BSEE’s risk-based inspection and safety alert programs have effectively drawn attention to grating risks. Attached is a recent alert describing a grating incident that could have been fatal.
A worker installing a pump in a skid above unsafe grating was kneeling on scaffolding boards. The tip of his boot was on the corroded grating when it suddenly gave way. The worker was able to grab a nearby section of piping to support himself. The 36″ x 36″ piece of grating collapsed and fell into the water.
Inexplicably, BSEE’s ROD designates the most environmentally harmful, unsafe, and costly alternative as the “preferred alternative.” The decision is contrary to the opinions expressed by the leading experts on the ecology of California offshore platforms, most notablyDr. Milton Love of the University of California at Santa Barbara.
Why did BSEE select alternative 1 (complete removal) when their $1.6 million EIS acknowledges that alternative 2 (partial removal) is environmentally preferable? Was their decision influenced by activists who support the alternative that is most punitive to the industry they despise?
“On December 7, 2023, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) issued a Record of Decision (ROD) recommending the full removal of California’s 23 offshore oil platforms in federal waters, following a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) conducted to assess decommissioning options for platforms, pipelines, and other related infrastructure. However, upon close review, the PEIS and ROD appear to have reached misguided and detrimental conclusions due to critical oversights in their analyses.” Asher Radziner, Montecito Journal
Addressing regulatory fragmentation will improve efficiency and lower costs for industry and government while reducing safety and environmental risks.
Unfortunately, the regulatory regime for US offshore oil and gas operations is noteworthy for redundancy, uncertainty, and complexity that divert industry and governmental attention from safety and environmental protection objectives to administrative processes, interpretations, and jurisdictional boundaries.
“Poster Child”for regulatory fragmentation?
The 12 Federal entities that have some OCS regulatory responsibilities are identified in the above chart. The organizations with core regulatory roles are included in the overlapping circles. The responsibilities of BOEM and BSEE are so inextricably intertwined that those bureaus occupy the same circle.
Coastal states also have OCS regulatory roles through authority granted in the Coastal Zone Management Act.
When multiple agencies have jurisdiction over a facility, system, or procedure, the redundancy inevitably results in inconsistency, ambiguity, and gaps in oversight. The focus of operating companies and contractors is diverted from safety and risk management to understanding and satisfying the regulators. The inevitable result is a compliance mentality that weakens the safety culture.
Interagency agreements in the form of MOUs and MOAs, which are ostensibly for the purpose of managing redundancy, are often unclear or inconclusive. They tend to be more for the benefit of the agencies than the regulated industry. The interests of the regulators and protecting turf are paramount.
Where legislation is not required (e.g. BOEM and BSEE), use executive orders to combine and streamline the regulatory functions.
Where agencies have separate legislative authority, establish a lead regulator by executive order pending corrective legislation. Under the EO, the agencies would function as a joint authority under the direction of the lead regulator.
A combined BOEM/BSEE would be the logical choice for leading the joint authority given that OCS energy is their sole focus and they are accountable for the success of OCS programs.
Use a management system regulatory approach that holistically considers all of the legislatively enacted regulatory objectives.
Increase the attention given to regulator and operator performance in terms of both outcomes and efficiency.
Reduce and simplify permitting requirements for operating companies that have demonstrated outstanding safety and environmental performance over a sustained period.
“At the heart of the dispute are rules from the federal Bureau of Ocean Energy Management – BOEM – which require energy producers in the Outer Continental Shelf to provide a bond to pay for well, platform, pipeline and facilities cleanup if the operating company fails to do so.”
“These insurance companies and their unreasonable demands for increased collateral pose an existential threat to independent operators like W&T.”
Comment: If insuring offshore decommissioning is so risk-free and lucrative, why aren’t other companies entering the market?
“Several states, including Texas, are challenging the BOEM rule and in one case they specifically cite W&T as an example of how the rule could be misused to irreparably harm energy producers.“
Comment:As previously posted, the concerned States should propose alternative solutions that would promote production while also protecting taxpayer interests. Arguing that decommissioning financial risks are not a problem is neither accurate nor a solution.
“In over 70 years of producer operations in the Gulf of Mexico, the federal government has never been forced to pay for any abandonment cleanup operations associated with well, platform facility, or pipeline operations.”
Comment: Shamefully, from the standpoints of both the offshore industry and the Federal government, that statement is no longer true. The taxpayer has now funded decommissioning operations in the Matagorda Island Area offshore Texas (BSEE photo below) and more significant decommissioning liabilities loom.
The attached BSEE document provides guidance for determining pollution inspection frequencies for unmanned facilities. Thoughts:
Reasonable risk-based approach
A minimum of bi-weekly visual and physical inspections for low risk platforms producing dry gas
Any platform with significant oil production and storage, and no real time monitoring system, will have to be visually inspected at least every 3 days (daily if other risk factors apply) and boarded weekly
Any platform that had spillage totaling > 1 bbl in the past 2 years will have to be visually inspected every other day and boarded weekly.
Provides for the application of technology (cameras, drones, innovative monitoring systems) to reduce inspection frequencies.
“On Sept. 16, 2024, a routine helicopter approach at an offshore facility nearly resulted in a serious accident due to a failure to follow proper helideck procedures. Before landing, the helicopter pilot visually confirmed that a nearby crane was securely stowed and stationary (Figure 1). However, as the helicopter neared the helideck, the crane operator unexpectedly raised the crane boom, bringing it alarmingly close to the landing area as the helicopter was 10 feet from touchdown. The pilots swiftly executed a go-around maneuver, successfully avoiding a collision and ensuring the safety of the crew and passengers onboard.”
BSEE: Vineyard Wind is still prohibited from installing blades, producing power or conducting any activity on the damaged A-38 turbine.
GE: We are “really now getting to a point of shifting back to execution out at sea.” (Not at all what BSEE said.)
BSEE: BSEE may permit other specific activities after a risk analysis has been performed and mitigations adopted.
GE: We were “granted approval to return to installing new blades on turbines at the project once stringent safety and operational conditions are met.” (Positive spin of the BSEE statement implying that approval is assured.)
BSEE:Root cause analysis of the blade failure has not yet been provided to BSEE.
GE: “We have finalized root cause analysis and confirm the blade at issue at Vineyard Wind was caused by a manufacturing deviation from our factory in Canada.” (Then why doesn’t BSEE have the analysis? Is the Canadian plant being scapegoated?)
BSEE:No timetable for completion of BSEE investigation (This could present a dilemma for BSEE. How do you allow the resumption of blade installation and power generation before the investigation has been completed? Will the report be held until the Harris or Trump administration gives the go-ahead?)
The attached letter was obtained by the Nantucket Current through a FOIA request. Key points:
Vineyard Wind power generation and blade installation suspension order remains in effect.
Vineyard Wind directed to conduct a site-specific study that evaluates the environmental harm and other potential damage from the blade failure, and to identify potential mitigation measures.
Vineyard Wind was required to submit a plan for the study by Oct. 11. It’s not clear whether the plan was submitted.
The study must include a mass balance of unrecovered debris material based on the weight of debris recovered and the weight of the subsea debris retrieved.
Comments:
The study requirement is appropriate given the significance of the blade incident and the implications for offshore wind development.
Why was a FOIA request needed to learn about the study requirement?
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 