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Archive for the ‘Gulf of Mexico’ Category

Honored to be named Inspector of the Year. I’m sincerely thankful to my supervisor and the management involved for recognizing my commitment to this mission, and I’m proud to work alongside the Well Operations Inspection team, whose support and professionalism elevate all of us. This award reflects our shared dedication to safety and the environment.”

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If Beacon and HEQ are willing sellers of their majority share in the impressive Shenandoah field, as appears to be the case (per Reuters), the big dogs are interested in buying. And why wouldn’t they be? Production began last July and the targeted rate of 100,000 bopd has already been achieved from just four phase-one wells.

Reuters reports that Total, Shell, BP, Repsol, and Chevron are interested in Beacon and HEQ’s 51% stake. More about Shenandoah:

  • located in Walker Ridge blocks 51, 52, and 53
  • ~150 miles off the coast of Louisiana
  • floating production unit (FPU) in 5800′ of water in WR block 52
  • true vertical reservoir depths ~30,000′
  • high pressure ~20,000 psi
  • Paleogene, Inboard Wilcox trend
  • FPU can host production from nearby subsea systems
  • capacity is being expanded to 140,000 bopd
  • estimated 600 million BOE recoverable including nearby tiebacks
  • other owner: Navitas Petroleum (49% share)

Investment companies like Beacon (owned by Blackstone) are positive, and increasingly necessary, contributors to the offshore program. These companies bring capital and new exploration strategies that increase development and production. They must, of course, be committed to safety excellence, which seems to be the case for Beacon.

It’s noteworthy that Anadarko and Conoco Phillips, Shenandoah’s major original partners holding 33% and 30% interest respectively, withdrew from the project in 2018 citing unsatisfactory appraisal results and weak commodity prices. Evaluation mistakes like this are common, which is why broad and diverse industry participation is needed. With mergers reducing the number of US majors (remember Amoco, Arco, Sun, Texaco, Getty, Mobil, Phillips, Marathon, Unocal, Superior, Hess, etc.), investment companies play an increasingly important role in OCS development.

Shenandoah, WR 51, 52, 53 (center blocks); green=active leases prior to Sale 261; blue=leased issued after Sale 261

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The EIA has revised Gulf of America oil production slightly downward for Nov. and Dec. such that we now have an absolute dead heat between 2025 and 2019. Production for both years averaged exactly 1.898 million bbls/day.

Because of the ~6 month lag in obtaining verified OCS production data from the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR), the monthly EIA reports are based on ONRR’s more timely sales of production data. The final sales and production numbers are typically very close. For the 2019 record OCS production year, both the EIA and ONRR report identical Gulf production of 1.898 million bopd.

Meanwhile, 2026 Gulf production (chart below) is off to a strong start – 2.019 million bopd in January. This is the third highest monthly oil production in the history of Gulf operations.

Finally, California OCS oil production, which has been hobbling along at ~10,000 bopd (2nd chart) will see a massive increase of up to 500% should Santa Ynez Unit production continue.

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Companies seeking to acquire OCS leases are not only competing with each other, they are also competing with BOEM’s tract evaluations. In that regard, the bidders fared well at Sale BBG1. Only 3 of the 181 high bids were rejected by BOEM. and those rejections appear to be warranted.

The rejected bids were significantly below both BOEM’s Mean of the Range-of-Value and Lower Bound Confidence Interval for these single bid tracts (table below).

Block No.Companyno. of bidsbidMROVLBCI
EW 921LLOG1$505,777$2,900,000$2,200,000
MC 587KUSA1$700,000 $3,300,000$2,200,000
MC 588LLOG1$613,008$6,100,000$4,600,000
MROV=Mean of the Range-of-Value; LBCI=Lower Bound Confidence Interval; KUSA=Karoon (Australia) Energy USA; EW=Ewing Bank; MC=Mississippi Canyon

LLOG submitted 9 other high bids (alone or with partners) that were accepted. KUSA did not submit any other bids. We’ll see if the rejected bids for these blocks are exceeded in future sales.

Nine other high bids (table below) were less than the MROV, but all were greater than the LBCI. Those bidders “beat the house,” acquiring leases for <MROV. In that regard, Equinor led the pack with no rejections even though 3 of their 7 bids were below MROV. Similarly, 2 of Beacon’s 4 bids were <MROV, with no rejections.

