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Posts Tagged ‘violations’

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The 2024 Gulf of America Safety Compliance Leaders are ranked below according to the number of incidents of non-compliance (INCs) per facility inspection. To be ranked, a company must:

  • operate at least 2 production platforms
  • have drilled at least 2 wells during the year
  • average <1 INC for every 3 facility inspections (0.33 INCs/facility inspection)
  • average <1 INC for every 10 inspections (0.1 INCs/inspection). Note that each facility inspection may include multiple types of inspections (e.g. production, pipeline, pollution, Coast Guard, site security, etc). In 2024, there were on average 3.4 inspections for every facility inspection.

This ranking is based solely on BSEE’s published compliance data. The absence of timely public information on safety incidents (e.g. injuries, fires, pollution, gas releases, property damage) precludes inclusion of these data.

District investigation reports are more timely and provide additional insights into safety performance. Impressively, Hess had no incidents warranting a District investigation, and was the only ranked operator with this distinction. I will comment more on the District reports in a future post

Chevron’s 2024 compliance record was among the best in the history of the US OCS oil and gas program. Was it the absolute best? Were it not for the FSI INC at a Unocal (Chevron) facility, one could unequivocally assert that it was. Further evaluation of that INC would be helpful. However, details on specific INCs are not publicly available, so the significance of that violation cannot be evaluated.

operatorWCSIFSItotal INCsfacility inspINCs/
fac insp
inspINCs/
insp
Chevron10121170.023110.006
BP2305930.052510.02
Anadarko891181430.133440.05
Hess2305260.19670.07
Walter64111500.221610.07
Shell23175451990.234950.09
Cantium2480321230.265370.06
Murphy89118700.261910.09
Arena29283601890.328030.07
Gulf-wide957398109146431330.47106640.14
Notes: Numbers are from published BSEE data; INC=incident of non-compliance; W=warning INC; CSI=component shut-in INC; FSI=facility shut-in INC; INCs/fac insp= INCs issued per facility inspection; each facility-inspection may include multiple types of inspections (e.g. production, pipeline, pollution, Coast Guard, site security, etc), in 2024, there were on average 3.4 inspections for every facility inspection

Not meeting the production facilities requirement to be ranked among the top performers, but nonetheless noteworthy, was the compliance record of BOE Exploration & Production (no relation to the BOE blog 😀). See their impressive inspection results below:

WCSIFSItotal INCsfacility inspINCs/
fac insp
inspINCs/
insp
BOE1102210.1480.04

Transparency on inspections and incidents is important for a program that is dependent on public confidence. For independent observers to better evaluate industry-wide and company-specific safety performance, publication of the following information should be considered:

  • quarterly updates of the incident tables, as was once common practice
  • posting of violation summaries for inspections resulting in the issuance of one or more INCs
  • more timely publication of panel reports for more serious incidents
  • real time list of ongoing investigations including the reason for each investigation
  • status summary for civil penalties that have been proposed, including the violations and responsible parties

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The previously discussed sale of Cox assets in 6 GoM fields to W&T was completed in January for $72 million, $16.5 million less than the proposed price. W&T, an established GoM operator, believes they can increase the pre-bankruptcy production (8300 boepd) through workovers, recompletions, and facility repairs.

The extent to which W&T is assuming decommissioning liability for the Cox assets is unclear to this observer. Decommissioning information from W&T’s SEC filing is pasted at the end of this post.

In February, Cox won court approval to sell “about a dozen oil fields to Natural Resources Worldwide LLC for about $20 million following a bankruptcy court auction.” This sale is more concerning given that the purchaser has no operating history in the GoM, and scant information about the company can be found online. Perhaps they are affiliated with Natural Resources Partners L.P., an energy investment firm which “owns mineral interests and other rights that are leased to companies engaged in the extraction of minerals,” but “does not mine, drill, or produce minerals, has no operations, and conducts business solely in an office environment.”

Per BOEM data, Cox filed requests to assign a number of leases to Natural Resources Worldwide (NRW) in May, but those requests have yet to be approved. Hopefully, BOEM is taking a hard look at these requests and their obligations following the court auction. Decommissioning liabilities should be their number one concern. (Note: NRW was just listed as the operator of the former Cox platform at EI 361, so presumably at least some of those assignments have now been approved.)

According to BOEM’s platform data base, Cox and affiliates Energy XXI and EPL still operate 243 platforms, down from 435 in June 2023. Also per the data base, the Cox companies have not removed any platforms during 2023 or 2024 YTD, so the reduction in platforms is presumably the result of the W&T transaction. Most of the remaining Cox platforms are old – 16 of their 77 major platforms were installed in the 1950s!

