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Posts Tagged ‘decommissioning’

John Smith, a decommissioning specialist who retired from BOEM, has published numerous professional papers on the topic. He has kindly shared his comments (below) on the new GAO report.

The Appeal Process is Broken – The GAO should have emphasized this point.  Companies routinely appeal orders to decommission platforms to forestall having to spend money on plugging wells and removing platforms, pipelines and other facilities. The appeal process commonly takes 5 or more years to reolove (e.g., DCOR appeal of BSEE order to decommission Platform Habitat).

Well P&A – BSEE has been negligent in requiring operators to plug and abandon wells no longer useful for operations. I’m shocked BSEE has curtailed or stopped issuing Inc’s for the failure of operators to P&A wells.  That’s a major failure on the part of BSEE management. That may explain why operator performance criteria was proposed to be eliminated for financial assurance.

Failure to Issue Civil Penalties for Well P&A – From GAO Report “BSEE officials explained that their reluctance to pursue civil penalties stems in part from concerns about whether inducing financial harm against an operator is an effective approach to compel decommissioning. They expressed reservations about taking actions—such as issuing civil penalties—that might strain the financial resources of operators to the point of pushing them into bankruptcy.”   This attitude underscores a real problem – an abrogation of regulatory and enforcement responsibility by BSEE. 

POCS Well P&A –  More than 700 wells have been drilled from the 23 California OCS platforms. The GAO report notes that approximately 200 are in the process of being plugged and abandoned – about 50% of those are probably associated with Gail, Grace, Harvest, Hermosa, Hidalgo, where P&A work has largely been completed by Chevron and Freeport McMoRan.  The vast majority of the remaining 500 wells are no longer useful for operations and have been idle for several decades.  Note POCS was never part of the Idle Well and Idle Iron Program, which was exclusive to the GOM. GAO gave POCS BSEE a pass by not highlighting that problem in POCS. It would have been interesting to know how many of the remaining 500 POCS wells are considered no longer useful for operations, and how many of those have been temporarily plugged and abandoned pursuant to regulations.  The GAO report broke that down for the GOM.

Footnote 46 of GAO Report – “Two of the eight platforms due for decommissioning in the Pacific—platforms Hogan and Houchin—have posed serious safety, environmental, and financial risks, including poor safety compliance records, severe corrosion, and ongoing disputes about who will assume decommissioning liabilities for the platforms and their associated wells, according to BSEE officials and documentation. According to BSEE, these platforms are currently being attended, monitored, and maintained as part of an agreement between BSEE, BOEM, Interior’s Office of the Solicitor, and the three predecessor operators pending a decision from the Interior Board of Land Appeals on the predecessors’ appeal. BSEE estimates that approximately $5 million of the estimated costs to decommission 21 orphaned sidetrack wells associated with these platforms are uncovered by financial assurances.”    $5 million divide 21 = $238,000 per well  – extremely conservative cost estimate given age of wells, likely collapsed casing, and downwhole equipment that needs to be removed.  The cost could easily be 3-4 times higher and there is no bonding so the federal government and taxpayers are on the hook for those costs.

Platform Hogan and Houchin Wells – approximately 75 wells were drilled from the platforms.  It would be interesting to know the status of those wells.  How many have been properly temporarily plugged and abandoned with long-term barriers installed to prevent leaks before decommissioning pursuant to OCS regulations?  Are the 21 orphaned wells mentioned above the Signal wells?  What about the other 54 wells?  Have the predecessor lessees agreed they are responsible for plugging and abandoning those wells?  

Platform Habitat – GAO could have noted this is another example of the broken appeal process. It would be interesting to know whether the 21 wells (primarily if not all gas wells) on Habitat have been temporarily abandoned. There are likely to be significant fugitive emission levels at the platform.  Hopefully the APCD is on top of that.  Note – the platform is unmanned and as I previously mentioned a potential catastrophe was avoided several years ago when a fire broke out on the platform.

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Offshore facility decommissioning is a frequent target of Federal auditors given the complex financial and regulatory challenges. Unfortunately, the reviews have done little to better protect the public interest. As have previous inquiries, the new GAO report (attached for your convenience) calls for improved regulations and enforcement practices. That, of course, has been the objective for decades, but the problems have only worsened.

While the GAO recommendations are unsurprising, the body of the report is informative. Most notably, GAO (p. 29) raises a significant inconsistency on a key provision in the proposed decommissioning financial assurance regulations published last year:

One of the five criteria BOEM would no longer use under the proposed rule is demonstrated reliability, as shown by record of compliance with laws, regulations, and lease terms, among other factors. BOEM’s June 2023 regulatory analysis concluded this criterion is not a good predictive indicator of default on decommissioning obligations. However, BOEM and BSEE officials we spoke with told us that poor compliance records—such as safety and maintenance issues or delayed decommissioning obligations—can be an indicator of potential decommissioning noncompliance or financial stress.

