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Posts Tagged ‘offshore safety’

The oil patch is known for booms, busts, mergers, and acquisitions. Hess is now among the once important offshore operators that no longer exist as separate companies. Others include Amoco, Arco, Texaco, Getty, Gulf, Unocal, Sun, Anadarko, BHP, Mobil, Phillips, Noble Energy, Pennzoil, Kerr-McGee, Superior, Nexen, and Newfield.

Hess would probably not have been a Chevron target had they not taken a chance in 2014 when they obtained a 30% position in Exxon’s Stabroek block offshore Guyana. The rest is history, and Stabroek is now the world’s most prized offshore block. Hess had other nice assets in the Gulf, Bakken Shale, and elsewhere, but Stabroek was Chevron’s primary target.

Paying the price for the Hess acquisition are up to 8,000 employees who will be axed by the end of 2026, starting with 575 cuts at the former Hess Tower in Houston on September 26 and matched reductions in Texas, California and North Dakota. The cuts also have to be disappointing to the Federal, Texas and North Dakota governments, given their strong support for oil and gas production. Mass layoffs don’t equate to energy dominance.

Why is the loss of Hess is significant:

  • Hess was a safety compliance leader in both 2023 and 2024.
  • Hess was an active participant in pre-merger lease sales.
  • The combined company is unlikely to be greater than the sum of the parts in terms of US lease acquisition, exploration, and development.
  • Combining companies limits the diversity of geological assessments and exploration strategies.
  • Consolidation limits participation on committees engaged in assessing technology and developing standards. Declining industry participation in these activities, which are critical to offshore safety, has been a historical concern of OCS program leadership.

When the merger was announced, Chevron’s CEO Mike Wirth was quoted as saying “We’ve got too many CEOs per BOE, so consolidation is natural.” That comment makes sense from the perspective of an acquiring CEO. Employees of the companies being acquired have a somewhat different view. They would prefer increasing exploration and production rather than reducing employees.

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Aban Pearl listing off Trinidad in August 2009 before sinking offshore Venezuela in 2010

Now that we are friends with Venezuela, can someone in the Administration ask them to release the report on the sinking of the Aban Pearl semisubmersible drilling rig in May 2010? This incident is of great interest to operating companies, safety regulators, and contractors worldwide.

Posts on the Aban Pearl sinking.

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Jason’s message, pasted in full below, is important for all who are associated with offshore oil and gas operations, in the US and internationally.

Be The Difference

On the Outer Continental Shelf, BSEE (or MMA) annually oversees ~70 million manhours of offshore personnel, production of >650 million barrels oil, and activities on ~1300 platforms and 75-90 rig / rig units. We all have a profound respect for the men and women who work offshore and put their lives on hold for 14-28 days to deliver much needed OCS production to meet the US demand, and that could not be clearer today.

Last month, Lou Holtz, a legendary coach and person passed away, and it reminded me of the rules of life he lived by and often promoted to others – 1) Do the right thing, 2) Do the best you can, and 3) Always show people you care.

Since February, BSEE has lost two great engineers, Tom Meyer and Bobby Nelson, who were both men of conviction. Tom and Bobby made a difference in all of us as they constantly worked with integrity, moral clarity, and high standards, choosing to act based on principles rather than preference or ease. While at BSEE, I have no doubt both of these men acted from internal motivation to adhere to their principles, not based on external applause or convenience. During their careers, both Tom and Bobby personified Lou Holtz’s rules of life.

Sixteen years ago, to this day, a phone call took place from the Deepwater Horizon to BP’s onshore office. The phone call discussed the anomalies encountered in the negative pressure test, and it was between the Well Site Leader and the lead drilling engineer. BP drilling engineer, Mark Hafle, allowed the temporary abandonment operations on the Deepwater Horizon to proceed even though he told Donald Vidrine, the Deepwater Horizon well site leader, that “you can’t have pressure on the drill pipe and zero pressure on the kill line in a [negative] test that is properly lined up.” Furthermore, Hafle did nothing to investigate or resolve the pressure differential issue even though he remained in BP’s office until 10:00 p.m. the evening of April 20 and had access to real‐time well data (which he logged out of at 5:27:35 p.m.). Hafle’s failure to investigate or resolve the negative test anomalies noted by Vidrine was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure that resulted in the Macondo blowout and 11 fatalities (Jason Anderson, Aaron Burkeen, Donald Clark, Stephen Curtis, Gordon Jones, Wyatt Kemp, Karl Kleppinger, Jr., Blair Manuel, Dewey Revette, Shane Roshto, Adam Weise).

Every day your actions, no matter how small, have a profound impact on others at the platform, in the company, and in industry. If you know something is not right, something is not possible, or even if you have doubt, consider being the difference.

