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Archive for the ‘well control incidents’ Category

The Platform Habitat fire was extinguished at 11:40 a.m. on 5/11/2026 after burning for 5 hours.

All 26 workers were safely evacuated from DCOR’s Platform Habitat. The big question now is the fitness of the structure for continuing well plugging/abandonment and platform decommissioning.

As indicated in the attached letter, BSEE had informed DCOR that their Pitas Point Unit leases (where Platform Habitat is located) expired on 3/15/2016 owing to the cessation of well operations 6 months prior. Following the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) May 7, 2021 affirmation of BSEE’s directive, DCOR was notified that they must permanently plug all wells within one year of the lease termination (i.e. one year after the 2021 IBLA decision). I’ll include the informative IBLA decision in a future post.

Although details have not been shared, it appears that well plugging operations were still ongoing on 5/11/2026 when the fire occurred. According to BSEE’s borehole file, most of the Habitat wells have been temporarily abandoned, but few have been permanently abandoned, and several are still completed (i.e. neither temporarily nor permanently abandoned).

The risks and costs associated with delaying well plugging and abandonment have once again been demonstrated at Habitat. Fortunately, there were no casualties or pollution.

With regard to overall safety compliance, DCOR is the violations leader in the Pacific Region. In 2025 and 2026 (YTD) they were cited for 70 violations, 66 of which required component or facility shut-ins. The age of the 9 DCOR platforms (installed by others between 1968 and 1984) has likely contributed to the compliance challenges.

BSEE spreadsheets for 2020-2024 show 6 incidents at Platform Habitat. BSEE’s incident summaries are pasted in the second attachment.

Neither DCOR nor BSEE has issued a statement on the Habitat fire.

This serious incident further demonstrates the concerns expressed by John Smith and me about the relaxed decommissioning financial assurance regulations proposed by BOEM.

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  • Crew safely evacuated
  • Prompt response by the USCG and local fire agencies
  • Gas leak during decommissioning operations
  • Fire began at 0700 PT; controlled by 1100 PT
  • 45 year old platform; no longer producing
  • Operated by DCOR LLC
  • No environmental threat
  • Habitat was the only California OCS platform that produced dry natural gas (minimal oil or condensate)
Habitat is SSE of Santa Barbara

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I am again sharing this touching tribute to the 11 men who lost their lives on the Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010. The video is introduced by country singer Trace Atkins, a former Gulf of Mexico rig worker. The video and Trace’s song serve as a memorial to the 11 Deepwater Horizon workers and others who have died exploring for and producing oil and gas around the world. Please take a moment to watch.

Macondo revisited series:

Reiterating this proposal: Make April 20th International Offshore Safety Day to honor those who have been killed or injured, to recognize the many workers who provide energy for our economies and way of life, and to encourage safety leadership by all offshore operators, contractors, and service companies.

Deepwater Horizon Memorial, New Orleans

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This picture was posted on the “Rig Pigs” Facebook page by Huston Funk. Per Huston: First crew photo from the Deepwater Horizon. Taken in the Indian Ocean after we had left Singapore.”

Commenters identified 3 Macondo victims in the photo: Jason Anderson, Don Clark, and Stephen Curtis 🙏

Tribute to the Deepwater Horizon victims

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(from the BOE archives)

Vineyard Wind’s finest! Note the blade failures!

Wild Well Control!

Our North Atlantic District crew, Hyannis, Halloween 1981 <sigh>

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Earlier this week a tree service company was removing some large branches in our backyard. The 2 young workers stopped the job before they finished. They knocked on our door and told me that their foreman was off and they were uncomfortable tackling a large, high branch without him and a crane operator. They would come back with a full crew.

I congratulated them and told them they did exactly the right thing. I told them I was involved with offshore safety and many serious incidents would have been prevented if workers, with their employers encouragement, had been more assertive in stopping work. Developing that type of culture takes time and requires strong leadership and consistent, unambiguous messaging. Leadership matters, both at the site and in the office!

The Macondo well is a worst case example on many fronts, including the reluctance or inability of management and workers to stop taking actions that increased well control risks. Given the narrow pore pressure/fracture gradient, the prudent decision would have been to set a cement plug in the open hole and carefully assess next steps. However, delays and cost overruns were the overriding concerns, and well construction continued despite the long list of issues described here. Sadly, we know how that worked out.

