“As was widely reported in national and local news, in July 2024, one of the GER offshore blades collapsed and fell into the waters off Nantucket, necessitating a massive environmental cleanup, and a six-month construction hiatus during which GER performed a “root cause” analysis. That analysis concluded that 68 of the 72 GER blades installed at the Project (nearly all manufactured by GER in Gaspé, Canada) were also defective because they were inadequately bonded together, and were so poorly made that they were beyond repair. GER’s remediation plan required it to remove all of the blades and to replace all Gaspé blades with others manufactured at a different facility in Cherbourg, France.“
Unsurprisingly, VW has found their contractor GE Renewables to be solely responsible for this troubling incident. However, as lessee and operator VW bears ultimate responsibility for all lease activities including the work of contractors, project design and management, fabrication and installation oversight, selection of the certified verification agent, and incident response.
Meanwhile, the Federal ( BSEE) investigation report has still not been issued. That report should provide an independent assessment of concerns discussed on this blog including quality control,regulatory departures, debris recovery, and environmental impacts.The investigation is significant, not only for VW, but for other offshore wind projects planned or under construction, in the US and worldwide.
Keep in mind that the lengthy and complex National Commission, BOEMRE, Chief Counsel, and NAE reports on the 2010 Macondo blowout were published 6 to 17 months after the well was shut-in.
Pointing to the potential financial implications for GE Vernova, Recharge News cites this serious fraud accusationby Vineyard Wind (VW):
“This exceptional misconduct includes [GE Vernova’s] intentional scheme to falsify critical quality assurance data… and to intentionally misrepresent the quality of those blades to [Vineyard Wind] in a brazen fraudulent, and willful breach of the TSA, ultimately resulting in the catastrophic blade failure…”
Recharge also discusses the findings of the Project Engineer appointed by VW to resolve claims between parties. Under the terms of the contract, the engineer’s determinations are binding unless overturned in arbitration.
The engineer determined that GE Vernova was liable for project delays, blade defects, vessel costs, and a $185m rescission of previously certified payments.
The damage claims issued by the project engineer total $853m.
On the basis of those determinations, VW withheld 100% of the outstanding invoices issued by GE Vernova. Even netted against sums allegedly owed to GE Vernova, VW says the turbine maker owes around $545m.
Per the contract, there are no limitations on liability in cases of “fraud, gross negligence, deliberate default or willful misconduct.”
My take: VW’s charges against GE Vernova will be resolved in the courts. However, VW is the lessee and operator, and is thus the party responsible to the Federal govt for project safety and environmental protection.
Operator responsibility is a fundamental tenet of the OCS regulatory program. As lessee/operator, VW bears ultimate responsibility for project safety and environmental protection.
VW is responsible for contractor selection, management, and oversight.
If a contractor violates a regulation, the violation notice is given to the operator. If a contractor causes pollution, the operator is responsible for the cleanup.
DNV, the Certified Verification Agent (CVA) hired by VW, was required to verify the design, fabrication, and installation procedures. Did they raise any issues to VW and the regulators?
Did the division of responsibilities between BOEM and BSEE weaken regulatory oversight? BOEM, ostensibly just the leasing bureau, should not have been authorized to grant departures that could affect structural integrity and operational safety.
It’s surprising that VW has not been cited for civil penalties resulting from the blade failure and the resulting environmental damage.
How can a judge prevent a contractor from stopping work for an operator that has filed serious fraud allegations against the contractor, has stopped making payments, and has, along with the Governor, declared the project to be complete?
The transition reflects more than a decade of operational experience managing offshore resources. By consolidating the planning, permitting, inspection, and enforcement responsibilities currently divided between BOEM and BSEE, the Department aims to:
Improve coordination and consistency
Reduce duplication of efforts
Strengthen oversight and environmental safeguards
Modernize organizational structure
All current regulatory responsibilities and protections will remain in place throughout the transition. There will be no disruption to permitting, environmental reviews, or enforcement activities.
What to Expect
Phased Transition: Internal alignment activities begin soon.
No Regulatory Rollbacks: Existing requirements remain in full effect.
New Website and Branding: The Marine Minerals Administration’s full digital presence will launch in the coming months.
A New York Times article suggests that the consolidation of BOEM and BSEE into the Marine Minerals Administration will weaken environmental oversight. It will not. On the contrary, regulation is likely to be strengthened as resources shift from inter-bureau coordination and redundancy management to the primary safety and environmental protection missions.
Given the challenges associated with Federal reorganizations, agency heads often opt for the status quo. I’m pleased that the current DOI leadership team, with whom I disagree on some issues, chose to merge the bureaus.
Quotes from the NYT article followed by my comments:
NYT:The Trump administration is creating a new office that critics say could weaken the environmental oversight of oil drilling and seabed mining in territorial waters.
