Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Archive for the ‘accidents’ Category

Piper Alpha Memorial Garden, Aberdeen, Scotland
Scottish Hazards

In terms of the total number of fatalities, the Piper Alpha fire was the worst disaster in the history of offshore oil and gas operations and sent shock waves around the world. Eight months later another interactive pipeline-platform fire killed 7 workers at the South Pass 60 “B” facility in the Gulf of Mexico. A US Minerals Management Service task group reviewed the investigation reports for both fires and recommended regulatory changes with regard to:

  1. the identification and notification procedures for out-of-service safety devices and systems,
  2. location and protection of pipeline risers,
  3. diesel and helicopter fuel storage areas and tanks,
  4. approval of pipeline repairs, and
  5. location of ESD valves on pipelines.

Paul Schneider and I wrote a paper on the task group’s findings and that paper was published in Offshore Operations Post Piper Alpha (Institute of Marine Engineers,1991). The proposed regulations that followed summarized these findings and can be be found at this Federal Register link.

Lord Cullen’s comprehensive inquiry into the Piper Alpha tragedy challenged traditional thinking about regulation and how safety objectives could best be achieved, and was perhaps the most important report in the history of offshore oil and gas operations. Per Cullen:

“Many current safety regulations are unduly restrictive because they impose solutions rather than objectives. They also are out of date in relation to technological advances. Guidance notes lend themselves to interpretations that discourage alternatives. There is a danger that compliance takes precedence over wider safety considerations and that sound innovations are discouraged.“

Cullen advocated management systems that describe the safety objectives, the system by which those objectives were to be achieved, the performance standards to be met, and the means by which adherence to those standards was to be monitored. He called for safety cases that describe major hazards on an installation and provide appropriate safety measures. Per Cullen, each operator should be required in the safety case to demonstrate that the safety management systems of the company and the installation are adequate to assure that design and operation of the platform and its equipment are safe.

Links for the full Piper Alpha Inquiry: volume 1 and volume 2

Read Full Post »

Related posts: Falls are NOT trivial  and Important reading for offshore safety leaders

Read Full Post »

The pipeline rupture, which was apparently caused by a ship’s anchor, occurred almost 9 months ago, but no investigation report has been issued. In February, the LA Times reported that the investigation was being delayed by bureaucratic processes. Meanwhile local politicians (see letter below) seem intent on preventing future production through the pipeline, regardless of the investigation’s findings.

Reports indicate that the pipeline was in excellent condition at the time of the incident. The best reporting and expert commentary on the incident also explains why immediate leak detection can be difficult on low pressure pipelines.

Read Full Post »

As we should and must, offshore operators, contractors, and regulators suffer over every injury, leak, or potentially hazardous event. This is also true for onshore oil and gas operations and most other industries. Yet for the past 2 years, we have been waiting for a proper investigation into the origins of the Covid virus. The Daily Mail is reporting that the Director-General of the WHO now believes that the virus was released from the Wuhan lab.

How can a company have a proper safety culture in a world where this level of malfeasance and stonewalling are tolerated and rewarded?

Read Full Post »

Kudos to BSEE’s Gulf of Mexico Region for their timely safety alerts and comprehensive updates on offshore incidents, trends, and compliance issues. Their most recent update is linked below.

For the past 50 years. my main goal for US offshore operations has been a zero fatality year. Sadly, that goal has never been achieved and will not be achieved this year (see slide 15).

Many casualties are associated with activities that are not perceived to be of high risk. The message on slide 22 of Jason’s presentation is thus very important:

Perceived low risk activities can still result in impactful injuries. Continually risk assess the work being undertaken, no matter if it permitted or nonpermitted work.

Know your personal limits and stop before you reach your limit. Pause and ask for help before you are at your limit.

Jason Mathews, BSEE, 6/7/2022

Read Full Post »

“Our knowledge and expertise in geoscience and petroleum engineering represent advantageous foundation for CCS development, leading us towards our carbon emissions reduction target.” 

PTTEP

Those who closely followed Australia’s Montara Inquiry in 2010 may be less convinced about PTTEP’s expertise. The Montara well suspension program was completely irresponsible. Even though the production casing cement was clearly compromised, PTTEP suspended the well without a single barrier in the well bore. The company was extremely lucky to have avoided a major safety, environmental, and economic disaster. Perhaps they are a very different company now; I certainly hope so.

