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The sad state of UK North Sea production

JL Daeschler, other North Sea veterans, and those of us who once admired the UK offshore program, lament the sad plight of their oil and gas industry and the destruction of the economy in northeast Scotland.

Incomprehensibly, the UK has retained the Energy Profits Levy, which requires North Sea operators to hand over 78% of their diminished profits to the Treasury. Most have regrettably chosen to do business elsewhere. Investment in the UK North Sea is at a record low and a study from Robert Gordon University says jobs are being “quietly” lost at a rate of 1,000 a month.

The UK government is grudgingly allowing some tieback production to existing facilities, but this will do little to stem the industry’s decline. JL notes that this limited infield development is not the type of new field investment needed to grow production and sustain the service industry (rigs, boats, helicopters, equipment, etc.).

The UK Oil and Gas Authority rather smugly changed its name to the North Sea Transition Authority in 2022. Besides lower production and higher energy prices, what has the Transition Authority accomplished? As Dan Yergin correctly informs us:

“The term energy transition somehow sounds like it is a well-lubricated slide from one reality to another. In fact, it will be far more complex: Throughout history, energy transitions have been difficult, and this one is even more challenging than any previous shift.”

Related article in the WSJ: “Europe’s Green Energy Rush Slashed Emissions—and Crippled the Economy”

European politicians pitched the continent’s green transition to voters as a win-win: Citizens would benefit from green jobs and cheap, abundant solar and wind energy alongside a sharp reduction in carbon emissions. Nearly two decades on, the promise has largely proved costly for consumers and damaging for the economy.

Europe largely took an “or” strategy: It raced to replace fossil fuels with solar, wind and biomass by taxing carbon heavily, subsidizing renewables and closing scores of fossil-fuel power plants. Britain, which pioneered the use of coal for energy, last year became the first large industrialized country to shut all of its coal-fired power plants. It has also banned new offshore oil-and-gas drilling. Denmark plans to eliminate gas for home heating by 2035. Around one-fifth of Germany’s municipal utilities plan to shut down their gas networks in coming years, according to an October survey by the utilities’ trade association.”

Kayla Bartkowski/Los Angeles Times/Getty Images

WSJ article on Sable Offshore:

“Oil giants have fled California, but James Flores is desperate to get in, even if it means crossing swords with the state.”

On Thanksgiving

On my favorite holiday, I’m sending best wishes to BOE readers of all persuasions. Offshore energy issues can be divisive, even among friends, and I’m grateful for the opportunity to share information and opinions.

My wife and I will be spending Thanksgiving with my daughter’s family including our 6 grandchildren, none of whom have expressed interest in being offshore safety regulators (no higher calling 😉).

Belated holiday wishes to our friends in Canada where Thanksgiving is celebrated in October, and cheers to those living where a similar fall holiday is observed.

Bud

One Big Beautiful Gulf of America

In JPMorgan’s view, the stage is set for a potential decline of as much as 50% in oil prices through the end of 2027, taking Brent crude down to the low $30s per barrel range from its current level of around $63.50.

Will bearish forecasts by JPMorgan and others temper bidding at the highly anticipated, and long awaited, Gulf lease sale to be held on 12/10/2025? Probably not for these reasons:

  • This will be the first lease sale in 2 years.
  • The terms are very attractive.
  • Given the longer term nature of deepwater development, production will not begin for years following lease issuance. Note that anticipated first production for 3 new high-pressure deepwater projects, Kaskida, Sparta, and Tiber, will be 23, 16, and 21 years after the field discovery dates.
  • To the extent that price forecasts are reliable at all (see no. 9 in the image below), the degree of uncertainty for longer term forecasts is particularly high.
  • The sale has to live up to its name Big Beautiful Gulf 1 (BBG1). 😉

“So, the safety culture is fine because we don’t report when people die.” Former Ørsted safety head, Eskild Lund Sørensen, accuses offshore wind body G+ of cherry picking data. The 2024 G+ incident data report is attached.

Member companies, which include major players such as Ørsted, Equinor, Vattenfall, RWE, and CIP, report quarterly data on accidents, near-misses, hazardous observations, and equipment damage. As is the case with most industry reporting schemes, anonymity is prioritized over transparency.

Sørensen asserts that the G+ wind industry data are incomplete: ”It shows that what is reported under the guidelines has gone down, and also that there is a cut off on what is being reported that does not include the full value chain on the industry.” He notes that a contractor to Northland Power from Canada, a member of G+, was involved in a 2024 workplace accident in Taiwan that resulted in three fatalities. (It’s also noteworthy that Equinor’s 2024 Empire Wind fatality was not included.)

