Two weeks after the Trinity Spirit FPSO fire offshore Nigeria we still don’t know the fate of the crew. Neither the operator nor the regulator websites include any mention of the fire. The last operator statement (more than a week ago) advised that 3 workers were confirmed dead and others were still missing. There has been no subsequent update and the media have moved on, as is usually the case when there is no ongoing oil spill.
We need an international standard that identifies incident information to be publicly disclosed and specifies the timeframes and methods for releasing this information. An API or ISO committee would seem to be the best means of developing such a standard. If these organizations are unwilling to take the lead, perhaps the International Regulators’ Forum can do so. The credibility of the offshore industry is at stake.
This is an excellent tribute written by two brothers who lost their father in the Ocean Ranger tragedy. I highly recommend that you listen and reflect.
Condensed below is important background information from my notes and from an outstanding presentation by Howard Pike in St. John’s Newfoundland in 2017.
84 men aboard; no survivors
Largest semisubmersible drilling rig of its day
US registered MODU
The “unsinkable” rig had weathered more than 50 significant storms
Unlike most semisubmersibles, the ballast control room was located in one of the legs (starboard column No.3). At drilling draft, it was just 28 feet above mean sea level.
Water depth was 240′, rig was moored with 12 anchors
Ballast control operators had minimal training
Incident with the ballast control system just a week before the disaster.
On February 14th, the Ocean Ranger was battered by a severe storm; wave heights up to 21m; rogue wave damaged deck items on nearby Sedco 706
Crew stopped drilling when the heave exceeded 15′, forced to shear the drill pipe during the disconnect process
Crew did not deballast to the storm draft from the 80′ drilling draft
Waves broke portlight in the ballast control room
Salt water soaked the ballast control console
Short circuits or inadvertent operator commands caused ballast tank valves in the bow to open.
Water flooded the forward ballast tanks, and the rig began to list toward the bow.
Crew inadvertently opened more pontoon valves
Forward list passed the point of recovery
The Ranger’s standby vessel, the Seaforth Highlander, was contacted but was delayed by sea conditions
At approximately 1:10 a.m. on February 15 th , the Ocean Ranger began sending mayday signals.
Zapata Ugland and Sedco 706, working in the area, sent their standby vessels
At 1:30 a.m. the Ocean Ranger’s radio man sent his final transmission. The crew was boarding the lifeboats.
Investigators later determined that as the lifeboats descended, violent winds threw them against the side of the rig, damaging some lifeboat hulls before they ever touched the water.
Crew did not have survival suits
Seaforth Highlander attempted unsuccessfully to rescue survivors from a damaged lifeboat
At the time of the Ocean Ranger tragedy, 3 rigs – the Alaskan Star, Rowan Midland, and Zapata Saratoga were working on Georges Bank in the US North Atlantic. The nor’easter had passed over Georges Bank before strengthening as it moved toward the Grand Banks. Among the small Georges Bank drilling community there was a kinship with those working in the even harsher environment on the Grand Banks. 40 years later, we are still greatly saddened by what transpired. Many lessons were learned and applied, but the ocean is unforgiving and we must continue to assess storm preparedness. Reflection on past tragedies is an important part of the process.
Ikemefuna Okafor, the executive officer of Shebah Exploration & Production Company Ltd (SEPCOL), the vessel owner, said late Sunday “three crew members have been found alive in the community”.
The incident occurred last Wednesday (2/2), but the only public statement from the operator was the following day:
“At this time there are no reported fatalities but we can confirm that there were 10 crewmen on board the vessel prior to the incident and we are prioritising investigations with respect to their safety and security,” SEPCOL Chief Executive Ikemefuna Okafor said in a statement.
That statement has been contradicted by at least 2 Nigerian press reports:
Meanwhile, three persons have been confirmed dead while eleven others declared missing following the explosion. Sources told reporters in Warri yesterday that three bodies had been recovered while 12 others were yet to be accounted for at the time of filing this report.
Daily Trust had, however, gathered that three Seafarers working onboard the Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) facility may have lost their lives in the fire
The only public statement by the Nigerian regulator (NUPRC) echoed the SEPCOL statement:
“There has been no report of any casualties or fatalities and the Commission will take necessary measures to ensure that all safety and environmental measures in line with global best practices to safeguard lives and the environment are put in place.”
Comments:
Apparently, the fate of the workers was unknown, and the “no report of any casualties” comments were misleading and inappropriate given the gravity of the situation.
Neither the operator nor the regulator have provided any update on the number of workers safely recovered or missing, or the status of any ongoing search.
There is not a single mention of the fire on either the operator or regulator website.
There seems to be uncertainty about the size of the crew at the time of the incident.
