Gulfwide, Chevron was high bidder for 9 of the 10 blocks they sought vs. 6 of 9 for Oxy, 5 of 8 for Shell, 5 of 6 for BP, and 5 of 5 for Equinor.
US supermajors and historically important Gulf producers, Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips, were no-shows once again.
Bidding was spirited among the “big dogs” for KC Block 258, with BP taking the prize (assuming their $7.5 million bid is accepted). Chevron rebounded by taking KC 430, outbidding Oxy and Shell. (See below)
Among the large independents, LLOG batted 8 for 8, Murphy 6 for 8 (including the sale’s highest bid of $7.7 million), Talos 2 for 2, and Woodside 1 for 2. Our favorite tribal corporation, Red Willow Offshore (Southern Ute Tribe), partnered with LLOG, Navitas, Houston Energy, and CL&F Offshore on the high bid for Atwater Valley Block 63.
Murphy was the top $$$ bidder among all participating companies (see below). In 2025, Murphy was the Gulf’s 5th leading oil producer, trailing only Shell, BP, Chevron, and Oxy.
The sale’s highest bid ($7.7 million) was for Alaminos Canyon Block 380. The block was previously leased to LLOG, and exploratory drilling was conducted in 2019. LLOG’s lease expired on 12/20/2025, and complete well data were released on 4/24/2026. Murphy must have liked what they saw.
The absence of other bidders for AC 380 reminds us that interpretations and strategies differ. Murphy has had a pretty good track record in the Gulf. We’ll see what happens.
Murphy and Shell valued and competed for 2 other Alaminos Canyon blocks as the summary below indicates, and Murphy was the lone bidder ($4.1 million) for another.
“L” for the “W”? All 5 of Equinor’s high bids (red) formed an “L” in the Walker Ridge area. Equinor was the lone bidder for each (see below). Existing blocks WR 56 and 100 (blue) are Equinor leases. Prior lessee Anadarko drilled on block 143 in 2014
We’ll see how this all worked out in about 10-20 years! 😀
Notes: The Gulf keeps on rollin’ – this was the 137th Gulf lease sale. Congrats to Bryan Domangue on being named Gulf of America Regional Director for the Marine Minerals Administration!The WWII Museum in New Orleans was a nice venue for the sale.
The oil patch is known for booms, busts, mergers, and acquisitions. Hess is now among the once important offshore operators that no longer exist as separate companies. Others include Amoco, Arco, Texaco, Getty, Gulf, Unocal, Sun, Anadarko, BHP, Mobil, Phillips, Noble Energy, Pennzoil, Kerr-McGee, Superior, Nexen, and Newfield.
Hess would probably not have been a Chevron target had they not taken a chance in 2014 when they obtained a 30% position in Exxon’s Stabroek block offshore Guyana. The rest is history, and Stabroek is now the world’s most prized offshore block. Hess had other nice assets in the Gulf, Bakken Shale, and elsewhere, but Stabroek was Chevron’s primary target.
Hess was a safety compliance leader in both 2023 and 2024.
Hess was an active participant in pre-merger lease sales.
The combined company is unlikely to be greater than the sum of the parts in terms of US lease acquisition, exploration, and development.
Combining companies limits the diversity of geological assessments and exploration strategies.
Consolidation limits participation on committees engaged in assessing technology and developing standards. Declining industry participation in these activities, which are critical to offshore safety, has been a historical concern of OCS program leadership.
When the merger was announced, Chevron’s CEO Mike Wirth was quoted as saying “We’ve got too many CEOs per BOE, so consolidation is natural.” That comment makes sense from the perspective of an acquiring CEO. Employees of the companies being acquired have a somewhat different view. They would prefer increasing exploration and production rather than reducing employees.
John Smith’s update on California OCS Decommissioning Obligations is attached. His comments:
Chevron and FMC hold joint and several liability responsibilities for many platforms and all of those operated by DCOR. This reflects Chevron’s long history in developing CA onshore and offshore oil and gas resources. A 2020 report issued by BSEE estimated the nine platforms operated by DCOR had a combined decommissioning cost of $397 million.The actual cost could be 2-3-fold higher based on estimates for decommissioning California state water platforms prepared by experienced decommissioning consultants.
