Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged FPSO fire, Nigeria, Shebah E&P on February 3, 2022| Leave a Comment »
Posted in accidents, California, well control incidents, tagged Platform A, Santa Barbara blowout, Union Oil Company on January 28, 2022| Leave a Comment »
On January 28, 1969, well A-21, the 5th well to be drilled from Union Oil Company’s “A” platform began flowing uncontrollably through fractures into the Santa Barbara Channel.
The absence of any well casing to protect the permeable, fractured cap rock meant that the operator couldn’t safely shut-in a sudden influx of hydrocarbons into the well bore (i.e. a “kick”). Shutting-in the well at the surface would create well bore fractures through which oil and gas could migrate to shallow strata and the sea floor. The probability of an oil blowout was thus essentially the same as the probability of a kick (>10-2). Compare this with the historical US offshore oil blowout probability (<10-4) and the probability of <10-5 for wells with optimal barrier management.
Here, in brief, is the well A-21 story:
Here is the link to an excellent US Geological Survey report from 1969 that describes the geologic setting, well activities, and remedial measures after the blowout.
We need to continue studying these historically important incidents, not just the technical details but also the human and organizational factors that allowed such safety and environmental disasters to occur. The idea is not to shame, but to remember and better understand.
Posted in accidents, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, tagged Chevron, Fieldwood Energy, Hogan and Houchin, INCs, safety leadership, safety violations on January 20, 2022| Leave a Comment »
Per BSEE’s Incidents of Non-Compliance (INC) data base, the number of violations surged in 2021, both in terms of the total number of INCs and the INCs/inspection ratio (see chart below). Remarkably, a single company – Fieldwood Energy – was responsible for 845 INCs or 44% of the total number issued. Normalizing for the number of inspections, Fieldwood facilities were cited for 1.46 INCs/inspection versus 0.46 INCs/inspection for all other companies. An unprecedented 61 of Fieldwood’s 2021 INCs called for facility shut-ins, many times more than any other operator. Through the first 17 days of 2022, Fieldwood has already been cited for 21 INCs, 5 of which required facilities to be shut-in.
Fieldwood and its affiliates have experienced multiple bankruptcies and the company has once again been reorganized with the blessing of the courts. Chevron’s comprehensive objection to the reorganization plan asserted that Fieldwood has $9 billion in current and anticipated decommissioning obligations. These enormous decommissioning liabilities and their implications for predecessor lessees (former facility owners) and the Federal government were the main issue in these proceedings, and the bankruptcy plan includes settlements with predecessor companies and the government.
Even more significant than the financial matters and INCs are the following:
While BSEE regulations provide for the removal of operating rights for poor safety performance, companies can reorganize and problem managers can reappear elsewhere. As a result, marginally financed and ineffective operating companies are a major challenge for BSEE as evidenced by the INCs, civil penalties, and investigations. (See the related saga of Platforms Hogan and Houchin in the Pacific Region.)
Poor safety performers drag down the entire industry. The costs of mega-disasters like the Santa Barbara and Macondo blowouts have been widely discussed. However, chronic poor performance and the associated incidents also weaken the industry and damage the integrity of the offshore oil and gas program. These performance issues can’t be left entirely to BSEE and the Coast Guard to resolve. The industry needs to do a better job of self-evaluation, calling out poor performers, and exercising judgement in the assignment of offshore properties.
Posted in accidents, California, Gulf of Mexico, Regulation, tagged corrosion, falls, Gulf of Mexico, offshore platforms, Pacific, safety on January 11, 2022| Leave a Comment »
Yesterday, BSEE issued investigation reports for 2 of the fatal 2020 incidents. Both of these incidents involved falls, a chronic and preventable cause of offshore worker casualties. Not enough industry and trade association attention is given to such incidents, which have been trivialized in the past by categorizing them as “slips, trips, and falls.” The reports are linked below:
The reports describe how the incidents occurred and what we can do better to prevent similar events in the future. Despite the advance in safety management programs over the past 30 years, there has been no discernible improvement in preventing these incidents. We need to rethink training programs, planning, and methods. Deadly falls are not inevitable.
Posted in accidents, decommissioning, energy policy, hurricanes, Offshore Energy - General, tagged 2020 offshore fatalities, Beta Unit pipeline, Globetrotter II, Hogan and Houchin, Huntington Beach, Khamsin, Lease Sale 257, offshore production, Russell Peterson on January 10, 2022| Leave a Comment »
Posted in accidents, California, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, tagged bp, BSEE, DCOR, EnVen, Fieldwood, national academies, offshore fatalities, safety culture, Talos, Total on January 6, 2022| Leave a Comment »
Last month (12/2021), BSEE finally posted the 2020 incident statistics. Unfortunately, no details or incident summaries are provided for the 6 fatalities. The fatalities are simply classified as “occupational” (4) or “non-occupational” (2). As a result, we still know very little about these fatal incidents 13 – 24 months after they occurred.
The BSEE spreadsheet advises that 3 of the 4 “non-occupational” fatalities are being investigated, but the reports are still “pending.” Why the long delay? The National Commission, BOEMRE-CG, and NAE investigations of the Macondo tragedy were completed (and reports published) in less time.