This Nigerian source is now reporting that there are 3 confirmed deaths, and 11 workers declared missing. No other sources are reporting casualties at this time.
The latest AFP report indicates that the fire has been extinguished.
The Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC) Thursday disclosed that it had commenced an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the explosion of a Floating Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel in Warri, Delta State.
Industry source indicated that the FPSO was not producing at the time and had about 50,000 barrels in storage
No indication that any wells are on fire
Per Rystad the FPSO has not been producing since 2019 and was being used solely for storage.
Per Reuters, SEPCOL is the technical operator of the block though the production licence was held by consortium member Express Petroleum. SEPCOL’s production license had reportedly been revoked in 2019 for legacy debts.
Lots of important technical, operational, and management aspects to this major incident. Hopefully, NUPRC’s report will be publicly available at the conclusion of their investigation.
On January 28, 1969, well A-21, the 5th well to be drilled from Union Oil Company’s “A” platform began flowing uncontrollably through fractures into the Santa Barbara Channel.
The absence of any well casing to protect the permeable, fractured cap rock meant that the operator couldn’t safely shut-in a sudden influx of hydrocarbons into the well bore (i.e. a “kick”). Shutting-in the well at the surface would create well bore fractures through which oil and gas could migrate to shallow strata and the sea floor. The probability of an oil blowout was thus essentially the same as the probability of a kick (>10-2). Compare this with the historical US offshore oil blowout probability (<10-4) and the probability of <10-5 for wells with optimal barrier management.
Here, in brief, is the well A-21 story:
Well drilled to total depth of 3203′ below the ocean floor (BOF).
13 3/8″ casing had been set at 238′ BOF. The well was unprotected from the base of this casing string to total depth.
Evidence of natural seeps near the site suggested the presence of fracture channels
The well was drilled through permeable cap rock and a small high pressured gas reservoir before penetrating the target oil sands.
When the well reached total depth, the crew started pulling drill pipe out of hole to in preparation for well logging.
The first 5 stands of drill pipe pulled tight; the next 3 pulled free suggesting the swabbing of fluids into the well bore..
The well started flowing through the drill pipe. The crew attempted to stab an inside preventer into the drill pipe, but the well was blowing too hard. The crew then attempted unsuccessfully to stab the kelly into the drill pipe and halt the flow.
The crew dropped the drill pipe into the well bore and closed the blind ram to shut-in the well.
Boils of gas began to appear on the water surface. Oil flowed to the surface through numerous fracture channels. The sketch below by a former colleague depicts the fracturing, which greatly complicated mitigation of the flow.
We need to continue studying these historically important incidents, not just the technical details but also the human and organizational factors that allowed such safety and environmental disasters to occur. The idea is not to shame, but to remember and better understand.
Per BSEE’s Incidents of Non-Compliance (INC) data base, the number of violations surged in 2021, both in terms of the total number of INCs and the INCs/inspection ratio (see chart below). Remarkably, a single company – Fieldwood Energy – was responsible for 845 INCs or 44% of the total number issued. Normalizing for the number of inspections, Fieldwood facilities were cited for 1.46 INCs/inspection versus 0.46 INCs/inspection for all other companies. An unprecedented 61 of Fieldwood’s 2021 INCs called for facility shut-ins, many times more than any other operator. Through the first 17 days of 2022, Fieldwood has already been cited for 21 INCs, 5 of which required facilities to be shut-in.
Fieldwood and its affiliates have experienced multiple bankruptcies and the company has once again been reorganized with the blessing of the courts.Chevron’s comprehensive objection to the reorganization plan asserted that Fieldwood has $9 billion in current and anticipated decommissioning obligations. These enormous decommissioning liabilities and their implications for predecessor lessees (former facility owners) and the Federal government were the main issue in these proceedings, and the bankruptcy plan includes settlements with predecessor companies and the government.
Even more significant than the financial matters and INCs are the following:
While BSEE regulations provide for the removal of operating rights for poor safety performance, companies can reorganize and problem managers can reappear elsewhere. As a result, marginally financed and ineffective operating companies are a major challenge for BSEE as evidenced by the INCs, civil penalties, and investigations. (See the related saga of Platforms Hogan and Houchin in the Pacific Region.)
Poor safety performers drag down the entire industry. The costs of mega-disasters like the Santa Barbara and Macondo blowouts have been widely discussed. However, chronic poor performance and the associated incidents also weaken the industry and damage the integrity of the offshore oil and gas program. These performance issues can’t be left entirely to BSEE and the Coast Guard to resolve. The industry needs to do a better job of self-evaluation, calling out poor performers, and exercising judgement in the assignment of offshore properties.