Chevron may be checking out of California by moving its corporate offices to Houston, but as someone once said about decommissioning – referring to the popular Eagles Hotel California song “You can check out but you can never leave.”
Official decommissioning anthem 😉: Hotel California
Excerpt from the lyrics – Hotel California, Eagles, 1976
Last thing I remember I was running for the door I had to find the passage back To the place I was before “Relax, ” said the night man “We are programmed to receive You can check out any time you like But you can never leave”
Although BOEM’s decision matrix has not yet been posted, a comparison of the acceptances with the bids submitted tells us that the Keathley Canyon Block 828 ($1,101,202) and Atwater Valley Block 63 ($650,018) bids were rejected.
Both of the rejected bids were submitted by LLOG, partnering with 4 other companies on the Atwater Valley block. LLOG’s high bids on 3 other blocks were accepted, so their rejection rate was 40%. Interestingly, 2 of the 3 BBG1 rejected bids were also submitted by LLOG.
There is no shame in bid rejections, which are part of the legislated leasing process. Why pay more than you have to (or think a block is worth)? A bid rejection may attract future competition, but otherwise the only downside is that you don’t get a lease that you can possibly acquire at another sale if desired (an advantage of regular, predictable lease sales).
BOEM is charged with making fair market value determinations and their process and decisions are publicly available. Of course, opinions differ on the value of an unexplored lease. We will see what the bidding on the BBG1 and BBG2 rejections looks like in future sales.
BOEM did accept the the high bids for the BBG2 “sweet spot” blocks (red in map below; also see the table) in the Green Canyon Area of the Gulf. These 4 blocks accounted for 17 of the sale’s 38 bids (45%) and $32.8 milion of the sale’s $47 million in high bids (70%). BP’s $21 million bid for GC 404 was by far the sale’s highest bid.
red=blocks receiving bids at BBG2; blue=BBG1 and Sale 261 leases; green=active leases issued prior to Sale 261
Thankfully, from the standpoint of those of us whose primary concerns are the integrity of the OCS program and protecting taxpayers from decommissioning liabilities, the API comments (attached), along with those submitted by Shell and Chevron, have exposed the folly of eliminating financial assurance whenever there is a financially strong company somewhere in the lease chain of custody.
Mindful of ongoing and anticipated decommissioning liability battles, API effectivelychallenges the BOEM proposal on legal grounds. API also demonstrates why revisions intended to improve regulatory efficiency and increase production would do exactly the opposite. Excerpts from the API comments (emphasis added):
Further, foisting financial assurance obligations on predecessors will not achieve BOEM’s stated aims of financial “savings” and increased OCS oil and gas production; it more likely will do the opposite. The Proposed Rule would just shift financial assurance burdens to financially stronger predecessors, many of which remain engaged in the majority of leasing and production across the OCS and are far more likely to be future investors in increased OCS development and production. By contrast, nothing ensures that entities standing to benefit from the Proposed Rule will reinvest saved financial assurance premium dollars into OCS production; in fact, such entities largely do not explore or increase reserves, but merely buy pre-discovered reserves and produce them to a lower economic limit.
Nor would the Proposed Rule promote or save costs for future OCS transactions since, in the absence of any option for BOEM-demanded financial assurance from current interest holders, assignors will demand financial assurance at sufficiently conservative levels to address the risk of residual liability if assignees default on their obligations.
Even more problematically, the Proposed Rule would retroactively impose this new regulatory burden on entities that divested their OCS property interests years (or decades) earlier—in reliance on BOEM’s regulations that required their assignees to provide any supplemental financial assurance. Such entities are no longer in privity with BOEM, and have no control over current operations on those OCS properties. The Proposed Rule would reach back even to impose these obligations on predecessors that divested their interests before the 1997 regulatory imposition of joint and several liability for assignors (a time period on which the Proposed Rule is silent).
