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Archive for February, 2024

The Sikorsky S-92 helicopter is the most advanced aircraft in Sikorsky’s civil product line, certified to the most stringent safety requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).” 

One person has died following the helicopter crash outside Bergen in Norway on the night of Wednesday 28th February. The helicopter was on a training assignment for Equinor ’s SAR service for the Oseberg area in the North Sea.

Equinor

Search and rescue service is critical to offshore safety, and North Sea operators have excellent SAR capabilities. Sadly, one person died and five were injured (two seriously) when a Sikorsky S-92 helicopter, owned by Bristow and under contract to Equinor, crashed offshore Bergen last night. The crew was training to serve offshore workers in need.

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Note that the Stabroek block is equivalent in size to 1,150 Gulf of Mexico lease blocks and contains multiple outstanding prospects.

Are Exxon and Chinese partner (CNOOC) attempting to use Chevron’s acquisition of Hess to improve their already lucrative position in Guyana’s prolific Stabroek block?

From OilNow Guyana:

  • The Stabroek operating agreement outlines terms for Hess, Exxon, and CNOOC to explore and develop the block.
  • This Stabroek agreement includes a right of first refusal (ROFR) provision which allows the parties to buy out the stake of one of them in the event of a ‘change of control’ transaction.
  • Chevron and Hess argue that the merger’s structure does not trigger the ROFR clause.
  • Exxon and CNOOC argue that the clause applies. This could force Hess to offer its stake in the Stabroek block to its partners first. 

The Exxon/CNOOC position seems to be a stretch. Chevron did not buy the Stabroek share; they bought the company that holds that share. Hess is to be part of Chevron and there would be no change of control from the standpoint of the partnership.

As an offshore operator, Exxon has been highly responsible from a safety standpoint. However, the company has a shown tendency to stretch the envelope when it comes to contract rights. The most recent example was their acquisition of 163 GoM oil and gas leases for carbon disposal purposes, contrary to the terms of the sale notice and lease contracts.

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John Smith, a decommissioning specialist who retired from BOEM, has published numerous professional papers on the topic. He has kindly shared his comments (below) on the new GAO report.

The Appeal Process is Broken – The GAO should have emphasized this point.  Companies routinely appeal orders to decommission platforms to forestall having to spend money on plugging wells and removing platforms, pipelines and other facilities. The appeal process commonly takes 5 or more years to reolove (e.g., DCOR appeal of BSEE order to decommission Platform Habitat).

Well P&A – BSEE has been negligent in requiring operators to plug and abandon wells no longer useful for operations. I’m shocked BSEE has curtailed or stopped issuing Inc’s for the failure of operators to P&A wells.  That’s a major failure on the part of BSEE management. That may explain why operator performance criteria was proposed to be eliminated for financial assurance.

Failure to Issue Civil Penalties for Well P&A – From GAO Report “BSEE officials explained that their reluctance to pursue civil penalties stems in part from concerns about whether inducing financial harm against an operator is an effective approach to compel decommissioning. They expressed reservations about taking actions—such as issuing civil penalties—that might strain the financial resources of operators to the point of pushing them into bankruptcy.”   This attitude underscores a real problem – an abrogation of regulatory and enforcement responsibility by BSEE. 

POCS Well P&A –  More than 700 wells have been drilled from the 23 California OCS platforms. The GAO report notes that approximately 200 are in the process of being plugged and abandoned – about 50% of those are probably associated with Gail, Grace, Harvest, Hermosa, Hidalgo, where P&A work has largely been completed by Chevron and Freeport McMoRan.  The vast majority of the remaining 500 wells are no longer useful for operations and have been idle for several decades.  Note POCS was never part of the Idle Well and Idle Iron Program, which was exclusive to the GOM. GAO gave POCS BSEE a pass by not highlighting that problem in POCS. It would have been interesting to know how many of the remaining 500 POCS wells are considered no longer useful for operations, and how many of those have been temporarily plugged and abandoned pursuant to regulations.  The GAO report broke that down for the GOM.

Footnote 46 of GAO Report – “Two of the eight platforms due for decommissioning in the Pacific—platforms Hogan and Houchin—have posed serious safety, environmental, and financial risks, including poor safety compliance records, severe corrosion, and ongoing disputes about who will assume decommissioning liabilities for the platforms and their associated wells, according to BSEE officials and documentation. According to BSEE, these platforms are currently being attended, monitored, and maintained as part of an agreement between BSEE, BOEM, Interior’s Office of the Solicitor, and the three predecessor operators pending a decision from the Interior Board of Land Appeals on the predecessors’ appeal. BSEE estimates that approximately $5 million of the estimated costs to decommission 21 orphaned sidetrack wells associated with these platforms are uncovered by financial assurances.”    $5 million divide 21 = $238,000 per well  – extremely conservative cost estimate given age of wells, likely collapsed casing, and downwhole equipment that needs to be removed.  The cost could easily be 3-4 times higher and there is no bonding so the federal government and taxpayers are on the hook for those costs.

