A Bell 212 helicopter is in the news following the crash that killed Iran’s President and Foreign Minister. Given the difficult weather conditions and mountainous terrain, the crash was most likely an accident.
As noted in this vintage newsletter (p. 8), we flew to Georges Bank drilling rigs in the early 1980’s in a Bell 212 contract helicopter, owned and operated by Petroleum Helicopters Inc (PHI).
The Bell 212 was chosen by the USGS aviation expert because of its range, reliability, and IFR capabilities that enabled flying in limited visibility. Because of difficult fog conditions on Georges Bank, drilling rigs were sometimes not visible until we were descending to land.
For the most part, the offshore industry has replaced Bell 212 helicopters with newer models, but the 212 was in use for many years and had an excellent performance record.
PHI Bell 212 prepares to land at a platform in the Gulf of Mexico, 1974, Vertiflite.
Nord Stream AG has responded to their insurers’ “a goverment did it, so we don’t have to pay” defense. Nord Stream’s full response, courtesy of Swedish engineer Erik Andersson, a leader in seeking the truth about the the pipeline sabotage, is linked.
Key excerpts from the Nord Stream AG filing (p.5):
(a) On their proper construction, in the context of Exclusion 2.i as a whole, the words “destruction of or damage to property by or under the order of any government or public or local authority” relate only to destruction or damage that arises out of or is related to the confiscation, nationalisation or requisition of therelevant property (and/or attempts thereat). In the premises, those words do not apply to the Damage.
(b) Alternatively, in the event that the Defendants establish that the Damage does constitute destruction of or damage to property by or under the order of any government, then it is therefore covered by the Deliberate Damage clause because it would have been “loss, damage, liability, cost or expense caused or inflicted by order of any governmental or regulatory body or agency” and Exclusion 2(i) to Section I does not apply: paragraphs 8 and 9.2 above are repeated.
If the insurers contend that one or more governments were responsible, shouldn’t they have to identify the government(s)? That would be nice. However, Erik doesn’t think the Nord Stream AG response puts the insurers in that politically difficult position. I agree. This case is about getting the insurers to pay for the damages, not identifying the responsible parties, something that the Swedes, Danes, and Germans have shied away from.
JL Daeschler, pioneering subsea engineer and BOE contributor, recounted a frightening incident in 1976, a year after UK North Sea production began:
We found ourselves in a drastic situation. While working on a subsea well, the wireline retrievable tubing safety valve got tangled up in the tree area. We had an open well situation and couldn’t cut the wire in the subsea tree. Further, the weather was bad, and keeping on location was difficult. The riser hydraulic release was faulty, so there was an imminent high risk of a “jammed ” subsea tree, bent/damaged riser, and uncontrollable well flow.
We got through this, but recognized that improved well control capabilities were needed during workover operations. Management decided that any future workover operations on a subsea tree/well would require a small diameter workover BOP with shearing capability immediately above the Xmas tree. A year later, we had the hybrid kit pictured below (with JL). Note that the guide funnels are slim to run on guide lines and not overshoot the guide base posts.
JL’s story reminds us once again that safety achievement is dependent on continuous improvement driven by experience, research, and technological advances.
When I was a young engineer with the US Geological Survey, the OCS safety regulator at the time, my boss and mentor Richard Krahl (known as “Mr. OCS” for his commitment to offshore safety) slammed😀 a copy of the first edition of API RP 14C (Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Safety Systems for Offshore Production Facilities) on my desk and told me to read it carefully. That pioneering process safety document has grown with the offshore industry and is now in its 8th edition.
Similarly, API RP 2A-WSD (Planning, Designing, and Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms— Working Stress Design) is now in its 22nd edition and API STD 53 (Well Control Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells) is in its 5th edition. There are countless other examples of the progression in safety equipment and practices.
As individuals, companies, agencies, and collectively as an industry, there can be no standing still. Nothing is routine and the challenges continue to grow: deeper wells, more complex geology, higher temperature and pressure, deeper water, harsher environments, remote locations, new security risks, and more. We get better or we get worse, and the latter is not an option. Onward!
