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Archive for the ‘accidents’ Category

At a minimum, the fire will further delay and increase the cost of well plugging operations on Platform Habitat. Per BSEE’s borehole file, 17 wells remain to be permanently abandoned, 3 of which have yet to be temporarily abandoned. These wells are 23-44 years old, and have been inactive for 11 years.

If there is significant platform damage, the remediation delays and costs would be substantial, comparable to those associated with major Gulf platforms damaged by hurricanes. Structural damage could increase the urgency of removing the platform. Given California’s decommissioning quagmire, this would be a major challenge.

Who pays, and what does the financial assurance picture look like? Per the attached BOEM spreadsheet (excerpt pasted below):

  • The 2020 cost estimate for decommissioning Habitat was $44.3 million. That number is optimistic even if platform damage is minimal.
  • $13.6 million in supplemental assurance has been provided.
  • A third party guarantee has been secured.
  • The guarantee was provided by Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas (FMOG)
  • Per BOEM, FMOG is the guarantor for all DCOR leases. Unless BOEM has allowed otherwise, the guarantor pays all costs not covered by the lessees. Given the number of old platforms and California decommissioning challenges, the risks for FMOG are indeed large.

Although DCOR LLC is the current Habitat operator, the company owns only a 4.18% share of the project. CHANNEL ISLANDS CAPITAL, L.L.C., a private company about which little is known, holds a 95.82% share.

Should the 2 owners default, BOEM/MMA will look to the guarantor and predecessor lessees (see the chart below). Unfortunately for FMOG, they are both the guarantor and the predecessor lessee. FMOG acquired Plains Exploration & Production (PXP), the operator prior to DCOR. Nuevo Energy was acquired by PXP and thus also tracks back to FMOC. (This may explain FMOC’s decision to be a guarantor!).

Should FMOC fail to fulfill their obligation. Chevron would likely be the next target. The original Harvest partners were Texaco (operator) and Union Oil, both of which were acquired by Chevron.

TEPI=Texaco Expl. & Production. Nuevo Energy was acquired by Plains Expl.&Production (PXP), which was acquired by Freeport McMoRan Oil & Gas (FMOG)


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The Platform Habitat fire was extinguished at 11:40 a.m. on 5/11/2026 after burning for 5 hours.

All 26 workers were safely evacuated from DCOR’s Platform Habitat. The big question now is the fitness of the structure for continuing well plugging/abandonment and platform decommissioning.

As indicated in the attached letter, BSEE had informed DCOR that their Pitas Point Unit leases (where Platform Habitat is located) expired on 3/15/2016 owing to the cessation of well operations 6 months prior. Following the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) May 7, 2021 affirmation of BSEE’s directive, DCOR was notified that they must permanently plug all wells within one year of the lease termination (i.e. one year after the 2021 IBLA decision). I’ll include the informative IBLA decision in a future post.

Although details have not been shared, it appears that well plugging operations were still ongoing on 5/11/2026 when the fire occurred. According to BSEE’s borehole file, most of the Habitat wells have been temporarily abandoned, but few have been permanently abandoned, and several are still completed (i.e. neither temporarily nor permanently abandoned).

The risks and costs associated with delaying well plugging and abandonment have once again been demonstrated at Habitat. Fortunately, there were no casualties or pollution.

With regard to overall safety compliance, DCOR is the violations leader in the Pacific Region. In 2025 and 2026 (YTD) they were cited for 70 violations, 66 of which required component or facility shut-ins. The age of the 9 DCOR platforms (installed by others between 1968 and 1984) has likely contributed to the compliance challenges.

BSEE spreadsheets for 2020-2024 show 6 incidents at Platform Habitat. BSEE’s incident summaries are pasted in the second attachment.

Neither DCOR nor BSEE has issued a statement on the Habitat fire.

This serious incident further demonstrates the concerns expressed by John Smith and me about the relaxed decommissioning financial assurance regulations proposed by BOEM.