Platform Hogan and Houchin Wells – approximately 75 wells were drilled from the platforms.  It would be interesting to know the status of those wells.  How many have been properly temporarily plugged and abandoned with long-term barriers installed to prevent leaks before decommissioning pursuant to OCS regulations?  Are the 21 orphaned wells mentioned above the Signal wells?  What about the other 54 wells?  Have the predecessor lessees agreed they are responsible for plugging and abandoning those wells?  

Platform Habitat – GAO could have noted this is another example of the broken appeal process. It would be interesting to know whether the 21 wells (primarily if not all gas wells) on Habitat have been temporarily abandoned. There are likely to be significant fugitive emission levels at the platform.  Hopefully the APCD is on top of that.  Note – the platform is unmanned and as I previously mentioned a potential catastrophe was avoided several years ago when a fire broke out on the platform.

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Offshore facility decommissioning is a frequent target of Federal auditors given the complex financial and regulatory challenges. Unfortunately, the reviews have done little to better protect the public interest. As have previous inquiries, the new GAO report (attached for your convenience) calls for improved regulations and enforcement practices. That, of course, has been the objective for decades, but the problems have only worsened.

While the GAO recommendations are unsurprising, the body of the report is informative. Most notably, GAO (p. 29) raises a significant inconsistency on a key provision in the proposed decommissioning financial assurance regulations published last year:

One of the five criteria BOEM would no longer use under the proposed rule is demonstrated reliability, as shown by record of compliance with laws, regulations, and lease terms, among other factors. BOEM’s June 2023 regulatory analysis concluded this criterion is not a good predictive indicator of default on decommissioning obligations. However, BOEM and BSEE officials we spoke with told us that poor compliance records—such as safety and maintenance issues or delayed decommissioning obligations—can be an indicator of potential decommissioning noncompliance or financial stress.

Why was there such a disconnect between the opinions of BOEM and BSEE officials (who are directly involved with decommissioning) and BOEM’s decision not to include a company’s compliance record among the factors to be considered in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance? As pointed out here and here, safety performance is arguably the most important predictor of financial failure and decommissioning noncompliance.

The GAO report correctly acknowledges the difficulties in disqualifying operating companies. However, the regulations at 30 CFR § 250.135 specifically provide for disqualification for poor performance. While the regulations could be tighter, enforcing disqualifications regulations is dependent on persistence and strong support from management and DOI attorneys. Given the political risks associated with disqualifying operators, that support is often lacking.

Disqualification difficulties make it imperative that BOEM carefully consider past performance before approving lease assignments or determining financial assurance amounts. Provisions in 30 CFR §585.408 and §585.107 could have been used to disapprove assignments to Signal Hill, Fieldwood, Cox, and other problem operators. The failure to do so has significantly delayed decommissioning and increased public exposure to financial risks.

In some cases, lease assignments to unqualified companies have not only been approved but they have been facilitated by BOEM/MMS. The case of Platforms Hogan and Houchin, in the Santa Barbara Channel, is a particularly good example. (Did GAO inquire about the Inspector General report on this matter or ask why that report has still not been released?)

Most operating companies are responsible about planning for and fulfilling their decommissioning obligations. The problem is the exceptions, and they are not difficult to identify if you look at compliance data and obtain input from BSEE inspection personnel.

Other important decommissioning questions that need to be considered:

Additional comments on the GAO report from decommissioning specialist John Smith will be posted tomorrow.

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Either the investigators were incompetent (unlikely) or the political pressure was too great (likely).

“The investigation has led the authorities to conclude that there was deliberate sabotage of the gas pipelines. However, the assessment is that there are not sufficient grounds to pursue a criminal case in Denmark,” a Copenhagen police statement said.

Reuters

After 17 months of investigation, that’s a pretty lame statement. Will we see their report?

The ball is now in Germany’s court. Should we expect more of the same?

Our June 2023 summary remains unchanged.

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After 3 months of investigation, only a small connector leak has been identified in or near the Main Pass Oil Gathering system. According to the Coast Guard, that leak was not the source of the large November spill (pictured). The absence of findings raises many questions:

  • Is the Main Pass Oil Gathering system still being implicated? Surrounding pipelines?
  • Was a vessel or some other source responsible?
  • Were sheen samples fingerprinted and are those results definitive?
  • Given that the source has not been identified, what was the basis for the large (and rather sensational) spill volume estimate? The sheen was not indicative of a spill of that magnitude.
  • How much production has been shut-in since the slick was first identified? November production data indicate a GoM-wide oil production decline of ~80,000 bopd decline from September.

Given the public claims that were made about the size and potential implications of this spill, the authorities need to be more forthcoming regarding their findings to date.

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In light of the surge in art vandalism, admirers of “Rig at Sunset” have expressed concern about this priceless and symbolic masterpiece.😉

“Rig at Sunset”

Rest assured that “Rig at Sunset” is not being targeted. Climate activists believe the painting is disturbingly visionary and is thus socially important. Even those who are less appreciative of great artwork are reluctant to damage “Rig at Sunset,” fearing that their vandalism might actually improve its quality. So friends of this beloved masterpiece have nothing to fear! 😉

If you are unfamiliar with “Rig at Sunset,” here is a brief summary of the history:

“Rig at Sunset” was painted nearly 50 years ago by a US Geological Survey (USGS) employee who chose to remain anonymous. Initially, the masterpiece was presented to USGS (later MMS) engineers and scientists who had made important contributions to the offshore oil and gas program. Understandably, the intended recipients were so humbled by the magnificence of the painting that they could not accept it. As the painting grew in value and international prominence, framed copies were presented to retirees and the original painting was kept at a secure, undisclosed location.