This novel and misguided approach allows, and even encourages, current interest holders to eschew their lease and grant obligations, and instead freely operate on the backs of predecessors and taxpayers. Meanwhile, current interest holders could choose to allocate little or no funding for end-of-life obligations like decommissioning whenever they desire to conclude production, file for bankruptcy, and leave BOEM to eventually issue decommissioning orders to predecessors that have not operated the grants and leases for years or even decades. This would create higher administrative and financial burdens for the government and system as a whole, including where no viable predecessor had accrued liability for decommissioning all facilities present on the lease or grant, and potential operational impacts that a predecessor has no obligation to cure.
This new proposed obligation on predecessors is arbitrary and capricious and unlawful on multiple grounds. It violates the rule against retroactivity by creating new federal liability stemming from already-completed transactions. It violates the agency change in position doctrine, particularly given that BOEM on multiple occasions has rejected precisely the same approach as in the Proposed Rule. It is unsupported, as it overstates the burdens under the discretionary Existing Rule, disregards repeated U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and BOEM findings calling for more robust financial assurance by current interest holders, cites only anecdotal prior comments while ignoring the bulk of countervailing comments detailing reality on the OCS, and identifies no means by which BOEM can compel collect, and assess adequate financial information for all predecessor entities. And it is self contradictory, including by tying up more capital among entities producing the vast majority of oil and natural gas on the OCS.
Chevron points to their potential liability balance of ~ $2 billion for satisfying the decommissioning obligations of default owners:
John Smith and I do not agree with the industry support for the use of reserves as financial assurance. The margin of error in reserve, oil price, and decommissioning cost estimates, not to mention the potential for facility damage, the ever-changing political environment, and the administration challenges, present an unacceptably high risk for taxpayers. If companies want to guarantee decommissioning based on reserves, let them do so. Shell makes a good point about why it is especially important to prohibit the use of reserve estimates on a company-wide basis:
If Beacon and HEQ are willing sellers of their majority share in the impressive Shenandoah field, as appears to be the case (per Reuters), the big dogs are interested in buying. And why wouldn’t they be? Production began last July and the targeted rate of 100,000 bopd has already been achieved from just four phase-one wells.
Reuters reports that Total, Shell, BP, Repsol, and Chevron are interested in Beacon and HEQ’s 51% stake. More about Shenandoah:
located in Walker Ridge blocks 51, 52, and 53
~150 miles off the coast of Louisiana
floating production unit (FPU) in 5800′ of water in WR block 52
Investment companies like Beacon (owned by Blackstone) are positive, and increasingly necessary, contributors to the offshore program. These companies bring capital and new exploration strategies that increase development and production. They must, of course, be committed to safety excellence, which seems to be the case for Beacon.
It’s noteworthy that Anadarko and Conoco Phillips, Shenandoah’s major original partners holding 33% and 30% interest respectively, withdrew from the project in 2018 citing unsatisfactory appraisal results and weak commodity prices. Evaluation mistakes like this are common, which is why broad and diverse industry participation is needed. With mergers reducing the number of US majors (remember Amoco, Arco, Sun, Texaco, Getty, Mobil, Phillips, Marathon, Unocal, Superior, Hess, etc.), investment companies play an increasingly important role in OCS development.
Shenandoah, WR 51, 52, 53 (center blocks); green=active leases prior to Sale 261; blue=leased issued after Sale 261
On Monday, Sable got a boost from Judge Wilson, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Judge Wilson denied a request by the California Department of Parks and Recreation (and other State agencies) to enjoin Sable Offshore from restarting or continuing the operation of oil pipeline segments withing Gaviota State Park.
Sable got another boost from Chevron, which agreed to buy 20,000 bopd from Sable for its El Segundo refinery.
Not to be denied, the California Attorney General filed the attached lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The AG argues that US Energy Secretary Chris Wright has no authority under the Defense Production Act (DPA) to excuse Sable from compliance with state and federal laws and court orders. The lawsuit alleges that the DPA Order violates the Administrative Procedure Act and infringes on California’s sovereign power under the Tenth Amendment.
The suit also alleges that the Order violates the constitutional Separation of Powers by purporting to override not only state law and a preliminary injunction issued by the Santa Barbara Superior Court, but also a judicial Consent Decree approved by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California that expressly acknowledged and approved the State’s role in reviewing and approving any planned restart of the onshore pipelines.
