deployable without delay. In that regard, BSEE has a good program for testing Gulf of Mexico capping stack readiness. Capping stack drills are an important post-Macondo addition to the unannounced oil spill response program that dates back to 1981.

The capping stack designed during the Macondo blowout shut-in the well on 15 July 2010. The decision process that allowed the well to remain shut-in was a bit perplexing, and we had a bizarre situation where the Federal Incident Commander threatened to require the resumption of the blowout. The same well integrity concerns had prematurely ended the “top kill” operation on 28 May, allowing the well to flow unnecessarily into the Gulf for an additional 48 days (5/28-7/15). (See this important paper by LSU Petroleum Engineering professor Dr. Mayank Tyagi et al: Analysis of Well Containment and Control Attempts in the Aftermath of the Deepwater Blowout in MC252)

“Troy Naquin, BSEE New Orleans District, observes as a capping stack is carefully lowered onto the deck of ship to be transported more than 100 miles offshore for a drill designed to test industry’s ability to successfully deploy it in case of an emergency, May 8, 2023.” BSEE photo/Bobby Nash

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GoM production for Feb 2024 remained well below June to Oct (2023) levels

Posted in Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, oil spill response, pipelines, tagged , , , on May 1, 2024| Leave a Comment »

To what extent was the Main Pass Oil Gathering (MPOG) system shut-in responsible for the Nov. to Feb. production decline (chart below)? The MPOG wasn’t cleared for production until earlier this month, so we may not know until the investigation report is published and the EIA posts April 2024 production data (2 month lag).

The NTSB is leading the investigation on the MPOG spill. This short summary is all they have posted so far, but we should see a preliminary report soon. The NTSB’s final reports are frequently delayed. They still haven’t finalized their report on the Dec. 2022 Gulf of Mexico helicopter crash.

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Main Pass Oil Gathering system is finally cleared for production

Posted in Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, oil spill response, pipelines, tagged , , , , , , on April 10, 2024| Leave a Comment »

After 5 months of investigation, the Main Pass Oil Gathering (MPOG) system has finally been cleared for production. (The Coast Guard update only says that the pipeline passed the integrity test, but I assume the operators may resume production though the MPOG system.)

Only a small connector leak that was previously reported was identified during the extensive integrity testing. The Coast Guard had advised that the connector leak was not the source of the large sheen that was observed in November.

So what was the source of the November sheen and what was the basis for the 1.1 million gallon spill volume estimate? The sheen was not indicative of a spill of that magnitude. Did the Coast Guard et al assume a worst case loss from the MPOG system, even though no leak had been identified?

Is this the most oversight ever for a pipeline integrity test?

The removal and replacement of the spool piece and the subsequent integrity test of the MPOG line were conducted under the close supervision of the Unified Command and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. During both operations, spill response vessels were on site, along with divers, remotely operated vehicles, helicopters equipped with trained oil observers and multi-spectral imaging cameras, and other containment and recovery equipment. No material discharge of oil was observed during these operations.

Unified Command

The NTSB has the lead in the investigation into the source of the sheen. Don’t expect any findings soon.

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Gulf of Mexico production declined further in January. How big of a factor were the “sheen shut-ins?”

Posted in Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, oil spill response, pipelines, tagged , , , , on April 1, 2024| Leave a Comment »

Average GoM oil production from Nov. to Jan. was more than 130,000 BOPD below the July to Oct. average. Production in Jan. 2024 was 245,000 BOPD lower than Sept. 2023 production. (See the table and chart below.)

The production shut-ins associated with the mysterious November sheen in the Main Pass area were no doubt a contributing factor to the decline, but the magnitude and duration of those shut-ins has not been disclosed. The source of the sheen has apparently still not been determined, nor has any information been provided on the status of the Federal investigation. The absence of transparency is disappointing.

production monthGoM oil production (BOPD, 1000’s)
Jan. 20241752
Dec. 20231829
Nov. 20231845
Oct. 20231950
Sept 20231997
Aug. 20231890
July 20231935
EIA data

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Huntington Beach sheen caused by natural source not platform spill

Posted in California, Offshore Energy - General, oil spill response, tagged , , on March 11, 2024| Leave a Comment »

Test results came back from the Office of Spill Prevention and Response – part of the Department of Fish and Wildlife – indicating the natural oil source, said Richard Uranga, US Coast Guard public affairs specialist.

“From the first initial stages, they were tracking that from the samples,” he said. “The oil rig samples were not the same as the oil that was gathered from the oil sheen.”

LA Daily News

So why did the LA Times report shortly after the sheen was detected that it was not from natural causes, and attribute that finding to the Coast Guard? It was too soon for the lab results to be back. Was a platform spill the desired narrative?

