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Posts Tagged ‘fire’

At a minimum, the fire will further delay and increase the cost of well plugging operations on Platform Habitat. Per BSEE’s borehole file, 17 wells remain to be permanently abandoned, 3 of which have yet to be temporarily abandoned. These wells are 23-44 years old, and have been inactive for 11 years.

If there is significant platform damage, the remediation delays and costs would be substantial, comparable to those associated with major Gulf platforms damaged by hurricanes. Structural damage could increase the urgency of removing the platform. Given California’s decommissioning quagmire, this would be a major challenge.

Who pays, and what does the financial assurance picture look like? Per the attached BOEM spreadsheet (excerpt pasted below):

  • The 2020 cost estimate for decommissioning Habitat was $44.3 million. That number is optimistic even if platform damage is minimal.
  • $13.6 million in supplemental assurance has been provided.
  • A third party guarantee has been secured.
  • The guarantee was provided by Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas (FMOG)
  • Per BOEM, FMOG is the guarantor for all DCOR leases. Unless BOEM has allowed otherwise, the guarantor pays all costs not covered by the lessees. Given the number of old platforms and California decommissioning challenges, the risks for FMOG are indeed large.

Although DCOR LLC is the current Habitat operator, the company owns only a 4.18% share of the project. CHANNEL ISLANDS CAPITAL, L.L.C., a private company about which little is known, holds a 95.82% share.

Should the 2 owners default, BOEM/MMA will look to the guarantor and predecessor lessees (see the chart below). Unfortunately for FMOG, they are both the guarantor and the predecessor lessee. FMOG acquired Plains Exploration & Production (PXP), the operator prior to DCOR. Nuevo Energy was acquired by PXP and thus also tracks back to FMOC. (This may explain FMOC’s decision to be a guarantor!).

Should FMOC fail to fulfill their obligation. Chevron would likely be the next target. The original Harvest partners were Texaco (operator) and Union Oil, both of which were acquired by Chevron.

TEPI=Texaco Expl. & Production. Nuevo Energy was acquired by Plains Expl.&Production (PXP), which was acquired by Freeport McMoRan Oil & Gas (FMOG)


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The Platform Habitat fire was extinguished at 11:40 a.m. on 5/11/2026 after burning for 5 hours.

All 26 workers were safely evacuated from DCOR’s Platform Habitat. The big question now is the fitness of the structure for continuing well plugging/abandonment and platform decommissioning.

As indicated in the attached letter, BSEE had informed DCOR that their Pitas Point Unit leases (where Platform Habitat is located) expired on 3/15/2016 owing to the cessation of well operations 6 months prior. Following the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) May 7, 2021 affirmation of BSEE’s directive, DCOR was notified that they must permanently plug all wells within one year of the lease termination (i.e. one year after the 2021 IBLA decision). I’ll include the informative IBLA decision in a future post.

Although details have not been shared, it appears that well plugging operations were still ongoing on 5/11/2026 when the fire occurred. According to BSEE’s borehole file, most of the Habitat wells have been temporarily abandoned, but few have been permanently abandoned, and several are still completed (i.e. neither temporarily nor permanently abandoned).

The risks and costs associated with delaying well plugging and abandonment have once again been demonstrated at Habitat. Fortunately, there were no casualties or pollution.

With regard to overall safety compliance, DCOR is the violations leader in the Pacific Region. In 2025 and 2026 (YTD) they were cited for 70 violations, 66 of which required component or facility shut-ins. The age of the 9 DCOR platforms (installed by others between 1968 and 1984) has likely contributed to the compliance challenges.

BSEE spreadsheets for 2020-2024 show 6 incidents at Platform Habitat. BSEE’s incident summaries are pasted in the second attachment.

Neither DCOR nor BSEE has issued a statement on the Habitat fire.

This serious incident further demonstrates the concerns expressed by John Smith and me about the relaxed decommissioning financial assurance regulations proposed by BOEM.

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  • Crew safely evacuated
  • Prompt response by the USCG and local fire agencies
  • Gas leak during decommissioning operations
  • Fire began at 0700 PT; controlled by 1100 PT
  • 45 year old platform; no longer producing
  • Operated by DCOR LLC
  • No environmental threat
  • Habitat was the only California OCS platform that produced dry natural gas (minimal oil or condensate)
Habitat is SSE of Santa Barbara

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The Piper Alpha fire was the worst disaster in the history of offshore oil and gas operations and sent shock waves around the world. Eight months later another interactive pipeline-platform fire killed 7 workers at the South Pass 60 “B” facility in the Gulf of Mexico. A US Minerals Management Service task group reviewed the investigation reports for both fires and recommended regulatory changes with regard to:

  1. the identification and notification procedures for out-of-service safety devices and systems,
  2. location and protection of pipeline risers,
  3. diesel and helicopter fuel storage areas and tanks,
  4. approval of pipeline repairs, and
  5. location of ESD valves on pipelines.

Paul Schneider and I wrote a paper on the task group’s findings and that paper was published in Offshore Operations Post Piper Alpha (Institute of Marine Engineers,1991). The proposed regulations that followed summarized these findings and can be be found at this Federal Register link.