The AG asks the Court (p. 33) to issue a judicial declaration that the Wright Order is unconstitutional and/or unlawful because it violates the APA and the U.S. Constitution.
Read the Court filing for full details, and stay tuned. No doubt there will be more swings in momentum going forward.
red=blocks receiving bids at BBG2; blue=BBG1 and Sale 261 leases; green=active leases issued prior to Sale 261
Although bidding at Sale BBG2 was rather subdued, Gulf heavyweights BP, Chevron, Shell, and Oxy/Anadarko, along with increasingly important Woodside Energy, competed for the 4 red blocks in the Green Canyon area (map above and table below). These elephant hunters presumably see excellent Paleogene (Wilcox) prospectivity in those blocks.
17 of the sale’s 38 bids (45%) and $32.8 milion of the sale’s $47 million in high bids (70%) were for these 4 blocks. BP’s $21 million bid for GC 404 was by far the sale’s highest bid.
Green Canyon Block No.
No. of bidders
High Bidder
Bid
404
5
BP
$21,009,990
405
2
BP
$885,99
448
5
Chevron
$4,967,067
492
5
Chevron
$5,887,188
At this time, the high costs and technical complexities (e.g. deepwaterand high pressure/high temperature reservoirs) limit Wilcox development to major oil companies and well financed, technically savvy independents. Expect some of the international majors that did not participate in BBG2 to acquire lease interest at a later date, which will again raise questions about the merits of joint bidding restrictions.
From AAPG graphic-Wilcox trend map. Eastern area can be subdivided into an outboard and inboard trend, with wells in the latter area showing variable thickness due to salt tectonics contemporaneous with deposition (From Zarra et al. 2019’s AAPG Search and Discovery article).
Imbedded below is a good presentation on the Paleogene Wilcox by Dr. Mike Sweet, Univ. of Texas:
Although no one was expecting a barnburner only 3 months after the previous sale, BBG2 was historically weak for a Gulf-wide sale. The table below compares BBG2 with the previous 4 Gulf sales, none of which were particularly impressive.
However, the sale was not without highlights. There was some spirited bidding for tracts in the Green Canyon area. BP’s bid was the highest of 5 for GC Block 404. BP bid $21 million for the block, 45% of the high bids sum for the entire sale. The BP bid was also $20 million higher than the next highest bid for that tract (ouch!).
Also interesting was Chevron edging Shell $5,887,188.00 to $5,501,240.00 to acquire GC Block 492.
Sale No.
257
259
261
BBG1
BBG2
date
11/17/2021
3/29/2023
12/20/2023
12/10/2025
3/11/2026
companies participating
33
32
26
30
13
total bids
2233
2842
3161
219
38
tracts receiving bids
2143
2442
2751
181
25
sum of all bids $millions
198.5
309.8
441.9
371.9
69.9
sum of high bids ($millions)
101.7
263.8
382.2
279.4
47.0
highest bid company block
$10,001,252 Anadarko AC 259
$15,911,947 Chevron KC 96
$25,500,085 Anadarko MC 389
$18,592,086 Chevron KC 25
$21,009,990 bp GC 404
most high bids company sum ($millions)
46 bp 29.0
75 Chevron 108.0
65 Shell 69.0
50 bp 61.0
6 Anadarko (Oxy) 4.0
sum of high bids ($millions) company
47.1 Chevron
108 Chevron
88.3 Hess
61.0 bp
22.6 bp
most high bids by independent
14-DG Expl.
13-Beacon 13-Red Willow
22-Red Willow
14-Murphy
5-LLOG
1excludes 36 leases improperly acquired for carbon disposal purposes; 2excludes 69 leases improperly acquired for carbon disposal purposes; 3excludes 94 leases improperly acquired for carbon disposal purposes
For historical comparison purposes, Gulf Sale 206 drew $3.7 billion ($5.6 billion in today’s dollars) in 2008. Twenty-siz sales between 1972 and 2013 garnered more than $1 billion in high bids.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 
Restart seems likely for decommissioning financial assurance rule
Posted in decommissioning, energy policy, Regulation, tagged API, BOEM, Chevron, comments, decommissioning, financial assurance, NEFSA, proposed regulation, Shell on May 18, 2026| Leave a Comment »
Thankfully, from the standpoint of those of us whose primary concerns are the integrity of the OCS program and protecting taxpayers from decommissioning liabilities, the API comments (attached), along with those submitted by Shell and Chevron, have exposed the folly of eliminating financial assurance whenever there is a financially strong company somewhere in the lease chain of custody.
