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Posts Tagged ‘BSEE’

Nantucket Current photo: Vineyard Wind turbine AW38 with a damaged blade that has caused thousands of pieces of debris to wash ashore on Nantucket since Tuesday.

Vineyard Wind statement (7/18):

  • “This morning, a significant part of the remaining GE Vernova blade detached from the turbine. Maritime crews were onsite overnight preparing to respond to this development, though current weather conditions create a difficult working environment.”
  • We are staying apprised of GE Vernova’s efforts to manage the situation, including the removal and recovery of the remaining blade attached to the turbine.”
  • Staying apprised? As operator, Vineyard Wind is fully responsible. This is their situation to manage.

BSEE statement:

  • BSEE has ordered Vineyard Wind to suspend power production and wind turbine generator construction.
  • Kudos to BSEE for their decisive and timely action. They need to better understand what happened before allowing operations and construction to continue.
  • Imagine the pressure on the regulator if the project was providing a significant portion of the region’s electricity.
  • BSEE’s comment that there has been “no harm to any marine resources or mammals from the incident” is premature given the extensive marine debris and the associated risks to mammals.

What about the CVA?

  • The regulations at 30 CFR § 285.707-712 assign important responsibilities to Certified Verification Agents (CVAs), independent third parties with established technical expertise. These responsibilities include detailed reviews of the design, fabrication, and installation plans.
  • Oddly, the CVA’s “Statement of Qualifications” and “Scope of Work and Verification Plan” have been redacted in their entirety from Vineyard Wind’s Construction and Operations Plan (COP) (see Appendix I-C and I-D).
  • Who was the CVA and why was that important information redacted?
  • Were any of the CVA requirements waived per 258.705?

BOEM:

  • Will BOEM, the lessor and Federal wind program manager, be making a statement? Will they be reassessing their COP review procedures?
  • BOEM should temper their over-the-top promotion of offshore wind. The complete shutdown of the first utility scale offshore wind farm heightens public concerns about the intermittency of this power source, and the need for reliable backup sources.

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Nantucket Current photo

Appropriate response by BSEE.

Late Tuesday afternoon, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement said all operations are shut down until further notice.

“A team of BSEE experts is onsite to work closely with Vineyard Wind on an analysis of the cause of the incident and next steps,” the agency said in a statement.  

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Photo by Capt. Carl Bois shared with the Nantucket Current
Ack4whales photo of the damaged turbine

On Sunday (7/14), Capt. Carl Bois, of the fishing charter Topspin out of Nantucket, told the Current he noticed a significant amount of debris in the Vineyard Wind lease area.

“There was so much debris at the wind farm,” Bois said. “We covered many miles and only saw the debris at the wind farm site: big sheets of fiberglass with foam core and lots of loose foam.”

On Saturday night (7/13) the Coast Guard warned Mariners as follows: “Coast Guard received a report of 03 floating debris 10 meters by 2 meters in the vicinity of approximately 26 NM SE of Marthas Vineyard and 22 NM SW of Nantucket in position 40 59.559N 070 25.404W. All marines are requested to use extreme caution while transiting the area.

On Monday (7/15), Vineyard Wind confirmed that a turbine blade incident occurred on 7/13: “On Saturday evening, Vineyard Wind experienced blade damage on a wind turbine in its offshore development area. No personnel or third parties were in the vicinity of the turbine at the time, and all employees of Vineyard Wind and its contractors are safe and secure.”

On 7/16, Vineyard Wind issued another statement advising that they were deploying teams to Nantucket to clean up debris from the incident.

Comments:

  • Not a good look for the first large-scale offshore wind project in the US.
  • It’s unclear what the status of operations was at the time of the incident.
  • Vineyard Wind seems to be passing the buck a bit when they note that “GE, as the project’s turbine and blade manufacturer and installation contractor, will now be conducting the analysis into the root cause of the incident.” While GE’s findings are critical, Vineyard Wind, as operator, is fully responsible and accountable for the incident and should be leading the analysis.
  • Was their a third party review of the turbine design?
  • Was the incident reported to BSEE, the safety regulator for offshore wind? State and local government?
  • BSEE and the Coast Guard should ensure that Vineyard Wind’s findings and their own independent report are made publicly available in a timely manner. Ditto for Safety Alerts.
  • What other incidents have occurred during offshore wind facility construction and operations?
  • In 2017, Vineyard Wind requested to defer providing the full amount of the required financial assurance until year 15 of actual operations. That request was denied, but was approved when resubmitted in 2021. The regulations have now been revised to allow such deferrals of financial assurance on all offshore wind projects.

