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Archive for the ‘Offshore Energy – General’ Category

W&T (lease and facility map above) claims that insurers have colluded to damage the company by jointly demanding additional collateral and premiums.

Comments on excerpts from the W&T press release follow:

At the heart of the dispute are rules from the federal Bureau of Ocean Energy Management – BOEM – which require energy producers in the Outer Continental Shelf to provide a bond to pay for well, platform, pipeline and facilities cleanup if the operating company fails to do so.”

Comment: Despite disagreeing with aspects of the BOEM financial assurance rule, this blog has defended the rule against unfair criticism. Better solutions are achievable, but that will require industry leaders from all factions to come to the table with a commitment to reach a balanced agreement that protects the public interest.

“These insurance companies and their unreasonable demands for increased collateral pose an existential threat to independent operators like W&T.”

Comment: If insuring offshore decommissioning is so risk-free and lucrative, why aren’t other companies entering the market?

Several states, including Texas, are challenging the BOEM rule and in one case they specifically cite W&T as an example of how the rule could be misused to irreparably harm energy producers.

Comment: As previously posted, the concerned States should propose alternative solutions that would promote production while also protecting taxpayer interests. Arguing that decommissioning financial risks are not a problem is neither accurate nor a solution.

“In over 70 years of producer operations in the Gulf of Mexico, the federal government has never been forced to pay for any abandonment cleanup operations associated with well, platform facility, or pipeline operations.”

Comment: Shamefully, from the standpoints of both the offshore industry and the Federal government, that statement is no longer true. The taxpayer has now funded decommissioning operations in the Matagorda Island Area offshore Texas (BSEE photo below) and more significant decommissioning liabilities loom.

Other thoughts:

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Timeframe for government and industry actions following the 2005 hurricane season.

  

Optimally, the regulator establishes clear objectives for the operating companies and a schedule for achieving those objectives. This approach was demonstrated with great success following the 2005 hurricane season (Katrina and Rita) when numerous mooring system and other stationkeeping issues were identified.

Minerals Management Service Director Johnnie Burton sent a letter (attachment 1) to industry leaders calling for a face-to-face meeting with Department of the Interior Secretary Gale Norton. The Secretary outlined her concerns and informed offshore operators that there would be no drilling from moored mobile drilling units or jackup rigs during the next hurricane season until the issues identified during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were addressed.

The collaborative effort that followed was a resounding success (2nd attachment). In addition to addressing station keeping concerns, a comprehensive list of hurricane issues was developed. Industry and government then worked together to assess mitigations and develop new standards and procedures. The essential MODU standards were completed before the 2006 hurricane season, and all of the related concerns were effectively addressed prior to the 2009 hurricane season. Had the government elected to promulgate regulations to address all of these issues, much of this work would have never been completed.

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The attached BSEE document provides guidance for determining pollution inspection frequencies for unmanned facilities. Thoughts:

  • Reasonable risk-based approach
  • A minimum of bi-weekly visual and physical inspections for low risk platforms producing dry gas
  • Any platform with significant oil production and storage, and no real time monitoring system, will have to be visually inspected at least every 3 days (daily if other risk factors apply) and boarded weekly
  • Any platform that had spillage totaling > 1 bbl in the past 2 years will have to be visually inspected every other day and boarded weekly.
  • Provides for the application of technology (cameras, drones, innovative monitoring systems) to reduce inspection frequencies.

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No bids for the 3 large North Sea tracts (yellow) west of Denmark.

Danish Energy Agency: “The deadline for bidding on the first 3 GW of Denmark’s 6 GW offshore wind tendering procedure expired on Thursday. The Danish Energy Agency has not received bids for any of the three offshore wind farms in the North Sea put out to tender. The Minister for Climate, Energy, and Utilities has asked The Danish Energy Agency to engage in dialogue with the market to identify why no bids have been submitted.

Even Orsted, which is 50.1% Danish govt owned, failed to submit a bid. Perhaps the economic realities of offshore wind, as reflected in Orsted’s share price (below) are sinking in.

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As expected, the Gulf of Mexico’s remarkable 7 month production consistency streak ended in September as a result of shut-ins associated with Tropical Storms Francine and Helene. Nonetheless, average daily production still amounted to 88% of the ~1.8 million bopd average that had been achieved for the previous 7 months. Rather impressive resiliency!

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A recent Nantucket Current piece criticizes the Nantucket Select Board for failing to address community concerns about the attached Good Neighbor Agreement (GNA) with Vineyard Wind. In particular, any discussion about the GNA was throttled at a recent public forum on the SouthCoast Wind project.

Some key points from the article and related thoughts:

  • Over 2,000 individuals and 150 businesses have signed a petition asking the Nantucket Select Board to withdraw from the GNA.
  • The GNA established a long-term relationship between Vineyard Wind and Nantucket. In essence, Nantucket became a partner and an advocate for the projects.
  • Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of the GNA are particularly striking and believed to be unprecedented in the history of Federal offshore energy programs.
  • Section 5.2 defines Nantucket’s broad advocacy responsibilities.
  • Section 5.3 stipulates that “the Nantucket Parties shall use their reasonable best efforts to inform federal, state, and local elected officials of their support for the Projects” throughout the environmental, historical, and state review processes. Wow, nothing subtle about that directive!
  • By signing the GNA with Vineyard Wind, Nantucket withdrew from the important National Historic Preservation Act consulting process for these projects.
  • Vineyard Wind, New England Wind, and the other projects that are covered under the GNA will add approximately 350 turbines off Nantucket’s south shore beaches.
  • Given the partnership with Vineyard Wind, it’s difficult for Nantucket to challenge the mitigations for another project, SouthCoast Wind, which is not covered by the GNA.