For the remainder of the year, I challenge all of us, as regulators, to urge individuals on our teams to use their personal strengths to influence change rather than waiting for others to take initiative – including yourself. Also, promote the idea that one does not have to follow the crowd and can take a unique, personal stance to improve the offshore workplace. Be the difference just like Tom and Bobby.

Be The Difference and do whatever it takes to ensure the people offshore return from work the same way they arrived.

Respectfully, 

Jason P. Mathews

Petroleum Engineer

Field Operations – OSM

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Honored to be named Inspector of the Year. I’m sincerely thankful to my supervisor and the management involved for recognizing my commitment to this mission, and I’m proud to work alongside the Well Operations Inspection team, whose support and professionalism elevate all of us. This award reflects our shared dedication to safety and the environment.”

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Robert August Nelson 47921313

Robert “Bobby” Nelson, a beloved father and husband, and a highly respected engineer, died suddenly last Saturday.

Jason Mathews, a Supervisory Petroleum Engineer with the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, had this to say about his admired colleague:

A legacy is not just what you leave for others; it’s the impact of your presence, the influence of your actions, and the memories you create.

Bobby was an exceptional engineer, father, husband and friend who had a lasting impact on many of us. In fact, I would argue Bobby was one of the most impactful engineers in my tenure on developing and transforming younger engineers on how to think critically on complex offshore systems and processes.

Bobby’s legacy in my industry will push on for many years, and we are forever grateful for the time we had with him.”

More from his colleagues:

Bobby dedicated much of his professional life to BSEE, where he served as a Technical Advisor since January 2020, and for the previous seven years as Well Operations Section Chief and Drilling Engineer in the Houma District.

His expertise in well control, drilling engineering, and offshore regulatory compliance was invaluable. He contributed significantly as a subject matter expert and assistant content writer for the BSEE Well Control Rule Revision Team, helping shape post-Deepwater Horizon reforms, and provided technical insights on critical projects ranging from tropical cyclone risk assessments for floating rigs to hydrate pressure coring expeditions and incident investigations.  

Bobby’s commitment to safety and environmental stewardship on the Gulf of America’s Outer Continental Shelf left a lasting impact on his colleagues and the industry.

He is survived by his loving wife, Amber, whom he met at BSEE, and their young daughter. In this time of grief, please keep Bobby’s family in your thoughts and prayers.

Obituary

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Photos courtesy of Glenn’s sister and MMS colleague Eddie Lee Lim

On February 27, 2026, we lost a long-time pillar of the OCS safety program, the foremost authority on California offshore oil and gas operations, and a wonderful friend and colleague.

Glenn Shackell grew up in Hawthorne, California, where he lived most of his life. He attended Hawthorne High with the Beach Boys!

Glenn served as a helicopter door gunner during the Vietnam War, an extremely hazardous assignment. According to historical accounts, the average life expectancy of a door gunner was two weeks. Think about that! (See the door gunner video embedded below.)

Glenn discussed his Vietnam experience with Minerals Management Service (MMS) colleague Andrew Konczvald:

Glenn told me about encounters when the bullets were hitting the bottom of his Huey helicopter, and he was sitting on his personal armored jacket as the only protection against the bullets! He told me how he prayed every night and miraculously escaped wounds and returned home safely.

Thankfully, Glenn survived and returned to earn a Petroleum Engineering degree from the Univ. of Southern California. He was a proud USC Trojan.

Glenn had an outstanding career in our Pacific Region office, starting in the early days when the OCS regulatory program was part of the US Geological Survey. He assessed and monitored drilling and production operations in the region, which once produced 120,000 bopd from 23 platforms, and had up to 9 mobile drilling units operating concurrently. Floating drilling operations were pioneered offshore California with the CUSS 1, and production was extended to 1200 feet of water at Platform Harmony.

Glenn had an encyclopedic knowledge of the California offshore sector, and was an expert on the history of the applicable regulations, orders, and standards. We had countless discussions about topics like OCS Order No. 2 (Drilling) and the evolution of API RP 14C (Production Safety Systems).

Glenn served on numerous MMS teams that evaluated the latest technical innovations of the offshore industry, established research priorities, and assessed safety and environmental performance. He was an authority on drilling safety and was called on to evaluate and accredit well control training programs.

Glenn respected everyone, and everyone admired and respected him. He was a man of faith, but didn’t impose his beliefs on others. Fittingly, his favorite Bible passage was John 11:25-26: Jesus tells Martha, “I am the resurrection and the life. The one who believes in me will live, even though they die; and whoever lives by believing in me will never die.”

RIP Glenn, you continue to inspire your friends, and your important contributions to society live on. We love you man!

