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Posts Tagged ‘investigation’

On July 13, 2024, a Vineyard Wind (VW) turbine blade shattered and spread debris on Nantucket beaches and throughout the region.

In VW’s own words:

“As was widely reported in national and local news, in July 2024, one of the GER offshore blades collapsed and fell into the waters off Nantucket, necessitating a massive environmental cleanup, and a six-month construction hiatus during which GER performed a “root cause” analysis. That analysis concluded that 68 of the 72 GER blades installed at the Project (nearly all manufactured by GER in Gaspé, Canada) were also defective because they were inadequately bonded together, and were so poorly made that they were beyond repair. GER’s remediation plan required it to remove all of the blades and to replace all Gaspé blades with others manufactured at a different facility in Cherbourg, France.

Unsurprisingly, VW has found their contractor GE Renewables to be solely responsible for this troubling incident. However, as lessee and operator VW bears ultimate responsibility for all lease activities including the work of contractors, project design and management, fabrication and installation oversight, selection of the certified verification agent, and incident response.

Meanwhile, the Federal ( BSEE) investigation report has still not been issued. That report should provide an independent assessment of concerns discussed on this blog including quality control, regulatory departuresdebris recovery, and environmental impacts. The investigation is significant, not only for VW, but for other offshore wind projects planned or under construction, in the US and worldwide.

Keep in mind that the lengthy and complex National Commission, BOEMRE, Chief Counsel, and NAE reports on the 2010 Macondo blowout were published 6 to 17 months after the well was shut-in.

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Aban Pearl listing off Trinidad in August 2009 before sinking offshore Venezuela in 2010

Now that we are friends with Venezuela, can someone in the Administration ask them to release the report on the sinking of the Aban Pearl semisubmersible drilling rig in May 2010? This incident is of great interest to operating companies, safety regulators, and contractors worldwide.

Posts on the Aban Pearl sinking.

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Important and long overdue:

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Vineyard Wind turbine blade that was damaged on July 13, 2024, captured by a New Bedford commercial fisherman. Photo courtesy of Anthony Seiger

Excellent New Bedford Light piece on the unacceptable delay in completing the blade failure investigation report.

The Town of Nantucket’s attorney, Greg Werkheiser of Cultural Heritage Partners, told The Light last month that “it’s taken far too long” to get a final report on the blade failure. 

It’s noteworthy that there have also been unacceptable delays in issuing panel reports for serious offshore oil and gas incidents:

ncident datereport dateelapsed time (months)incident type
5/15/202110/31/202329.5fatality
1/24/20217/24/202330fatality
8/23/20202/15/202330fatality
7/25/20202/15/202331spill

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Damaged Vineyard Wind turbine; Kit Noble photo
BSEE statement to the Nantucket Current

Comparing the above BSEE statement with recent GE Venova (GE) statements:

  • GE: We were “granted approval to return to installing new blades on turbines at the project once stringent safety and operational conditions are met.” (Positive spin of the BSEE statement implying that approval is assured.)
  • GE: “We have finalized root cause analysis and confirm the blade at issue at Vineyard Wind was caused by a manufacturing deviation from our factory in Canada.” (Then why doesn’t BSEE have the analysis? Is the Canadian plant being scapegoated?)

Finally, as expected, we can now conclude that the blades being shipped from New Bedford to France were defective.

Rolldock Sun arriving in Cherbourg with defective blades

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damaged Vineyard Wind turbine – Cape Cod Times photo

BOEM’s long list of approved departures from the renewable energy regulations includes the eyebrow-raising approval of Vineyard Wind’s request to shortcut the review of design, fabrication, and installation reports.

Contrary to the regulations, Vineyard Wind was authorized to begin the fabrication of facilities before BOEM “received and offered no objections to the their Facility Design Report (FDR) and Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR).” The approval letter is attached, and excerpts (emphasis added) are pasted below. [Note: The requirement that was then at §585.700(b) is found at §585.632 in the current regulations.]

Vineyard Wind requests a regulatory departure from §585.700(b) requiring that fabrication of approved facilities not begin until BOEM provides notification that it has received and has no objections to the submitted Facility Design Report (FDR) and Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR). Vineyard Wind proposes to fabricate, but not install the following project elements:
1) Monopile foundations;
2) Electrical service platform;
3) Export cable;
4) Inter-array cables; and
5) Wind turbine generator facilities.

