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Posts Tagged ‘US Coast Guard’

The subject IEc report for the US Coast Guard may be of interest to BOE followers. The Coast Guard is requesting comments by July 28, 2026. You can download the full report (129 pages) here.

The report is intended to update the Coast Guard’s methodology for estimating the cost savings resulting from spill prevention regulations. The paragraph pasted below is a good summary of the objective.

The offshore industry could benefit from this report, because the estimated cost of spills >100 gallons is reduced, dramatically so when the DWH/Macondo blowout is excluded (see the second table below). That reduction would support regulatory reform initiatives, and could thus generate some controversy.

My main concern is that there is only a single distance-from-shore category for offshore spills (see text below). The natural resources damage from a spill 3 miles from shore will almost always be much greater than from an equivalent volume spill 100 miles from shore.

The single-offshore-category issue is illustrated in the 2 tables pasted below. The first table presents a summary of expert opinions on the smallest spill size that is likely to result in measurable natural resource damages. The mean response to Question 3 (offshore) is 7782 gallons. A spill of that size occurring 3 miles from shore is much more likely to result in resource damage than a spill originating 50 or 100 miles from shore.

In the second table, note the new methodology results in the same cost estimates for large nearshore/coastal spills as for offshore spills. Again, this is presumably because there is only a single offshore category.

The public comments on this report should be interesting.

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Coast Guard photo. Thanks to Lars Herbst for bringing this incident to my attention.

In what the Coast Guard is describing as an “uncontrolled discharge” (euphemism for blowout), an 82-year-old oil well has been spewing oil, gas, and water into the coastal marshes of southern Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, for more than a week.

In hopes of future production, prior and current owners had elected not to permanently plug the well, apparently with the State’s acquiescence.

The well is currently operated by an affiliate of Spectrum Energy. Typical of these situations, the previous owner, Whitney Oil and Gas, was in bankruptcy.

The Coast Guard has taken over the response and has accessed the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.

We don’t need relaxed decommissioning and financial assurance requirements. We need a cooperative Federal, State, and industry effort to ensure that wells are plugged in a timely manner and that financial assurance is provided to protect the public interest.

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Less than a month ago  BSEE issued an alert that addressed chronic and persistent helideck safety issues. This week BSEE again issued an alert (attached) following yet another near-miss. Per BSEE:

After receiving clearance for landing at an offshore helideck, the aircrew noticed upon landing that a section of the helideck’s safety skirting was not properly secured to the support structure and was blowing upward and downward due to the helicopter’s rotor downwash. This created an imminent hazard to safe helicopter operations with potentially catastrophic results.

Of course, we are still waiting for the NTSB report on the tragic helideck incident at the end of 2022 that killed 4 workers.

The latest near-miss is yet another reminder that the muddled regulatory regime for helideck safety needs to be addressed. The most recent Coast Guard – BSEE MOA for fixed platforms only added to helideck regulatory uncertainty by assigning decks and fuel handling to BSEE and railings and perimeter netting to the Coast Guard. What about safety skirting? As is the case with all safety regulations, a holistic, systems based approach to helideck safety oversight is needed.

To their credit, BSEE has been addressing these helideck issues with safety alerts. Since they are bearing the responsibility for these incidents, they should have the unambiguous authority needed to take enforcement actions regardless of which helideck elements are involved.

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Kudos to offshore-energy.biz for drawing attention to the recent Coast Guard medevacs from the pipelay vessel Solitaire. Three health-related medevacs from the same facility in <2 months would seem to warrant further scrutiny. Will the Coast Guard investigate?

The only timely information on medevacs is from Coast Guard news releases. Information on private medevacs is seldom provided, except as included in the BSEE incident tables, which are typically more than 1 year behind, and update presentations by BSEE’s Gulf of Mexico region.

Below is information on 2023 YTD Coast Guard medevacs associated with Gulf of Mexico oil and gas activities. As previously posted, at least 12 workers died at OCS facilities in 2021-22 of natural causes. Unfortunately, “natural cause” fatalities and illnesses receive little industry or regulator attention.

datevessel or platformdescriptioncondition report
5/18OSV Brandon Bordelon 50-year-old male crewmember with an injury to his legstable
5/17Allseas’ pipelay vessel Solitaire65-year-old male crewmember was experiencing heart attack-like symptomsstable
4/26crew boat Mr. Fredhalted search for missing crewmemberpresumed dead
4/23Allseas’ pipelay vessel Solitaire32-year-old male crewmember experiencing severe abdominal pain.stable
3/22Allseas’ pipelay vessel Solitairecrewmember was experiencing seizure-like symptomsstable
3/18BP’s Atlantis platform28 year old male, eye injurystable
3/13unidentified platform 40 miles south of Port Fourchon37-year-old man having difficulty breathingstable

