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Posts Tagged ‘macondo’

Jason’s message, pasted in full below, is important for all who are associated with offshore oil and gas operations, in the US and internationally.

Be The Difference

On the Outer Continental Shelf, BSEE (or MMA) annually oversees ~70 million manhours of offshore personnel, production of >650 million barrels oil, and activities on ~1300 platforms and 75-90 rig / rig units. We all have a profound respect for the men and women who work offshore and put their lives on hold for 14-28 days to deliver much needed OCS production to meet the US demand, and that could not be clearer today.

Last month, Lou Holtz, a legendary coach and person passed away, and it reminded me of the rules of life he lived by and often promoted to others – 1) Do the right thing, 2) Do the best you can, and 3) Always show people you care.

Since February, BSEE has lost two great engineers, Tom Meyer and Bobby Nelson, who were both men of conviction. Tom and Bobby made a difference in all of us as they constantly worked with integrity, moral clarity, and high standards, choosing to act based on principles rather than preference or ease. While at BSEE, I have no doubt both of these men acted from internal motivation to adhere to their principles, not based on external applause or convenience. During their careers, both Tom and Bobby personified Lou Holtz’s rules of life.

Sixteen years ago, to this day, a phone call took place from the Deepwater Horizon to BP’s onshore office. The phone call discussed the anomalies encountered in the negative pressure test, and it was between the Well Site Leader and the lead drilling engineer. BP drilling engineer, Mark Hafle, allowed the temporary abandonment operations on the Deepwater Horizon to proceed even though he told Donald Vidrine, the Deepwater Horizon well site leader, that “you can’t have pressure on the drill pipe and zero pressure on the kill line in a [negative] test that is properly lined up.” Furthermore, Hafle did nothing to investigate or resolve the pressure differential issue even though he remained in BP’s office until 10:00 p.m. the evening of April 20 and had access to real‐time well data (which he logged out of at 5:27:35 p.m.). Hafle’s failure to investigate or resolve the negative test anomalies noted by Vidrine was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure that resulted in the Macondo blowout and 11 fatalities (Jason Anderson, Aaron Burkeen, Donald Clark, Stephen Curtis, Gordon Jones, Wyatt Kemp, Karl Kleppinger, Jr., Blair Manuel, Dewey Revette, Shane Roshto, Adam Weise).

Every day your actions, no matter how small, have a profound impact on others at the platform, in the company, and in industry. If you know something is not right, something is not possible, or even if you have doubt, consider being the difference.

For the remainder of the year, I challenge all of us, as regulators, to urge individuals on our teams to use their personal strengths to influence change rather than waiting for others to take initiative – including yourself. Also, promote the idea that one does not have to follow the crowd and can take a unique, personal stance to improve the offshore workplace. Be the difference just like Tom and Bobby.

Be The Difference and do whatever it takes to ensure the people offshore return from work the same way they arrived.

Respectfully, 

Jason P. Mathews

Petroleum Engineer

Field Operations – OSM

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I am again sharing this touching tribute to the 11 men who lost their lives on the Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010. The video is introduced by country singer Trace Atkins, a former Gulf of Mexico rig worker. The video and Trace’s song serve as a memorial to the 11 Deepwater Horizon workers and others who have died exploring for and producing oil and gas around the world. Please take a moment to watch.

Macondo revisited series:

Reiterating this proposal: Make April 20th International Offshore Safety Day to honor those who have been killed or injured, to recognize the many workers who provide energy for our economies and way of life, and to encourage safety leadership by all offshore operators, contractors, and service companies.

Deepwater Horizon Memorial, New Orleans

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This picture was posted on the “Rig Pigs” Facebook page by Huston Funk. Per Huston: First crew photo from the Deepwater Horizon. Taken in the Indian Ocean after we had left Singapore.”

Commenters identified 3 Macondo victims in the photo: Jason Anderson, Don Clark, and Stephen Curtis 🙏

Tribute to the Deepwater Horizon victims

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Earlier this week a tree service company was removing some large branches in our backyard. The 2 young workers stopped the job before they finished. They knocked on our door and told me that their foreman was off and they were uncomfortable tackling a large, high branch without him and a crane operator. They would come back with a full crew.

I congratulated them and told them they did exactly the right thing. I told them I was involved with offshore safety and many serious incidents would have been prevented if workers, with their employers encouragement, had been more assertive in stopping work. Developing that type of culture takes time and requires strong leadership and consistent, unambiguous messaging. Leadership matters, both at the site and in the office!

The Macondo well is a worst case example on many fronts, including the reluctance or inability of management and workers to stop taking actions that increased well control risks. Given the narrow pore pressure/fracture gradient, the prudent decision would have been to set a cement plug in the open hole and carefully assess next steps. However, delays and cost overruns were the overriding concerns, and well construction continued despite the long list of issues described here. Sadly, we know how that worked out.

