Along with Cox Operating, six affiliates also filed: MLCJR , M21K, EPL Oil & Gas, Cox Oil Offshore, Energy XXI Gulf Coast, and Energy XXI GOM.
The BOEM platform data base lists only Cox Operating (276 platforms), EPL (10 platforms), and Energy XXI GOM (26 platforms) as current operators of OCS platforms. However, according to the Cox Operating website, the company operates 600 producing wells on 500 structures. Presumably, ~200 of those structures are in State waters.
In 2020, the OPEC price war drove oil prices down, while stay-at-home orders and well shut-ins associated with the COVID-19 global pandemic sharply reduced production.
The debtors’ assets suffered significant damage from five named storms and hurricanes during 2020 and 2021, leading to further reductions in production. Comment: According to BSEE, 7 tropical systems affected GoM operations in 2021, so the number of storms is not in dispute. The extent to which maintenance or preparedness issues contributed to the damage is unknown.
In 2020, a foreign-flagged vessel struck a platform owned by one of the debtors resulting in major damage and substantial losses of production. Comment: Apparently, this is the incident being cited. According to the BSEE report, the operator (Cox) was not at fault. Per BSEE: (1) The navigational lights and foghorn on the platform were maintained and in operational order, (2) the allision was not due to any platform related error, and (3) the platform’s operator and safety system responded in accordance with the regulations.
At this time, the debtors’ production volume is half what it was in 2019. Comment: Comparing the 2019 and 2022 production data, OCS oil and gas production are down by about 30% and 40% respectively. However, the 50% reduction figure seems reasonable given the likelihood of further reductions in State water production and in 2023.
Per BOEM’s latest update, 137 of the 313 Sale 259 tracts receiving bids have now been accepted. No decision has been made on the other 176 high bids, including the 69 bids for carbon sequestration purposes. For the reasons previously expressed, I continue to believe those sequestration bids were invalid.
Just as I was lamenting the absence of scientific surveying in the Atlantic, my former colleague Renee Orr brought this NOAA announcement to my attention. Researchers from the University of Texas Institute of Geophysics and Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, with funding from the National Science Foundation, propose to conduct seismic surveys in the Blake Plateau area of the South Atlantic (map below).
The proposed study would acquire two-dimensional (2-D) seismic reflection and seismic refraction data to examine the structure and evolution of the rifted margins of the southeastern United States, including the rift dynamics during the formation of the Carolina Trough and Blake Plateau.
The survey will lead to a better understanding of “the interaction between tectonic and magmatic processes that led to continental breakup and the onset of seafloor spreading in the central Atlantic Ocean 200 million years ago.” The investigators are particularly interested in the “stratigraphy of sediments that formed during and after rifting, the degree of crustal stretching at the continental margins, crustal faults that formed during extension of the margin, and the geometry of lava flows that were placed on the crust before the start of seafloor spreading.”
While not a primary purpose, the research should improve our understanding of the relationship between productive oil and gas fields offshore Africa and US analogs. Paul Post and his BOEM team estimated that the US Atlantic could contain >20 billion BOE (link to the latest report).
NOAA has conducted a detailed review of the proposal and made a “preliminary determination that the impacts resulting from this activity are not expected to adversely affect any of the species or stocks through effects on annual rates of recruitment or survival.”
Regulatory fragmentation occurs when multiple federal agencies oversee a single issue. Using the full text of the Federal Register, the government’s official daily publication, we provide the first systematic evidence on the extent and costs of regulatory fragmentation. We find that fragmentation increases the firm’s costs while lowering its productivity, profitability, and growth. Moreover, it deters entry into an industry. These effects arise from regulatory redundancy and, more prominently, regulatory inconsistency between agencies. Our results uncover a new source of regulatory burden: companies pay a substantial economic price when regulatory oversight is fragmented across multiple government agencies.
The US has a highly fragmented offshore regulatory regime that has become even more fragmented with the complex division of responsibilities between BOEM and BSEE. The slide below is from a presentation on this topic.
While the linked paper focuses on costs and productivity, fragmentation may also be a significant safety risk factor. A UK colleague once asseted that “overlap is underlap,” and I believe there is something to that. If multiple agencies have jurisdiction over a facility, system, or procedure, the resulting redundancy, inconsistency, and ambiguity may create significant gaps in industry and governmental oversight.