Vineyard Wind is a joint venture between Avangrid, a Spanish company, and Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners. They were

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As is the case with many Federal and corporate entities, the Secret Service website is long on promotion and short on substantive details and performance data. The limited “Measurable Impact” statistics on their webpage advise that the Secret Service protected 6623 foreign and domestic visits “without incident” in Fiscal Year 2022, which ended 22 months ago.

Their 2024 budget request overview includes a bit more information (pasted below). The Secret Service gives themselves a perfect score if protectees arrive and depart safely. When your scores are always 100%, your performance measures are clearly inadequate.

Like drilling blowouts, assassinations are low frequency, high consequence events. Prevention requires gathering data on lesser events, identifying leading indicators, and tracking high-potential precursors. You don’t prevent high consequence events by only tracking high consequence events.

Inspections are also critical. Does the Secret Service inspect events to assess protective measures such as verifying that the surrounding areas are cleared and being observed? If so, what do those numbers look like.

BSEE, the OCS safety regulator, does a good job of collecting data, but fails to compile and post updates in a timely manner. Their latest incident tables are for 2022, and even those data are incomplete. Panel investigations, which are conducted for the more serious incidents, now take 2.5 years to complete. This is unacceptable for an organization with BSEE’s talent, resources, and safety mandate.

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For decades, Gulf of Mexico operators have reported facility evacuation and production curtailment data to MMS/BSEE as tropical storms or hurricanes approached. Requirements for this reporting are found in the regulations (30 CFR 250.192(a)) supplemented by NTL 20I5-G02.

Operators must submit reports by 11:00 a.m. (CT) daily throughout the period of evacuation and shut-in with the understanding that BSEE will post the compiled data by 1 pm CT. This reporting has been diligently accomplished for decades and MMS/BSEE posted the data each day, including weekends and holidays, without fail. Everyone in industry and government understood the importance of safely evacuating personnel, shutting down production, and ensuring that these hurricane data were made available to the public each day. (All of the daily updates for 2011 onward can be found here.)

On Wednesday, July 3, Shell informed the media that they had begun evacuating non-essential personnel and shutting-in production at certain facilities. Both Shell and Chevron issued general statements on the status of their operations on Thursday, July 4. Both companies no doubt submitted the required reports to BSEE, as did other companies with operations near the projected path of the storm.

BSEE failed to post any evacuation and shut-in data on any date from July 3 through today (July 8).

Beryl missed the heart of the Gulf of Mexico basin, but Shell and other companies with facilities in the more westerly areas evacuated personnel and curtailed production. BSEE’s unprecedented failure to post this information needs to be addressed before more significant storms threaten offshore personnel and production in the Gulf.

Shell evacuated non-essential personnel and shut-in production at Perdido (pictured)

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Followers of the US OCS oil and gas program have observed some impressive chutzpah over the years, but a new law suit challenging the extension of Santa Ynez Unit leases raises the bar.

Groups that helped block every attempt to resume production in the Santa Ynez Unit are now suing to terminate the leases for non-production. Brilliant!🥇

Without these extensions, each of the leases would have expired and ExxonMobil would have been required to permanently cease its oil and gas operations, plug its wells, and decommission its other infrastructure.” See the full text of the law suit.

More posts on the Santa Ynez Unit saga.

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Your tax dollars at work. Highway project? No, Federally funded decommissioning in the Matagorda Island area of the Gulf of Mexico.

This unprecedented use of Federal funds for offshore facility decommissioning does not reflect favorably on lease management practices.

