WASHINGTON –Today, the Department of the Interior announced a settlement agreement with affiliates of Invenergy, North America’s largest privately held developer, owner, and operator of independent power infrastructure, aimed at strengthening American security and lowering costs, advancing goals central to President Donald Trump’s Energy Dominance Agenda.
As part of the settlement agreement, Invenergy will voluntarily terminate its affiliates’ four offshore wind leases located in the New York Bight, Central Coast of California and the Gulf of Maine totaling $765 million, and redirect that amount towards other domestic energy sources with the demonstrated capability to deliver reliable, affordable power, including the development of natural gas-fired power plants in Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri and geothermal power generation projects in the Western U.S.
Pointing to the potential financial implications for GE Vernova, Recharge News cites this serious fraud accusationby Vineyard Wind (VW):
“This exceptional misconduct includes [GE Vernova’s] intentional scheme to falsify critical quality assurance data… and to intentionally misrepresent the quality of those blades to [Vineyard Wind] in a brazen fraudulent, and willful breach of the TSA, ultimately resulting in the catastrophic blade failure…”
Recharge also discusses the findings of the Project Engineer appointed by VW to resolve claims between parties. Under the terms of the contract, the engineer’s determinations are binding unless overturned in arbitration.
The engineer determined that GE Vernova was liable for project delays, blade defects, vessel costs, and a $185m rescission of previously certified payments.
The damage claims issued by the project engineer total $853m.
On the basis of those determinations, VW withheld 100% of the outstanding invoices issued by GE Vernova. Even netted against sums allegedly owed to GE Vernova, VW says the turbine maker owes around $545m.
Per the contract, there are no limitations on liability in cases of “fraud, gross negligence, deliberate default or willful misconduct.”
My take: VW’s charges against GE Vernova will be resolved in the courts. However, VW is the lessee and operator, and is thus the party responsible to the Federal govt for project safety and environmental protection.
Operator responsibility is a fundamental tenet of the OCS regulatory program. As lessee/operator, VW bears ultimate responsibility for project safety and environmental protection.
VW is responsible for contractor selection, management, and oversight.
If a contractor violates a regulation, the violation notice is given to the operator. If a contractor causes pollution, the operator is responsible for the cleanup.
DNV, the Certified Verification Agent (CVA) hired by VW, was required to verify the design, fabrication, and installation procedures. Did they raise any issues to VW and the regulators?
Did the division of responsibilities between BOEM and BSEE weaken regulatory oversight? BOEM, ostensibly just the leasing bureau, should not have been authorized to grant departures that could affect structural integrity and operational safety.
It’s surprising that VW has not been cited for civil penalties resulting from the blade failure and the resulting environmental damage.
How can a judge prevent a contractor from stopping work for an operator that has filed serious fraud allegations against the contractor, has stopped making payments, and has, along with the Governor, declared the project to be complete?
damaged Vineyard Wind turbine – Cape Cod Times photo
Massachusetts Judge Peter Krupp confirms that GE Rewables (GER) can’t quit now, but must continue working on the Vineyard Wind (VW) project! As we approach the 2 year anniversary of the blade failure, this ugly legal dispute among the responsible parties is another black eye for the troubled project.
Judge Krupp: In discussing irreparable harm in the April Memorandum, I found that the project “is at a critical phase,” that GER’s termination “would set the project back immeasurably and threaten VW’s financing,” that the requirements “to bring the project into commercial viability is highly dependent on GER’s capabilities, personnel and technology,” and that “[t]o pretend that VW could go out and hire one or more contractors to finish the installation and troubleshoot and modify GER’s proprietary design without GER’s specialized knowledge is fanciful.” Nothing has been brought to my attention that would alter any of these conclusions.
Project completion declarations by VW and Gov. Healey did not reflect the reality of the project (expected grandstanding, nothing to see there 😉):
Moreover, the fact that VW declared the COD (Commercial Operation Date) – or that Gov. Healey and VW’s parent commented on it – does not change the reality on the ground. It does not change the fact that the Project requires GER’s expertise and proprietary know-how to bring the turbines up to operational capacity.