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The CNLOPB has announced contingent resources of 340 million bbls for the Cambriol discovery which would be co-developed with 2 nearby discoveries as part of Equinor’s Bay du Nord project. Per CNLOPB estimates, this brings the Bay du Nord resource total to 1.132 billion bbls. Equinor has announced that 2 exploratory wells will be spudded this summer. Positive results would further strengthen the case for Bay du Nord development.

contingent resources per CNLOPB (million bbls)
Bay du Nord407
Cappahayden385
Cambriol340
project area total1132
“Contingent Resources” are volumes of hydrocarbons, expressed at 50% probability, assessed to be technically recoverable that have not been delineated and have unknown economic viability.

Meanwhile, Terra Nova production is ramping up after a long hiatus for FPSO refurbishment, remarkable Hibernia has produced more than double the original resource estimate of 520 million bbls and is still producing about 60,000-70,000 bopd, and Hebron is impressively producing about 120,000 bopd on average.

There is indeed reason for optimism about North America’s only Atlantic production in what is arguably the continent’s (world’s?) most challenging operating environment.

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As concerns about wind leasing mount, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the rush to hold auctions may not be in the best long-term interest of the wind program. The primary objective should be cost-effective and responsible development, not gigawatt deadlines. The administration’s vision for wind energy capacity, particularly the 15 GW goal for floating turbines by 2035, is unlikely to be achieved and rushing the process is not helpful.

The current wind program is reminiscent of James Watt’s ill-fated approach to oil and gas leasing. Watt’s “lease-everything now” agenda had the opposite effect of that which was intended, the result being that 96.3% of our offshore land is now off-limits to oil and gas leasing.

Affected parties in Oregon have not held back in voicing their displeasure with BOEM’s wind energy announcement.

BOEM wants offshore wind come hell or high water and they don’t care who they harm to get it.

Heather Mann, executive director of Midwater Trawlers Cooperative

The Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw tribal council unanimously passed a resolution opposing offshore wind energy development off the Oregon coast.

The federal government states that it has ‘engaged’ with the Tribe, but that engagement has amounted to listening to the Tribe’s concerns and ignoring them and providing promises that they may be dealt with at some later stage of the process. The Tribe will not stand by while a project is developed that causes it more harm than good – this is simply green colonialism.

Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw tribal council Chair Brad Kneaper

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Background:

  • Last summer, Trident Energy exercised multiple options for the use of the Island Innovator semi-submersible (pictured above), extending the duration of the Equatorial Guinea contract to approximately 230 days.
  • The rig arrived in Equatorial Guinea in Nov. 2023.
  • On 7 Feb, a Trident team briefed Equatorial Guinea Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons Antonio Oburu Ondo about problems with the Innovator’s BOP system. Apparently, Island Drilling, the rig owner, was not present at that meeting.
  • Mr. Ondo subsequently reported that the BOP had serious problems and failed to respond to control system commands.
  • Trident terminated the rig contract on safety grounds.
  • Island has publicly responded that (1) the Trident statements are inaccurate, (2) there have been no critical safety incidents, (3) the BOP has been checked and tested by the OEM representative on the rig and declared safe and ready for operations, and (4) they will challenge the contract termination.

Questions & comments:

  • Since the rig had just arrived on location, the BOP issues were presumably identified during onboard stump testing. Were corrective measures discussed? Why was contract termination deemed necessary?
  • Island’s statement indicates that the rig was tested with the OEM representative present. Presumably those tests were in accordance with API S53 or the ISO equivalent.
  • Had inspections and maintenance also been conducted in accordance with the standard? Did Trident inspect the rig and review maintenance and testing records before signing the contract?
  • Have other companies had similar issues with the Innovator? None have been identified in my web search.
  • Was a bridging document in place to address differences in Trident/Island management systems? If so, what does that document say about BOP inspection and oversight.
  • Why was the drilling contractor not present at the meeting with the Equatorial Guinea authorities? Was Island advised that the contract was being terminated prior to that meeting? Did the authorities speak with Island to hear their side of the story?
  • Does the contract provide for mandatory arbitration in the event of such disagreements?
  • Could other factors have influenced the cancellation decision? I was involved with an arbitration case involving an operator that used safety issues as the reason for terminating an expensive long-term rig contract. The arbitration panel ruled in favor of the drilling contractor resulting in a very large payment to the rig owner. Ironically, serious safety violations by the operating company (but not the drilling contractor) were identified during the arbitration process.
  • Island Drilling is a Norwegian Company with an experienced management team. The Innovator has conducted operations in the Norwegian and UK offshore sectors. These factors typically imply a strong commitment to safe operations.

Hopefully, we’ll be able to learn more about the specifics of this dispute in the near future.

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