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Walter platform with helicopter debris in foreground

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….for continuing to recognize the Conservation Division of the Geological Survey (USGS) as the US offshore safety regulator, even though 40 years have passed since that was the case and there have been 3 successor bureaus. 😀

33 CFR § 140.4 Relationship to other law. (current text excerpted from Coast Guard Subchapter N regulations)

(a) Design and equipment requirements of this subchapter for OCS facilities, including mobile offshore drilling units in contact with the seabed of the OCS for exploration or exploitation of subsea resources, are in addition to the regulations and orders of the U.S. Geological Survey applicable to those facilities.

USGS North Atlantic District, Hyannis, MA, Halloween 1980

Most of us old-timers think the best regulatory framework for the offshore program was in the USGS days (pre-1982). Some of this may be nostalgia, but there are some good reasons for this thinking:

  • USGS was/is an internationally acclaimed scientific organization that was always headed by a renowned geologist. The regulatory program was thus somewhat insulated from political pressures. Vince McKelvey, Bill Menard, and Dallas Peck were the Directors when I worked for USGS. Their credentials are linked. Bill and Dallas visited our Hyannis office (not at Halloween 😀) and were very supportive.
  • The Conservation Division was responsible for onshore operations on Federal lands as well as offshore activity. This facilitated information sharing and offered diverse career opportunities. My first bosses in New Orleans had worked previously in the Farmington and Roswell, NM offices.
  • We had excellent synergy with the other USGS divisions. The Marine Science Center in Woods Hole was an incredible resource for our Hyannis office. The Woods Hole office, particularly Mike Bothner and Brad Butman, had a critical role in the Georges Bank Monitoring Program, the best ever (in my biased opinion) environmental study of exploratory drilling operations in a frontier area.
  • The USGS Conservation Division had a very small and supportive headquarter’s staff, which minimized the potential for conflict with field offices.
  • Prior to the formation of the Minerals Management Service (MMS) in 1982, the Bureau of Land Management was responsible for leasing, but all regulatory functions were under USGS. This included resource evaluation/conservation, plan review and approval, permitting, inspections and enforcement, and investigations. The division of MMS responsibilities, most notably the assignment of plan approval to the leasing bureau (BOEM) rather than the regulatory bureau (BSEE), complicates the work of both bureaus and is a prescription for inefficiency, confusion, overlap, and conflict.

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BEIJING photo
Vessel Finder

According to the Coast Guard, investigators determined the ship “was involved in an anchor dragging incident on Jan. 25, 2021 during a heavy weather event that impacted the Ports of L.A. and Long Beach.” The anchor- dragging occurred “in close proximity” to an underwater pipeline later determined to be the source of the October leak that spilled thousands of gallons of oil into the ocean, forcing the closure of beaches and harbors across Orange County.

CBS-LA

The hearings and the liability battles that follow will be most interesting. Those lined up to sue the pipeline operator (Amplify), such as this Huntington Beach disc jockey, may have difficulties.

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The vessel was conducting research for a proposed offshore wind project. The Coast Guard rescued the 2 crew members, one of whom tragically died. Why has the Coast Guard still not issued an investigation report more than 13 years after the incident? An inquiry was sent to the Coast Guard but no response has been received.

There are serious questions regarding the positioning of a liftboat in the Mid-Atlantic for several months beginning in March when major storms are likely. There are also important questions about the liftboat’s failure mechanisms, the operator’s authority to be conducting this research, and the actions that were taken in preparation for storm conditions.

One worker died and another was seriously endangered. 13 years after the incident, we are still wondering what happened and why.

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US Coast Guard Subchapter N (current language as of 9/29/2021)

33 CFR §140.4   Relationship to other law.

(b) Any apparent conflict between the application of any requirement of this subchapter and any regulation or order of the U.S. Geological Survey should immediately be brought to the attention of the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection.

I was proud to have worked for the Conservation Division of the U.S Geological Survey (USGS) when the US offshore program was at its peak in terms of scope and activity. I therefore like the nostalgia value of this provision. That said, USGS has not been the offshore safety regulator since 1982. While updating regulations can be extraordinarily difficult, simple administrative fixes are not. Such corrections are a good way to give old, outdated rules a fresh look. 😃

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