Why was there such a disconnect between the opinions of BOEM and BSEE officials (who are directly involved with decommissioning) and BOEM’s decision not to include a company’s compliance record among the factors to be considered in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance? As pointed out here and here, safety performance is arguably the most important predictor of financial failure and decommissioning noncompliance.

The GAO report correctly acknowledges the difficulties in disqualifying operating companies. However, the regulations at 30 CFR § 250.135 specifically provide for disqualification for poor performance. While the regulations could be tighter, enforcing disqualifications regulations is dependent on persistence and strong support from management and DOI attorneys. Given the political risks associated with disqualifying operators, that support is often lacking.

Disqualification difficulties make it imperative that BOEM carefully consider past performance before approving lease assignments or determining financial assurance amounts. Provisions in 30 CFR §585.408 and §585.107 could have been used to disapprove assignments to Signal Hill, Fieldwood, Cox, and other problem operators. The failure to do so has significantly delayed decommissioning and increased public exposure to financial risks.

In some cases, lease assignments to unqualified companies have not only been approved but they have been facilitated by BOEM/MMS. The case of Platforms Hogan and Houchin, in the Santa Barbara Channel, is a particularly good example. (Did GAO inquire about the Inspector General report on this matter or ask why that report has still not been released?)

Most operating companies are responsible about planning for and fulfilling their decommissioning obligations. The problem is the exceptions, and they are not difficult to identify if you look at compliance data and obtain input from BSEE inspection personnel.

Other important decommissioning questions that need to be considered:

Additional comments on the GAO report from decommissioning specialist John Smith will be posted tomorrow.

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The financial, technical, and regulatory aspects of decommissioning have received much attention on this blog. Andrew Konczvald sends this photo with regrets that the behemoth “Pioneering Spirit” wasn’t available when he was concerned with such matters.

For comparison (size only given the different missions), the massive Thunder Horse floating production platform (see below) in the Gulf of Mexico is 136 m x 112 m, only 12 m narrower but just over 1/3 of the Pioneering Spirit’s length.

The worlds largest 403,342 gross tonnage ship ‘Pioneering Spirit’ (formerly Pieter Schelte) is a catamaran crane vessel owned by the Switzerland-based All Seas Group designed for the single-lift installation and removal of large oil and gas platforms and the installation of record-weight pipelines. The 382-metre-long (1,253 ft), 124-metre-wide (407 ft) vessel is the world’s largest vessel by gross tonnage, and since September 2021 also the largest floating sheer-leg in the world. It was built in South Korea by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering in 2013 at a cost of €2.6 billion. It commenced offshore operations in August 2016.
Thunder Horse

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Safety first: As a descendant of troubled Fieldwood Energy, which had a very poor safety and compliance record, QuarterNorth Energy (QNE) had much to prove. That said, QNE has had a good compliance record in its brief 2 year history. During 76 facility inspections in 2022 and 2023, QNE was cited for only 15 Incidents of noncompliance, all but 2 of which were warnings. This is on par with the companies that had the best compliance records during that period.

BSEE’s incident statistics are hopelessly out-of-date, with the latest data being for 2021, so we have limited information on QNE safety incidents. However, BSEE’s District Investigation Reports, which document the more significant incidents, are relatively current and no QNE incidents were investigated in 2022 and 2023.

Platforms: Consistent with the general sense that QNE inherited the best of Fieldwood’s facilities, the company’s 15 platforms include Bullwinkle, the Thunder Hawk floating production unit in 6050′ of water, and prominent shelf platforms Tarantula and Hickory.

The acquisition reunites 2 iconic Shell platforms under the same ownership. QNE’s Bullwinkle, installed in 1988 in 1353′ of water, is the world’s tallest (non-compliant) steel tower platform. Talos’s Cognac, installed in 1978 in 1023′ of water, is the first platform in >1000′ of water.

Production and reserves: Per Talos, QNE adds 30,000 boe/d of production and 69 million boe of reserves.

Drilling: Per BSEE records, QNE was the operator for 2 deepwater exploration wells, both of which are classified as completed.

Active leases: The QNE acquisition will add 51 leases to the Talos’s 143 lease inventory.