Block No.Companyno. of bidsbidMROVLBCI
GC 345Beacon1$5,302,358$5,400,000$4,200,000
GC 346Beacon1$1,102,358$1,500,000$900,000
GC 547Equinor1$3,200,067$4,500,000$2,600,000
GC 549Equinor1$899,967$1,500,000$576,000
AT 64LLOG1$7,997,018$8,300,000$6,700.000
KC 386Oxy2$3,000,505$3,500,000$2,800,000
KC 429Oxy1$600,505$910,000$470,000
KC 431Woodside1$904,547$1,200,000$840,000
WR 56Equinor1$904,547$1,200,000$576,000
MROV=Mean of the Range-of-Value; LBCI=Lower Bound Confidence Interval; AT=Atwater Valley, GC=Green Canyon, KC=Keathley Canyon, WR=Walker Ridge

Perhaps most interesting were the blocks that were highly valued by industry, but not by BOEM. Each of these blocks (table below) received multiple bids and high bids >$10 million. Conversely, BOEM valued the blocks at only $576,000, which (per the terms of the sale) equates to the minimum acceptable bid of $100/acre.

Block No.high bidderhigh bidother bidsMROV
GC 845Beacon$11,802,358LLOG: $613,008$576,000
KC 25Chevron$18,592,086BP: $11,507,770
Shell: $753,029
$576,000
WR 443Woodside$15,204,547Chevron $1,596,189$576,000
WR444Woodside$12,204,547BP: $4,593,770
Chevron $1,482,378
$576,000
MROV=Mean of the Range-of-Value; LBCI=Lower Bound Confidence Interval; GC=Green Canyon, KC=Keathley Canyon, WR=Walker Ridge


All of this demonstrates yet again that:

  • the govt is leasing exploration and development opportunities, not confirmed resources,
  • commercial discoveries are far from certain,
  • informed assessments differ (I.e. great minds, and their computers, don’t always think alike 😀),
  • corporate priorities differ, and
  • exploration strategies evolve.

Superstition, tactic, AI, coded or subliminal message? 😉

  • All 58 BP bids end with 770. Examples: $1,707,770 and $807,770. (At Sale BBG2, all 5 BP bids ended with 990.)
  • All 18 Shell bids ended with 029. (At Sale BBG2, all 6 Shell bids ended with 240.)
  • 13 of 15 Anadarko bids ended with 505, the other 2 ended with 101.
  • All 9 Woodside bids ended with 547.
  • All 3 Eni bids ended with 001.
  • All 4 Arena bids ended with 912.
  • All 12 Talos bids ended with 986.
  • All 3 Beacon bids ended with 358.

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The ESA, which was enacted with good intentions, has perhaps been most effective in blocking, delaying, or complicating energy development. In the Gulf of America, the primary species in recent ESA battles has been the Rice’s whale.

While this blog was focused on the Santa Ynez Unit drama, a major ESA policy maneuver for the Gulf of America was in the works.

A provision of the ESA authorizes an Endangered Species Committee, known to critics as the “God Squad,” to grant exemptions to ESA requirements. The Committee is comprised of the Secretary of the Interior (chair), the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Yesterday, the Committee met (notice attached) and agreed to exempt Gulf oil and gas operations from the Endangered Species Act.

Knowing the swings in the political pendulum, provisions for reversing this decision warrant attention. The applicable language from the statute is pasted below:

16 U.S. Code § 1536 (h)(2)

(B) An exemption shall be permanent under subparagraph (A) unless

(i) the Secretary finds, based on the best scientific and commercial data available, that such exemption would result in the extinction of a species that was not the subject of consultation under subsection (a)(2) or was not identified in any biological assessment conducted under subsection (c), and

(ii) the Committee determines within 60 days after the date of the Secretary’s finding that the exemption should not be permanent.

So, barring legislation, the exemption would seem to be difficult to overturn.

Earthjustice is vowing to “go to court to stop this illegal order.”

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Rules of thumb for offshore spills:

  • The initial spill estimates are low; often by a lot
  • The estimates of oil recovered are high and unverified

Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) spill:

  • product spilled: Venezuelan crude
  • first observed:  2/26 at approximately 0400
  • initial spill volume estimate: <100 barrels (bbls)
  • 3/3: spill volume update: 300 bbls
  • 3/5: final spill volume update: 750 bbls; volume reaffirmed on 3/17 and 2/26
  • reported cause: material failure in a section of the cargo transfer hose during a crude oil transfer between the offshore facility tanker
  • estimate of oil recovered: 655–664 bbls (>87%!)