Gas turbine business soarswind turbine business slumps
Steve Milloy, National Center for Public Policy Research: GE Vernova is losing money on wind turbines and will continue to lose money for the foreseeable future. Wind losses are real and guided to persist at ~$400 million in 2026.
On the other hand, GE Vernova’s gas turbine business is booming. The gas turbine backlog and slot reservations surged from 83 GW to 100 GW in Q1, with a target of at least 110 GW by year-end. There is strong demand for reliable, dispatchable power to support data centers and grid stability. This segment is a major profit driver.
Milloy is asking GE Vernova shareholders to support the following resolution:
RESOLVED: Shareholders request that the Board of Directors of GE Vernova Inc. publish a report within the next year—prepared at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary or competitively sensitive information—assessing the extent to which the Corporation’s sustainability goals have been authorized and maintained on the basis of net-present-value and return-on-investment calculations.
Perhaps the wind industry’s problems are more fundamental than those presented by US policies. Why else would TotalEnergies, the company that jumped at the chance to annul its costly romance with US offshore wind, be looking for a way out of its German commitments?
NDR / Süddeutsche Zeitung: TotalEnergies is seeking to quit a major offshore wind energy project in Germany for which it offered to pay six billion euros in a 2023 state auction, arguing that slow grid connections and a deteriorating economic environment have triggered the decision.
According to the reports, energy company BP, which also won a successful multi-billion euro bid in 2023, could seek a similar opt-out. After transferring its offshore wind activities into a subsidiary in 2025, the new company is said to be scaling back and ultimately planning to shut down its offices in Berlin and Hamburg.
Does this sound familiar?The mood in Germany’s offshore wind industry and elsewhere in Europe has shifted markedly in recent years. While bidders in offshore auctions in 2023 were ready to pay billions of euros for the right to implement new projects, a subsequent auction round in 2025 failed to attract a single bid. According to offshore wind industry association BWO, the meager expansion of less than 1 GW annually since 2020 was mainly triggered by a spike in investment and capital costs.
Environmental NGO Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH, not the best acronym in English 😉) called the result a “quantum leap” for offshore wind energy. “Wind power at sea is now so economically attractive that project developers are outbidding each other for access to marine areas,” said DUH executive director Sascha Müller-Kraenner. “The fairy tale of expensive green electricity is thus finally off the table.” (This quote didn’t age well!)
“The sums are obscene,” an industry source, who was part of a non-successful bid, told business daily Handelsblatt. (Irrational bidding similar to what we saw during the 2022 U.S. Atlantic Wind Sale.)
Equinor has cut planned investments in renewable energy by roughly EUR 3.5bn for 2026–2027, while the company maintains and expects growth in oil and gas production.
Perhaps the premium for climate virtue signaling has shrunk, and Equinor, like other energy giants, is making a prudent business decision for its shareholders, which include the Norwegian govt.
Meanwhile, what are the implications for Equinor’s offshore wind investments in the US? Equinor’s embattled Empire Wind project is probably too far along to reverse course. Their Central Atlantic (Lease 0557) and California (Lease 0563, Atlas Wind) may be a different story. However, buyback negotiations would be complicated by the Empire Wind situation, and perhaps by the Norwegian government’s 2/3 ownership. On the other hand, Equinor is a significant oil and gas leaseholder in the Gulf of America, so they would have ample options for investing wind lease rebates.
Bluepoint Wind Lease 0537 owned by Global Infrastructure Partners, a part of BlackRock, and Ocean Wind (Engie, France and EDP Renewables, Portugal)Golden State Wind Lease 0564 owned by Ocean Wind (Engie, France and EDP Renewables, Portugal) and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board
These are mutually beneficial “Win-Win” agreements. Bluepoint and Golden State benefit by escaping bad business decisions:
Bluepoint massively overpaid ($765 million) for Atlantic lease 0537 during the brief irrational exuberance era of the offshore wind program. The intense bidding was driven by the lure of subsidies, guaranteed power sales, unprecedented Federal and State promotion, peak climate activism, inattention to mounting public opposition, and irrational expectations regarding the role of offshore wind in powering the economy.
