Coast Guard photo. Thanks to Lars Herbst for bringing this incident to my attention.
In what the Coast Guard is describing as an “uncontrolled discharge” (euphemism for blowout), an 82-year-old oil well has been spewing oil, gas, and water into the coastal marshes of southern Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, for more than a week.
In hopes of future production, prior and current owners had elected not to permanently plug the well, apparently with the State’s acquiescence.
The Coast Guard has taken over the response and has accessed the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
We don’t need relaxed decommissioning and financial assurance requirements. We need a cooperative Federal, State, and industry effort to ensure that wells are plugged in a timely manner and that financial assurance is provided to protect the public interest.
Those who are concerned about minimizing the Federal government’s decommissioning risk exposure should closely monitor this process. Some companies and their political allies have sought to minimize the financial risks associated with plugging wells and removing facilities. As a result, it has been necessary to defend BOEM from unwarranted commentary about decommissioning issues and the financial assurance rule. Stay tuned!
Of particular interest are mandated reviews of the:
RIsk Management and Financial Assurance Rule: Those who want to gut this rule should come to the table with proposals that better protect the taxpayer from decommissioning liabilities. Pretending that decommissioning financial risks don’t exist or that they are someone else’s (or the govt’s) problem is unacceptable.
5 Year leasing program – This review is urgently needed. See this and this!
BOP/Well Control Rule – This keystone safety rule has undergone multiple reviews in recent years. Because of the rule’s importance, further review for continuous improvement purposes may nonetheless be warranted. Here are the blog comments on the current version of the rule.
After a zero fatality year in 2023, the first in at least 60 years, Jason Mathews of BSEE advises that one worker was killed during US OCS oil and gas operations in 2024.
The fatality occurred during decommissioning operations on the Helix D/B EPIC HEDRON at Talos Energy’s Ship Shoal Block 225 “D” platform in the Gulf. The platform was to be reefed in Eugene Island Block 276.
The victim, who worked for Triton Diving Services, was moving hoses on the port side of the barge and got caught between the bulwark and counterweight of the crawler crane (see picture below).
The victim’s family have filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Helix Energy Services and Triton Diving Services. The plaintiffs assert that prior to the crane movement the crane operator and crew had not undertaken measures to assure that the crane’s swing area was clear of other crew members. Per their filing, Triton and Helix were negligent as follows:
“At the heart of the dispute are rules from the federal Bureau of Ocean Energy Management – BOEM – which require energy producers in the Outer Continental Shelf to provide a bond to pay for well, platform, pipeline and facilities cleanup if the operating company fails to do so.”
“These insurance companies and their unreasonable demands for increased collateral pose an existential threat to independent operators like W&T.”
Comment: If insuring offshore decommissioning is so risk-free and lucrative, why aren’t other companies entering the market?
“Several states, including Texas, are challenging the BOEM rule and in one case they specifically cite W&T as an example of how the rule could be misused to irreparably harm energy producers.“
Comment:As previously posted, the concerned States should propose alternative solutions that would promote production while also protecting taxpayer interests. Arguing that decommissioning financial risks are not a problem is neither accurate nor a solution.
“In over 70 years of producer operations in the Gulf of Mexico, the federal government has never been forced to pay for any abandonment cleanup operations associated with well, platform facility, or pipeline operations.”
Comment: Shamefully, from the standpoints of both the offshore industry and the Federal government, that statement is no longer true. The taxpayer has now funded decommissioning operations in the Matagorda Island Area offshore Texas (BSEE photo below) and more significant decommissioning liabilities loom.
Almost 40 years ago, four large oil and gas platforms were installed in the beautiful offshore area that was part of our Santa Maria District (Pacific Region of the Minerals Management Service). Those platforms are now within the boundaries of the Chumash Heritage National Marine Sanctuary (see map above).
We watched those platforms being installed, inspected the drilling and production operations, and performed a myriad of other duties including the curtailment of offshore operations prior to launches from Vandenberg AFB. Those Vandenberg launches weren’t always perfect as this link clearly demonstrates. Even knowing that, it was still a bit unnerving when missiles were recovered during post-abandonment site clearance trawls.