Lord Cullen’s comprehensive inquiry into the Piper Alpha tragedy challenged traditional thinking about regulation and how safety objectives could best be achieved, and was perhaps the most important report in the history of offshore oil and gas operations. Per Cullen:

Many current safety regulations are unduly restrictive because they impose solutions rather than objectives. They also are out of date in relation to technological advances. Guidance notes lend themselves to interpretations that discourage alternatives. There is a danger that compliance takes precedence over wider safety considerations and that sound innovations are discouraged.

Cullen advocated management systems that describe the safety objectives, the system by which those objectives were to be achieved, the performance standards to be met, and the means by which adherence to those standards was to be monitored. He called for safety cases that describe major hazards on an installation and provide appropriate safety measures. Per Cullen, each operator should be required in the safety case to demonstrate that the safety management systems of the company and the installation are adequate to assure that design and operation of the platform and its equipment are safe.

Links for the full Piper Alpha Inquiry: volume 1 and volume 2

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Piper Alpha Memorial Garden, Aberdeen, Scotland
Scottish Hazards

In terms of the total number of fatalities, the Piper Alpha fire was the worst disaster in the history of offshore oil and gas operations and sent shock waves around the world. Eight months later another interactive pipeline-platform fire killed 7 workers at the South Pass 60 “B” facility in the Gulf of Mexico. A US Minerals Management Service task group reviewed the investigation reports for both fires and recommended regulatory changes with regard to:

  1. the identification and notification procedures for out-of-service safety devices and systems,
  2. location and protection of pipeline risers,
  3. diesel and helicopter fuel storage areas and tanks,
  4. approval of pipeline repairs, and
  5. location of ESD valves on pipelines.

Paul Schneider and I wrote a paper on the task group’s findings and that paper was published in Offshore Operations Post Piper Alpha (Institute of Marine Engineers,1991). The proposed regulations that followed summarized these findings and can be be found at this Federal Register link.

Lord Cullen’s comprehensive inquiry into the Piper Alpha tragedy challenged traditional thinking about regulation and how safety objectives could best be achieved, and was perhaps the most important report in the history of offshore oil and gas operations. Per Cullen:

Many current safety regulations are unduly restrictive because they impose solutions rather than objectives. They also are out of date in relation to technological advances. Guidance notes lend themselves to interpretations that discourage alternatives. There is a danger that compliance takes precedence over wider safety considerations and that sound innovations are discouraged.

Cullen advocated management systems that describe the safety objectives, the system by which those objectives were to be achieved, the performance standards to be met, and the means by which adherence to those standards was to be monitored. He called for safety cases that describe major hazards on an installation and provide appropriate safety measures. Per Cullen, each operator should be required in the safety case to demonstrate that the safety management systems of the company and the installation are adequate to assure that design and operation of the platform and its equipment are safe.

Links for the full Piper Alpha Inquiry: volume 1 and volume 2

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14.07.2011 | On Wednesday 13 July, a fire broke out in the compressor area of Valhall PCP. Today the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) will send two representatives to Valhall to investigate the incident.

The fire, which was reported to the authorities yesterday afternoon, started at around 4.40 p.m. A standby vessel was deployed to put out the fire and at 6.45 p.m. it was confirmed that the fire had been extinguished. All personnel were evacuated and there were no injuries.

link

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Per Upstream:

A fire at BP’s Valhall oil platform off Norway in the southern part of the North Sea forced the UK supermajor to halt production and evacuate the facility today. 

Valhall Complex (www.mfox.nl)

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Reposted from Platt’s Oilgram News (31 January 2011):

Brazil’s Petrobras said January 28 it was forced to shut output at its Cherne II production platform after a January 19 fire on the structure, one of the oldest working in the offshore Campos Basin. The fire in an oil transfer pump unit was brought under control without injuries to crew members, damage to the environment or major structural damage to the platform, Petrobras said in a statement. The platform was producing about 9,300 b/d of crude oil when output was shut, Petrobras said, adding the field should be ready to restart production on February 1. Brazilian oil regulators, the country’s navy and environmental officials, and Petrobras technicians are investigating the cause of the fire, Petrobras said. The platform is one of two in the Chernefield, which recorded output of about 22,000 b/d of crude in November. Brazil’s petroleum regulator had an on-site inspection of the platform scheduled for June.—Jeb Blount

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While this accident has almost nothing in common with the Macondo disaster and would have received little attention if it occurred before April 20th, the Mariner fire deserves close scrutiny.  Thirteen workers had to jump into the Gulf and the platform was badly damaged (destroyed?).  This was a major accident that could have been much worse.

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Fire on Mariner Platform, Vermilion 380 from CultureMap.com

Summary of what we know:

-Mariner Energy production platform in Vermilion Block 380 in the Gulf of Mexico

-13 workers rescued; no reported casualties

– light sheen one mile long by 100′ wide was reported (the Coast Guard subsequently said there was no spill)

-fire was extinguished Thursday afternoon

-recent production rate reported to be 9.2 million cubic feet of gas per day and 1400 barrels of oil per day

-water depth of approximately 340,’ about 100 miles offshore

-fire reported to have started on a platform deck away from the wellheads at 0930 CDT

-crew reported to have been painting and sandblasting at the time.

-fire reported to have been from flammable material in storage on the platform

-wells have been shut-in (presumably ESD actuated subsurface safety valves)

-The Coast Guard and BOEMRE will investigate

Representatives Henry A. Waxman, Bart Stupak, and Edward J. Markey from the House Energy and Commerce Committee sent a letter to Mariner requesting a briefing by Sept. 10.

picture from NationalGeographic.com

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