For example, regulatory fragmentation was arguably a significant factor in the most fatal US offshore fire/explosion incidents in the past 35 years – the South Pass B fire in 1989 and the Macondo blowout in 2010. More specifically:
South Pass 60 B: The investigation of the 1989 South Pass 60 B platform explosion that killed 7 workers noted the inconsistency in regulatory practices for the platform, regulated by DOI, and the pipeline regulated by DOT. Cutting into the 18-inch pipeline riser did not require an approved procedure, and the risks associated with hydrocarbon pockets in the undulating pipeline were not carefully assessed. Oversight by the pipeline operator was minimal, and the contractor began cutting into the riser without first determining its contents. A massive explosion occurred and 7 lives were lost.
One would hope that this major spill will lead to an independent review of the regulatory regime for offshore pipelines. Consideration should be given to designating a single regulator that is responsible and accountable for offshore pipeline safety (a joint authority approach might also merit consideration) and developing a single set of clear and consistent regulations.
Macondo: While the root causes of the Macondo blowout involved well planning and construction decisions regarding the casing point, cementing of the production casing, and well suspension procedure, the blowout would likely have been at least partially mitigated (and lives saved) if the gas detection system was fully operable, the emergency disconnect sequence was activated in a timely manner, flow was automatically diverted overboard, or engine overspeed devices functioned properly. Indeed, regulatory overlap led to underlap as summarized below:
Macondo contributing factor
jurisdiction
flow not automatically diverted overboard
DOI/USCG (also concerns about EPA discharge violations)
some gas detectors were inoperable
DOI/USCG
generators did not automatically shutdown when gas was detected
USCG/DOI
failure to activate emergency disconnect sequence in a timely manner (training deficiencies and chain-of-command complications)
USCG/DOI
engine overspeed devices did not function
USCG/DOI
hazardous area classification shortcomings
USCG/DOI
MOUs and MOAs are seldom effective regulatory solutions as they are often unclear or inconclusive, and tend to be more about the interests of the regulator and protecting turf. They also do nothing to ensure a consistent commitment among the regulators. In the case of the US OCS program, BOEM-BSEE have a greater stake in the safety and environmental outcomes given that offshore energy is the reason for their existence. That is not the case for any of the other regulators identified in the graphic above.
Industry consultancy Rystad Energy estimates Guyana will be pumping 1.7 million barrels per day by 2035, which is higher than other major offshore basins including the Gulf of Mexico, ranking the country as the world’s fourth largest offshore oil producer.
The GoM is currently producing >1.8 million bopd. If Rystad/OilPrice intended to say that Guyana production will exceed GoM production in 2035, that could be the case. However, sustained GoM production in 2035 could easily be >1.7 million bopd with proper resource management by government and industry. In fact, BOEM’s latest forecast (table below) calls for production >1.8 million bopd in 2031, the last year in their forecast.
“BSEE will continue to evaluate the process for issuing decommissioning orders and will continue to issue decommissioning orders to jointly and severally liable parties on a case-by-case basis.“
Although the news release for BSEE’s final decommissioning rule asserts that the regulations “provide the certainty requested by industry,” that does not seem to be the case. The main change in the final rule was to delete the reverse chronological order (RCO) provision which called for issuing decommissioning orders to the most recent predecessor first. Instead, BSEE may continue to issue decommissioning orders arbitrarily.
While deleting the RCO provision may be advantageous for the regulator, and in some cases for the public, claiming that the decision provides certainty for industry is quite a stretch. BSEE may continue to issue a decommissioning order to anyone in the ownership chain, whether the company was a recent lessee or one that had owned the lease decades ago. Original or early lessees may be held liable for decommissioning old facilities regardless of subsequent damage, modifications, or neglected maintenance.
The absence of a defined procedure for issuing decommissioning orders may also expose BSEE to new legal challenges, particularly in cases where a company has not held the lease for decades. A 1988 letter from the Director of the Minerals Management Service to Amoco (attached below) explicitly relieves the assignor (predecessor) of decommissioning liability after the lease has been assigned. A revised bonding rule published on May 22, 1997 reversed that policy, but decommissioning liability for leases assigned prior to the 1997 rule may still be very much in question.
Another concern is the split jurisdiction for decommissioning between BSEE and BOEM. The financial, land management, operational, and environmental aspects of decommissioning are inextricably intertwined and attempts to divide these responsibilities between two bureaus with separate regulations is a prescription for gaps, overlap, inconsistency, inefficiency, disputes, and confusion. Decommissioning should be regulated holistically, not with separate “BOEM-only” and “BSEE-only” regulations.
Finally, wind facility decommissioning may prove to be even more challenging given the higher facility density and economic uncertainties. The regulatory regime needs to be clearly established early in the development phase.