Meanwhile, Cox and affiliates continue to be the GoM violations leader by far with 549 incidents of non-compliance (INCs) in 2024 YTD, 45% of the GoM total for all operators. No other company has more than 100 INCs (although Whitney Oil and Gas has a disappointing 93 INCs, including 33 facility shut-ins on only 65 inspections!)

operatorplatforms/
major platforms
warning INCscomponent shut-in INCsfacility shut-in INCs
Cox209/69407444
Energy XXI19/77312
EPL5/11611
Total Cox233/77496467
Total GoM1519/73683131768
INCs are for 2024 as of 9/17/2024. A major platform has at least 6 well completions or more than 2 pieces of production equipment.

From W&T’s quarterly SEC filing:

Contingent Decommissioning Obligations

The Company may be subject to retained liabilities with respect to certain divested property interests by operation of law. Certain counterparties in past divestiture transactions or third parties in existing leases that have filed for bankruptcy protection or undergone associated reorganizations may not be able to perform required abandonment obligations. Due to operation of law, the Company may be required to assume decommissioning obligations for those interests. The Company may be held jointly and severally liable for the decommissioning of various facilities and related wells. The Company no longer owns these assets, nor are they related to current operations.

During the three months ended March 31, 2024, the Company incurred $2.6 million in costs related to these decommissioning obligations and reassessed the existing decommissioning obligations, recording an additional $5.3 million. As of March 31, 2024, the remaining loss contingency recorded related to the anticipated decommissioning obligations was $20.8 million.

Although it is reasonably possible that the Company could receive state or federal decommissioning orders in the future or be notified of defaulting third parties in existing leases, the Company cannot predict with certainty, if, how or when such orders or notices will be resolved or estimate a possible loss or range of loss that may result from such orders. However, the Company could incur judgments, enter into settlements or revise the Company’s opinion regarding the outcome of certain notices or matters, and such developments could have a material adverse effect on the Company’s results of operations in the period in which the amounts are accrued and the Company’s cash flows in the period in which the amounts are paid. To the extent that the Company does incur costs associated with these properties in future periods, the Company intends to seek contribution from other parties that owned an interest in the facilities.

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The 2023 Safety Honor Roll list will be posted tomorrow.

As background information, below is a summary of compliance data for 2022 and 2023.

The performance of Fieldwood and Cox skewed the 2022 and 2023 data. In 2022, Fieldwood was issued 448 INCs, 26% of the Gulf of Mexico total. In 2023, Cox was by far the leading violator with 718 INCs, 39% of the GoM total (780/43% when Cox affiliates are included). These data point to the importance of considering safety and compliance in approving lease assignments and making supplemental bonding determinations.

20222023
facility inspections33093100
inspection types1085610341
W INCs8091050
CSI INCs530600
FSI INCs376180
total INCs17151830
INCs/facility inspection0.520.59
INCs/inspection type0.160.18
Pacific facility inspections280300
Pacific inspection types802744
Pacific W INCs2211
Pacific CSI INCs1314
Pacific FSI10
Pacific total INCs3625
Pacific INCs/facility inspection0.130.08
Pacific INCS/inspection type0.040.03
Alaska facility inspections85
Alaska inspection types3722
Alaska W INCs01
Alaska CSI INCs01
Alaska FSI INCs00
Alaska INCs total02
Alaska INCs/facility inspection00.4
Alaska INCS/inspection type00.09
INC=incident of noncompliance, W=warning, CSI=component shut-in, FSI=facility shut-in.
No Alaska facilities are located on the Federal OCS. One Alaska facility, Hilcorp’s Northstar island, has wells that are completed on the OCS; hence the limited BSEE inspections.

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  • Per the previous civil penalties post
  • Data are on a fiscal year basis (i.e. 2022 started on 10/1/2021 and ended on 9/30/2022)
  • These data are only for civil penalties paid in that year. Data for civil penalties referrals are not publicly available.
  • Nothing terribly surprising in the data. Fieldwood’s issues have been discussed at length.
  • Note (last chart) the lag between the date violations were observed and the date penalties were paid. This lag is significant but understandable given due process considerations.
  • Fastest payment: 6 months by Shell for an open hole that was not properly barricaded ($26,750 penalty, 2018).
  • Slowest payment: 54 months by LLOG for failing to install and maintain equipment properly (three 2016 violations)
  • Largest civil penalty paid: $512,900 by bp for a high-pressure gas release caused by the use of improper seals (May 8, 2018 violation).
  • Smallest civil penalty paid: $16,300 by Arena for the release of 1000 psi gas on October 16, 2018
  • The current maximum penalty amount is $52,646 per day, per violation.
  • To learn more about the specific cases.

