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Posts Tagged ‘safety’

A New York Times article suggests that the consolidation of BOEM and BSEE into the Marine Minerals Administration will weaken environmental oversight. It will not. On the contrary, regulation is likely to be strengthened as resources shift from inter-bureau coordination and redundancy management to the primary safety and environmental protection missions.

I recommended a BOEM-BSEE merger in the comments I submitted to DOI last July. No doubt others have made similar recommendations. Nonetheless, I was surprised when the consolidation was announced and quickly expressed my support for the decision.

Given the challenges associated with Federal reorganizations, agency heads often opt for the status quo. I’m pleased that the current DOI leadership team, with whom I disagree on some issues, chose to merge the bureaus.

Quotes from the NYT article followed by my comments:

NYT: The Trump administration is creating a new office that critics say could weaken the environmental oversight of oil drilling and seabed mining in territorial waters.

Comment: The functional overlap and associated uncertainty that permeates the offshore regulatory regime is a weakness, not a strength. Virtually every element of the regulatory program requires coordination between the two bureaus. This includes plan and permit approvals, decommissioning and financial assurance, spill response plans, lease stipulations, assignments, pipeline regulation, environmental reviews, enforcement actions, and geologic data collection and review. Note the list of MOUs that are intended to coordinate BOEM and BSEE redundancy. The documents often do more to confuse than clarify. For example, see the MOU entitled “Environmental and NEPA.”

Multi-bureau organizational complexity is not in the best interest of safety and environmental protection. Overlapping responsibilities, coordination challenges, and “turf” issues distract the technical staff from their important risk management duties, the work they are good at and enjoy doing. BSEE and BOEM should be overseeing the offshore industry, not each other.

NYT: The new agency, the Marine Minerals Administration, will be formed by reunifying two offices that had been split up after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in an effort to increase environmental oversight of the energy industry and prevent future oil disasters. After the split, the Interior Department’s oil-leasing activities were separated from environmental regulation and financial management. (emphasis added)

Comment: The assertion that the leasing and environmental regulation were separated is false. The leasing bureau (BOEM) was assigned lead responsibility for the review and approval of the fundamental operational planning documents – Exploration Plans, Development and Production Plans, and Development Operations Coordination Documents. This includes the environmental reviews pursuant to NEPA.

NYT: The move is “worrisome because it has the potential of bringing things back where they were, where there was this inherent conflict of interest between promotion of offshore oil and gas, and oversight safety,” according to Donald Boesch, emeritus professor at the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science.

Comment: None of the investigations of Macondo provided evidence that conflicts of interest contributed to the blowout. On the contrary, the Chief Counsel for the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, reported as follows (page 261):

In recent years various bodies have concluded that certain MMS offices and programs have violated ethical rules or guidelines. In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, some questioned whether ethical lapses played any role in causing the blowout. The Chief Counsel‘s team found no evidence of any such lapses.

Also, keep in mind that prior to the Macondo blowout, 25,000 wells had been drilled in US Federal waters over the previous 25 years without a single well control fatality, an offshore safety record that is unprecedented in the U.S. and internationally. 

For some reason, the NYT did not mention the offshore wind program. Perhaps the NYT should have looked at the relationship between the offshore wind industry and BOEM, most notably the decommissioning financial assurance and fabrication and installation report waivers.

NYT: The new bureau will also take on oversight of the Trump administration’s plans to lease waters in U.S. territories to deep-sea mining companies. The first of these sales, according to the spokeswoman for the Interior Department, are likely to happen next year.

Comment: DOI’s marine minerals program is decades old and is a priority for the current administration. Reorganization should not affect the MMA’s capability to oversee these activities.

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1947 Oil and Gas is a great name choice given that the first offshore oil well beyond the sight of land was completed in 1947 (see photo). The numeric name choice is reminiscent of historically important team names like the San Francisco 49ers and the Philadelphia 76ers.

The name is especially fitting given that 1947’s first acquisition, Renaissance Offshore, operates entirely on the Gulf shelf (map below). Renaissance is a significant shelf producer ranking 19th among all Gulf operators in both oil (791,572 bbls) and gas (1,335,009 mcf) production in 2025. Renaissance ranked 6th in oil production and 7th in gas production among companies that focus on the shelf.

A challenge for 1947 will be improving Renaissance’s compliance and safety record:

  • In 2025, Renaissance was one of only four companies that operated more than 10 shelf platforms and had INC/facility inspection ratios >1.0.
  • Renaissance has averaged 0.93 violations (INCs) per inspection since 1/1/2020, trailing only Cox legacy Array in INC frequency.
  • In 2019, a worker fell to his death at the Renaissance Eugene Island 331 B platform. BSEE’s investigation found that Renaissance failed to maintain all of its walking and working surfaces in a safe condition, that supervisors failed to promptly correct or prevent employees from accessing the uncorrected and uncontrolled walking and working surface hazard area, and that Renaissance and its contractors failed to follow the agreed upon terms and conditions within their respective Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) bridging arrangements. (Renaissance incurred a seemingly modest $105,292 civil penalty for this incident. There is no public information on any settlement with the victim’s family.)