Sørensen:There have been no significant improvements in the last 10 years. Safety in offshore wind is neither getting worse nor better. There are no signs of that.”

I’m speaking up because we owe people the truth. If we’re not honest about the actual safety conditions in offshore wind, we can’t change them. Misinformation about workplace safety creates a dangerous illusion that everything is “under control”, while too many people are getting hurt. But when we dare to speak about reality as it is, we create the foundation for a safer, faster, and truly sustainable energy transition,” Sørensen says.

”And then it becomes difficult to learn if you have to wait for something to go through 57 gates and down past legal,” he says. (Sound familiar?)

In the U.S., both industry and govt need to do a better job of sharing complete incident data in a timely manner.

The Gulf oil patch got a pass in 2025! 2026 is anyone’s guess.

As was the case in 2023, there were no tropical storm production shut-ins in the Gulf in 2025. Per the chart below derived from BSEE data, only 4 tropical storms caused platform shut-ins in the past 5 years. This lull followed a 6-storm year in 2020.

The Minerals Management Service Technology Assessment and Research Program began closely studying hurricane damage to offshore facilities following Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Dr. Charles Smith was a leader in these efforts. Attached is a comprehensive study report on Andrew’s effects on offshore platforms. Three background paragraphs are pasted below.

A specific description of the proposed Florida buffer in the Eastern Gulf is found in a footnote on page five of the Draft Proposed Program (DPP):

2 Includes a 100-mile coastal buffer off the coast of Florida and the area eastward of a line extending south from a point approximately 25 miles west of Tallahassee, Florida.

The 100 mile buffer seems like a reasonable proposal that minimizes the risk of coastal impacts without significantly reducing the oil and gas resource potential. However, the 125 mile buffer established in the Gulf of Mexico Security Act (2006) and the 2020 Trump withdrawal (see the comparison above) has become sacrosanct, and Gov. DeSantis and the Florida delegation oppose any change:

Unfortunately, the additional 25 miles is thought to eliminate much of the oil and gas resource potential:

The press release and full program are linked. It looks like the most recent leaks were accurate. See the maps below with the locations and dates. This will stir the pot!

The pipeline spill just north of Refugio State Beach on May 19, 2015, coated miles of shoreline and marine habitat, and dolphins, elephant seals, sea lions, pelicans and other birds. | Santa Barbara Independent

We can scream all we want (with some justification) about the California Coastal Commission, Santa Barbara County, and intractable environmental organizations, but the Santa Ynez Unit would still be producing today were it not for an ugly, preventable pipeline spill.

What happened:

At approximately 10:55 a.m. Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on May 19, 2015, the Plains Pipeline, LP (Plains), Line 901 pipeline in Santa Barbara County, CA, ruptured, resulting in the release of approximately 2,934 barrels (bbl) of heavy crude oil. An estimated 500 bbl of crude oil entered the Pacific Ocean.

Why it happened:

1) Ineffective protection against external corrosion of the pipeline
 The condition of the pipeline’s coating and insulation system fostered an environment that led to the external corrosion.
 The pipeline’s cathodic protection (CP) system was not effective in preventing corrosion from occurring beneath the pipeline’s coating/insulation system.
2) Failure by Plains to detect and mitigate the corrosion
 The in-line inspection (ILI) tool and subsequent analysis of ILI data did not characterize the extent and depth of the external corrosion accurately.
3) Lack of timely detection of and response to the rupture
 The pipeline supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system did not have safety-related alarms established at values sufficient to alert the control room staff to the release at this location.
 Control room staff did not detect the abnormal conditions in regards to the release as they occurred. This resulted in a delayed shutdown of the pipeline.
 The pipeline controller restarted the Line 901 pipeline after the release occurred.
 The pipeline’s leak detection system lacked instrumentation and associated calculations to monitor line pack (the total volume of liquid present in a pipeline section) along all portions of the pipeline when it was operating or shut down.
 Control room staff training lacked formalized and succinct requirements, including emergency shutdown and leak detection system functions such as alarms.

Plains Pipeline was the responsible party, but that doesn’t absolve the companies that were dependent on Plains to transport their production. Given the organized opposition that emerged following the Santa Barbara blowout in 1969 (the result of a reckless well plan), the integrity of that pipeline was critical to their business strategy and they should have exercised some oversight.

Offshore disasters have had enormous consequences for the oil and gas industry in terms of lost opportunities. Think about this: prior to the Macondo blowout, the Obama administration had proposed an oil and gas lease sale in the Atlantic and the Florida Senate was holding hearings about leasing in Florida State waters. Such lease sales are now completely out of the question.

Regulations and standards are not enough. We need open discussion about incidents, large and small, and a willingness to be critical of the responsible parties.