All four of those Santa Maria District platforms are now on terminated OCS leases. All were installed by companies that are now part of Chevron Corp. (Chevron, Texaco, and Unocal). They are currently maintained by Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas, with Chevron retaining financial responsibility for decommissioning.
Platform
Install yr.
installed by
water depth (ft)
Est. removal weight (short tons)
wells drilled
Harvest
1985
Texaco
675
35,150
19
Hermosa
1985
Chevron
603
30,868
13
Hidalgo
1986
Chevron
430
23,384
14
Irene
1985
Unocal
242
8,762
26
BSEE reports that the 46 wells on Harvest, Hermosa, and Hidalgo have been plugged and tested, and that the well conductors have been removed. No information has been posted on the status of the wells at Platform Irene, but presumably they are (or will soon be) plugged in accordance with BSEE regulations.
Will the inclusion of these platforms in the Chumash Marine Sanctuary further complicate the already difficult decommissioning process? Decommissioning specialist John Smith thinks it may:
“In addition to the BOEM and BSEE approval process, Chevron and FMC are going to be dealing with the NOAA permitting regime for Sanctuaries. Those permitting and environmental compliance requirements are extensive. NOAA’s NEPA documentation for West Coast marine sanctuaries will also need to be amended to include the Chumash.”
So the “Mission Impossible” that is California OCS decommissioning now has yet another complex regulatory element.
“Even though most of the SYU facilities are outside the Sanctuary, the proximity of the operations to the Sanctuary is problematic. The Chumash are now going to be a co-manager of the Sanctuary, adding another player in the process. Sable is going to obtain multiple Federal, State and local permits to restart SYU, and law suits are likely at every stage of the process.”
Platform Holly, California State waters in the Santa Barbara Channel, formerly operated by Venoco
Platform Holly sits immediately offshore from the Univ. of California at Santa Barbara, and UCSB scientists have studied the platform and surrounding ecology extensively. Multiple studies have shown that production from Holly reduced natural seepage and methane pollution from shallow formations beneath the Channel. Platform Holly was thus a “net negative” hydrocarbon polluter.
The natural seepage in the Santa Barbara Channel was important to the earliest inhabitants of the area. The Chumash used the tar for binding and sealing purposes, including caulking their canoes. Since Holly shut down in 2015 following the Refugio pipeline spill, offshore workers and supply boat crews have reported a considerable increase in gas seepage.
Earlier this month, it was reported that well plugging operations at Holly had now been completed, but decisions regarding the final decommissioning of the platform remain.
Venoco declared bankruptcy in 2015 and the State of California became the platform owner. According to the State Lands Commission, Exxon will pay the costs for decommissioning the platform. This is because Exxon acquisition Mobil operated the platform from 1993-1997 before Venoco became owner.
The most recent Holly development is that Venoco has settled its law suit with Plains, the company responsible for the 2015 Refugio pipeline spill that halted production from Holly. Terms of the settlement have not been disclosed.
Note: As an aside, I’m curious as to whether Mobil provided a decommissioning guarantee as part of the sale to Venoco or whether the State is simply holding ExxonMobil accountable as a legacy owner. If it’s the latter, why isn’t bp (bp acquisition Arco was Holly’s operator from 1966-1993) also liable? Is it a matter of Mobil being the more recent predecessor owner?
The previously discussed sale of Cox assets in 6 GoM fields to W&T was completed in January for $72 million, $16.5 million less than the proposed price. W&T, an established GoM operator, believes they can increase the pre-bankruptcy production (8300 boepd) through workovers, recompletions, and facility repairs.
The extent to which W&T is assuming decommissioning liability for the Cox assets is unclear to this observer. Decommissioning information from W&T’s SEC filing is pasted at the end of this post.
