Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE)

While the previously discussed planning, cementing, and well suspension issues allowed the well to flow, there were many other equipment, operational, and management deficiencies that elevated the incident to a disaster. Below are those that bother me the most:

• Blowout Preventers
  • The Deepwater Horizon BOP stack had a single blind shear ram. Regardless of what the regulations allowed, you don’t drill a complex well like this without redundant shearing capability (and at the time of the blowout most deepwater drillers were using rigs with dual shear rams). All well control emergencies requiring the emergency disconnect sequence, deadman, and autoshear functions are dependent on effective shearing capability. You can have redundancy in every other BOP element, but without dual shear rams, you don’t have a redundant BOP system. Further, for full redundancy both shear rams should be capable of sealing the well bore after shearing. In that regard, the present regulations and the applicable standard (API S 53) require only one shear ram capable of sealing. They are thus deficient and should be updated.
  • The DWH BOP system did not have full bore shearing capability (available at the time) which may have sheared the deflected drill pipe.
  • The DWH BOP system was not properly maintained and recertified as required by regulation.
  • Transocean’s “condition based maintenance” was a euphenism for “fix it when it fails.” Perhaps worse, BP authorized the continuation of operations knowing that an annular preventer was leaking.
• The initial flow from the well was directed to the mud-gas separator instead of being routed overboard via the diverter. Routing the flow to the diverter would have provided additional time for the crew to safely evacuate.
• Gas detectors
  • Not all gas detectors were fully operational. As justification, Transocean’s report expressed concerns about alarm fatigue, a weak excuse. Alarm issues can be effectively managed without disabling the devices.
  • The gas detectors did not automatically shutdown the generators, the source of the initial explosion. This is somewhat understandable on a dynamically positioned rig that is dependent on power to maintain position. However, someone should have shut down the generators as soon as gas was detected.
• Engine overspeed devices didn’t work, and apparently weren’t tested regularly. Had they worked, the engine room explosion may have been prevented.
• The crew had time to activate the Emergency Disconnect Sequence, but did not.
  • Deficient training
  • Uncertain chain of command
  • Fear of repercussions?