Even after the well started to flow, the crew had time to actuate the emergency disconnect sequence and avert disaster. However, some combination of deficient training, uncertain authority, and fear of repercussions prevented that from happening.

Be it a small tree service company or a major oil company, safety culture development is a journey that has no end point and requires continuous leadership from everyone in the organization.

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The following message is from Jason Mathews – petroleum engineer, football coach, proud father, and outstanding offshore safety leader.

Happy Easter – BSEE Family and Friends

The explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig occurred on April 20, 2010, at approximately 9:45 p.m. CDT. Shortly after the initial explosion, a series of further explosions and a firestorm engulfed the platform that forever changed our industry and eleven families.

This past week, I was in Orlando with my family attending an International Cheer event – All Star World Championship. As I was sitting there, I noticed a young athlete with a date written on her shoes, and she touched the date as she walked back with her team. My assumption was it was something to inspire her.

It quickly reminded me of a young man by the name of Shane Roshto. At only 22 years young, he was a victim of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, and he had written the date of his wedding and his son’s birthday on the inside of his hard hat. Those dates served as reminders of the important people and events in his life while working on the rig miles away from those who meant the most to him.

On Wednesday evening, they brought the top ten teams at the cheer competition onto the stage and called out each finalist on the stage until there were three left, and my daughter’s team was still remaining. While those girls were on stage, I thought back on the countless hours her coaches pushed her and always requested more from them because they had a collective goal to win Nationals and Worlds, and then they called the third-place finisher. It seemed like forever before they called the second-place finisher, but when they did, I got to witness athletes, coaches and families reach something they had put everything into since they began cheer. A date LA Spirit – Fame will never forget – April 16th, and only four days from a day we will never forget – April 20th.

At the conclusion of the day after taking everything in and calming down, I sent this message to the coaches of my daughter’s team – “Coaches thanks for “living your legacy” with our girls at LA Spirit. Every one of your goals, expectations, and coaching styles foster a meaningful life well beyond cheer that leaves a positive impact on our girls. All too often, our girls are told what they can and can’t do with their schedules, their abilities, or their choices. Y’all showed them they can do whatever they set their mind to if they want it bad enough and are willing to make sacrifices for it. As a parent, thank you for making positive memories and experiences that have a ripple effect and continue to inspire our girls for years to come.”

Although the two events have nothing in common (one being a tragedy and one being a highlight), they both drive individuals to live their legacies. At BSEE, all of us (not just inspectors and engineers) have an awesome responsibility to live our legacy in the oil and gas industry by actively shaping our life’s story and influence by focusing on our values, actions, and contributions to those around us (and those who work offshore).

Whether you have days like April 20th or April 16th, always “Live Your Legacy.”

Respectfully,

Jason Mathews

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I am again sharing this touching tribute to the 11 men who lost their lives on the Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010. The video is introduced by country singer Trace Atkins, a former Gulf of Mexico rig worker. The video and Trace’s song serve as a memorial to the 11 Deepwater Horizon workers and others who have died exploring for and producing oil and gas around the world. Please take a moment to watch.

Deepwater Horizon Memorial, New Orleans

Macondo revisited series:

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Addressing regulatory fragmentation will improve efficiency and lower costs for industry and government while reducing safety and environmental risks.

Unfortunately, the regulatory regime for US offshore oil and gas operations is noteworthy for redundancy, uncertainty, and complexity that divert industry and governmental attention from safety and environmental protection objectives to administrative processes, interpretations, and jurisdictional boundaries.

“Poster Child” for regulatory fragmentation?

The 12 Federal entities that have some OCS regulatory responsibilities are identified in the above chart. The organizations with core regulatory roles are included in the overlapping circles. The responsibilities of BOEM and BSEE are so inextricably intertwined that those bureaus occupy the same circle.

Coastal states also have OCS regulatory roles through authority granted in the Coastal Zone Management Act.

When multiple agencies have jurisdiction over a facility, system, or procedure, the redundancy inevitably results in inconsistency, ambiguity, and gaps in oversight. The focus of operating companies and contractors is diverted from safety and risk management to understanding and satisfying the regulators. The inevitable result is a compliance mentality that weakens the safety culture.

Interagency agreements in the form of MOUs and MOAs, which are ostensibly for the purpose of managing redundancy, are often unclear or inconclusive. They tend to be more for the benefit of the agencies than the regulated industry. The interests of the regulators and protecting turf are paramount.

