Posted in energy policy, Offshore Energy - General, Uncategorized, tagged BOE, energy policy, environmental protection, offshore safety, Regulation on December 31, 2022| Leave a Comment »
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Posted in energy policy, pipelines, Regulation, tagged IMP, PHMSA, pipelines, Regulation on December 21, 2021| Leave a Comment »
At the behest of Congress, coastal areas and beaches are now designated as Unusually Sensitive Areas (USAs). Given that any offshore liquids pipeline has the potential to affect coastal waters or beaches, the rule would seem to require that all such pipelines be included in Integrity Management Programs, which are mandatory for pipelines that could affect USAs. (The IMP requirements would almost certainly apply to all DOT regulated offshore pipelines. Their applicability to DOI/producer pipelines is less certain. Of course, very little is clear and consistent in US offshore pipeline regulation.)
As one would expect, the recent Huntington Beach pipeline spill is among the incidents cited in the justification for this regulation. More surprisingly, the Santa Barbara well blowout was also cited. This incident occurred 53 years ago, was the result of a reckless drilling program, and had nothing to do with production operations or pipelines.
As noted in a recent BOE post, the regulatory regime for offshore pipelines is badly in need of overhaul. DOT and DOI, with inconsistent jurisdictional boundaries, regulations, and approaches, have primary responsibility and multiple regulatory entities have roles.
Lastly, PHMSA seems to have inadvertently posted a highlighted copy of the new regulation. Nothing at all scandalous (looks like someone was highlighting potential talking points), but possibly amusing to other regulation nerds. đ
Posted in hurricanes, Regulation, tagged OSHA, Regulation, vaccine mandate on November 7, 2021| Leave a Comment »
The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals granted an emergency stay of the requirement by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration that those workers be vaccinated by Jan. 4 or face mask requirements and weekly tests.
NPR
This court action was completely predictable from the outset. OSHA no doubt knew this but had no option but to dedicate substantial resources to the task. In all likelihood, the ETS/regulation will never be finalized.
Many (probably most) proposed regulations are never completed. Others never get beyond the concept stage. Establishing an OSHA rule takes an average of 7 years. That is not at all atypical for Federal regulators. There are much better ways to accomplish the regulatory objectives as was demonstrated after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. Unfortunately our political system frowns on collaborative approaches so we do things the hard way – accomplishing much less in much more time and at a far greater cost.
Posted in decommissioning, energy policy, Offshore Energy - General, pipelines, Regulation, tagged decommissioning, pipelines, Regulation, Scandpower on October 19, 2021| Leave a Comment »
Scandpower study (2004) for MMS:
Overall Conclusion
Currently, there are no regulations that require removal of subsea pipelines if they are not an obstruction to navigation. Based on the high costs for removing the pipelines, the personnel risk involved in the removal operations, the negative effect on overall emissions to air and the very limited reduction in discharges to sea, the overall conclusion is that it is better to leave the pipelines in place. If possible, re-use of the pipelines is the optimal solution.
Environmental Impacts
The impacts on the environment and the marine environment from pipelines and cables left in place were found to be very minor. Conversely recovery operations will have a negative impact on the environment. The number of vessels required for removal operations and long operating hours will result in considerably more releases and emissions than leaving the pipelines in place. In addition the energy savings benefit from recycling the pipeline materials will be exceeded by the energy required to remove the pipelines and separate the materials.
Pipeline Decommissioning: Environmental Impact Metric (per Scandpower)
| Remove/ recycle | Remove/ landfill | Reuse or preserve | Bury | Abandon in place | |
| Energy | High | High | Low | Moderate | None |
| Emissions | High | High | Low | Low | Low |
| Discharges | Low | Low | Moderate | Low | Low |
| Habitat | Low | Low | Moderate | Low | Low |
| Aesthetics | Low | Moderate | None | None | None |
| Resource Utilization | High | None | High | None | None |
| Littering | Low | Low | Low | Low | Moderate |
The “Habitat” impacts row seems questionable. Pipeline removal certainly has a greater impact on habitat than abandonment in place, particularly for buried pipelines.
Posted in Gulf of Mexico, hurricanes, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, tagged collaboration, DOI, Gale Norton, Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita, OSHA, Regulation on October 13, 2021| Leave a Comment »
Establishing an OSHA rule takes an average of 7 years, and the process has ranged from 15 months to 19 years between 1981 and 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported to Congress in 2012
EHS Daily Advisor
OSHA’s long rule promulgation timeframes are actually quite typical for US regulatory agencies. In some cases, employees work on a single rule for most of their careers! On the plus side, the rigorous internal and public review processes help prevent arbitrary and capricious actions by regulators. However, the long promulgation process often results in regulations that are outdated before they are published. As a result, the entire process repeats and you have a regulatory “do loop.”
To avoid the daunting rulemaking process, regulators often resort to issuing notices, letters, or conditions of approval that accomplish some of their objectives. However, these actions are not always consistent with the rule promulgation requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act and other directives, and are less likely to survive legal challenges.
The optimal approach is for the regulator to establish clear objectives for the operating companies and a schedule for achieving those objectives. This approach was demonstrated following the 2005 hurricane season (Katrina and Rita) when numerous mooring system and other stationkeeping issues were identified. In a face-to-face meeting, Department of the Interior Secretary Gale Norton outlined her concerns and informed offshore operators that there would be no drilling from moored MODUs or jackups during hurricane season until the issues identified during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were addressed.
The collaborative effort that followed was a resounding success. In addition to addressing station keeping concerns, a comprehensive list of hurricane issues was developed. Industry and government then worked together to assess mitigations and develop new standards and procedures. The essential MODU standards were completed before the 2006 hurricane season, and all of the related concerns were effectively addressed prior to the 2009 hurricane season. Had the government elected to promulgate regulations to address all of these issues, much of this work would have never been completed.