No explanation is provided as to why the 4th occupational fatality is not being investigated.
Also, investigations of the preparedness and response aspects of the 2 non-occupational fatalities would have been beneficial. What was the cause of death? What medical screening procedures were in place? What treatment capabilities were available at the facility? How much time was required to transport the workers to hospitals? These are important considerations for the offshore community.
Below is a summary of the publicly available information for the 6 fatalities:
The number of US OCS fatalities remains unacceptably high, and timely data sharing and investigations are needed to better assess causes and trends. In that regard, this recommendation from the 2016 National Academies report entitled “Strengthening the Safety Culture of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry” merits further industry/government attention and action:
Recommendation 4.2.2: Because accident, incident, and inspection data all are needed to identify and understand safety risks and corrective actions, the committee recommends full transparency such that regulators make all these data readily available to the public in a timely way, taking into consideration applicable confidentiality requirements.
Posted in accidents, decommissioning, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, tagged consent decree, Hurricane Ivan, Mississippi Canyon, mudslide, Taylor Energy on December 27, 2021| Leave a Comment »
Taylor Energy’s Mississippi Canyon Block 20 “A” platform was destroyed by a massive mudslide during Hurricane Ivan in 2004 (see illustrations below). Per Naval Research Laboratory sensors, “Ivan the Terrible” generated freak waves as high as 91 feet, and NRL computer models suggest that wave heights may have exceeded 130 feet. The changes in pressure resulting from the motion of the huge waves triggered the flow of the unstable Mississippi delta sediments. The platform was swept 500 feet downslope and the wells were severed and buried under a deep layer of sediment. That was essentially the end for Taylor Energy, as the company would spend the next 17 years locating and plugging wells, decommissioning piping, collecting seepage, and mitigating pollution. Since 2008, when Taylor sold its remaining oil and gas assets, the company has been solely engaged in the MC-20 response.
Last week, Taylor and the Justice Department signed a consent degree that transfers the company’s remaining assets and control of the decommissioning trust fund to the Federal government. Questions remain as to whether the platform and wells could have been better designed to withstand the mudslide (note that the platform was installed and operated by BP prior to being sold to Taylor), and whether more should have been done to mitigate the seepage. Taylor does a good job of making its case at their response website.
Few offshore operators would argue that what happened to Taylor couldn’t happen to them. That would be brash and foolish. Hopefully, the companies that remain have absorbed the lessons of MC-20 and are applying them to their operations and management programs.
Posted in accidents, California, pipelines, tagged anchor dragging, Beta Unit, Huntington Beach, leak detection, pipeline spill on December 16, 2021| Leave a Comment »
This will be an interesting case given that the root cause of the leak appears to be anchor dragging and the responsible shipping company has yet to be identified. Also, these informed quotes about leak detection from a previous post are highly pertinent:
“My experience suggests this would be a darned hard leak to remotely determine quickly,” said Richard Kuprewicz, a private pipeline accident investigator and consultant. “An opening of this type, on a 17-mile-long (27-kilometer) underwater pipe is very hard to spot by remote indications. These crack-type releases are lower rate and can go for quite a while.”
The type of crack seen in the Coast Guard video is big enough to allow some oil to escape to potentially trigger the low pressure alarm, Kuprewicz said. But because the pipeline was operating under relatively low pressure, the control room operator may have simply dismissed the alarm because the pressure was not very high to begin, he said.
ABC News
Posted in accidents, California, Offshore Energy - General, pipelines, tagged Amplify, Beta Unit, Huntington Beach, NTSB, pipeline spill, US Coast Guard on December 9, 2021| Leave a Comment »
According to the Coast Guard, investigators determined the ship “was involved in an anchor dragging incident on Jan. 25, 2021 during a heavy weather event that impacted the Ports of L.A. and Long Beach.” The anchor- dragging occurred “in close proximity” to an underwater pipeline later determined to be the source of the October leak that spilled thousands of gallons of oil into the ocean, forcing the closure of beaches and harbors across Orange County.
CBS-LA
The hearings and the liability battles that follow will be most interesting. Those lined up to sue the pipeline operator (Amplify), such as this Huntington Beach disc jockey, may have difficulties.
Posted in accidents, offshore, Wind Energy, tagged Delaware, liftboat indicent, Russell Peterson, US Coast Guard on December 3, 2021| Leave a Comment »
The vessel was conducting research for a proposed offshore wind project. The Coast Guard rescued the 2 crew members, one of whom tragically died. Why has the Coast Guard still not issued an investigation report more than 13 years after the incident? An inquiry was sent to the Coast Guard but no response has been received.
There are serious questions regarding the positioning of a liftboat in the Mid-Atlantic for several months beginning in March when major storms are likely. There are also important questions about the liftboat’s failure mechanisms, the operator’s authority to be conducting this research, and the actions that were taken in preparation for storm conditions.
One worker died and another was seriously endangered. 13 years after the incident, we are still wondering what happened and why.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 