Regulatory fragmentation was a contributing factor to the two most fatal US OCS incidents in the past 35 years, the 2010 Macondo blowout and the South Pass 60 “B” fire and explosion in 1989.

Solutions:

  • Where legislation is not required (e.g. BOEM and BSEE), use executive orders to combine and streamline the regulatory functions.
  • Where agencies have separate legislative authority, establish a lead regulator by executive order pending corrective legislation. Under the EO, the agencies would function as a joint authority under the direction of the lead regulator.
  • A combined BOEM/BSEE would be the logical choice for leading the joint authority given that OCS energy is their sole focus and they are accountable for the success of OCS programs.
  • Use a management system regulatory approach that holistically considers all of the legislatively enacted regulatory objectives.
  • Increase the attention given to regulator and operator performance in terms of both outcomes and efficiency.
  • Reduce and simplify permitting requirements for operating companies that have demonstrated outstanding safety and environmental performance over a sustained period.
  • See the findings and recommendations from the 2010 Vancouver IRF Conference.

 

 

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This is very true, but engineers may not have a choice when directed to optimize a flawed decision.

Gaza pier

For example, the installation of the Gaza pier was a political decision imposed on military engineers without assessing the operational risks. The $230 million pier was in operation for only 20 days, long enough for several serious injuries to result from the reckless decision.

Some of the worst offshore drilling incidents were largely the result of culture or management driven attempts to save time and money. Modest cost savings were prioritized over verifying well integrity during both the Montara and Macondo well suspensions. The Santa Barbara blowout was the result of eliminating a casing string during development drilling, which virtually assured an uncontrolled flow in the event of a well kick.

Danenberger slide

 

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Florida HB 1645 (attached) was signed by Gov. DeSantis on 5/15/2024. The bill boosts natural gas, prohibits offshore wind turbines, and deletes references to climate change and greenhouse gases in state law. Given the State’s support for traditional energy sources, is it time to renew the dialogue about exploration and production in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico (EGOM)?

HB 1645 prohibits offshore and coastal wind development (p. 30), acknowledges that natural gas is critical for power resiliency, prohibits zoning regulations that restrict gas storage facilities and gas appliances (p.8), and relaxes permitting requirements for pipelines <100 miles long.

Given Florida’s energy preferences as expressed in this legislation, the State could assist regional energy planners by better defining its position on oil and gas leasing in the EGOM. What limits, in terms of lease numbers and minimum distances from shore, would best improve Florida’s energy supply options while further minimizing environmental risks?

As illustrated on the map below, the petroleum geology of the EGOM and Florida’s preferences are likely aligned in that the best prospects for oil and gas production are in deep water and more than 100 miles from the State’s coast. Does Florida support a 100 mile buffer?

The 4/20/2010 Macondo blowout was a tragic failure that has been, and will continue to be, discussed at length on this blog. We should also acknowledge that prior to Macondo 25,000 wells were drilled on the US OCS over a 25 year period without a single well control fatality, an offshore safety record that was unprecedented in the U.S. and internationally. We should also applaud recent advances in well integrity and control, including the addition of capping stack capabilities that further reduce the risk of a sustained well blowout.

Florida’s independent thinking on energy policy is commendable. That independence is contingent on importing petroleum products and natural gas from elsewhere in the Gulf region. Securing that supply over the intermediate and longer term should be a priority for Florida. In that regard, EGOM production is an important consideration.

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The government’s decision to require that a capping stack be located in Guyana is prudent. Although the need for a capping stack is dependent on multiple barrier failures and is thus extremely low, the environmental and economic consequences of a prolonged well blowout warrant timely access to this tertiary well control option.

A capping stack must be properly maintained and deployable without delay. In that regard, BSEE has a good program for testing Gulf of Mexico capping stack readiness. Capping stack drills are an important post-Macondo addition to the unannounced oil spill response program that dates back to 1981.

The capping stack designed during the Macondo blowout shut-in the well on 15 July 2010. The decision process that allowed the well to remain shut-in was a bit perplexing, and we had a bizarre situation where the Federal Incident Commander threatened to require the resumption of the blowout. The same well integrity concerns had prematurely ended the “top kill” operation on 28 May, allowing the well to flow unnecessarily into the Gulf for an additional 48 days (5/28-7/15). (See this important paper by LSU Petroleum Engineering professor Dr. Mayank Tyagi et al: Analysis of Well Containment and Control Attempts in the Aftermath of the Deepwater Blowout in MC252)

“Troy Naquin, BSEE New Orleans District, observes as a capping stack is carefully lowered onto the deck of ship to be transported more than 100 miles offshore for a drill designed to test industry’s ability to successfully deploy it in case of an emergency, May 8, 2023.” BSEE photo/Bobby Nash

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