Comments:

  • According to a Unified Command interview, the spill volume estimate was based on visual observations and estimates of the volume of oil recovered. Neither are reliable indicators of the volume actually spilled.
  • Was the volume transferred being metered at the vessel and LOOP, such that meter differentials could indicate the actual spill volume?
  • The spill was first observed at night. What procedures were in place for monitoring the transfer operation for potential leaks?
  • LOOP first reported a spill estimate of <100 bbls, subsequently increased to 300 bbls, and then 750 bbls.
  • The oil recovery estimate of 655-664 bbls is highly suspect unless the spill was much larger than reported. Recoveries >50% are unlikely for open water spills. (Typically <20% is recovered.)
  • How were the oil recovery estimates determined? Is data available on the total fluid recovered and water content?
  • NOAA reports that the spill response and repair were postponed due to hazardous offshore conditions. This makes the spill and recovery numbers even more suspect.
  • Ed Tennyson, a leading authority on oil spill response capabilities and a former colleague, was skeptical of oil recovery claims. When on-scene, he would ask to see the recovered oil and data on how the volumes were determined.
  • Hopefully, the investigation report will be timely and comprehensive.

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Tyler Priest, the leading historian on US offshore oil and gas operations, has informed me that his much anticipated book, “Offshore Oildom,”is now available for order from LSU Press. Tyler’s book is a fascinating account of the history of the technologically innovative and economically important, yet controversial, OCS Oil and Gas program. See the attached flyer.

Consider this recommendation by Daniel Yergin:

“Tyler Priest, a preeminent historian of energy and the environment, explores how a single well drilled off a pier near Santa Barbara in 1898 gave rise to a major American industry—offshore oil and gas. In spirited prose, Priest demonstrates how this U.S. industry was created not only by innovation, creative engineering, and complex execution; it was also the result of fierce political battles.” ~Daniel Yergin, Pulitzer Prize–winning author of The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power and The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations.

You can order the book from LSU Press.

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Robert August Nelson 47921313

Robert “Bobby” Nelson, a beloved father and husband, and a highly respected engineer, died suddenly last Saturday.

Jason Mathews, a Supervisory Petroleum Engineer with the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, had this to say about his admired colleague:

A legacy is not just what you leave for others; it’s the impact of your presence, the influence of your actions, and the memories you create.

Bobby was an exceptional engineer, father, husband and friend who had a lasting impact on many of us. In fact, I would argue Bobby was one of the most impactful engineers in my tenure on developing and transforming younger engineers on how to think critically on complex offshore systems and processes.

Bobby’s legacy in my industry will push on for many years, and we are forever grateful for the time we had with him.”

More from his colleagues:

Bobby dedicated much of his professional life to BSEE, where he served as a Technical Advisor since January 2020, and for the previous seven years as Well Operations Section Chief and Drilling Engineer in the Houma District.

His expertise in well control, drilling engineering, and offshore regulatory compliance was invaluable. He contributed significantly as a subject matter expert and assistant content writer for the BSEE Well Control Rule Revision Team, helping shape post-Deepwater Horizon reforms, and provided technical insights on critical projects ranging from tropical cyclone risk assessments for floating rigs to hydrate pressure coring expeditions and incident investigations.  

Bobby’s commitment to safety and environmental stewardship on the Gulf of America’s Outer Continental Shelf left a lasting impact on his colleagues and the industry.

He is survived by his loving wife, Amber, whom he met at BSEE, and their young daughter. In this time of grief, please keep Bobby’s family in your thoughts and prayers.

Obituary

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For 40 years, challenges associated with bankruptcies (or the threat thereof), a divided offshore industry, political pressure, hurricane damage, and unresolved legal issues have hindered initiatives to better protect the public from decommissioning liabilities. Nonetheless, regulators and industry were able to prevent taxpayers from incurring any decommissioning costs. Unfortunately that is no longer the case.

For the first time in history, the govt has funded decommissioning on the OCS (and bragged about it – photo below).

Federally funded decommissioning operation in the Matagorda Area of the Gulf.

BOEM’s proposed revisions to the decommissioning regulations (attached) would facilitate the transfer of aging structures to companies with limited assets, and in some cases, poor or undemonstrated safety records.

The proposal would reduce or eliminate the supplemental financial assurance requirement if a predecessor lessee has a strong credit rating. For that strategy to work, related decommissioning issues must be addressed. and clarifications and boundaries provided to ensure taxpayers are protected from decommissioning liabilities.