Recent lease sale activity:

SaleQNETalos
2572/110/10
2596/45/4
2616/414/13
total/high bids for QuarterNorth (QNE) and Talos

Sales price and decommissioning: QNE was already on the market for “more than $2 billion,” shortly after the company was formed. Talos is paying $1.29 billion consisting of 24.8 million shares of Talos’s common stock and approximately $965 million in cash. A case study of the complex Fieldwood bankruptcy and the outcomes for the various parties would be most interesting. Also of interest would be a study of the decommissioning obligations of the former companies and the extent to which the sale proceeds are being applied.

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Hywind Scotland, Equinor

It’s prudent, if not imperative, to tow floating wind turbines to sheltered coastal locations for major maintenance. For that reason, Hywind, the world’s first floating wind farm will be offline for up to 4 months this summer.

Hywind Scotland‘s operator, Norwegian power giant Equinor, says that operational data has indicated that its wind turbines need work. The pilot project has been in operation since 2017.

The five Siemens Gamesa turbines will be towed to Norway this summer. An Equinor spokesperson said, “This is the first such operation for a floating farm, and the safest method to do this is to tow the turbines to shore and execute the operations in sheltered conditions.”

electrek

Published data indicate that Hywind has been the UK’s best performing offshore wind farm. Performance data for Hywind, and a chart illustrating the capacity factors since commissioning, are posted below. The 2024 capacity factor will, of course, be substantially reduced as a result of the essential offsite maintenance.

rolling 12 month capacity factor
ending 5/2022
life capacity
factor
age
(years)
installed
capacity
(MWp)
total elec
generated
(GWh)
power/
unit area spanned
(W/m2)
Hywind Scotland49.5%52.6%4.6306421.0
capacity factor = total energy generated/(hours since commissioning x capacity)

The first US floating turbines are expected to be at these California offshore leases, and Hywind operator Equinor is one of the lessees:

Given the financial challenges facing the offshore wind industry, the still emerging technology, and the risks inherent in California offshore development, the amounts bid on these leases only 13 months ago are stunning.

Some Central Coast residents are not enamoured with “another attempt to industrialize the coast.” Although the turbines will be >20 miles offshore, they will have to be towed to shore for major maintenance. For the Central California leases, nearby harbor areas like Morro Bay (pictured below) would be overwhelmed by the large structures and the maintenance and repair operations. Towing the towers to LA/Long Beach, albeit rather distant from the leases, would seem to be the preferred option for such work.

Ironically, a report for BOEM, points to synergies between the offshore wind industry and oil and gas decommissioning industry. Such synergies will only be possible if longstanding oil and gas decommissioning obstacles are satisfactorily addressed and the offshore wind projects proceed as planned.

Which will come first – platform decommissioning or wind turbine commissioning? For those young enough to find out, what is the over-under for the years until (1) half of those platforms are decommissioned, and (2) half of the wind turbines commissioned? Any number <10 is unrealistic for either.

Morro Bay Harbor

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Vineyard Wind project

BOEM is charged with protecting the public from financial risks associated with the decommissioning of offshore facilities. Previous posts have addressed oil and gas facility decommissioning issues and proposed revisions to BOEM’s financial assurance regulations for those operations.

Recent disclosures indicate that BOEM, which very publicly promotes the offshore wind projects that it regulates, has waived a fundamental financial assurance requirement at the request of Vineyard Wind (approval letter attached). Given its broad applicability, this precedential waiver could have the effect of revising a significant provision of the offshore wind decommissioning regulations without public review and comment.

The issue is the “pay as you build” financial assurance requirement at 30 CFR § 585.516, which was waived by BOEM. This requirement, which is intended to project the public from decommissioning liability, is fair and reasonable given that wind developers must only provide financial assurance “in accordance with the number of facilities installed or being installed.” Companies that don’t have sufficient financial strength to comply with this requirement should not be installing and operating offshore wind turbines.

Vineyard Wind was either unable or unwilling to comply with the requirement. They instead requested to defer providing the full amount of the required financial assurance until year 15 of actual operations. The waiver changes “provide assurance when you install” to provide assurance 15 years after installation if everything goes as planned (hoped?).

After their waiver request was denied in 2017, Vineyard Wind resubmitted the request in 2021 seeking a favorable decision from an administration concerned that project cancellation or delay might tarnish the program that they were enthusiastically promoting.

BOEM (as directed from above?) granted the waiver, citing the general departure authority at 30 CFR § 585.103. However, that authority is intended for special situations, not for broadly applicable waivers that have the effect of revising the regulations without the public review required by the Administrative Procedures Act and Executive Orders 12866 and 13563.

There are no criteria in the Vineyard Wind waiver approval that could not apply to other wind developers. Vineyard Wind has simply committed to the same “risk-reduction factors” that apply to all offshore wind projects: damage insurance, the “use of proven turbine technology,” and long-term power purchase agreements. How could BOEM deny the same request from other companies?