Mindful of ongoing and anticipated decommissioning liability battles, API effectively challenges the BOEM proposal on legal grounds. API also demonstrates why revisions intended to improve regulatory efficiency and increase production would do exactly the opposite. Excerpts from the API comments (emphasis added):
Further, foisting financial assurance obligations on predecessors will not achieve BOEM’s stated aims of financial “savings” and increased OCS oil and gas production; it more likely will do the opposite. The Proposed Rule would just shift financial assurance burdens to financially stronger predecessors, many of which remain engaged in the majority of leasing and production across the OCS and are far more likely to be future investors in increased OCS development and production. By contrast, nothing ensures that entities standing to benefit from the Proposed Rule will reinvest saved financial assurance premium dollars into OCS production; in fact, such entities largely do not explore or increase reserves, but merely buy pre-discovered reserves and produce them to a lower economic limit.
Nor would the Proposed Rule promote or save costs for future OCS transactions since, in the absence of any option for BOEM-demanded financial assurance from current interest holders, assignors will demand financial assurance at sufficiently conservative levels to address the risk of residual liability if assignees default on their obligations.
Even more problematically, the Proposed Rule would retroactively impose this new regulatory burden on entities that divested their OCS property interests years (or decades) earlier—in reliance on BOEM’s regulations that required their assignees to provide any supplemental financial assurance. Such entities are no longer in privity with BOEM, and have no control over current operations on those OCS properties. The Proposed Rule would reach back even to impose these obligations on predecessors that divested their interests before the 1997 regulatory imposition of joint and several liability for assignors (a time period on which the Proposed Rule is silent).
This novel and misguided approach allows, and even encourages, current interest holders to eschew their lease and grant obligations, and instead freely operate on the backs of predecessors and taxpayers. Meanwhile, current interest holders could choose to allocate little or no funding for end-of-life obligations like decommissioning whenever they desire to conclude production, file for bankruptcy, and leave BOEM to eventually issue decommissioning orders to predecessors that have not operated the grants and leases for years or even decades. This would create higher administrative and financial burdens for the government and system as a whole, including where no viable predecessor had accrued liability for decommissioning all facilities present on the lease or grant, and potential operational impacts that a predecessor has no obligation to cure.
This new proposed obligation on predecessors is arbitrary and capricious and unlawful on multiple grounds. It violates the rule against retroactivity by creating new federal liability stemming from already-completed transactions. It violates the agency change in position doctrine, particularly given that BOEM on multiple occasions has rejected precisely the same approach as in the Proposed Rule. It is unsupported, as it overstates the burdens under the discretionary Existing Rule, disregards repeated U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and BOEM findings calling for more robust financial assurance by current interest holders, cites only anecdotal prior comments while ignoring the bulk of countervailing comments detailing reality on the OCS, and identifies no means by which BOEM can compel collect, and assess adequate financial information for all predecessor entities. And it is self contradictory, including by tying up more capital among entities producing the vast majority of oil and natural gas on the OCS.
Chevron points to their potential liability balance of ~ $2 billion for satisfying the decommissioning obligations of default owners:
John Smith and I do not agree with the industry support for the use of reserves as financial assurance. The margin of error in reserve, oil price, and decommissioning cost estimates, not to mention the potential for facility damage, the ever-changing political environment, and the administration challenges, present an unacceptably high risk for taxpayers. If companies want to guarantee decommissioning based on reserves, let them do so. Shell makes a good point about why it is especially important to prohibit the use of reserve estimates on a company-wide basis:
Lastly, kudos to the New England Fisherman’s Stewardship Association for raising the concern about financial assurance for decommissioning offshore wind facilities
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