Between 2012 and 2014 Renaissance grew substantially with the acquisition of sixteen Gulf of Mexico producing fields, fifteen of which are operated and most are 100% owned.” 1947’s financial strength is unclear. Hopefully, BOEM will verify that satisfactory decommissioning financial assurance arrangements are in place before any lease assignments are approved.

Renaissance operations being acquired by 1947 Oil and Gas

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Per JL Daeschler, Sedco’s Far East, North Sea, and South America operations were all run from Dallas in the late 60’s. In 1970, an old schoolhouse became Sedco’s corporate headquarters (see picture and narrative pasted above). Thank you Bill Clements for saving this historic building – what a beautiful headquarters for the challenging and booming offshore industry!

JL: After 2 years with SEDCO in Miri, East Malaysia (1971) I moved to Brownsville Tx. But in 1979 I returned to the old school house in Dallas in secondment to Sedco Hamilton Production Services from Hamilton Brothers Oil & Gas. The main objective of the joint venture was promotion of floating production systems and in particular use of semi sub technology.  One project assignment was the BP “Buchan” field in the North Sea. (Note: this work was a precursor to the deepwater floating production units that are now the method of choice for deepwater development in the Gulf.)

JL is pictured (right below) on the Sedco 135 during operations offshore East Malaysia.

Wisdom from JL: Rules were pretty simple, as you can read on the rig wall in the picture. No App, pin, or password…. In fact no internet and mobile phone, just a radio operator.

Safety was grounded in the attitude and respect of 100 + people living and working together  (47 working / 47 sleeping and 6 managing and protecting others.  More difficult was the integration of the visiting contractors, logging/cementing / diving / VIPs. (Still true today!)
No division amongst ages, nationality ( sometimes 6 of them) religions, Job position , and ethnicity. Just get along and do what you get paid for!
Safety issues were dealt with immediately with short, unscheduled “toolbox” meetings – less reporting and more fixing.

(As an aside, Dan Bourgeois and I were on assignment to Petronas in 1977 and visited their East Malaysian operations. Does anyone in Petronas remember us? 😉)

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The attached comments were submitted to Regulations.gov on 9/8/2025.

Legislatively dictating downhole commingling approvals, as per Section 50102 of the One Big Beautiful Bill, is a reckless precedent from both technical and regulatory policy standpoints. 

This type of legislative maneuver compromises the integrity of the OCS oil and gas program and the companies that participate in it. Shaving the maximum royalty rate was one thing; mandating well completion approvals is quite something else. Disappointing. ☹

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Noble’s acquisition of Diamond Offshore will unite two safety management pioneers and long-time offshore safety leaders. The press release stresses the importance of their “culture commonality around safety, operational excellence and service posture,” and their “shared commitment to these foundational principles is expected to be a driving force toward a successful and seamless integration.” While such statements are common in corporate merger announcements, Noble and Diamond “walked-the-walk” for decades, so their statement is more than corporate lip service.

Noble and Diamond have been driving company and industry safety performance through their management and culture programs like Zero Incident Operations (ZIO), Global Excellence Management Systems (GEMS), SAFE Days, and Live Safe Code, and through participation in IADC safety initiatives.

Because of their outstanding safety, environmental, and compliance records, both companies received multiple Minerals Management Service SAFE Awards.

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The final decommissioning financial assurance rule has been published and is largely unchanged from the proposed rule that we reviewed last summer.

Major concerns:

  • Despite ample evidence regarding the importance of compliance and safety performance in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance, BOEM has dropped all consideration of these factors. Did BSEE field personnel concur with this decision?
  • Proved reserves should not be a basis for reducing supplemental assurance. The uncertainty associated with reserve estimates and decommissioning costs can easily negate the assumed buffer in BOEM’s 3 to 1 reserves to decommissioning costs ratio. That approach failed completely at the Carpinteria Field in the Santa Barbara Channel (Platforms Hogan and Houchin). See other points on this issue.
  • Given that the reverse chronological order process for determining predecessor liability was dropped from consideration last April, there is no defined procedure for issuing decommissioning orders to prior owners. The absence of such a procedure increases the likelihood of confusion, inequity, and challenges, particularly when orders are first issued to companies that owned the leases decades ago, in some cases prior to the establishment of transferor liability in the 1997 MMS “bonding rule.”