The HORRORS of Door Gunners in Vietnam:

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The International Regulators’ Forum Offshore Safety Conference, Oct. 9-10 in St. John’s Newfoundland, has an impressive agenda focusing on safety through innovation. Among the topics that caught my eye:

  • Human Factors & AI
  • Managing New Tech with Old Regulations
  • Regulatory Sandboxes: Capture vs. Collaboration
  • How can AI and emerging technologies be used in risk management trending and operations?
  • Why are we not learning from accidents?
  • Breakthroughs in investigation techniques and sharing

The first IRF Conference was held 20 years ago in London followed by the 2007 conference at the Trump International Resort in Miami (little did we know 😀). More historical background.

The informed, diverse viewpoints about managing and regulating offshore operations sets these conferences apart from your typical professional events. The 2025 conference is highly recommended for those interested in offshore operations, risk mitigation, and regulatory policy.

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The table below captures the shorter public comments and provides links to the longer ones. They are listed in the order they were posted on Regulations.gov.

commentersummary/link
anonymousI recommend under no circumstance that we allow the onsite worker to approve the commingling of bore holes because there is extreme significant safety and environmental hazards that exist.
The best alternative is to have an environmental engineer and environmental scientist approve any commingling
Our Children’s Trust…your regulatory proposal is inconsistent with the federal law, the best available science on protecting the health and lives of children, and the legal mandate that agency decision-making does not deprive children of their fundamental constitutional rights…
E.P. DanenbergerSee BOE post
anonymousI support updating the regulations to align with the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, but I encourage BSEE to ensure that safety standards and environmental protections remain the highest priority in all commingling approvals. Clear guidance for industry compliance and transparent public reporting would also strengthen confidence in this rule.
Ananda FosterRegulations need to catch up with technology and we have not had a chance to do that yet. If you allow them on throttle access, they will destroy it. We all rely on the ocean, how can you do this to your own constituents?
APISupports direct final rule
bp AmericaSupports direct final rule

Legislatively dictating well construction, completion, or operational approvals is a redline for me, and I continue to strongly believe the downhole commingling rule should be published as a draft for public review and comment.

The only industry comments are from API and bp America. Both support the direct final rule, and I respect their position. My main quarrel is with the legislative action that put us in this position.

I have had many disagreements with API members over the years, but the dialogue has always been professional. Technical and policy disagreements are healthy for the OCS program, and I will continue to raise potential issues and concerns on this blog.

With regard to bp, I have been impressed by their commitment to the Gulf of America, as summarized in this excerpt from their comments:

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John Borne was an exceptional engineer and offshore safety leader in our OCS oil and gas program during the US Geological Survey (Conservation Div.) and Minerals Management Service (MMS) eras.

Some thoughts on John’s leadership followed by tributes from distinguished colleagues:

  • John’s Houma District office was a model for the rest of the OCS program. Houma was the program’s busiest district in terms of operational activity, and the most effective in meeting permitting, inspection, and investigation targets.
  • The few serious accidents that occurred in the District were carefully investigated and the findings were shared in a timely manner with the goal of preventing their recurrence. If John signed a report, you knew it was complete and accurate.
  • John was knowledgeable about the complex offshore oil and gas operations he regulated, and was an outstanding teacher and mentor.
  • John treated all companies the same from the super-majors to the small independents – no biases, no favors, and no ethics issues.
  • John expected companies to fully comply with the regulations. Any departures had to be clearly in the best interest of safety and the environment.

From Ken Arnold (ex-Shell engr, Paragon Engineering President, NAE): As part of the Shell Training program in 1964 I was assigned to trail John in East Bay for a week.  One night I was talking to another trainee on a logging barge tied up to a posted barge rig in SP Blk 24.  John was also on the barge.  Without warning the barge started pulling away from the rig.  The three of us jumped from the barge to the rig but I slipped and fell in the canal.  I don’t think I was in the water long enough to get wet, when John and a rig hand fished me out.  Unfortunately my glasses fell off and were in the mud.  John got a scissors device and retrieved my glasses in a matter of minutes.

I greatly appreciated my week with John.  What he took the time to teach me about field work was critical to my subsequent successful career in Shell and in Paragon.  He was a gentleman and a first class teacher.  I was lucky to have known him.

Jodie Connor (founder and retired President of J. Connor Consulting): John was an excellent representative of the MMS, always fair in his decision-making and approvals. I endearingly called him “By the Book Borne”. He enforced the regulations as they were written, which was fair to all operators. Always kind and willing to explain MMS policies. 

Lars Herbst (retired MMS/BSEE Regional Director, Gulf of Mexico): What a legend at MMS! A testament to his leadership are the number of Regional leaders that came out of Houma District. Just to name a few: Mike Saucier, Bryan Domangue, Troy Trosclair, and even Jack Leezy! That work ethic that John instilled has continued even to the next generation of leadership! I was fortunate that John let me act as Drilling Engineer when Saucier went hunting each December. My career at MMS was never the same after that opportunity!