The value of Atlantic wind leases declined by 99.4% between 2022 and 2024, and this was before the Presidential election!
Golden State bid $150 million for a wind lease that will require floating turbines. The 50 MW Kincardine Offshore Windfarm, which is billed as the “world’s largest floating wind farm,” experienced a £30 million loss in 2023 following a £18 million loss in 2022. Another floating wind project, Hywind Scotland, had to be taken offline for 4 months for maintenance after less than 6 years of operation. BOEM was forced to “postpone” the Oregon wind sale given the absence of bidders.
Significant work had not yet begun on either the Bluepoint or Golden State projects.
Many in Morro Bay and elsewhere along the Central Coast of California are not pleased with the attempt to “industrialize the coast.” Opposition to offshore wind projects is now well established along the Atlantic Coast.
The companies get to invest their inflated wind dollars in profitable energy projects without penalty. What prudent executive wouldn’t jump at the deal?
Waiting for the next Administration is not likely to improve the fundamental economics of offshore wind development, and increased subsidies are not popular.
A pro-wind govt would facilitate permitting, but is unlikely to buyback existing leases.
The Administration also benefits:
Two more wind leases are off the books.
Removing one of three leases could significantly affect the economics of Central Coast (CA) wind development.
Agreements were necessary because it’s difficult to cancel leases, and compensation would be required. If settled in court, the compensation could easily exceed the lease purchase price.
The companies agreed not to pursue any new offshore wind projects in the United States.
The rebates will be invested in projects favored by the Administration.
Question: Are the partners and parent companies also precluded from investing in offshore wind projects or just the Bluepoint Wind and Golden State Wind entities? If BlackRock, EDP, and Engie can no longer make such investments, that is a big deal. This is especially true given the agreement with Total, Vineyard Wind’s problems, Orsted’s financial challenges, BP and Shell’s apparent exit from the US offshore wind market, and Equinor’s reduced renewable energy ambitions.
Finally, a December 7, 2022 release by the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board heralding the 50% partnership in Golden State Wind might be of interest to our Canadian readers. That bad investment can now be removed from the books.
The Constance Gee letter (pasted below) is entertaining no matter where you stand on the Vineyard Wind debacle. A couple of quotes 😉:
It’s been a mess from the beginning and in a mess it will end, but the current “he said she said” over who owes more millions to whom is especially trashy.
Poor Vineyard Wind doesn’t have a clue how to service and maintain the 62 turbines they’ve hammered into the seabed 15 miles off our coast, and they are upset that GE Renewables won’t hand over the troubleshooting manual.
damaged Vineyard Wind turbine – Cape Cod Times photo
Excerpt from p.3 of Vineyard Wind’s suit against GE Renewables (attached):
“As was widely reported in national and local news, in July 2024, one of the GER offshore blades collapsed and fell into the waters off Nantucket, necessitating a massive environmental cleanup, and a six-month construction hiatus during which GER performed a “root cause” analysis. That analysis concluded that 68 of the 72 GER blades installed at the Project (nearly all manufactured by GER in Gaspé, Canada) were also defective because they were inadequately bonded together, and were so poorly made that they were beyond repair. GER’s remediation plan required it to remove all of the blades and to replace all Gaspé blades with others manufactured at a different facility in Cherbourg, France.
Regulatory issues of concern:
Nearly 2 years after the blade failure, all Vineyard Wind (VW) turbine blades have been installed, yet BSEE has still not issued their investigation report. The primary purpose of independent Federal investigations is to prevent recurrences at this or other projects in the US and worldwide. The investigation should assess the extraordinary VW blade defect rate.
DNV was the Certified Verification Agent (CVA) for the VW project, and was thus required to verify the design, fabrication, and installation procedures. When will we hear from them?
BOEM waived the requirement that the Facility Design Report (FDR) and Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR) be “received and offered no objections to” before beginning the fabrication of facilities. They did so to “allow Vineyard Wind to adhere to its construction schedule, maintain its qualification for the Federal Investment Tax Credit, and meet its contractual obligations under the Power Purchase Agreements with Massachusetts distribution companies.” Did BOEM’s commitment to promoting offshore wind and accelerating development influence their regulatory decisions?