Comment: The functional overlap and associated uncertainty that permeates the offshore regulatory regime is a weakness, not a strength. Virtually every element of the regulatory program requires coordination between the two bureaus. This includes plan and permit approvals, decommissioning and financial assurance, spill response plans, lease stipulations, assignments, pipeline regulation, environmental reviews, enforcement actions, and geologic data collection and review. Note the list of MOUs that are intended to coordinate BOEM and BSEE redundancy. The documents often do more to confuse than clarify. For example, see the MOU entitled “Environmental and NEPA.”
Multi-bureau organizational complexity is not in the best interest of safety and environmental protection. Overlapping responsibilities, coordination challenges, and “turf” issues distract the technical staff from their important risk management duties, the work they are good at and enjoy doing. BSEE and BOEM should be overseeing the offshore industry, not each other.
NYT:The new agency, the Marine Minerals Administration, will be formed by reunifying two offices that had been split up after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in an effort to increase environmental oversight of the energy industry and prevent future oil disasters. After the split, the Interior Department’s oil-leasing activities were separated from environmental regulation and financial management. (emphasis added)
Comment: The assertion that the leasing and environmental regulation were separated is false. The leasing bureau (BOEM) was assigned lead responsibility for the review and approval of the fundamental operational planning documents – Exploration Plans, Development and Production Plans, and Development Operations Coordination Documents. This includes the environmental reviews pursuant to NEPA.
NYT:The move is “worrisome because it has the potential of bringing things back where they were, where there was this inherent conflict of interest between promotion of offshore oil and gas, and oversight safety,” according to Donald Boesch, emeritus professor at the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science.
“In recent years various bodies have concluded that certain MMS offices and programs have violated ethical rules or guidelines. In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, some questioned whether ethical lapses played any role in causing the blowout. The Chief Counsel‘s team found no evidence of any such lapses.“
NYT:The new bureau will also take on oversight of the Trump administration’s plans to lease waters in U.S. territories to deep-sea mining companies. The first of these sales, according to the spokeswoman for the Interior Department, are likely to happen next year.
Comment: DOI’s marine minerals program is decades old and is a priority for the current administration. Reorganization should not affect the MMA’s capability to oversee these activities.
The name is especially fitting given that 1947’s first acquisition, Renaissance Offshore, operates entirely on the Gulf shelf (map below). Renaissance is a significant shelf producer ranking 19th among all Gulf operators in both oil (791,572 bbls) and gas (1,335,009 mcf) production in 2025. Renaissance ranked 6th in oil production and 7th in gas production among companies that focus on the shelf.
A challenge for 1947 will be improving Renaissance’s compliance and safety record:
Renaissance has averaged 0.93 violations (INCs) per inspection since 1/1/2020, trailing only Cox legacy Array in INC frequency.
In 2019, a worker fell to his death at the Renaissance Eugene Island 331 B platform. BSEE’s investigation found that Renaissance failed to maintain all of its walking and working surfaces in a safe condition, that supervisors failed to promptly correct or prevent employees from accessing the uncorrected and uncontrolled walking and working surface hazard area, and that Renaissance and its contractors failed to follow the agreed upon terms and conditions within their respective Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) bridging arrangements. (Renaissance incurred a seemingly modest $105,292 civil penalty for this incident. There is no public information on any settlement with the victim’s family.)
“Between 2012 and 2014 Renaissance grew substantially with the acquisition of sixteen Gulf of Mexico producing fields, fifteen of which are operated and most are 100% owned.” 1947’s financial strength is unclear. Hopefully, BOEM will verify that satisfactory decommissioning financial assurance arrangements are in place before any lease assignments are approved.
Jason’s message, pasted in full below, is important for all who are associated with offshore oil and gas operations, in the US and internationally.
Be The Difference
On the Outer Continental Shelf, BSEE (or MMA) annually oversees ~70 million manhours of offshore personnel, production of >650 million barrels oil, and activities on ~1300 platforms and 75-90 rig / rig units. We all have a profound respect for the men and women who work offshore and put their lives on hold for 14-28 days to deliver much needed OCS production to meet the US demand, and that could not be clearer today.
Last month, Lou Holtz, a legendary coach and person passed away, and it reminded me of the rules of life he lived by and often promoted to others – 1) Do the right thing, 2) Do the best you can, and 3) Always show people you care.
Since February, BSEE has lost two great engineers, Tom Meyer and Bobby Nelson, who were both men of conviction. Tom and Bobby made a difference in all of us as they constantly worked with integrity, moral clarity, and high standards, choosing to act based on principles rather than preference or ease. While at BSEE, I have no doubt both of these men acted from internal motivation to adhere to their principles, not based on external applause or convenience. During their careers, both Tom and Bobby personified Lou Holtz’s rules of life.