Hopefully, this is not the tip of the iceberg, but most of the estimated $4.5 billion in decommissioning liabilities associated with the Cox bankruptcy loom, as do legal questions regarding liability for Platforms Hogan and Houchin Santa Barbara Channel, and the 1130 remaining pre-1997 platforms. What portion of those liabilities cannot be assigned to prior owners with sufficient financial resources to cover the decommissioning costs?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0nU-Fl-gfUg

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I had the pleasure of working with Jason Mathews when he was a young MMS engineer. He truly cared about our safety mission and has taken that commitment to the next level at BSEE. Jason shared this important, heartfelt message on the anniversary of the Macondo blowout.

One of the greatest gifts I ever received in life is having a little girl and having the opportunity to go home every evening and spending time with her at cheer, softball, doing homework, etc. I have a great deal of respect for the men and women who work offshore and put their lives on hold for 14-28 days to deliver much needed OCS production to meet US demand. Undoubtedly, they are better / tougher people than me.

Over the last year, my team has seen multiple incidents that had a high potential severity that could have led to a fatal / serious injury or major incident in the GOM. Although we can sit and debate the causal factors for hours, one that jumps to the top of the discussion is the Human Factor – Complacency. Of all the things a leader should fear, complacency heads the list. There is no doubt success breeds complacency, and complacency breeds failure.

To this day, I am still shook by the mindset and complacency of many onboard the Deepwater Horizon prior to the incident. During testimony in the public hearings, John Guide, the BP well team leader for the Horizon, believed that the rig crew had become “too comfortable” because of its good track record for drilling difficult wells. Ross Skidmore, a BP contractor on the rig on April 20, testified that the crew became complacent after completing drilling because “when you get to that point, everybody goes to the mindset that weʹre through, this job is done.”  To me, the complacency on the Deepwater Horizon could be attributable to the crew not having access to all of the well data (OptiCem reports – cement job risk) available to BP personnel onshore and the well site leaders on the rig. Our investigation concluded, the overall complacency of the Deepwater Horizon crew was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

As regulators, we have special roles in the GOM as it relates to safety:

  • Driving the avoidance of complacency and risk-free mindsets of the offshore employees
  • Understanding we can’t be selfish – Our success is not our individual personal growth / gains, but it is being unwavering in your promotion of offshore safety to ensure all offshore employees return home to their families safely
  • Holding each other (internally) and industry (externally) accountable when necessary

In order to achieve greatness offshore, we ,as a regulator,  have to believe we can, and never sit still until we achieve it. 

Everyone on this email has a very critical function and role. Never underestimate the value of what you do, have the proper mindset, and avoid complacency.

Do whatever it takes to ensure the people offshore are gifted the same gift we receive every day – going home to our families.

All In –

Jason P. Mathews, Petroleum Engineer, Field Operations – OSM

Friday Night LIghts: Coach Mathews and his daughter

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As we enter the third month of 2024, BSEE has finally updated the incident tables to include 2022 data.

The OCS program managers I was privileged to work for would never have accepted such delays in posting fundamental safety data. Carolita Kallaur (RIP) wouldn’t tolerate a delay of 14 days in publishing quarterly incident statistics, let alone a delay of 14 months for annual data with no quarterly updates. Transparency and timeliness in informing the public about offshore safety performance was her highest priority. Cynthia Quarterman, Tom Readinger, and other OCS program leaders were similarly insistent on timeliness and transparency in the reporting of incident data.

The belated 2022 BSEE tables also include a glaring error. The most important figure, the number of fatalities, is incorrect. Five workers died from US OCS incidents in 2022, not one. The fatal helicopter crash at the West Delta 106 A helideck on 12/29/2022 that killed four workers (photos below) is inexplicably not included. 

Is the failure to include this fatal incident a regulatory fragmentation issue? OCS safety data should be reported holistically and should not be parsed based on perceived regulatory jurisdiction? In any event, the tragic accident at the West Delta 106 A platform occurred at the helideck, which per the MOA with the Coast Guard is under BSEE jurisdiction.

