The fire originated in an emergency switchboard room and caused heavy smoke, which also spread to nearby rooms. The fire was extinguished, and no injuries were reported. The majority of the personnel on board were evacuated, and the facility was shut down and depressurized as a result of the incident.
Havtil will:
Carefully review the sequence of events.
Consider actual and potential consequences.
Assess direct and underlying causes.
Identify deviations and areas for improvement related to regulations.
Havtil’s investigations are comprehensive and timely.
Visund is located 22 kilometres northeast of the Gullfaks field in 335m of water
In September, Vineyard Wind and GE Vernova announced “an amicable settlement” to resolve litigation regarding the Vineyard Wind project. The terms of the agreement are confidential, so we won’t know the extent to which financial arrangements factored into the settlement.
The parties may publicly be singing “Kumbaya,” but that doesn’t dismiss the serious allegations. Unresolved data falsification charges, including the following Vineyard Wind allegation, are particularly troubling:
“This exceptional misconduct includes [GE Vernova’s] intentional scheme to falsify critical quality assurance data… and to intentionally misrepresent the quality of those blades to [Vineyard Wind] in a brazen fraudulent, and willful breach of the TSA [Turbine Supply and Service and Maintenance Agreements], ultimately resulting in the catastrophic blade failure…”
Data falsification, was also reported by Radio Gaspesie in Quebec. If the allegations are true, serious violations of Federal regulations were committed, and both GE Vernova and Vineyard Wind may be subject to civil and criminal penalties.
Civil penalties are administered by MMA, Criminal penalties, administered by the Justice Dept, could be warranted if the falsification of quality assurance data is confirmed. The relevant text from the statute is pasted below.
Finally, 28 months after the incident, BSEE/MMA has yet to issue an investigation report or share information on their findings. Are penalty issues contributing to the delay?
Any person who knowingly and willfully (1) violates any provision of this subchapter, any term of a lease, license, or permit issued pursuant to this subchapter, or any regulation or order issued under the authority of this subchapter designed to protect health, safety, or the environment or conserve natural resources, (2) makes any false statement, representation, or certification in any application, record, report, or other document filed or required to be maintained under this subchapter, (3) falsifies, tampers with, or renders inaccurate any monitoring device or method of record required to be maintained under this subchapter, or (4) reveals any data or information required to be kept confidential by this subchapter shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than $100,000, or by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both. Each day that a violation under clause (1) of this subsection continues, or each day that any monitoring device or data recorder remains inoperative or inaccurate because of any activity described in clause (3) of this subsection, shall constitute a separate violation
“As was widely reported in national and local news, in July 2024, one of the GER offshore blades collapsed and fell into the waters off Nantucket, necessitating a massive environmental cleanup, and a six-month construction hiatus during which GER performed a “root cause” analysis. That analysis concluded that 68 of the 72 GER blades installed at the Project (nearly all manufactured by GER in Gaspé, Canada) were also defective because they were inadequately bonded together, and were so poorly made that they were beyond repair. GER’s remediation plan required it to remove all of the blades and to replace all Gaspé blades with others manufactured at a different facility in Cherbourg, France.“
Unsurprisingly, VW has found their contractor GE Renewables to be solely responsible for this troubling incident. However, as lessee and operator VW bears ultimate responsibility for all lease activities including the work of contractors, project design and management, fabrication and installation oversight, selection of the certified verification agent, and incident response.
Meanwhile, the Federal ( BSEE) investigation report has still not been issued. That report should provide an independent assessment of concerns discussed on this blog including quality control,regulatory departures, debris recovery, and environmental impacts.The investigation is significant, not only for VW, but for other offshore wind projects planned or under construction, in the US and worldwide.
Keep in mind that the lengthy and complex National Commission, BOEMRE, Chief Counsel, and NAE reports on the 2010 Macondo blowout were published 6 to 17 months after the well was shut-in.
Aban Pearl listing off Trinidad in August 2009before sinking offshore Venezuela in 2010
Now that we are friends with Venezuela, can someone in the Administration ask them to release the report on the sinking of the Aban Pearl semisubmersible drilling rig in May 2010? This incident is of great interest to operating companies, safety regulators, and contractors worldwide.
Updatedincident tables for OCS oil and gas operations. The most recent data are for 2023! Providing timely details on incidents is a fundamental responsibility of a safety regulator.
A summary of incidents associated with the OCS wind program. From press reports, we know about the fatality during Empire Wind construction. What other incidents have occurred to date?