Posted in accidents, Regulation, tagged bp, Deepwater, drilling, Regulation, standards on July 15, 2011| 2 Comments »
Posted in accidents, tagged accidents, API, blowouts, Center for Offshore Safety, macondo, Montara, personal safety, process safety, Regulation, risk management, safety, well control on June 27, 2011| 1 Comment »
I don’t buy the argument that industry and regulators have paid too much attention to personal safety at the expense of process safety. Casualties from falls, falling objects, helicopter crashes, and other workplace activities have been persistent, and safety management programs must emphasize practices and procedures that will reduce occurrence rates.
Also, process safety has hardly been ignored. API RP 14 C has proven to be an effective safety analysis procedure for addressing undesirable events associated with each process component of a production facility. For more complex facilities, Deepwater Operating Plans and API RP 14J, “Recommended Practice for Design and Hazard Analysis for Offshore Production Facilities, ” are good risk management supplements to RP 14C.
That said, we need better programs for sustaining the focus needed to further reduce the probability of low frequency, high consequence events. When memories about the most recent disaster start to fade, what do we do to keep workers on edge and prevent complacency? What more can be done to prevent events with enormous consequence potential? Some thoughts:
Posted in Regulation, tagged Coast Guard, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, macondo, Regulation, safety, standards, transocean on June 15, 2011| 2 Comments »
In their comments on the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team Report, Transocean made these statements about BOP maintenance standards incorporated in MMS drilling regulations:
By glossing over the contours of the regulatory language, the Draft Report unilaterally converts API Recommended Practice 53 from an advisory guideline into a mandatory requirement. Notwithstanding the Draft Reportâs insistence otherwise, the APIâs recommendation that the BOP âshouldâ be disassembled and inspected according to the manufacturerâs guidelines is not mandatory. The API clarifies that the word âshouldâ indicates a recommended practice for which a comparably safe alternative is available or which may be impractical or unnecessary in some conditions. In contrast, to denote a recommended practice that is âadvisable in all circumstances,â the API uses the word âshall.â The API also emphasizes that âthe formulation and publication of API standards is not intended in any way to inhibit anyone from using any other practices.â Though it recommends specific practices, API acknowledges that âequivalent alternative installations and practices may be utilized to accomplish the same objectives.â On its face, the language of API RP 53 makes clear that the recommendation that the BOP âshouldâ be disassembled and inspected in accordance with the manufacturerâs guidelines is a recommendation, and nothing more.
Although the MMS regulations governing BOP maintenance incorporate API RP 53 sections 17.10 and 18.10 by reference, this does not convert the APIâs recommendations into a mandatory requirement. As the MMS has clarified, â[t]he legal effect of incorporation by referenceâ is merely that âthe material is treated as if it were published in the Federal Register.â
Treating API RP 53 as if it had been published in the Federal Register does not imbue its language with more regulatory significance than it had before. The APIâs recommendations regarding BOP maintenanceâas well as the APIâs acknowledgement that alternative practices âmay be utilized to accomplish the same objectivesââremain recommendations, not requirements. Â Transocean’s complete comments are posted on their website.
I’ll withhold my comments on the above statements, except to say that my opinion differs substantially from Transocean’s.
More significantly, these and other recent industry and government comments demonstrate the complexity of standards policy issues. How are standards most effectively applied by operators in formulating safety management programs, operating plans, and safety cases? Contractors? How should deviations from standards be assessed and documented? How should regulators use standards? To what extent should standards be incorporated into regulations? What is the appropriate role for regulators in standards development? These issues may prove to be more challenging than updating technical requirements. Stay tuned!
Posted in Regulation, tagged engineering, Regulation, risk management on June 14, 2011| Leave a Comment »
This excerpt from a University of Michigan article describes the engineer’s paradox:
For engineers, failure and risk have a special relationship. If they donât take risks they never do anything new. But if they do take risks, their probability of failing increases. So engineers must welcome risk and the opportunity to learn from failure, but they must make every effort to succeed. This leaves engineers in the odd predicament of becoming less informed as they become more successful. In that light, bad judgment could be an invaluable but potentially lethal experience. Conversely, evidence shows that experience fosters good judgment â the longer people do something, the more likely they are to make decisions, and in making them theyâll acquire not just an appreciation for the difficulty of rendering good judgments but the skill to do it well.
Comments:
Posted in accidents, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, tagged accidents, Coast Guard, Deepwater Horizon, IADC, macondo, Montara, Norway, offshore drilling, Regulation, safety on June 2, 2011| 2 Comments »
Like the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, the Montara Commission of Inquiry, the Norwegian government, and leading safety and regulatory authorities around the world, the IADC recognizes the risks associated with complex, multi-agency regulatory regimes. A single authority should be responsible and accountable for safety and pollution prevention at offshore facilities, and should draw on the expertise of other agencies and organizations as necessary to achieve performance objectives.Â
The safety and environmental  risks associated with fragmented or compartmentalized regulation include gaps, overlap, confusion, inconsistencies, and conflicting standards. Industry and governmental personnel spend too much time coordinating with multiple parties and not enough time managing safety and environmental risks.
Link to IADC comments. Key quotes:
IADC continues to be concerned by seemingly duplicative regulatory requirements imposed by the Coast Guard and BOEMRE, particularly where the agencies appear to have divergent views regarding the placement of regulatory responsibility.
One cannot holistically address safety when faced with the unyielding and overlapping demands of multiple narrowly-focused regulatory agencies.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 