Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Posts Tagged ‘regulatory fragmentation’

Comments on the proposed “Revisions to the Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf” are due today.

My submission (one page) is attached. Main points:

  • Removing the same-season-relief-well (SSRW) requirements is an essential precursor to the renewal of arctic drilling activity. The SSRW provisions make Arctic operations cost prohibitive while at the same time increasing safety and environmental risks.
  • The potential risks and benefits of a subsea isolation device (SSID) should be assessed on a case-by-case basis considering water depth, temperature related BOP failure risks, wellhead integration, ice and vessel traffic exposure, and other factors.
  • As is the case for floating drilling operations anywhere, the focus in the Arctic should be on well design, integrity, and control, including carefully verifying casing and cement integrity, ensuring complete barrier redundancy, and having standby capping and containment capability.

Read Full Post »

The attached letter to the General Accountability Office (GAO) asserts that there were “deeply entrenched ethical issues and conflicts of interest within the former Minerals Management Service (MMS),” and implies that these issues were among the factors contributing to the tragic Macondo well blowout.

I retired from MMS shortly before the Macondo well blew out on April 20, 2020, and testified before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on May 11, 2010. My comments on MMS employee ethics still stand and are reiterated below:

I also want to express my disappointment in certain media comments directed at my former MMS colleagues. These comments have not only been ill-informed and unsubstantiated, but malicious. Without hesitation, I can tell you that MMS regulatory personnel–inspectors, engineers, scientists, and others–are 100% committed to their safety and pollution prevention mission. MMS inspectors are themselves exposed to risks every day when they fly offshore and inspect facilities. MMS personnel have repeatedly made personal sacrifices to support the regulatory mission. After Ivan, Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike, MMS employees worked to restore oil and gas production essential to our economy, even when their personal lives had been disrupted by the onshore impacts of these hurricanes. These personnel work under strict ethics standards, and despite a few isolated and highly publicized incidents that occurred more than four years ago, conduct themselves with the highest degree of professionalism. While a critical review of the entire offshore regulatory regime is necessary and appropriate, unsubstantiated accusations and personal attacks are not.


The comprehensive Chief Counsel’s Report, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, was the only inquiry to consider whether ethical lapses were a contributing factor to the blowout. In the “Regulatory Observations” chapter, the Chief Counsel addressed ethics concerns directly (p. 261):

“In recent years various bodies have concluded that certain MMS offices and programs have violated ethical rules or guidelines. In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, some questioned whether ethical lapses played any role in causing the blowout. The Chief Counsel‘s team found no evidence of any such lapses.“

This blog closely followed the Macondo blowout. I have read all of the investigation reports and many of the court documents. I also served on the defense team for Bob Kaluza, the BP Well Site Leader who was fully acquitted after being shamefully prosecuted in the wake of the blowout. My thoughts on the Macondo tragedy are summarized in a six part series.

Because of the false ethics narrative and scapegoating of MMS, experts who should have been directing the well control efforts, were pushed to the back of the bus shortly after the blowout began. Had that not been the case, I believe the top kill operation would not have been aborted in late May and the well would have been killed 48 days sooner, reducing the oil spill volume by at least 2.4 million bbls. (See the analysis by Dr. Mayank Tyagi and his colleagues at LSU.) Also, keep in mind that the USCG Incident Commander almost required BP to resume flow from the well after the capping stack successfully shut-in the well on 7/15/2010, and would have likely done so were it not for forceful input from an engineer from the former MMS.

The consolidation of BOEM and BSEE into a single bureau makes sense. As I previously commented:

This is an excellent step that many OCS program veterans have been advocating. In addition to the inefficiencies associated with overlapping and intertwined BOEM and BSEE responsibilities, the associated regulatory fragmentation is a significant safety risk factor.

The primary OCS functions including leasing, resource evaluation, economic analysis, permitting, inspection and enforcement, investigations, environmental assessment, spill response preparedness, promulgation of regulations, technology assessment, research,and decommissioning, are inextricably linked, cannot be effectively segmented, and should not be stovepiped.

Finally, with regard to the reorganization planning questions posed at the end of the attached letter, perhaps GAO should first consider the abrupt, unplanned termination of MMS. At a 2011 Ministerial Forum in Washington, an international offshore safety expert criticized that rash decision noting – “It took 87 days to stop the blowout, but only 30 days to get rid of the regulator.”

Read Full Post »

damaged Vineyard Wind turbine – Cape Cod Times photo

Excerpt from p.3 of Vineyard Wind’s suit against GE Renewables (attached):

“As was widely reported in national and local news, in July 2024, one of the GER offshore blades collapsed and fell into the waters off Nantucket, necessitating a massive environmental cleanup, and a six-month construction hiatus during which GER performed a “root cause” analysis. That analysis concluded that 68 of the 72 GER blades installed at the Project (nearly all manufactured by GER in Gaspé, Canada) were also defective because they were inadequately bonded together, and were so poorly made that they were beyond repair. GER’s remediation plan required it to remove all of the blades and to replace all Gaspé blades with others manufactured at a different facility in Cherbourg, France.