It’s unfortunate that 2023 data are not available, even in summary form. At a minimum, BSEE should be proudly reporting that 2023 was the first zero fatality year on the US OCS since at least 1963! While acknowledging that this outstanding achievement will be difficult to repeat, it most certainly deserves public attention.

Lastly, what about incident data for the offshore wind program? When will these data be posted?

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John Smith, a decommissioning specialist who retired from BOEM, has published numerous professional papers on the topic. He has kindly shared his comments (below) on the new GAO report.

The Appeal Process is Broken – The GAO should have emphasized this point.  Companies routinely appeal orders to decommission platforms to forestall having to spend money on plugging wells and removing platforms, pipelines and other facilities. The appeal process commonly takes 5 or more years to reolove (e.g., DCOR appeal of BSEE order to decommission Platform Habitat).

Well P&A – BSEE has been negligent in requiring operators to plug and abandon wells no longer useful for operations. I’m shocked BSEE has curtailed or stopped issuing Inc’s for the failure of operators to P&A wells.  That’s a major failure on the part of BSEE management. That may explain why operator performance criteria was proposed to be eliminated for financial assurance.

Failure to Issue Civil Penalties for Well P&A – From GAO Report “BSEE officials explained that their reluctance to pursue civil penalties stems in part from concerns about whether inducing financial harm against an operator is an effective approach to compel decommissioning. They expressed reservations about taking actions—such as issuing civil penalties—that might strain the financial resources of operators to the point of pushing them into bankruptcy.”   This attitude underscores a real problem – an abrogation of regulatory and enforcement responsibility by BSEE. 

POCS Well P&A –  More than 700 wells have been drilled from the 23 California OCS platforms. The GAO report notes that approximately 200 are in the process of being plugged and abandoned – about 50% of those are probably associated with Gail, Grace, Harvest, Hermosa, Hidalgo, where P&A work has largely been completed by Chevron and Freeport McMoRan.  The vast majority of the remaining 500 wells are no longer useful for operations and have been idle for several decades.  Note POCS was never part of the Idle Well and Idle Iron Program, which was exclusive to the GOM. GAO gave POCS BSEE a pass by not highlighting that problem in POCS. It would have been interesting to know how many of the remaining 500 POCS wells are considered no longer useful for operations, and how many of those have been temporarily plugged and abandoned pursuant to regulations.  The GAO report broke that down for the GOM.

Footnote 46 of GAO Report – “Two of the eight platforms due for decommissioning in the Pacific—platforms Hogan and Houchin—have posed serious safety, environmental, and financial risks, including poor safety compliance records, severe corrosion, and ongoing disputes about who will assume decommissioning liabilities for the platforms and their associated wells, according to BSEE officials and documentation. According to BSEE, these platforms are currently being attended, monitored, and maintained as part of an agreement between BSEE, BOEM, Interior’s Office of the Solicitor, and the three predecessor operators pending a decision from the Interior Board of Land Appeals on the predecessors’ appeal. BSEE estimates that approximately $5 million of the estimated costs to decommission 21 orphaned sidetrack wells associated with these platforms are uncovered by financial assurances.”    $5 million divide 21 = $238,000 per well  – extremely conservative cost estimate given age of wells, likely collapsed casing, and downwhole equipment that needs to be removed.  The cost could easily be 3-4 times higher and there is no bonding so the federal government and taxpayers are on the hook for those costs.

Platform Hogan and Houchin Wells – approximately 75 wells were drilled from the platforms.  It would be interesting to know the status of those wells.  How many have been properly temporarily plugged and abandoned with long-term barriers installed to prevent leaks before decommissioning pursuant to OCS regulations?  Are the 21 orphaned wells mentioned above the Signal wells?  What about the other 54 wells?  Have the predecessor lessees agreed they are responsible for plugging and abandoning those wells?  

Platform Habitat – GAO could have noted this is another example of the broken appeal process. It would be interesting to know whether the 21 wells (primarily if not all gas wells) on Habitat have been temporarily abandoned. There are likely to be significant fugitive emission levels at the platform.  Hopefully the APCD is on top of that.  Note – the platform is unmanned and as I previously mentioned a potential catastrophe was avoided several years ago when a fire broke out on the platform.

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