BOEM’s concern (below) about investment in US offshore exploration and production is interesting given that their 5 year leasing plan strongly implies otherwise.

BOEM’s goal for its financial assurance program continues to be the protection of the American taxpayers from exposure to financial loss associated with OCS development, while ensuring that the financial assurance program does not detrimentally affect offshore investment or position American offshore exploration and production at a competitive disadvantage

final decommissioning rule, p. 40

I’m just guessing here, but my sense is that BOEM was pressured to finalize this rule in a timely manner (<10 months is timely for such a complex rule) and was thus reluctant to make any significant changes to the proposal published last summer. A public workshop during the comment period would have been a good idea to facilitate informed discussion on the important issues addressed in this rule. Such workshops were once commonplace for major rules.

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The financial, technical, and regulatory aspects of decommissioning have received much attention on this blog. Andrew Konczvald sends this photo with regrets that the behemoth “Pioneering Spirit” wasn’t available when he was concerned with such matters.

For comparison (size only given the different missions), the massive Thunder Horse floating production platform (see below) in the Gulf of Mexico is 136 m x 112 m, only 12 m narrower but just over 1/3 of the Pioneering Spirit’s length.

The worlds largest 403,342 gross tonnage ship ‘Pioneering Spirit’ (formerly Pieter Schelte) is a catamaran crane vessel owned by the Switzerland-based All Seas Group designed for the single-lift installation and removal of large oil and gas platforms and the installation of record-weight pipelines. The 382-metre-long (1,253 ft), 124-metre-wide (407 ft) vessel is the world’s largest vessel by gross tonnage, and since September 2021 also the largest floating sheer-leg in the world. It was built in South Korea by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering in 2013 at a cost of €2.6 billion. It commenced offshore operations in August 2016.
Thunder Horse

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New York’s looming, self-imposed electric power crisis:

Something here does not remotely add up.  If New York state succeeds by 2030 in closing its natural gas plants — the plants that account for 60% of the State’s generation capacity — that would bring our total installed capacity down from 37.5 GW to as little as 15 GW. But we need almost 60 GW to meet projected demand.  And that’s 60 GW that can be called on any time as needed to meet peak usage.  The 9 GW of projected offshore wind turbines wouldn’t make much of a dent even if they operated all the time and could be dispatched to meet peak demand, which they can’t.  Instead, they will operate only about a third of the time, and at their own whim.  At best they will provide about 3 GW on average, when what we need for this full electrification project is more like 45 GW of dispatchable power to add to our existing hydro and nuclear.   

Manhattan Contrarian

Power generation realities:

  • Assuming sufficient capacity, gas power plants respond to variable demand.
  • Wind and solar power are intermittent, such that demand must respond to variable supply (not a prescription for economic growth).
  • Power grids can function effectively with only natural gas, but not with only wind/solar.
  • Integrated wind, solar, and gas systems can reduce, but not eliminate, demand for gas-generated power.
Siemens gas turbine for the offshore industry

Offshore platforms: In some regions, there is a push to power platforms with renewable energy transported by electric cable. Currently, most platforms are efficiently powered by gas turbines which satisfy energy needs even when demand spikes during well operations like tripping out of the hole. The extent to which renewables can reliably support platform operations during these and other operations, when power interruptions are unacceptable from a safety standpoint, is a risk that must be assessed prior to committing to alternative energy sources.

The environmental benefits of powering platforms with renewable energy also have not been clearly documented. In most cases, offshore platforms produce sufficient gas to support their power demands. Should platforms be powered by imported electricity, gas that is not used for platform operations would presumably be marketed for consumption elsewhere or reinjected.

If the gas is marketed and consumed elsewhere, there is essentially no net (global) CO2 emissions reduction benefit. Gas that is reinjected is wasted unless there is an enhanced oil recovery benefit. So, the net environmental benefit from importing electric power seems questionable, and the operational risks could be significant.

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A Metairie-based oil company that’s one of the largest independent operators still working in the state’s shallow coastal waters has filed for bankruptcy protection, leaving dozens of south Louisiana service and supply companies facing potential bankruptcies of their own.

Bankruptcy court documents show Cox’s estimated liabilities are close to $500 million – more than $200 million of which is owed to small businesses in the Houma-Thibodeaux and Acadiana areas.

Court documents indicate that Cox followed a path that led to financial trouble for other companies in recent years: using debt to acquire large fields of aging wells in shallow Gulf waters.

Nola.com

This blog is primarily concerned with the potential impacts of the bankruptcy on safety performance, the plugging of wells, and the decommissioning of old facilities. Per BOEM’s data base, Cox currently operates 276 Gulf of Mexico platforms, all in shallow shelf waters. The company is reported (Nola.com) to owe $8 million in bond premiums needed to support well plugging operations.