Even after the well started to flow, the crew had time to actuate the emergency disconnect sequence and avert disaster. However, some combination of deficient training, uncertain authority, and fear of repercussions prevented that from happening.

Be it a small tree service company or a major oil company, safety culture development is a journey that has no end point and requires continuous leadership from everyone in the organization.

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Guyana’s Oil Spill Bill (attached) has much in common with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that we implemented for US offshore faciities and the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation that I attended in 1990. A couple of issues warrant highlighting:

Operator/licensee responsibility:The definitions correctly establish the operator or license holder as the responsible party. This means that in the event of a well blowout while drilling from a mobile drilling unit, the licensee/operator would be the responsible party. This aligns with the “operator responsibility” mantra that is fundamental to the US offshore program. Drilling and other contractors are managed by the operator and are the operator’s responsibility.

Unlimited liability: The liability section (Part VI) establishes an unlimited liability standard for the responsible party. As previously discussed in more detail, this is a daunting, open-ended obligation that would trouble permittees in any industry. The unlimited liability provision could preclude responsible independent operators, including Guyanese companies, from seeking licenses.

The unlimited liability standard (par. 17) is qualified with a provision (pasted below) that also favors major international companies.

The unlimited liability provision therefore does not seem to apply to parent companies idemnifying a project. This was a point of contention during the parliamentary debate. The Kaieteur News delves into the issue and is not entirely convinced by the Government’s defense. Their article closes as follows:

It is important to note that stakeholders have argued that since ExxonMobil Guyana Limited (the responsible party) does not have adequate assets, the burden of oil spill-related costs could be left on Guyana, especially in the absence of unlimited coverage from the parent company. These and other “flaws” have prompted Guyanese to urge President Irfaan Ali not to assent to the Bill, passed in the National Assembly on May 16, 2025. Be that as it may, the Ministry maintained that the “robust statutory framework now established protects Guyana and its people.”

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Coast Guard photo. Thanks to Lars Herbst for bringing this incident to my attention.

In what the Coast Guard is describing as an “uncontrolled discharge” (euphemism for blowout), an 82-year-old oil well has been spewing oil, gas, and water into the coastal marshes of southern Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, for more than a week.

In hopes of future production, prior and current owners had elected not to permanently plug the well, apparently with the State’s acquiescence.

The well is currently operated by an affiliate of Spectrum Energy. Typical of these situations, the previous owner, Whitney Oil and Gas, was in bankruptcy.

The Coast Guard has taken over the response and has accessed the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.

We don’t need relaxed decommissioning and financial assurance requirements. We need a cooperative Federal, State, and industry effort to ensure that wells are plugged in a timely manner and that financial assurance is provided to protect the public interest.

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I am again sharing this touching tribute to the 11 men who lost their lives on the Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010. The video is introduced by country singer Trace Atkins, a former Gulf of Mexico rig worker. The video and Trace’s song serve as a memorial to the 11 Deepwater Horizon workers and others who have died exploring for and producing oil and gas around the world. Please take a moment to watch.

Deepwater Horizon Memorial, New Orleans

Macondo revisited series:

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Pioneering offshore engineer J.L. Daeschler, a Frenchman who lives in Scotland and has worked on drilling rigs worldwide, shared his 1974 training certificate signed by Bill Hise, the first director of the Blowout Prevention and Well Control Training Center at LSU. JL recalls his training:

The LSU well control course was new and very well organized. Training options were limited at that time. LSU took a step forward and incorporated equipment donated by Cameron Iron Works, Armco Steel /National, VETCO, and others.

The course was split between indoor class room style and outdoor training on a live well to remind us of the real things, like hard hats, tally books, and safety shoes.

LSU had a 1200 ft vertical well and a small 2″ diameter gas injection line to create a bottom hole gas kick, using a nitrogen truck as the supply. (note: the live well was a first for any well control school.) You had a choice of several manual chokes.  I selected the Cameron Willis choke to circulate the gas kick out with no increase in mud weight (drillers method).

The mud return level, kick detection, and general management of the operation were realistic as if on a rig. The gas would whistle and escape thru a vent line.

The training was simple and effective in that proper well control procedures were learned. In the process, there were many errors. Mud was seen flying out of the mud shaker/pits. School management would bring things under control and explain the errors that were made !!!

Given the importance of minimizing drilling risks, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) was the primary funder of the LSU facility. MMS predecessor, the Conservation Division of USGS, first established well control training requirements in 1975 (pasted below).

LSU’s well control center video:

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