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  • Crew safely evacuated
  • Prompt response by the USCG and local fire agencies
  • Gas leak during decommissioning operations
  • Fire began at 0700 PT; controlled by 1100 PT
  • 45 year old platform; no longer producing
  • Operated by DCOR LLC
  • No environmental threat
  • Habitat was the only California OCS platform that produced dry natural gas (minimal oil or condensate)
Habitat is SSE of Santa Barbara

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Jason’s message, pasted in full below, is important for all who are associated with offshore oil and gas operations, in the US and internationally.

Be The Difference

On the Outer Continental Shelf, BSEE (or MMA) annually oversees ~70 million manhours of offshore personnel, production of >650 million barrels oil, and activities on ~1300 platforms and 75-90 rig / rig units. We all have a profound respect for the men and women who work offshore and put their lives on hold for 14-28 days to deliver much needed OCS production to meet the US demand, and that could not be clearer today.

Last month, Lou Holtz, a legendary coach and person passed away, and it reminded me of the rules of life he lived by and often promoted to others – 1) Do the right thing, 2) Do the best you can, and 3) Always show people you care.

Since February, BSEE has lost two great engineers, Tom Meyer and Bobby Nelson, who were both men of conviction. Tom and Bobby made a difference in all of us as they constantly worked with integrity, moral clarity, and high standards, choosing to act based on principles rather than preference or ease. While at BSEE, I have no doubt both of these men acted from internal motivation to adhere to their principles, not based on external applause or convenience. During their careers, both Tom and Bobby personified Lou Holtz’s rules of life.

Sixteen years ago, to this day, a phone call took place from the Deepwater Horizon to BP’s onshore office. The phone call discussed the anomalies encountered in the negative pressure test, and it was between the Well Site Leader and the lead drilling engineer. BP drilling engineer, Mark Hafle, allowed the temporary abandonment operations on the Deepwater Horizon to proceed even though he told Donald Vidrine, the Deepwater Horizon well site leader, that “you can’t have pressure on the drill pipe and zero pressure on the kill line in a [negative] test that is properly lined up.” Furthermore, Hafle did nothing to investigate or resolve the pressure differential issue even though he remained in BP’s office until 10:00 p.m. the evening of April 20 and had access to real‐time well data (which he logged out of at 5:27:35 p.m.). Hafle’s failure to investigate or resolve the negative test anomalies noted by Vidrine was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure that resulted in the Macondo blowout and 11 fatalities (Jason Anderson, Aaron Burkeen, Donald Clark, Stephen Curtis, Gordon Jones, Wyatt Kemp, Karl Kleppinger, Jr., Blair Manuel, Dewey Revette, Shane Roshto, Adam Weise).

Every day your actions, no matter how small, have a profound impact on others at the platform, in the company, and in industry. If you know something is not right, something is not possible, or even if you have doubt, consider being the difference.

For the remainder of the year, I challenge all of us, as regulators, to urge individuals on our teams to use their personal strengths to influence change rather than waiting for others to take initiative – including yourself. Also, promote the idea that one does not have to follow the crowd and can take a unique, personal stance to improve the offshore workplace. Be the difference just like Tom and Bobby.

Be The Difference and do whatever it takes to ensure the people offshore return from work the same way they arrived.

Respectfully, 

Jason P. Mathews

Petroleum Engineer

Field Operations – OSM

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I am again sharing this touching tribute to the 11 men who lost their lives on the Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010. The video is introduced by country singer Trace Atkins, a former Gulf of Mexico rig worker. The video and Trace’s song serve as a memorial to the 11 Deepwater Horizon workers and others who have died exploring for and producing oil and gas around the world. Please take a moment to watch.

Macondo revisited series:

Reiterating this proposal: Make April 20th International Offshore Safety Day to honor those who have been killed or injured, to recognize the many workers who provide energy for our economies and way of life, and to encourage safety leadership by all offshore operators, contractors, and service companies.