Cox has not been an active driller of late with only 2 well starts since 1/1/2022 (BSEE borehole file).

Cox has been a major generator of INCs (incidents of noncompliance) with 437 INCs YTD. Cox has been responsible for 47% of all GoM INCs in 2023. Cox’s INC to inspection ratio was 2.46 vs. a combined ratio of 0.50 (490/972) for all other GoM operators.

Cox is currently ranked 11th and 18th respectively in GoM gas and oil production with 7.2 billion cu ft and 1.8 million barrels produced YTD.

BOE previously commented on Cox’s pursuit of Dept. of Energy funds to develop a carbon sequestration hub in the Gulf.

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Linking an interesting academic paper on regulatory fragmentation:

Regulatory fragmentation occurs when multiple federal agencies oversee a single issue. Using the full text of the Federal Register, the government’s official daily publication, we provide the first systematic evidence on the extent and costs of regulatory fragmentation. We find that fragmentation increases the firm’s costs while lowering its productivity, profitability, and growth. Moreover, it deters entry into an industry. These effects arise from regulatory redundancy and, more prominently, regulatory inconsistency between agencies. Our results uncover a new source of regulatory burden: companies pay a substantial economic price when regulatory oversight is fragmented across multiple government agencies.

Regulatory Fragmentation

The US has a highly fragmented offshore regulatory regime that has become even more fragmented with the complex division of responsibilities between BOEM and BSEE. The slide below is from a presentation on this topic.

While the linked paper focuses on costs and productivity, fragmentation may also be a significant safety risk factor. A UK colleague once asseted that “overlap is underlap,” and I believe there is something to that. If multiple agencies have jurisdiction over a facility, system, or procedure, the resulting redundancy, inconsistency, and ambiguity may create significant gaps in industry and governmental oversight.

For example, regulatory fragmentation was arguably a significant factor in the most fatal US offshore fire/explosion incidents in the past 35 years – the South Pass B fire in 1989 and the Macondo blowout in 2010. More specifically:

South Pass 60 B: The investigation of the 1989 South Pass 60 B platform explosion that killed 7 workers noted the inconsistency in regulatory practices for the platform, regulated by DOI, and the pipeline regulated by DOT. Cutting into the 18-inch pipeline riser did not require an approved procedure, and the risks associated with hydrocarbon pockets in the undulating pipeline were not carefully assessed. Oversight by the pipeline operator was minimal, and the contractor began cutting into the riser without first determining its contents. A massive explosion occurred and 7 lives were lost.

Decades later, DOT and DOI pipeline regulations and oversight practices are still inconsistent. Note the confusion regarding the applicable regulations following the Huntington Beach pipeline spill in 2021. As posted following that spill:

One would hope that this major spill will lead to an independent review of the regulatory regime for offshore pipelines. Consideration should be given to designating a single regulator that is responsible and accountable for offshore pipeline safety (a joint authority approach might also merit consideration) and developing a single set of clear and consistent regulations.

Macondo: While the root causes of the Macondo blowout involved well planning and construction decisions regarding the casing point, cementing of the production casing, and well suspension procedure, the blowout would likely have been at least partially mitigated (and lives saved) if the gas detection system was fully operable, the emergency disconnect sequence was activated in a timely manner, flow was automatically diverted overboard, or engine overspeed devices functioned properly. Indeed, regulatory overlap led to underlap as summarized below:

Macondo contributing factorjurisdiction
flow not automatically diverted overboardDOI/USCG (also concerns about EPA discharge violations)
some gas detectors were inoperableDOI/USCG
generators did not automatically shutdown when gas was detectedUSCG/DOI
failure to activate emergency disconnect sequence in a timely manner (training deficiencies and chain-of-command complications)USCG/DOI
engine overspeed devices did not functionUSCG/DOI
hazardous area classification shortcomingsUSCG/DOI

MOUs and MOAs are seldom effective regulatory solutions as they are often unclear or inconclusive, and tend to be more about the interests of the regulator and protecting turf. They also do nothing to ensure a consistent commitment among the regulators. In the case of the US OCS program, BOEM-BSEE have a greater stake in the safety and environmental outcomes given that offshore energy is the reason for their existence. That is not the case for any of the other regulators identified in the graphic above.

The contributing factors listed in the Macondo table are not clearly or effectively addressed in the current MOAs for MODUs and floating production facilities.

Helicopter safety is another example of MOA inadequacy. Three offshore workers and a pilot died in December when a helicopter crashed onto the helideck of a GoM platform during takeoff. The most recent Coast Guard – BSEE MOA for fixed platforms added to helideck regulatory uncertainty by assigning decks and fuel handling to BSEE and railings and perimeter netting to the Coast Guard. This is the antithesis of holistic, systems-based regulation.

 

 

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