Per EIA, September Gulf of Mexico production averaged 2 million bopd on the button! New production from Vito and Argos were no doubt contributors, as production reached the 2 million bopd mark for only the third month in the history of the OCS program. The other 2 months were in 2019.
Imagine what US offshore production might be if the OCS oil and gas program was actually managed to succeed!
Also, as the official hurricane season comes to a close today, we are fortunate in that there have been no production shut-ins from tropical storms in 2023.
Nestled on the northern tip of South America, the small nation of Guyana, now the fastest growing economy in the world, will become the continent’s second biggest oil producer by 2027.
Further to the announcement of 9th November, the Company has been informed by the counterparty that had been identified as a preferred potential partner, that they no longer wish to pursue further discussions in relation to participation in the Walton Morant Licence. The Company will now focus on the recent positive interest that has been shown by other parties in potentially participating in this high impact exploration opportunity and United and our advisors will continue in our efforts to secure a partner. The Board believes that the renewed interest in exploration opportunities worldwide which is being driven by the strong future demand for oil and gas, will support our farmout efforts.
The Company continues to engage with the Jamaican authorities to secure an extension to the current licence period which expires at the end of January 2024, with a negotiated work programme that comprises additional technical work that would further de-risk the licence prior to the drilling of the exploration well. This work is aimed at materially enhancing the risked value of the Company’s interest in the Licence. Additional updates on both the farmout process and licence extension will be provided in due course
I’m very curious about the companies that United has been talking to, but that information is understandably being withheld. I would hope that the Jamaican government is being kept informed, since they will presumably have to approve the farmout.
Conducting “additional technical work” is a common lease/license extension tactic. It will be interesting to see how the Jamaican government responds, particularly if a firm date for an exploratory well has not been provided.
Mining’s larger future will rest largely on how ISA (the International Seabed Authority) finalizes its rule book amid the rush to scour the seafloor. ISA has arare chance to regulate an industry before the industry has begun.
Thoughts:
Deep sea mining is not an entirely new industry. The technology and procedures evolved from other industries, most notably deepwater drilling, and from decades of ocean exploration. Keep in mind that the Hidden Gem mining vessel is a converted deepwater drillship.
The offshore oil and gas industry’s risk assessment and safety management practices can be adapted to deep-sea mining.
Effective regulations are not static. The deep-sea mining regulations should not be considered “final” when they are blessed by ISA and the governing body.
The more prescriptive elements of regulations are dependent on operational experience, observations, and performance data. These must evolve over time.
Timely revisions to equipment and procedural requirements through updates to operator management systems and industry standards are critical. In most cases, formally revising regulations takes much too long and is an ineffective means of mitigating emerging risks.
Long, detailed regulations are indicative of a weak regulatory regime, not a strong one. Optimal regulations specify goals, not methods, and are implemented by focused regulators who inquire, challenge, analyze, and where necessary penalize.
The respective roles of the operating companies and the regulating authority must be clearly articulated.
With continuous improvement as the primary objective, the regulator should develop a strategy for measuring safety and environmental performance.
News articles are reporting that The Metals Company is conducting studies in the Pacific. These articles erroneously include a file photo of the Hidden Gem, which is not involved with this research. The MV Coco, an impressive research vessel that is pictured below with the obligatory Greenpeace protesters, is conducting the studies.
On a related note, below is an interesting video about last year’s nodule recovery trials using the Hidden Gem’s integrated collection system.
Firstly, taking 2.5 years to publish an investigation report is unacceptable for an organization with BSEE’s talent, resources, and safety mandate. Unfortunately, such delays now seem to be the rule as the summary table (below) for the last 4 panel reports demonstrates. The most recent report implies that the actual investigation was completed in 2-3 months. Why were another 2+ years needed to publish the report? (Note that the lengthy and complex National Commission, BOEMRE, Chief Counsel, and NAE reports on the Macondo blowout were published 6 to to 17 months after the well was shut-in.)
incident date
report date
elapsed time (months)
incident type
5/15/2021
10/31/2023
29.5
fatality
1/24/2021
7/24/2023
30
fatality
8/23/2020
2/15/2023
30
fatality
7/25/2020
2/15/2023
31
spill
Four most recent BSEE panel reports
The subject (May 2021) fatality occurred during a casing integrity pressure test, and some of the risk factors were familiar:
The platform was installed 52 years prior to the incident, and had been shut-in for more than a year.
The well of concern (#27) was drilled in 1970, sidetracked in 1995, and last produced in February 2013.