The Nantucket GNA controversy should be carefully considered by other communities that are tempted by developer incentives to enter into agreements that may not be in their best long-term interest.

Will Nantucket exit (Nexit) the GNA? The pressure is building.

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Attached is an excellent Scientific American article featuring BOE contributor and decommissioning specialist John Smith, former colleague and marine biologist Dr. Ann Bull, and Dr. Milton Love, the leading authority on California’s offshore platform ecosystems.

I had the pleasure of taking a highly informative boat tour around Platform Holly with Dr. Love and a group of international visitors. Holly, which is pictured at sunset in the BOE header, is among the platforms awaiting decommissioning.

Dr. Love on the total removal of California offshore platforms:

“As a biologist, I just give people facts,” he says. “But I have my own view as a citizen, which is: I just think it’s criminal to kill huge numbers of animals because they settled on a piece of steel instead of a rock.”

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Johan Sverdrup field, 155 km from shore

Production from Equinor’s important Johan Sverdrup field, which accounts for 755,000 bopd (36% of Norway’s oil production), was shut-in on Monday as a result of a power outage. Production was in the process of being restored on Tuesday.

According to Equinor, the outage was caused by overheating at an electric converter station onshore.

A 2022 BOE post questioned Norway’s push to power offshore platforms with electricity transmitted from shore. This incident reinforces those concerns. Summary:

  • Most offshore platforms produce sufficient gas to support their power demands
  • Assuming gas that is not used to power a platform is marketed and consumed elsewhere, the net (global) reduction in CO2 emissions from electrifying offshore platforms is negligible. (Perhaps there is actually a small increase in net emissions given the power required to transport the gas to markets and the emissions associated with onshore power generation).
  • Offshore power demands are highly variable, especially when drilling operations are being conducted.
  • Gas turbines are reliable, and capable of responding to variable power demand. Excess generation capacity is typically provided.
  • Power from shore increases the cost of platform operations and could decrease ultimate recovery of oil and gas resources.
  • Per NPD, electrification of the shelf will increase electricity prices for onshore consumers and increase the need for onshore facility investment.
  • Gas turbines or diesel generators are still necessary to satisfy emergency power needs at the platforms.
  • Long power cables are vulnerable to damage (accidental or intentional), as are onshore power stations.

I hope the investigation of this incident considers some of these broader electrification policy issues.

Equinor diagram: The purple cable shows power from shore to Johan Sverdrup phase 1, established in 2018. The yellow power cable shows power from shore to Johan Sverdrup phase 2 and the Utsira High area solution, from 2022. The orange cable shows power from shore to the Sleipner field centre and connected fields from late 2022. Black cable shows existing power cables at Sleipner field centre and to the Gudrun installation.

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  • The Secretary of the Interior is the most important energy production position in the US govt, particularly for the offshore sector.
  • In recent years energy policy has been increasingly influenced (if not directed) by White House staff, most notably the White House Climate Office. Given that Burgum will also lead the new created National Energy Council, direction from White House staffers or other departments should not be an issue.
  • Burgum should work effectively with Dept. of Energy appointee Chris Wright, an engineer who understands energy production.
  • There is no apparent Republican dissent, so Burgum should have no problem being confirmed.
  • All of the offshore policy forecasts in the post-election post still stand.
  • Burgum is currently the Governor of North Dakota. Some energy production stats for the state:
    • 2023 oil production: 435,080,323 bbls. ND is the 3rd leading oil production state behind TX and NM. Most ND production is from the Bakken formation (shale).
    • ND ranks 4th if the OCS, for which Bergum will soon be responsible, is included. The OCS ranked 2nd in oil production, behind only TX, despite seemingly being managed to fail.
    • 2023 gas production: 1.2 tcf. ND ranks 10th in natural gas production.
    • Current number of active drilling rigs: 39
    • Wind: In 2023, wind was the second-largest electricity generating source in ND behind coal. At the beginning of 2024, ND had about 4,000 megawatts of installed wind power generating capacity.
  • What about carbon sequestration (disposal)?
    • As Governor, Burgum supported CCS projects that could be lucrative for North Dakota.
    • As Interior Secretary and Energy Czar, he will have to consider the high Federal subsidy costs, efficacy, and net environmental benefits.
    • Companies looking to benefit from publicly financed CCS projects will lobby hard for Federal support. Budget hawks and most environmental activists will be strongly opposed. It will be interesting to see who prevails.
    • This blog has consistently opposed offshore carbon disposal.

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The EIA reports an 8% increase in 2023 US associated gas production as crude oil production rose to record levels.  The Permian Basin, the dominant US crude oil producer, is unsurprisingly the leading associated gas producer.

EIA’s analysis inexplicably ignores the Gulf of Mexico OCS. The Gulf produced an average of 1.64 bcf/d of casinghead (associated) gas in 2023, ranking the GoM just behind the Eagle Ford and significantly above the Niobrara and Anadarko regions (see chart above). It’s also noteworthy that most production from the regions on the EIA chart is from private land, and is not constrained by 5 year leasing plans and other restrictive Federal policies.

80% of GoM gas production is from deepwater leases. The % of associated gas produced on deepwater leases is even higher. The 2 leading GoM gas producers, Shell and bp, only operate deepwater leases. The % of their 2023 gas production that was associated gas was 93% for Shell and 100% for bp.

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