Deepwater Horizon Memorial, New Orleans

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damaged Vineyard Wind turbine – Cape Cod Times photo

Excerpt from p.3 of Vineyard Wind’s suit against GE Renewables (attached):

“As was widely reported in national and local news, in July 2024, one of the GER offshore blades collapsed and fell into the waters off Nantucket, necessitating a massive environmental cleanup, and a six-month construction hiatus during which GER performed a “root cause” analysis. That analysis concluded that 68 of the 72 GER blades installed at the Project (nearly all manufactured by GER in Gaspé, Canada) were also defective because they were inadequately bonded together, and were so poorly made that they were beyond repair. GER’s remediation plan required it to remove all of the blades and to replace all Gaspé blades with others manufactured at a different facility in Cherbourg, France.

Regulatory issues of concern:

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    Rules of thumb for offshore spills:

    • The initial spill estimates are low; often by a lot
    • The estimates of oil recovered are high and unverified

    Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) spill:

    • product spilled: Venezuelan crude
    • first observed:  2/26 at approximately 0400
    • initial spill volume estimate: <100 barrels (bbls)
    • 3/3: spill volume update: 300 bbls
    • 3/5: final spill volume update: 750 bbls; volume reaffirmed on 3/17 and 2/26
    • reported cause: material failure in a section of the cargo transfer hose during a crude oil transfer between the offshore facility tanker
    • estimate of oil recovered: 655–664 bbls (>87%!)

    Comments:

    • According to a Unified Command interview, the spill volume estimate was based on visual observations and estimates of the volume of oil recovered. Neither are reliable indicators of the volume actually spilled.
    • Was the volume transferred being metered at the vessel and LOOP, such that meter differentials could indicate the actual spill volume?
    • The spill was first observed at night. What procedures were in place for monitoring the transfer operation for potential leaks?
    • LOOP first reported a spill estimate of <100 bbls, subsequently increased to 300 bbls, and then 750 bbls.
    • The oil recovery estimate of 655-664 bbls is highly suspect unless the spill was much larger than reported. Recoveries >50% are unlikely for open water spills. (Typically <20% is recovered.)
    • How were the oil recovery estimates determined? Is data available on the total fluid recovered and water content?
    • NOAA reports that the spill response and repair were postponed due to hazardous offshore conditions. This makes the spill and recovery numbers even more suspect.
    • Ed Tennyson, a leading authority on oil spill response capabilities and a former colleague, was skeptical of oil recovery claims. When on-scene, he would ask to see the recovered oil and data on how the volumes were determined.
    • Hopefully, the investigation report will be timely and comprehensive.

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    Broken blade at GE wind turbine at Björkvattnet wind farm in Sweden. Alexander Pohl photo posted at Recharge
    Per Recharge: The first blade break at the wind farm was probably caused by a manufacturing defect, and the second was damaged during installation. According to regional newspaper Jämtlandstidning, local residents were complaining about not getting sufficient information about the third such incident.

    “We don’t know what’s happening because we’re not told anything,” Terese Björk, who witnessed the broken blade on Friday, told the newspaper.

    This is reminiscent of the delay in informing the public about the Vineyard Wind GE Vernova failure. The investigation report about that incident has still not been issued nearly two years after the blade failure.

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    Vineyard Wind has finished installing turbine blades at their 62 turbine (186 blades) project. Yet the Federal investigation report on the July 2024 blade failure has still not been published. How is this acceptable?

    The primary purpose of the independent investigation is to prevent recurrences at this or other projects in the US and worldwide. Available data suggest that blade failures are far too common.

    Nearly two years have now elapsed since the Vineyard Wind blade failure. Important questions remain about the failure mechanisms, the manufacturing, testing, and quality control, a fabrication report waiver, the role of the CVA, debris recovery, and environmental impacts. Where is the investigation report?

    Cape Cod Times photo

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    Important and long overdue:

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