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In a draft rule published on June 29, 2023, BOEM proposes to discontinue using a company’s record of compliance in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance for decommissioning. BOEM’s full explanation for this surprising change is pasted at the end of this post.

Opposing view:

  • BOEM should be more attentive, not less, to safety performance and compliance data. If they were, taxpayers would have been better protected from the risks associated with the lease acquisitions by Fieldwood, Cox, Black Elk, Signal Hill, and others, and their subsequent bankruptcies.
  • Safe operations, as reflected in compliance and performance data, are critical to a company’s financial success.
  • BOEM wrongly infers that Incidents of Noncompliance (INCs) are solely dependent on the number and complexity of facilities. Decades of normalized compliance data have told us that there are marked differences among operators in terms of compliance and safety performance. Companies at the bottom of the performance table don’t usually survive.
  • Accidents are not mere matters of chance; management and culture matter.
  • Honor Roll companies, large and small, have superior compliance records, and in 2022 these companies had 50-90% fewer INCs/facility-inspection than the Gulf of Mexico average.
  • Does BOEM expect noncompliance leaders to be concerned about decommissioning obligations? The record shows that they are not.
  • Cox’s 2023 bankruptcy was predictable given their past safety performance. In 2022, Cox was a violations leader by any measure, and was responsible for 9 of the 30 safety incidents that were significant enough to require investigation by BSEE.
  • Fieldwood’s terrible 2021 safety performance has been discussed, and there was ample evidence of performance problems prior to their bankruptcy declaration in 2018. In 2016 and 2017 Fieldwood was, by far, the GoM violations leader with 818 INCs, 401 of which required a facility or component shut-in.
  • Ironically (or maybe not), the only other company that was even in the same noncompliance ballpark as Fieldwood in 2016 and 2017 was future Cox affiliate Energy XXI GOM. Energy XXI earned 465 INCs (240 shut-ins) during that 2 year period. Did BOEM object to or otherwise comment on the 2018 Cox-Energy XXI merger?
  • Black Elk Energy was new in 2007 and quickly became a violations leader. Between 2010 and 2012, BSEE cited Black Elk 415 times. 218 of these violations were serious enough to require facility or component shut-ins. On November 16, 2012, explosions at Black Elk’s West Delta 32 platform killed 3 workers, and 2 others suffered severe burns. Criminal charges and a complex bankruptcy followed. BSEE records show 1107 INCs during the company’s short history, 464 of which required facility or component shut-ins.
  • The rapid growth of Fieldwood, Cox, and Black Elk was in part facilitated by lax lease assignment and financial assurance policies. Operating companies should have to demonstrate that they can operate safety and comply with the regulations before they are approved to acquire more properties.
  • The Signal Hill saga was documented nearly 2 years ago, and none of the questions raised in that post have been answered. Violations data and inspector feedback predicted the Signal Hill/POOI failure. Nonetheless, and despite the objections of regional staff, Signal Hill was allowed to tap into its decommissioning account to cover operating expenses. Responsibility for decommissioning Platforms Hogan and Houchin is still uncertain.
  • Bankruptcy has been used to avoid or transfer decommissioning obligations. In that regard, Chevron’s comprehensive objection to Fieldwood’s restructuring plan is telling.
  • Given that BSEE, not BOEM, is responsible for safety and compliance, I sincerely hope that regulatory fragmentation was not a factor contributing to BOEM’s decision to discontinue the use of compliance data in determining financial assurance needs.

BOEM’s explanation for the proposal to eliminate the record of compliance criterion:

BOEM also proposes to eliminate the existing “record of compliance” criterion found in the current version of § 556.901(d)(1)(v). BOEM has determined that the number of INCs a company receives correlates with the number of OCS properties it owns, not its financial stability, and therefore, BOEM has concluded that it is not an accurate predictor of its financial health. BOEM reviewed BSEE’s Incidents of Non-Compliance (INCs) records and its Increased Oversight List, which represent BSEE’s cumulative records of violations of performance standards on the part of OCS operators and lessees and determined that the number of incidents of non-compliance typically increases with the size and complexity of the operator’s or lessee’s operations, including the ratio of incidents to number of components. Because larger companies (regardless of credit score) tend to have more properties and components and therefore more INCs, BOEM determined that record of compliance criterion does not accurately predict financial default. BOEM’s review of this information confirmed the feedback BOEM received in response to the 2016 NTL, namely that companies with a large number of properties and facilities tended to receive a large number of INCs and had more individual properties on the Increased Oversight List. BOEM specifically requests comments regarding the use of fines and violations as a criterion in the determination of a company’s ability to fulfill decommissioning obligations, and any data or analysis addressing any correlation between the number of violations and the risk of financial default. BOEM also requests comments on whether the elimination of the INC’s criteria would create a disincentive to comply with regulations. BOEM also requests comment on whether or not the cost of decommissioning is likely to increase based on the type, quantity, and magnitude of previous violations.