Keep in mind that up to several hundred barrels of oil per day seep naturally into Southern California waters.

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Oil sheen offshore Huntington Beach in the vicinity of Platforms Eva and Emma

Posted in California, oil spill response, tagged , , on March 9, 2024| Leave a Comment »

Coast Guard photo

According to the LA Times, the Coast Guard said the sheen was not from natural causes, but the Coast Guard press releases don’t say that. One of the nearby platforms could have been the source as could a pipeline or vessel. We’ll see what, if anything, the investigators find.

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GoM oil production remained slightly depressed in Dec. after Main Pass pipeline shut-ins

Posted in Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, oil spill response, pipelines, tagged , , , , on March 1, 2024| Leave a Comment »

from EIA data

Reports in Nov. indicated that ~60,000 bopd were shut-in as a result of the presumed Main Pass Oil Gathering system pipeline leak. The Coast Guard subsequently reported that other pipelines in the area were shut-in as the search for a leak continued. The bulk of the Nov./Dec. production decline of ~80,000 bopd (from Oct. levels) was probably attributable to those pipeline system shut-ins.

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What was the source of the November 2023 GoM spill? How was the 1.1 million gallon estimate made?

Posted in accidents, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, oil spill response, pipelines, tagged , , , on February 26, 2024| Leave a Comment »

After 3 months of investigation, only a small connector leak has been identified in or near the Main Pass Oil Gathering system. According to the Coast Guard, that leak was not the source of the large November spill (pictured). The absence of findings raises many questions:

  • Is the Main Pass Oil Gathering system still being implicated? Surrounding pipelines?
  • Was a vessel or some other source responsible?
  • Were sheen samples fingerprinted and are those results definitive?
  • Given that the source has not been identified, what was the basis for the large (and rather sensational) spill volume estimate? The sheen was not indicative of a spill of that magnitude.
  • How much production has been shut-in since the slick was first identified? November production data indicate a GoM-wide oil production decline of ~80,000 bopd decline from September.

Given the public claims that were made about the size and potential implications of this spill, the authorities need to be more forthcoming regarding their findings to date.

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Still waiting ….

Posted in accidents, California, CCS, decommissioning, energy policy, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, oil spill response, pipelines, Regulation, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , on February 12, 2024| Leave a Comment »

Still waiting for:

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55 years ago today a reckless well plan permanently scarred the US offshore program 

Posted in accidents, California, Offshore Energy - General, oil spill response, seeps, well control incidents, tagged , , , , on January 28, 2024| Leave a Comment »

On January 28, 1969, well A-21, the 5th well to be drilled from Union Oil Company’s “A” platform began flowing uncontrollably through fractures into the Santa Barbara Channel.

The absence of any well casing to protect the permeable, fractured cap rock meant that the operator couldn’t safely shut-in a sudden influx of hydrocarbons into the well bore (i.e. a “kick”). Shutting-in the well at the surface would create well bore fractures through which oil and gas could migrate to shallow strata and the sea floor. The probability of an oil blowout was thus essentially the same as the probability of a kick (>10-2). Compare this with the historical US offshore oil blowout probability (<10-4) and the probability of <10-5 for wells with optimal barrier management.

Here, in brief, is the well A-21 story:

  • Well drilled to total depth of 3203′ below the ocean floor (BOF).
  • 13 3/8″ casing had been set at 238′ BOF. The well was unprotected from the base of this casing string to total depth.
  • Evidence of natural seeps near the site suggested the presence of fracture channels
  • The well was drilled through permeable cap rock and a small high pressured gas reservoir before penetrating the target oil sands.
  • When the well reached total depth, the crew started pulling drill pipe out of hole to in preparation for well logging.
  • The first 5 stands of drill pipe pulled tight; the next 3 pulled free suggesting the swabbing of fluids into the well bore..
  • The well started flowing through the drill pipe. The crew attempted to stab an inside preventer into the drill pipe, but the well was blowing too hard. The crew then attempted unsuccessfully to stab the kelly into the drill pipe and halt the flow.
  • The crew dropped the drill pipe into the well bore and closed the blind ram to shut-in the well.
  • Boils of gas began to appear on the water surface. Oil flowed to the surface through numerous fracture channels. The above sketch by former colleague Jerry Daniels (RIP) depicts the fracturing, which greatly complicated mitigation of the flow.

Here is the link to an excellent US Geological Survey report from 1969 that describes the geologic setting, well activities, and remedial measures after the blowout.

We need to continue studying these historically important incidents, not just the technical details but also the human and organizational factors that allowed such safety and environmental disasters to occur. The idea is not to shame, but to remember and better understand.

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