….allowing these fabrication activities to take place earlier in time would allow Vineyard Wind to adhere to its construction schedule, maintain its qualification for the Federal Investment Tax Credit, and meet its contractual obligations under the Power Purchase Agreements with Massachusetts distribution companies.

30 cfr 585.103 requires that a departure provide safety and environmental protection equal to or greater than the provision in the regulations that is waived. BOEM’s letter fails to explain how allowing fabrication to begin before fundamental design and fabrication reports are submitted and reviewed meets this test.

It’s noteworthy that GE Vernova has attributed the Vineyard Wind turbine blade failure to a fabrication issue. The FIR is thus particularly pertinent, because it addresses quality assurance measures, significant factors in the Vineyard Wind blade failure.

Perhaps even more troubling is BOEM’s response to subsequent requests by other companies to waive the FDR and FIR requirement (example). In these responses, BOEM asserts that their “current interpretation” is that no departure is needed because “the regulation prohibits only fabrication and installation activities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) itself.” How does that make sense given the important activities, including the fabrication of turbine blades and other turbine components, that take place onshore?

In their letters approving the Vineyard Wind and other departures, BOEM implies that their review of these reports is unnecessary because “the design and fabrication of these components would occur under the supervision of the approved CVA” (Certified Verification Agent). That assertion misconstrues the role of the CVA. These agents, nominated and funded by the operator, provide third party oversight that is complementary to, not a substitute for, BOEM/BSEE project reviews.

According to this memo, DNV was the CVA for Vineyard Wind. Their insights on the turbine blade failure will presumably be included in BSEE’s investigation report.

The Vineyard Wind and other departures reinforce concerns that BOEM’s commitment to promoting offshore wind and accelerating development influenced their regulatory decisions. This concern, along with the division of responsibilities between BOEM and BSEE, should be part of the Vineyard Wind investigation. Hopefully, the investigation panel will be accorded a high degree of independence.

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link

The order comes as the bureau continues its oversight and investigation into the July 13, 2024, turbine generator blade failure. The order continues to prohibit Vineyard Wind 1 from generating electricity from any of the facilities or building any additional wind turbine generator towers, nacelles, or blades. This order also requires Vineyard Wind 1 to submit to BSEE an analysis of the risk to personnel and mitigation measures developed prior to personnel boarding any facility. Vineyard Wind 1 is not restricted from performing other activities besides those specifically directed for suspension or additional analysis. For example, Vineyard Wind 1 is still permitted to install inter-array cables and conduct surveys outside of the damaged turbine’s safety exclusion zone.” 

BSEE also advises that they are conducting their own investigation, and promises to release the findings to the public.

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Nantucket Current photo

Appropriate response by BSEE.

Late Tuesday afternoon, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement said all operations are shut down until further notice.

“A team of BSEE experts is onsite to work closely with Vineyard Wind on an analysis of the cause of the incident and next steps,” the agency said in a statement.  

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Nord Stream AG has responded to their insurers’ a goverment did it, so we don’t have to pay” defense. Nord Stream’s full response, courtesy of Swedish engineer Erik Andersson, a leader in seeking the truth about the the pipeline sabotage, is linked.

Key excerpts from the Nord Stream AG filing (p.5):

(a) On their proper construction, in the context of Exclusion 2.i as a whole, the words “destruction of or damage to property by or under the order of any government or public or local authority” relate only to destruction or damage that arises out of or is related to the confiscation, nationalisation or requisition of therelevant property (and/or attempts thereat). In the premises, those words do not apply to the Damage.

(b) Alternatively, in the event that the Defendants establish that the Damage does constitute destruction of or damage to property by or under the order of any government, then it is therefore covered by the Deliberate Damage clause because it would have been “loss, damage, liability, cost or expense caused or inflicted by order of any governmental or regulatory body or agency” and Exclusion 2(i) to Section I does not apply: paragraphs 8 and 9.2 above are repeated.

If the insurers contend that one or more governments were responsible, shouldn’t they have to identify the government(s)? That would be nice. However, Erik doesn’t think the Nord Stream AG response puts the insurers in that politically difficult position. I agree. This case is about getting the insurers to pay for the damages, not identifying the responsible parties, something that the Swedes, Danes, and Germans have shied away from.

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The conclusion of the investigation is that Swedish jurisdiction does not apply and that the investigation therefore should be closed,” the Swedish Prosecution Authority said in a statement.

Reuters

Weak, very weak. Instant Not My Job Award classic.



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