Sixteen years ago, to this day, a phone call took place from the Deepwater Horizon to BP’s onshore office. The phone call discussed the anomalies encountered in the negative pressure test, and it was between the Well Site Leader and the lead drilling engineer. BP drilling engineer, Mark Hafle, allowed the temporary abandonment operations on the Deepwater Horizon to proceed even though he told Donald Vidrine, the Deepwater Horizon well site leader, that “you can’t have pressure on the drill pipe and zero pressure on the kill line in a [negative] test that is properly lined up.” Furthermore, Hafle did nothing to investigate or resolve the pressure differential issue even though he remained in BP’s office until 10:00 p.m. the evening of April 20 and had access to real‐time well data (which he logged out of at 5:27:35 p.m.). Hafle’s failure to investigate or resolve the negative test anomalies noted by Vidrine was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure that resulted in the Macondo blowout and 11 fatalities (Jason Anderson, Aaron Burkeen, Donald Clark, Stephen Curtis, Gordon Jones, Wyatt Kemp, Karl Kleppinger, Jr., Blair Manuel, Dewey Revette, Shane Roshto, Adam Weise).
Every day your actions, no matter how small, have a profound impact on others at the platform, in the company, and in industry. If you know something is not right, something is not possible, or even if you have doubt, consider being the difference.
For the remainder of the year, I challenge all of us, as regulators, to urge individuals on our teams to use their personal strengths to influence change rather than waiting for others to take initiative – including yourself. Also, promote the idea that one does not have to follow the crowd and can take a unique, personal stance to improve the offshore workplace. Be the difference just like Tom and Bobby.
Be The Difference and do whatever it takes to ensure the people offshore return from work the same way they arrived.
damaged Vineyard Wind turbine – Cape Cod Times photo
Excerpt from p.3 of Vineyard Wind’s suit against GE Renewables (attached):
“As was widely reported in national and local news, in July 2024, one of the GER offshore blades collapsed and fell into the waters off Nantucket, necessitating a massive environmental cleanup, and a six-month construction hiatus during which GER performed a “root cause” analysis. That analysis concluded that 68 of the 72 GER blades installed at the Project (nearly all manufactured by GER in Gaspé, Canada) were also defective because they were inadequately bonded together, and were so poorly made that they were beyond repair. GER’s remediation plan required it to remove all of the blades and to replace all Gaspé blades with others manufactured at a different facility in Cherbourg, France.
Regulatory issues of concern:
Nearly 2 years after the blade failure, all Vineyard Wind (VW) turbine blades have been installed, yet BSEE has still not issued their investigation report. The primary purpose of independent Federal investigations is to prevent recurrences at this or other projects in the US and worldwide. The investigation should assess the extraordinary VW blade defect rate.
DNV was the Certified Verification Agent (CVA) for the VW project, and was thus required to verify the design, fabrication, and installation procedures. When will we hear from them?
BOEM waived the requirement that the Facility Design Report (FDR) and Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR) be “received and offered no objections to” before beginning the fabrication of facilities. They did so to “allow Vineyard Wind to adhere to its construction schedule, maintain its qualification for the Federal Investment Tax Credit, and meet its contractual obligations under the Power Purchase Agreements with Massachusetts distribution companies.” Did BOEM’s commitment to promoting offshore wind and accelerating development influence their regulatory decisions?
“Honored to be named Inspector of the Year. I’m sincerely thankful to my supervisor and the management involved for recognizing my commitment to this mission, and I’m proud to work alongside the Well Operations Inspection team, whose support and professionalism elevate all of us. This award reflects our shared dedication to safety and the environment.”
“The Department of the Interior today announced the start of a phased plan to establish the Marine Minerals Administration, bringing together the functions of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. This action is intended to improve coordination and increase efficiencies across offshore leasing, permitting, inspections and environmental oversight, while maintaining all existing regulatory protections and rigorous safety standards.
This streamlined approach reflects the evolution of offshore energy development and the need for a more integrated approach to managing conventional and emerging resources such as critical minerals. By aligning planning, leasing and oversight functions, the Department is positioning the agency to better meet current and future energy demands.“
This is an excellent step that many OCS program veterans have been advocating. In addition to the inefficiencies associated with overlapping and intertwined BOEM and BSEE responsibilities, the associated regulatory fragmentationis a significant safety risk factor.
Sable Offshore Corp. (3/30/2026) today announced that on March 29, 2026, Sable initiated oil sales. The Santa Ynez Pipeline System was filled from Las Flores Canyon to Pentland Station at a rate in excess of 50,000 barrels of oil per day.
At the Santa Ynez Unit, Platform Harmony is currently producing approximately 22,000 gross barrels of oil per day. Additionally, the United States Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement has completed its final pre-restart inspection of Platform Heritage. Sable plans to commence production restart at Platform Heritage today at an expected total rate of over 30,000 gross barrels of oil per day. We expect Platform Hondo to be online by the end of the second quarter of 2026 at a rate in excess of 10,000 barrels of oil per day.
Sable Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Jim Flores, said “Sable is proud to announce oil sales through the Santa Ynez Pipeline System to Chevron. In doing so, we are providing American oil from American soil through an American pipeline to an American refinery for American consumers and the United States military.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 