Jack Leezy: (President, Avenger Consulting, retired MMS): John served in the Marine Corp during the Korean war.  Upon discharge from the Marine Corp John attend the University of Lafayette and earned a BS degree in Petroleum Engineering.  John started his oilfield career when he went to work for Shell Oil in 1960 until 1970 as a Petroleum Engineer.

John joined U.S.G.S. In 1970 as a Petroleum Engineer in the Lafayette District.  John accepted a promotion in 1972 in the Regional office and was selected as the first District Supervisor in the newly formed Houma District office in October1974.  John remained as the District Supervisor until his retirement in 1995.  John was instrumental in developing Bureau policies of which some are still in place as of today.  John served on countless MMS and industry committees alike during his career.  John was looked upon as professional and highly respected by MMS and industry alike.  He performed is duties in such a way that even if you may not have liked his decision, you respected it.  John’s demeanor never changed as he never lost his composure and worked evenly though all the trials and tribulations during his career at MMS.  John even won MMS’s Engineer of the Year award.  I owe a lot to John in helping me form my career at MMS as I tried to handle my supervisory duties in the same manner in which John did.

RIP John. You were a superstar! As an engineer, regulator, leader, teacher, and colleague, no one did it better!

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The “One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025” (OBBB), Public Law 119-21, which was signed into law on July 4, 2025, includes a significant offshore production directive (section 50102) that has received little public attention:

The Secretary of the Interior shall approve a request of an operator to commingle oil or gas production from multiple reservoirs within a single wellbore completed on the outer Continental Shelf in the Gulf of America Region unless the Secretary of the Interior determines that conclusive evidence establishes that the commingling—(1) could not be conducted by the operator in a safe manner; or (2) would result in an ultimate recovery from the applicable reservoirs to be reduced in comparison to the expected recovery of those reservoirs if they had not been commingled.”

This is, to the best of my knowledge, the first time in the history of the OCS oil and gas program that Congress has directed the safety regulator to approve well completion practices that could increase safety, environmental, and resource conservation risks.

Rather than calling for the operator to demonstrate that a downhole commingling plan is safe and optimizes resource recovery, the plan must be approved unless BSEE proves conclusively that the operation could not be conducted safely or that resource recovery would be reduced. This is the antithesis of the operator responsibility doctrine, a fundamental principle of the OCS regulatory program, and safety management principles that call for the operator to demonstrate that safety, environmental, and resource conservation risks have been effectively addressed.

Only 40 days after the OBBB was signed, BSEE published a direct final rule implementing the downhole commingling directive. This is warp speed for promulgating a Federal regulation! In keeping with the rush to finalize the rule, the preamble asserts that “notice and comment are unnecessary because this rule is noncontroversial; of a minor, technical nature; and is unlikely to receive any significant adverse comments.”

I intend to submit comments prior to the Sept. 12 deadline. These comments will assert that the rule does not qualify for an exemption from the Administrative Procedures Act’s public review and comment requirement. I will also recommend that BSEE consider hosting a public forum during the comment period to present their research on downhole commingling and discuss the risk mitigations.

Below are some of the issues/questions that should be considered during the public comment period:

  • BSEE’s own fact sheet acknowledges the well-known pressure differential, crossflow, and fluid compatibility risks associated with downhole commingling. The public should have the opportunity to provide input on the extent to which “intelligent completions” and other production technology are effective in mitigating these risks.
  • The industry-funded Univ. of Texas (UT) study, which led to a relaxation of downhole commingling restrictions, was specific to the “unique Paleogene Gulf of Mexico fields.” Does BSEE have evidence that supports the applicability of the study to other fields?
  • The authors of the UT study acknowledged that their findings were based on a “simple but reasonable geological base case model.” They also acknowledged the need for “a more comprehensive study using advanced geological models to explore additional geological features.” What are BSEE’s plans for additional research?
  • Should an independent assessment of Gulf of America downhole commingling safety and resource recovery risks be conducted before finalizing a rule that essentially mandates approval of all applications?
  • BSEE’s April 2025 policy change raised the allowable pressure differential for commingling production in Paleogene (Wilcox) reservoirs from 200 psi to 1500 psi. Unlike the policy update, the new rule includes no boundaries whatsoever.
  • What criteria will BSEE use in determining that there is “conclusive evidence” that a commingling request would be unsafe or would reduce ultimate resource recovery? Will BSEE disapprove any requests outside the parameters in the current policy guidance or subsequent updates?

There are many more issues that remain to be discussed, which is why the downhole commingling rule should be published in draft form, with a comment period of at least 90 days.

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