On a related note, BOEM/BSEE should consider a followup to the John Shultz thesis which found that INCs are a very good predictor of accidents and spills.

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Kudos to BSEE’s Gulf of Mexico Region for their timely safety alerts and comprehensive updates on offshore incidents, trends, and compliance issues. Their most recent update is linked below.

For the past 50 years. my main goal for US offshore operations has been a zero fatality year. Sadly, that goal has never been achieved and will not be achieved this year (see slide 15).

Many casualties are associated with activities that are not perceived to be of high risk. The message on slide 22 of Jason’s presentation is thus very important:

Perceived low risk activities can still result in impactful injuries. Continually risk assess the work being undertaken, no matter if it permitted or nonpermitted work.

Know your personal limits and stop before you reach your limit. Pause and ask for help before you are at your limit.

Jason Mathews, BSEE, 6/7/2022

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  • Operating companies that produced >1 million bbls of oil or >1 BCF of gas in 2021 are listed in descending order based on oil production.
  • Both the total number of well starts and the number of exploratory wells are indicated
  • An INC is an Incident of Noncompliance (i.e. a violation). W=warning, CSI=component shut-in, and FSI=facility shut-in are the enforcement actions.
  • All of the below data are publicly available on the BSEE-BOEM websites.
2021
oil (MMbbls)
2021
gas (BCF)
2021/22
well starts

total-expl
2021/22
INCs
W-CSI-FSI
Shell149.8190.828-1211-14-4
bp114.082.75-26-3-4
Chevron83.742.28-81-1-3
Anadarko (Oxy)67.757.88-68-5-1
Hess27.561.72-27-4-0
Murphy25.150.07-74-8-1
LLOG20.429.03-01-1-1
Talos17.723.05-025-26-14
BHP14.55.93-22-3-0
Exxon13.22.31-1-1
Beacon10.515.71-00-0-0
Fieldwood10.424.7685-235-91
EnVen9.612.66-02-6-3
Kosmos9.48.41-11-0-0
Arena8.627.932-068-45-19
Walter8.136.22-23-1-2
Cox6.230.3237-169-3
Eni4.713.62-08-0-2
W&T5.027.21-065-40-7
Cantium4.55.518-023-15-2
QuarterNorth4.28.3no data
GoM Shelf2.34.852-5-2
ANKOR1.42.50-0-1
Byron1.04.45-8-2
Renaissance0.71.620-9-3
Sanare0.34.538-20-3
Helis0.21.21-0-2
Contango0.035.04-0-0
Samchully0.021.2no data

Comments:

  • “Energy transition” companies Shell and bp still love the Gulf of Mexico, which is a good thing for them and us. Together they accounted for 42.4% of the 2021 oil production.
  • The top 4 producers, Shell, bp, Chevron (includes Unocal), and Anadarko accounted for 2/3 of GoM oil production, nearly all of which was from deepwater leases.
  • Those are impressive production numbers for Anadarko (Oxy). No wonder Warren Buffett likes Oxy stock.
  • The relative number of deepwater exploratory wells is mildly encouraging given our concerns about sustaining production.
  • Exploratory well determinations are rather subjective and may not be entirely consistent.
  • Understandably, no exploratory wells were drilled by Arena or Cantium, the companies responsible for most well operations on shelf (shallow water) leases.
  • Overall, the INC numbers are impressively low for the deepwater operators, with Chevron and LLOG standing out. BSEE does not post the specific violation information (more on this in an upcoming post), so it’s difficult to properly assess a company’s compliance record.
  • Unfortunately, incident data could not be included on the scoreboard. BSEE’s incident tables are badly out of date, and no 2021/2022 summaries have been posted.
  • Fieldwood’s disturbing INC numbers were discussed earlier this year. High INC rates for 3 other operators have also were noted last month.
  • Exxon production is limited to the Hoover Diana spar, which was installed 22 years ago. The largest US oil company has only drilled one GoM exploratory well (2018) in the past 5 years. Currently, their main GoM interest seems to be the sequestration (disposal) of onshore emissions. (More on this topic in an upcoming post.)

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