Information on the mysterious sinking of the Aban Pearl semi-submersiblein May 2010. An investigation was conducted, but the report was never shared. In the interest of offshore safety, the new regime in Venezuela should release this report.
The Town of Nantucket’s attorney, Greg Werkheiser of Cultural Heritage Partners, told The Light last month that “it’s taken far too long” to get a final report on the blade failure.
BSEE: Vineyard Wind is still prohibited from installing blades, producing power or conducting any activity on the damaged A-38 turbine.
GE: We are “really now getting to a point of shifting back to execution out at sea.” (Not at all what BSEE said.)
BSEE: BSEE may permit other specific activities after a risk analysis has been performed and mitigations adopted.
GE: We were “granted approval to return to installing new blades on turbines at the project once stringent safety and operational conditions are met.” (Positive spin of the BSEE statement implying that approval is assured.)
BSEE:Root cause analysis of the blade failure has not yet been provided to BSEE.
GE: “We have finalized root cause analysis and confirm the blade at issue at Vineyard Wind was caused by a manufacturing deviation from our factory in Canada.” (Then why doesn’t BSEE have the analysis? Is the Canadian plant being scapegoated?)
BSEE:No timetable for completion of BSEE investigation (This could present a dilemma for BSEE. How do you allow the resumption of blade installation and power generation before the investigation has been completed? Will the report be held until the Harris or Trump administration gives the go-ahead?)
Contrary to the regulations, Vineyard Wind was authorized to begin the fabrication of facilities beforeBOEM “received and offered no objections to the their Facility Design Report (FDR) and Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR).” The approval letter is attached, and excerpts (emphasis added) are pasted below. [Note: The requirement that was then at §585.700(b) is found at §585.632 in the current regulations.]
“Vineyard Wind requests a regulatory departure from §585.700(b) requiring that fabrication of approved facilities not begin until BOEM provides notification that it has received and has no objections to the submitted Facility Design Report (FDR) and Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR). Vineyard Wind proposes to fabricate, but not install the following project elements: 1) Monopile foundations; 2) Electrical service platform; 3) Export cable; 4) Inter-array cables; and 5) Wind turbine generator facilities.
….allowing these fabrication activities to take place earlier in time would allow Vineyard Wind to adhere to its construction schedule, maintain its qualification for the Federal Investment Tax Credit, and meet its contractual obligations under the Power Purchase Agreements with Massachusetts distribution companies.
30 cfr 585.103 requires that a departure provide safety and environmental protection equal to or greater than the provision in the regulations that is waived. BOEM’s letter fails to explain how allowing fabrication to begin before fundamental design and fabrication reports are submitted and reviewed meets this test.
Perhaps even more troubling is BOEM’s response to subsequent requests by other companies to waive the FDR and FIR requirement (example). In these responses, BOEM asserts that their “current interpretation” is that no departure is needed because “the regulation prohibits only fabrication and installation activities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) itself.” How does that make sense given the important activities, including the fabrication of turbine blades and other turbine components, that take place onshore?
In their letters approving the Vineyard Wind and other departures, BOEM implies that their review of these reports is unnecessary because “the design and fabrication of these components would occur under the supervision of the approved CVA” (Certified Verification Agent). That assertion misconstrues the role of the CVA. These agents, nominated and funded by the operator, provide third party oversight that is complementary to, not a substitute for, BOEM/BSEE project reviews.
According to this memo, DNV was the CVA for Vineyard Wind. Their insights on the turbine blade failure will presumably be included in BSEE’s investigation report.
“The order comes as the bureau continues its oversight and investigation into the July 13, 2024, turbine generator blade failure. The order continues to prohibit Vineyard Wind 1 from generating electricity from any of the facilities or building any additional wind turbine generator towers, nacelles, or blades. This order also requires Vineyard Wind 1 to submit to BSEE an analysis of the risk to personnel and mitigation measures developed prior to personnel boarding any facility. Vineyard Wind 1 is not restricted from performing other activities besides those specifically directed for suspension or additional analysis. For example, Vineyard Wind 1 is still permitted to install inter-array cables and conduct surveys outside of the damaged turbine’s safety exclusion zone.”
BSEE also advises that they are conducting their own investigation, and promises to release the findings to the public.
“A team of BSEE experts is onsite to work closely with Vineyard Wind on an analysis of the cause of the incident and next steps,” the agency said in a statement.