Regulatory issues of concern:

    Read Full Post »

    “The Department of the Interior today announced the start of a phased plan to establish the Marine Minerals Administration, bringing together the functions of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. This action is intended to improve coordination and increase efficiencies across offshore leasing, permitting, inspections and environmental oversight, while maintaining all existing regulatory protections and rigorous safety standards. 

    This streamlined approach reflects the evolution of offshore energy development and the need for a more integrated approach to managing conventional and emerging resources such as critical minerals. By aligning planning, leasing and oversight functions, the Department is positioning the agency to better meet current and future energy demands.“

    This is an excellent step that many OCS program veterans have been advocating. In addition to the inefficiencies associated with overlapping and intertwined BOEM and BSEE responsibilities, the associated regulatory fragmentation is a significant safety risk factor.

    See the comments that I submitted to the Dept. of the Interior in response to their request for regulatory reform recommendations.

    Read Full Post »

    John Smith shared the attached Santa Ynez Unit regulatory update for the 8 state agencies that have oversight roles (see regulatory fragmentation).

    John notes that Exxon’s March 26 contractual deadline for Sable to have the SYU up and running is fast approaching.  What will Exxon do in the likely event that Sable fails to meet that deadline? Does Exxon want to re-enter the SYU legal and regulatory quagmire?

    The SYU’s 500+ million barrels of oil, 3 deepwater platforms, and onshore processing facilities are an enormous prize, but is that prize attainable?

    Meanwhile, the latest skirmish between Sable and the Office of the State Fire Marshal (OFSM) pertains to metal loss anomalies and inspection tool tolerances. The dispute is summarized in the linked filing.

    Sable contends that the Fire Marshal’s letter contradicts guidance from OSFM staff and provides examples. Sable goes a step further at the end of their response by calling for the FIre Marshal to coordinate better with the experts on his staff:

    “We respectfully request that, given this background, you coordinate further with the expert team at OSFM and revisit the statements in your October 22nd letter.”

    It’s not looking good for a quick resolution of these issues.

    Read Full Post »

    My comments in response to the Dept. of the Interior’s regulatory reform notice are attached. First and foremost, I believe these recommendations would reduce safety and environmental risks. Second, I am confident that they would also reduce governmental costs and the regulatory burden on industry.

    The first attachment discusses regulatory fragmentation and recommends actions to reduce the complexity and redundancy of the offshore regulatory regime. The second attachment proposes a Drilling Safety Leaders Pilot Program as a means of evaluating a more adaptable framework regulatory framework for operators with outstanding performance records.

    Read Full Post »

    The “Zero Based Regulatory Budgeting” Executive Order will promote confusion and uncertainty, not sustainable regulatory reform.

    The EO requires agencies to issue a rule, effective not later than September 30, 2025, that inserts a sunset date into each “covered regulation.” The sunset date must be 1 year after the effective date of the sunset rule, but may be extended multiple times for a total of up to 5 years.  

    From an offshore energy perspective, the confusion starts with the EO’s applicability. One section of the order exempts regulatory permitting regimes authorized by statute. Another section specifies that the order “applies to all regulations issued pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Act of 1953 and any amendments thereto.” This is a fundamental contradiction given that OCSLA is a statutory planning and permitting regime. Which regulations are subject to the EO?

    Comments:

    • For some reason (too complicated?), EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers are given 30 days to provide a list of statutes that are subject to the EO. Perhaps all affected regulators should have been given 30 days to comment on the draft EO before it was finalized.
    • The EO is sure to create chaos as regulators, under the direction of managers keen on complying with the President’s directive, attempt to determine the EO’s applicability and establish implementation procedures.
    • The EO, which is intended to provide order and certainty, will do exactly the opposite. How does the regulated industry plan for future operations while this vague and controversial “zero based regulatory budgeting” exercise is ongoing? What are the chances of this directive being sustained?
    • Reducing the number of pages in the US Code, while desirable, is not regulatory reform.
    • The order assumes that most regulations are meaningless, which is not the case. What is the plan for filling the void after regulations are deleted?
    • The EO should embrace, rather than circumvent, the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. The tedious and sometimes burdensome APA has protected the public and the energy industry from countless unjustified, unauthorized, and poorly considered regulatory initiatives.
    • Eliminating rules is not synonymous with establishing a regulatory framework that will improve efficiency and stimulate innovation.
    • Other factors are paramount in improving regulatory effectiveness and efficiency. These include regulatory fragmentation, effective goal setting, management systems, culture, data gathering, performance monitoring, continuous improvement, collaboration, and the adoption of industry standards.
    • Quality regulators are more important than quality regulations. Regulating with fewer rules requires skilled regulators.
    • Agencies should be directed to consider how they can best reduce the regulatory burden without compromising safety and environmental performance. Page reduction should be secondary.