It’s noteworthy that the regulations specific to financial assurance at 30 CFR § 585.516 provide no criteria for waiving the assurance requirements; nor do the regulations provide for the 15-year payment plan approved by BOEM. Given the precedential nature of the BOEM action and its enormous financial implications, a revision to the decommissioning regulations that provides criteria for such payment schemes should be promulgating before any similar departures are approved.

In light of the waiver, the public will likely incur substantial costs if Vineyard Wind fails, walks away, doesn’t fully fund their decommissioning account in a timely manner, or seeks new concessions after some or all of the 62 turbines have been installed.

Given the decommissioning obligations, what company would want to step in and assume responsibility for a failing project 10-15 years from now? What happens if Vineyard Wind’s project revenues don’t meet expectations and contributions to their decommissioning account are insufficient or used improperly? More concessions? We’ve seen this dance before.

Whether the project is for oil, gas, or wind energy, protecting the public from decommissioning liabilities should always be prioritized over facilitating development.

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Cox proposes to sell its Gulf of Mexico assets to W&T Offshore for $88.5 million. The bankruptcy case docket has 64 pages of linked documents including many objections to the terms of the sale.

The bankruptcy court’s priorities should be 1) minimizing safety and environmental risks and 2) protecting the public from the massive decommissioning liabilities.

Per the latest BOEM information, Cox and affiliates Energy XXI and EPL operate 477 platforms, which is 31% of the Gulf of Mexico total! (See the related information posted last June.) BSEE estimates that the decommissioning costs for these platforms will exceed $4.5 billion!

Per BSEE data, Cox and its affiliates were cited for 780 incidents of noncompliance (violations) in 2023. They thus accounted for 43% of all 2023 GoM INCs.

Questions:

  • How will taxpayers be protected from Cox’s $4.5+ billion decommissioning obligations?
  • What is the plan for both safely decommissioning facilities and operating those that remain?
  • Why was Cox allowed to continue expanding GoM operations without demonstrating financial assurance and operational competence?
  • Why did BOEM propose to eliminate consideration of a company’s compliance record in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance?
  • How was a failing operator (Cox) selected just 8 months ago for a Federally funded (DOE) project to repurpose GoM facilities for carbon sequestration purposes?

The Cox bankruptcy is yet another costly lesson for Federal regulators. Moving forward, decommissioning and lease assignment policies must prioritize safety, environmental protection, and protection of the public’s financial interests.

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On January 2, 2024, Chevron Corporation announced that for fourth quarter 2023, the Company will be impairing a portion of its U.S. upstream assets, primarily in California, due to continuing regulatory challenges in the state that have resulted in lower anticipated future investment levels in its business plans. The Company expects to continue operating the impacted assets for many years to come. In addition, the Company will be recognizing a loss related to abandonment and decommissioning obligations from previously sold oil and gas production assets in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, as companies that purchased these assets have filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and we believe it is now probable and estimable that a portion of these obligations will revert to the Company. We expect to undertake the decommissioning activities on these assets over the next decade.

SEC filing

On Monday, we will be posting comments on the proposed bankruptcy sale of Cox’s GoM assets and the related safety and decommissioning concerns.

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This Santa Barbara Independent article discusses the Record of Decision (ROD) for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Pacific OCS Decommissioning. A quote from the article regarding BSEE’s support for complete removal of all infrastructure follows:

“It’s great that the federal government finally has a loose game plan for getting oil companies to clean up their rusty messes,” said Miyoko Sakashita, oceans program director at the Center for Biological Diversity. 

Apparently the Center for Biological Diversity supports complete removal, the decommissioning alternative that would destroy “the most productive marine habitats per unit area in the world.” How’s that for irony?

Complete removal may be the most politically expedient alternative in California, but it is by far the most environmentally damaging and poses the greatest safety risks. Old disputes about offshore oil and gas production should not be driving decommissioning policy.

beneath Platform Gilda, Santa Barbara Channel

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BSEE’s Facility Infrastructure Dashboard is a useful tool for tracking decommissioning activity in the Gulf of Mexico. A few numbers from the dashboard:

  • Current structure count:1438 (Per BSEE’s platform structures online query, the number of non-removed structures is 1554. The reason for the discrepancy is unclear; perhaps the dashboard number is more current.)
  • Structures with decom application submittal: 291
  • Total structures on terminated leases: 318
  • Structures on terminated leases with decom application submittal: 196

Planned disposition of the 291 pending removals (25% of the structures to be reefed):

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