In February, Cox won court approval to sell “about a dozen oil fields to Natural Resources Worldwide LLC for about $20 million following a bankruptcy court auction.” This sale is more concerning given that the purchaser has no operating history in the GoM, and scant information about the company can be found online. Perhaps they are affiliated with Natural Resources Partners L.P., an energy investment firm which “owns mineral interests and other rights that are leased to companies engaged in the extraction of minerals,” but “does not mine, drill, or produce minerals, has no operations, and conducts business solely in an office environment.”
Per BOEM data, Cox filed requests to assign a number of leases to Natural Resources Worldwide (NRW) in May, but those requests have yet to be approved. Hopefully, BOEM is taking a hard look at these requests and their obligations following the court auction. Decommissioning liabilities should be their number one concern. (Note: NRW was just listed as the operator of the former Cox platform at EI 361, so presumably at least some of those assignments have now been approved.)
According to BOEM’s platform data base, Cox and affiliates Energy XXI and EPL still operate 243 platforms, down from 435 in June 2023. Also per the data base, the Cox companies have not removed any platforms during 2023 or 2024 YTD, so the reduction in platforms is presumably the result of the W&T transaction. Most of the remaining Cox platforms are old – 16 of their 77 major platforms were installed in the 1950s!
Meanwhile, Cox and affiliates continue to be the GoM violations leader by far with 549 incidents of non-compliance (INCs) in 2024 YTD, 45% of the GoM total for all operators. No other company has more than 100 INCs (although Whitney Oil and Gas has a disappointing 93 INCs, including 33 facility shut-ins on only 65 inspections!)
operator
platforms/ major platforms
warning INCs
component shut-in INCs
facility shut-in INCs
Cox
209/69
407
44
4
Energy XXI
19/7
73
1
2
EPL
5/1
16
1
1
Total Cox
233/77
496
46
7
Total GoM
1519/736
831
317
68
INCs are for 2024 as of 9/17/2024. A major platform has at least 6 well completions or more than 2 pieces of production equipment.
The Company may be subject to retained liabilities with respect to certain divested property interests by operation of law. Certain counterparties in past divestiture transactions or third parties in existing leases that have filed for bankruptcy protection or undergone associated reorganizations may not be able to perform required abandonment obligations. Due to operation of law, the Company may be required to assume decommissioning obligations for those interests. The Company may be held jointly and severally liable for the decommissioning of various facilities and related wells. The Company no longer owns these assets, nor are they related to current operations.
During the three months ended March 31, 2024, the Company incurred $2.6 million in costs related to these decommissioning obligations and reassessed the existing decommissioning obligations, recording an additional $5.3 million. As of March 31, 2024, the remaining loss contingency recorded related to the anticipated decommissioning obligations was $20.8 million.
Although it is reasonably possible that the Company could receive state or federal decommissioning orders in the future or be notified of defaulting third parties in existing leases, the Company cannot predict with certainty, if, how or when such orders or notices will be resolved or estimate a possible loss or range of loss that may result from such orders. However, the Company could incur judgments, enter into settlements or revise the Company’s opinion regarding the outcome of certain notices or matters, and such developments could have a material adverse effect on the Company’s results of operations in the period in which the amounts are accrued and the Company’s cash flows in the period in which the amounts are paid. To the extent that the Company does incur costs associated with these properties in future periods, the Company intends to seek contribution from other parties that owned an interest in the facilities.
I’m not typically aligned with the sponsors of the attached “Plug Offshore Wells Act,” but the call for transparency is understandable given that taxpayer funds are, for the first time, being used to decommission offshore platforms in the Matagorda Island area of the Gulf of Mexico, massive liabilities associated with the Cox bankruptcy loom, and the Hogan and Houchin saga drags on without resolution.
The bill would require an annual report on well, platform, and pipeline decommissioning including applications, deadlines, and enforcement actions. BSEE does have a good facility infrastructure page for the GoM, but much of the information called for in H.R. 9168 is not publicly available.
Crews from the U.S. Coast Guard, Texas General Land Office, and the Texas Railroad Commission monitored the operation. It’s unclear who the responsible party is and who funded and performed the work.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 