    If regulatory efficiency is the goal, this EO is likely to do more harm than good. Federal agencies are largely comprised of bright people with good intentions. Challenge them to propose innovative reforms that will simplify and improve their regulatory regimes.

    Read Full Post »

    Addressing regulatory fragmentation will improve efficiency and lower costs for industry and government while reducing safety and environmental risks.

    Unfortunately, the regulatory regime for US offshore oil and gas operations is noteworthy for redundancy, uncertainty, and complexity that divert industry and governmental attention from safety and environmental protection objectives to administrative processes, interpretations, and jurisdictional boundaries.

    “Poster Child” for regulatory fragmentation?

    The 12 Federal entities that have some OCS regulatory responsibilities are identified in the above chart. The organizations with core regulatory roles are included in the overlapping circles. The responsibilities of BOEM and BSEE are so inextricably intertwined that those bureaus occupy the same circle.

    Coastal states also have OCS regulatory roles through authority granted in the Coastal Zone Management Act.

    When multiple agencies have jurisdiction over a facility, system, or procedure, the redundancy inevitably results in inconsistency, ambiguity, and gaps in oversight. The focus of operating companies and contractors is diverted from safety and risk management to understanding and satisfying the regulators. The inevitable result is a compliance mentality that weakens the safety culture.

    Interagency agreements in the form of MOUs and MOAs, which are ostensibly for the purpose of managing redundancy, are often unclear or inconclusive. They tend to be more for the benefit of the agencies than the regulated industry. The interests of the regulators and protecting turf are paramount.

    Regulatory fragmentation was a contributing factor to the two most fatal US OCS incidents in the past 35 years, the 2010 Macondo blowout and the South Pass 60 “B” fire and explosion in 1989.

    Solutions:

    • Where legislation is not required (e.g. BOEM and BSEE), use executive orders to combine and streamline the regulatory functions.
    • Where agencies have separate legislative authority, establish a lead regulator by executive order pending corrective legislation. Under the EO, the agencies would function as a joint authority under the direction of the lead regulator.
    • A combined BOEM/BSEE would be the logical choice for leading the joint authority given that OCS energy is their sole focus and they are accountable for the success of OCS programs.
    • Use a management system regulatory approach that holistically considers all of the legislatively enacted regulatory objectives.
    • Increase the attention given to regulator and operator performance in terms of both outcomes and efficiency.
    • Reduce and simplify permitting requirements for operating companies that have demonstrated outstanding safety and environmental performance over a sustained period.
    • See the findings and recommendations from the 2010 Vancouver IRF Conference.

     

     

    Read Full Post »

    David Scarborough, Island Operating Co., was one of the 4 workers who died in the 2022 crash at a West Delta 106 platform.

    Read Full Post »

    A close-up of the damaged GE Haliade-X turbine blade at the Vineyard Wind farm in late July. Photo by Burton Balkind

    From the Nantucket Current:

    Additionally, ultimate authority over the wind farm remained unclear, with various federal agencies claiming responsibility over different portions of the permitting, licensing, review, and operation of the wind farm.

    “Sometimes I have a hard time figuring out, who do we talk to? Who is going to keep us safe? Who is the responsible boss here? Who is going to make the hard decision?” Select Board member Matt Fee asked.

    As previously discussed, regulatory fragmentation is a safety and environmental risk factor.

    Causes of regulatory fragmentation:

    • Separate legislation granting redundant or overlapping authority to different departments or agencies.
    • Legislation that is non-specific, assigning broad authority to the President or cabinet level level officials, leaving it up to the bureaus to resolve.
    • Bi- and multi-lateral agreements like MOA’s and MOU’s, which are intended to “coordinate the redundancy,” often cause more confusion than they prevent, creating gaps in the process.
    • “Fixing” problems by adding redundancy.

    The Dept. of the Interior’s division of responsibilities for offshore wind, which was finalized in January 2023, inexplicably assigns review and approval of Construction and Operations Plans to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (i.e. the land manager, lessor, and wind energy promoter) rather than the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (i.e. the principal regulator of the activities described in those plans).

    More significantly, the offshore wind responsibilities of the 2 bureaus are so intertwined (as is also the case for offshore oil and gas), that attempts to separate the functions have, at a minimum, created inefficiencies and increased regulatory and operational costs.

    FTR, the idea that having the BOEM and BSEE functions combined in a single bureau, as was the case with the predecessor bureau (MMS), had anything to do with the Macondo blowout is a complete fallacy. Regarding the accusations that were made toward MMS, the Chief Counsel for the national commission that investigated the tragic incident found no evidence that ethical lapses on the part of MMS employees played any role in causing the blowout. 

    There were important regulatory changes made after the Macondo blowout. These included capping stack requirements, mandatory safety management systems, and updated rules and standards for cementing/zonal isolation and blowout preventer systems. None of these improvements were precipitated by or dependent on the division of MMS into two bureaus.

    Read Full Post »

    Older Posts »