Promoting the offshore wind program is a very high BOEM priority. The bureau is charged with deploying 30 gigawatts of offshore wind energy capacity by 2030, which requires extensive advocacy. However, BOEM is also a core regulator for offshore wind projects, and the concern is that their regulatory role could be compromised by their advocacy priorities.
Per Notice to Lessees 2023 N-01, which arguably should have been published for public comment given its regulatory significance, BOEM has retained important responsibilities for wind project development and operations. These include review and approval of construction and operations plans, site assessment plans, and general activities plans. BOEM may also exercise enforcement authority through the issuance of violation notices and the assessment of civil penalties.
BOEM exists because in 2010 the Administration wanted to separate the OCS program’s leasing (sales/advocacy) and safety (regulatory/enforcement) functions. The intent was to avoid conflicting missions (or the appearance thereof) in the post-Macondo era. (More on this in an upcoming post.)
Ironically, the Save LBI comment describes BSEE as “a distinct unit within BOEM.” That may seem to be the case, but BSEE is actually a separate bureau in the Department of the Interior.
The authors conclude that inventory emissions of CO2 (as reported to BOEM) “are generally consistent with observations from our aircraft survey, suggesting that combustion is well represented in the federal inventory.“
However, that is not the case for methane (CH4) emissions which are underestimated by the Federal inventories. As summarized in the chart below, deepwater facility methane emissions are consistent with the reported inventories, but shelf emissions in State and Federal waters differ significantly.
Comments:
As previously discussed, the lower CI for deepwater production is entirely consistent with expectations. When the most modern 5% (57) of GoM platforms are producing 93% of the oil and 76% of the gas, their CI should be impressive (which indeed it is).
As summarized using ONRR data, more gas-well gas was vented from 2015-2021 than was flared, which is not what you want from a GHG standpoint. Gas wells are predominantly at shallow water facilities, many of which are not equipped with flare booms.
Oil-well gas, most of which is produced at deepwater platforms, is flared rather than vented by a ratio of approximately 4 to 1.
One bad actor may have been a major contributor to the shelf methane emissions observed during the study’s observational flights. That company entered into bankruptcy proceedings. Presumably those issues have been resolved and more rigorous monitoring and enforcement practices have been implemented. I’ll be looking at the 2022 ONRR flaring and venting data for evidence of such improvement. The remainder of the 2022 data should be available in May.
The subject study’s only observational measurements were in August 2020. Followup airborne measurements would be helpful.
The study only considered production emissions. Shelf facilities are primarily natural gas producers and would thus have a lower relative CI when consumed.
Deepwater (>1000′) activity continues to dominate, accounting for 61% of the well starts.
Not a single company drilled both shelf and deepwater wells.
While shelf facilities currently account for only about 7% of GoM oil production, 1122 of the 1179 remaining platforms are on the shelf and they account for 24% of GoM gas production, most of which is environmentally favorable nonassociated gas.
Two companies, Arena and Cantium, accounted for 75% of the shelf well starts. Excluding the CCS bids, Arena and Cantium were the most active shelf bidders in Sale 279. Arena bid alone on 7 blocks. Cantium was the high bidder on 5 blocks. (Focus Exploration was high bidder on 4 shelf blocks and was “outbid” by Exxon for High Island 177.)
One company, Shell, accounted for 39% of the deepwater well starts
One of BP’s exploratory wells (drilled subsequent to Sale 257) was in Green Canyon 821, immediately south of GC 777, the block that BP/Talos bid $1.8 million for in Sale 257. That bid was rejected by BOEM. In sale 259, BP was the sole bidder for GC 777, and their bid was only $583,000, less than 1/3 of their Sale 257 bid. Perhaps the GC 821 exploratory well reduced the value of GC 777? Will this lower bid now be accepted?
DW expl
DW dev
shelf expl
shelf dev
Anadarko
5
1
Arena
22
BOE
1
4
BP
2
3
Byron
2
Cantium
20
Chevron
3
Contango
2
Cox
2
Eni
2
5
EnVen
5
Greyhound
2
Hess
2
Kosmos
1
LLOG
3
1
Murphy
4
QuarterNorth
2
Shell
25
9
Talos
2
8
Walter
1
Woodside
3
1
Gulf of Mexico well starts during 2022 and the first quarter of 2023
Exxon doubled down on their strategic CCS bidding; their only bids (69 in total) again appeared to be solely for carbon sequestration purposes. As previously noted, acquiring tracts for CCS purposes is not authorized in an oil and gas sale. Arguably, these bids should be rejected.
The other super-majors, BP, Chevron, and Shell, were active participants as were many independents.
It was good to see BOEM Director Liz Klein announcing bids. This shows respect for the OCS oil and gas program.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 