Montara blowout, Timor Sea

The PTTEP announcement adds to our skepticism about the motives of some CCS proponents. Is CCS prudent public policy? That question is by no means settled and there has been very little opportunity for comment and debate. BOE has raised concerns and there are no doubt many more that have yet to be addressed.

Read Full Post »

Read Full Post »

BOE was troubled by this incident and the contractor’s statements that followed.

BSEE has posted a strong safety alert.

The BSEE investigation concluded that the operator and contractor representatives failed to promptly start the Temporary Abandonment (TA) procedures.

BSEE’s investigation report provides complete details on the incident.

Globetrotter II

Read Full Post »

Important BSEE safety alert – barricades and fall protection

hazardous grating

I never liked the label “slips, trips, and falls” because it trivializes serious safety incidents. Falls don’t get headlines, but they kill workers. In the 10 years prior to Macondo, falls were the leading cause of Gulf of Mexico fatalities. 17 workers died from fall incidents during that period. Related incidents associated with falling or moving equipment (15) and lifting operations (5) accounted for another 20 fatalities. There was only one fire related fatality.

Unfortunately, BSEE’s posted incident data are incomplete, so more detailed, company specific analysis is difficult. No incident summaries whatsoever are posted for 2001-2012 and 2021, and 2020 fatalities are only described as “occupational” or “non-occupational.”

BSEE does do a very good job with their safety alert program, and has repeatedly expressed concerns about chronic grating and fall issues. 2022 Safety Alerts 438 and 427, and 8 other BSEE alerts issued within the last 3 years (nos. 353, 365, 378, 389, 399, 409, 416, 423) addressed grating and falls. BSEE has also conducted blitz inspections to identify problem facilities, and the Coast Guard has repeatedly raised concerns about grating and fall protection.

Per BSEE Safety Alert 365, grating, open hole, and fall prevention safety measures were seriously deficient at many of the facilities visited during their blitz inspections in 2019. The prevention of fall incidents requires the full commitment of management. Some companies are clearly not making that commitment.

Read Full Post »

[Disclosure: I assisted the legal team that defended Bob Kaluza. That said, I completely disagreed with the charges against him and Don Vidrine before my involvement in the case.]

Bob Kaluza (L) and Don Vidrine

Unsurprisingly, there was a lot of tough guy talk in Washington DC after the blowout:

“Our job is basically to keep the boot on the neck of British Petroleum” 

Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior

Weeks after the explosion, President Obama told NBC’s Matt Lauer he was trying to figure out “whose ass to kick.”

Texas Monthly

It was therefore predictable that the Department of Justice (DOJ) would choose to prosecute BP employees individually. There were BP managers who would have been good candidates, but instead DOJ chose to criminally prosecute the working stiffs – the two BP well site leaders on the rig. They were the lowest ranking BP employees associated with the incident. This was apparently acceptable to BP, since their plea agreement blamed Kaluza and Vidrine’s for their role in overseeing the negative pressure test (#blametheworker). Never mind that:

  • BP management was responsible for the well planning and shortcuts that were the root causes of the blowout (see the previous posts in this Macondo series).
  • the extent to which the negative pressure test was misconducted and misinterpreted was and remains a topic of dispute.
  • there were no regulations or standards requiring this test or explaining how it should be conducted, and BP’s internal guidance was woefully inadequate.
  • Bob Kaluza was a temporary replacement for the regular well site leader, had worked primarily onshore, and had never conducted or witnessed a negative pressure test.
  • Kaluza and Vidrine were themselves victims and were fortunate to have survived the incident.

Despite all of this, DOJ still chose to prosecute the two well site leaders. However, the weaknesses in the DOJ case became more obvious over time, and DOJ dropped all but a misdemeanor water pollution charge. Vidrine, who had health issues that were exacerbated by the case, accepted a plea deal. Kaluza was confident of his innocence and chose to make his case in court. His defense team was very strong, and the trial was essentially a walkover. After less than 2 hours of deliberation, the jury fully acquitted Bob Kaluza (2/25/2016). Sadly, Don Vidrine passed away the following year.

LInked is a very good Texas Monthly article about the case.

Read Full Post »

« Newer Posts - Older Posts »