Diagnostic tests clearly demonstrated communication between the tubing, production casing, and surface casing.
In light of the known well integrity issues and the absence of production for more than 8 years, the prudent action would have been to plug and abandon the well in a timely manner. However, under 30 CFR 250.526 as interpreted at the time, Fieldwood had another option – submit a casing pressure request to BSEE to confirm the integrity of the outermost 16″ casing and (per p. 10 of the report) “continue to operate the well in its existing condition.” Given that the well had not produced for 8 years and that the platform had been shut-in for more than a year, the option to continue operating the well should not have been applicable.
The only issue for Fieldwood to resolve with the regulator should have been the timing of the plugging operation. Additional well diagnostics would only serve to create new risks and further delay the well’s abandonment.
The resulting pressure test of the outermost (16″) casing was solely for the purpose of confirming a second well bore barrier. Per the report (p.10), there is a “known frequency of outermost casings in the GOM experiencing a loss of integrity as a result of corrosion.” Whether or not the 16″ casing passed the test, the inactive well had clear integrity issues and should have been plugged.
Fieldwood proceeded with the pressure test rather than correcting the problem. The regulations, as interpreted, thus facilitated the unsafe actions that followed. These factors heightened the operational risks:
Extensive scaffolding and a standby boat were needed for the test.
Process gas via temporary test equipment was used to conduct the test.
The Field-Person In Charge (PIC) heard about the test for the first time on the morning of the incident.
The PIC and victim had no procedures to follow, and had to figure out how to conduct the test on the fly.
A high pressure hose was connected without a pressure regulator or pressure safety valve.
The digital pressure gauge had two measurement modes, one to display pressure in psi and the other in bars. (One bar is equivalent to 14.5 psi. Assuming that the readings were in psi rather than bars would thus result in serious overpressure of the casing.)
Seconds after the victim told the field-PIC the pressure was 175 psi (presumably 175 bar and 2538 psi), the casing ruptured. The force of the explosion propelled the victim into the handrail approximately 4 feet away, which bent from the impact. The victim’s hardhat was projected 60 to 80 feet upwards, lodging into the piping.
The investigation report fails to address the wisdom of conducting the pressure test and the regulatory weaknesses that enabled Fieldwood to defer safety critical well plugging operations. The pressure test option in 30 CFR § 250.526, was not intended for long out-of-service wells with demonstrated well integrity issues. The only acceptable option was corrective action (plugging the well) without further delay. The pressure test option added risks without addressing the fundamental problem and helped enable the operator to further delay decommissioning obligations.
Postscript: According to BOEM data, the lease where the fatal incident occurred expired on 7/31/2021. Per the BSEE Borehole and structures files, neither the platform (#14) nor any of the other 4 structures remaining on the lease have been removed, and the well (#27) has yet to be plugged.
Current structure count:1438 (Per BSEE’s platform structures online query, the number of non-removed structures is 1554. The reason for the discrepancy is unclear; perhaps the dashboard number is more current.)
Structures with decom application submittal: 291
Total structures on terminated leases: 318
Structures on terminated leases with decom application submittal: 196
Planned disposition of the 291 pending removals (25% of the structures to be reefed):
Karoon Energy, an Australian company, has entered the Gulf of Mexico in a big way by acquiring an interest in the Who Dat field (winner of BOE’s best field name award!) from LLOG. For more information on the acquisition, see Karoon’s slide at the end of this post. The full presentation is here.
To learn more about the cultural importance of ‘Who Dat,’ see the youtube clip below, or read this article. For more in-depth ‘Who dat’ history, this wiki page is quite good.
An excellent compliance and incident update by Jason Mathews is attached. BSEE’s focus on risk assessment, compliance and incident trends, high potential near-misses, medivac capabilities, hot work safety, lifting operations, and gas releases is encouraging. Good work by the folks in BSEE’s Gulf of Mexico Region.
Observations:
Zero 2023 occupational fatalities through Q3. Hoping this holds through the end of the year and beyond.
INCs/component are down but INCs/inspection are slightly higher. This may imply a relative increase in the inspection of high component deepwater facilities.
No. of hours worked is increasing; good sign for the offshore program.
Hand and finger injuries are driving up the injury count.
Well control incidents are stable at a low level.
Improved fire data help facilitate risk assessments
No YTD explosions
No. of collisions is down
10 YTD spills> 1 barrel (total volume not specified)
Some evidence of decline in lifting incidents in Q2 and Q3
Gas releases are up (aging facilities, decommissioning related?)
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 