Predecessor liability, which is important because it helps prevent companies from assigning leases for the purpose of avoiding decommissioning obligations, was not established in the regulations until much of the OCS infrastructure was already installed. In a final rule that was effective on 8/20/1997, my office (thanks to the perseverance of Gerry Rhodes, John Mirabella, and Dennis Daugherty) codified the joint and several liability principle in 30 CFR 250.110 as follows:

(b) Lessees must plug and abandon all well bores, remove all platforms or other facilities, and clear the ocean of all obstructions to other users. This obligation:
(1) Accrues to the lessee when the well is drilled, the platform or other facility is installed, or the obstruction is created; and
(2) Is the joint and several responsibility of all lessees and owners of operating rights under the lease at the time the obligation accrues, and of each future lessee or owner of operating rights, until
the obligation is satisfied under the requirements of this part.

Prior to the that rule, the official policy of the Dept. of the Interior, as expressed in a 1988 letter from the Director of the Minerals Management Service (see excerpt pasted below), was that lease assignors would NOT be held accountable should their successors fail to fulfill their decommissioning responsibilities.

A major unanswered question regarding decommissioning obligations is thus the extent to which predecessor liability applies to leases assigned prior to the 1997 regulation. According to BOEM data, 771 remaining platforms were installed at least 10 years before the rule change, and 504 were installed at least 20 years prior. For assets transferred prior to the rule change, do the predecessors retain liability? BOEM should explain its position on this issue.

Other predecessor liability questions that need to be answered:

  • Now that the reverse chronological guidance has been scrapped, what will be the process for determining which predecessors will be held responsible?
  • If the govt doesn’t ensure that the new lessees fulfill their performance obligations (e.g. funding escrow accounts, well plugging, insurance, etc.), are predecessors still liable?
  • What if the structures were poorly maintained by the new lessees, complicating decommissioning and increasing the costs
  • Should a predecessor several transfers removed from operating the facilities still be held responsible?

Two examples of what can happen (and has happened):

Example 1: Big AAA Oil assigns a lease to Proud Production, a reputable independent. After years of operations, Proud can no longer profitably produce from the lease. Proud assigns the lease to CCC Oil & Gas, a small and highly efficient operator. After the lease is no longer profitable, even for a company with a low cost structure, CCC assigns the lease to Elmer’s E&P, a sketchy, barely solvent operating company with a poor compliance record. Elmer rather predictably neglects maintenance and declares bankruptcy after a decline in oil prices. Should Big AAA Oil, which had no say in the last 2 transfers in the assignment chain, be financially responsible for decommissioning the facilities?

Example 2: Big AAA Oil assigns a lease to DDD Development Company. Per the terms of the assignment, DDD establishes an Abandonment Escrow Account, as provided for in 30 CFR 556.904. BOEM allows DDD to withdraw funds from the account for purposes not authorized in the regulations. Should Big AAA Oil be liable for decommissioning costs after DDD is no longer solvent? (See “The troubling case of Platforms Hogan and Houchin.”)

For predecessor liability to be fairly and effectively implemented, and survive legal challenges, BOEM should:

  • Before approving lease assignments, verify that the assignors and assignees have contractually specified, to BOEM’s satisfaction, how the decommissioning of assigned assets will be funded.
  • Not approve subsequent lease assignments until the predecessor that is being held financially responsible has approved a funding agreement with the new lessees.

Another important concern is that BOEM’s proposal does not correct two prior changes that further expose the public to decommissioning liabilities:

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Per EIA data, the Appalachia, Permian, and Haynesville regions accounted for 67% of the total marketed gas production in the US in 2025 and 81% of the growth last year.

In 2025, more natural gas was produced in the Appalachia region of the Northeast than in any other US region, accounting for 31% of marketed natural gas production. (See the chart below.) Were it not for pipeline capacity limitations, recent growth in Appalachia production would have been greater.

Appalachia production is primarily from the Marcellus and Utica shales in PA, WV, and Ohio.

OCS gas production, 80% of which is now associated gas from deepwater oil wells, continues to lag the shale basins. This is a big change from 25 years ago when the OCS produced more gas than any state but Texas. (See the chart below.) Interest in ultradeep (subsurface) OCS shelf gas prospects remains scant despite favorable demand forecasts and technological advances.

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Meanwhile, New York continues to block development of the State’s ample shale gas resources. foregoing the economic and environmental benefits.

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