The government’s decision to require that a capping stack be located in Guyanais prudent. Although the need for a capping stack is dependent on multiple barrier failures and is thus extremely low, the environmental and economic consequences of a prolonged well blowout warrant timely access to this tertiary well control option.
A capping stack must be properly maintained and deployable without delay. In that regard, BSEE has a good program for testing Gulf of Mexico capping stack readiness. Capping stack drills are an important post-Macondo addition to the unannounced oil spill response program that dates back to 1981.
“Troy Naquin, BSEE New Orleans District, observes as a capping stack is carefully lowered onto the deck of ship to be transported more than 100 miles offshore for a drill designed to test industry’s ability to successfully deploy it in case of an emergency, May 8, 2023.” BSEE photo/Bobby Nash
Havtil prioritizes risk assessment and publishes their comprehensive annual analysis of safety trends in a timely manner. The 2023 RNNP was posted in Norwegian earlier this year and the summary report is already available in English. RNNP reports are an important safety resource that should be reviewed and discussed wherever oil and gas operations are conducted.
As an example of the breadth of these reviews, the two sets of charts below convey data that are not typically documented by offshore safety regulators. The first set documents near-misses that did not result in injuries, but did expose workers to that risk.
The second set of charts is a summary of worker responses to a survey, a means of assessing the safety culture. The big jump in favorable responses to the HSE questions is encouraging. In particular, the report notes (p. 14) that responses to a question about being pressured not to report incidents has moved in a positive direction in the last two surveys. Hopefully, this is an industry-wide trend.
Our last Nord Stream pipeline post discussed the Nord Stream AG suit to recover damage costs from insurers Lloyd’s and Arch.
In a court document (excerpt below) obtained by Swedish engineer Erik Andersson, Lloyd’s and Arch assert that the damage was inflicted by, or under order of, a government , and therefore the insurers are not liable.
Given that the suspect governments have denied responsibility, shouldn’t the insurers have to prove that a government did it, and identify the government? That is what Nord Stream AG is asserting in their filing (except below).
I had the pleasure of working with Jason Mathews when he was a young MMS engineer. He truly cared about our safety mission and has taken that commitment to the next level at BSEE. Jason shared this important, heartfelt message on the anniversary of the Macondo blowout.
One of the greatest gifts I ever received in life is having a little girl and having the opportunity to go home every evening and spending time with her at cheer, softball, doing homework, etc. I have a great deal of respect for the men and women who work offshore and put their lives on hold for 14-28 days to deliver much needed OCS production to meet US demand. Undoubtedly, they are better / tougher people than me.
Over the last year, my team has seen multiple incidents that had a high potential severity that could have led to a fatal / serious injury or major incident in the GOM. Although we can sit and debate the causal factors for hours, one that jumps to the top of the discussion is the Human Factor – Complacency. Of all the things a leader should fear, complacency heads the list. There is no doubt success breeds complacency, and complacency breeds failure.
To this day, I am still shook by the mindset and complacency of many onboard the Deepwater Horizon prior to the incident. During testimony in the public hearings, John Guide, the BP well team leader for the Horizon, believed that the rig crew had become “too comfortable” because of its good track record for drilling difficult wells. Ross Skidmore, a BP contractor on the rig on April 20, testified that the crew became complacent after completing drilling because “when you get to that point, everybody goes to the mindset that weʹre through, this job is done.” To me, the complacency on the Deepwater Horizon could be attributable to the crew not having access to all of the well data (OptiCem reports – cement job risk) available to BP personnel onshore and the well site leaders on the rig. Our investigation concluded, the overall complacency of the Deepwater Horizon crew was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure.
As regulators, we have special roles in the GOM as it relates to safety:
Driving the avoidance of complacency and risk-free mindsets of the offshore employees
Understanding we can’t be selfish – Our success is not our individual personal growth / gains, but it is being unwavering in your promotion of offshore safety to ensure all offshore employees return home to their families safely
Holding each other (internally) and industry (externally) accountable when necessary
In order to achieve greatness offshore, we ,as a regulator, have to believe we can, and never sit still until we achieve it.
Everyone on this email has a very critical function and role. Never underestimate the value of what you do, have the proper mindset, and avoid complacency.
Do whatever it takes to ensure the people offshore are gifted the same gift we receive every day – going home to our families.
All In –
Jason P. Mathews, Petroleum Engineer, Field Operations – OSM
Friday Night LIghts: Coach Mathews and his daughter
I am again sharing this touching tribute to the 11 men who lost their lives on the Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010. The video is introduced by country singer Trace Atkins, a former Gulf of Mexico rig worker. The video and Trace’s song serve as a memorial to the 11 Deepwater Horizon workers and others who have died exploring for and producing oil and gas around the world. Please take a moment to watch.
PSA Norway, now Havtil, has long been a pacesetter in analyzing offshore incident and performance data, and publishing timely, comprehensive assessments. Their key findings for 2023 are pasted below (emphasis added):
Hydrocarbon leaks: four on the NCS in 2023 – the lowest figure since the RNNP survey began. None of them are considered particularly serious.
Well control incidents: 11 in 2023. The level is stable, with the figure unchanged from 2022, and all had a low potential.
Structural damage: three incidents were reported in 2023, a halving from the year before.
Total major accident indicator: the annual value is the lowest ever, and the average for the past three years declined. No particularly serious incidents occurred in 2023.
Personal injuries: no accidents resulting in fatalities occurred in the petroleum sector during 2023, while 25 serious personal injuries were reported. The serious injury frequency rose to 0.6 per million hours worked (back to the 2021 level), and lay within the expected range based on the 10 previous years.
Questionnaire survey: responses to this biennial poll showed an improvement from 2021 in most of the indices for the HSE climate and the psychosocial working environment. Furthermore, some challenges are seen with regard to language and parallel operations leading to hazardous conditions.
Havtil informs me that the complete “Trends in Risk Level (RNNP)” report for 2023 will be available in English later this month. A link to the report will be posted on this blog.
On a related note, JL Daeschler has brought The Norwegian Oil Pioneer Club’s website to my attention. Those interested in the history of North Sea exploration and production should take a look! A couple of pictures from the site are pasted below.
Svein and Axel, North Sea pioneers, 1966Sinking of the Ocean Prince, 1968
Houston, TX, March 29, 2024. Beacon Offshore Energy LLC (“Beacon”) announced today the completion of the divestment of its non-operated interests in certain fields in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico in accordance with a previously executed definitive agreement with GOM 1 Holdings Inc., an affiliate of O.G. Oil & Gas Limited. The divestment includes Beacon’s 18.7% interest in the Buckskin producing field, 17% interest in the Leon development, 16.15% interest in the Castile development, 0.5% interest in the Salamanca FPS/lateral infrastructure, and 32.83% interest in the Sicily discovery.
According to BOEM records, GOM 1 HOLDINGS INC, a Delaware company, registered with BOEM effective 3/15/2024. The parent entity, O.G. Oil & Gas Limited, is a privately held E&P company incorporated in 2017 and based in Singapore.
O.G. Oil & Gas Ltd is part of the Ofer Global Group, “a private portfolio of international businesses active in maritime shipping, real estate and hotels, technology, banking, energy and large public investments.”
After a partial takeover by O.G Oil & Gas Limited in 2018, New Zealand Oil and Gas is now 70% owned by the Ofer Global Group. Among other interests, NZ Oil and Gas produces from fields offshore Taranaki, NZ.
Because they are jointly and severally liable for safe operations and decommissioning, minority investors should take a strong interest in safety management and financial assurance. Investors should remember that partners are adversely affected by the mistakes of the operating company. Anadarko and Mitsubishi took a hit following the Macondo blowout. To what extent had they been monitoring bp’s risk and safety management programs for drilling operations?
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 