In JPMorgan’s view, the stage is set for a potential decline of as much as 50% in oil prices through the end of 2027, taking Brent crude down to the low $30s per barrel range from its current level of around $63.50.
Will bearish forecasts by JPMorgan and others temper bidding at the highly anticipated, and long awaited, Gulf lease sale to be held on 12/10/2025? Probably not for these reasons:
Given the longer term nature of deepwater development, production will not begin for years following lease issuance. Note that anticipated first production for 3 new high-pressure deepwater projects, Kaskida, Sparta, and Tiber, will be 23, 16, and 21 years after the field discovery dates.
To the extent that price forecasts are reliable at all (see no. 9 in the image below), the degree of uncertainty for longer term forecasts is particularly high.
The sale has to live up to its name Big Beautiful Gulf 1 (BBG1). 😉
The Gulf oil patch got a pass in 2025! 2026 is anyone’s guess.
As was the case in 2023, there were no tropical storm production shut-ins in the Gulf in 2025. Per the chart below derived from BSEE data, only 4 tropical storms caused platform shut-ins in the past 5 years. This lull followed a 6-storm year in 2020.
The Minerals Management Service Technology Assessment and Research Program began closely studying hurricane damage to offshore facilities following Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Dr. Charles Smith was a leader in these efforts. Attached is a comprehensive study report on Andrew’s effects on offshore platforms. Three background paragraphs are pasted below.
A specific description of the proposed Florida buffer in the Eastern Gulf is found in a footnote on page five of the Draft Proposed Program (DPP):
2 Includes a 100-mile coastal buffer off the coast of Florida and the area eastward of a line extending south from a point approximately 25 miles west of Tallahassee, Florida.
Draft Proposed Program2020 Trump Withdrawal
The 100 mile buffer seems like a reasonable proposal that minimizes the risk of coastal impacts without significantly reducing the oil and gas resource potential. However, the 125 mile buffer established in the Gulf of Mexico Security Act (2006) and the 2020 Trump withdrawal (see the comparison above) has become sacrosanct, and Gov. DeSantis and the Florida delegation oppose any change:
President Trump’s 2020 memorandum protecting Florida’s eastern Gulf waters represents a thoughtful approach to the issue.
The press release and full program are linked. It looks like the most recent leaks were accurate. See the maps below with the locations and dates. This will stir the pot!
The COS has been effective in strengthening corporate Safety and Environmental Management Systems, influencing the industry’s safety culture, and sharing best practices and lessons learned. These are important accomplishments.
The COS has fallen short in gathering the data needed to assess the offshore industry’s safety performance. As is the case with most voluntary reporting programs, data completeness and accuracy issues limit the significance of COS performance reviews.
The COS uses accepted performance indicators and a logical classification scheme.
COS reports that their members accounted for 78% of OCS oil and gas activity in 2024. This is accurate when cross-checked with BSEE hours worked data. However, the % of hours worked is not a good measure of the % of incidents reported in any category.
Only two drilling contractors – Helmerich & Payne and Valaris – are members. Major contractors like Noble, Transocean, and Seadrill are not members. Their incidents will thus not be reported if they are not working for a COS member.
No production contractors are COS members. These companies conduct most of the platform operations on the shelf, where many of the lease operators are not COS members.
Pacific and Alaska Region operators do not participate.
Looking only at fatalities (table below), the most important and easily verified incident category, there are troubling omissions:
COS reports no 2024 fatalities when in fact there was a fatality during an operation for a COS member.
COS reports no 2022 fatalities when there were actually five. A workover incident took the life of one worker, and four died in a helideck crash on an OCS platform. In both cases, the facility operator was a non-member company.
COS records one 2021 fatality, but fails to include a 2021 Fieldwood fatality. There were also6 “non-occupational” fatalities on OCS facilities in 2021, as classified by BSEE. Given the importance of worker health (the H in HSE), such a high number of non-occupational fatalities should be of interest industry-wide.
The COS report includes only two of the six 2020 fatalities, 2 of which were classified by BSEE as non-occupational.
The bottom line is that COS accounted for only 3 of 12 (25%) occupational fatalities during the 2020-24 period. There were at least 20 fatalities if you include the non-occupational incidents.
fatalities per COS
occupational fatalities (from BSEE data)
non-occupational fatalities (from BSEE data)
2024
0
1
?
2023
0
0
?
2022
0
5
?
2021
1
2
6
2020
2
4
2
The offshore industry is only as good as its worst performer, so complete participation is essential. Voluntary reporting is seldom complete reporting, because some companies are more concerned about confidentiality than completeness and information sharing.
For industry reporting programs to be comprehensive and credible:
The entity receiving the reports and managing the data must be independent and not affiliated with an industry advocacy organization.
All operating companies must participate and complete reporting must be required. This can be accomplished contractually. If necessary, the regulator can require participation (either as a separate regulation or as a SEMS element).
Company incident submittals should be audited by the independent entity.
Fees should be solely for the purpose of supporting the independent reporting system.
For SP1 and SP2 incidents (per the COS classification scheme), the names of the responsible companies should be included in the performance reports. The current COS system prioritizes confidentiality over accountabiity and information sharing.
The first ever Gulf of America oil and gas lease sale 😉 will be held on Dec. 10, 2025. Instead of numbering the sale sequentially (i.e. Sale 262), the sale has been designated OCS Oil and Gas One Big Beautiful Bill Act Lease Sale 1 (BBG1). 🙄 This change is a bit too cute for some of us old-timers, but we’ll judge the sale by its results, not its name.
The Notice of Sale is attached. The terms are very attractive, with the lowest allowable royalty rate (1/8th) on all shelf and deepwater leases. Note the comparison of royalty rates in the table below. The 6.25% difference for deepwater leases is substantial when you consider their high production potential.
Gulf Sale No.
Date
% royalty: <200m water depth
% royalty: >200m water depth
256
11/18/2020
12.5
18.75
257
11/17/2021
12.5
18.75
258
12/30/2022
18.75
18.75
259
3/29/2023
18.75
18.75
261
12/20/2023
18.75
18.75
BBG1
12/10/2025
12.5
12.5
The rental rates for the BBG1 Sale are also very attractive compared to Sale 261:
Water Depth
Sale 261 rental rates ($/ac)
BBG1 Sale rental rates ($/ac)
0 to <200m
years 1-5: $10 year 6: $20 year 7: $30 year 8+: $40
years 1-5: $7 year 6: $14 year 7: $21 year 8+: $28
200 to <400m
years 1-5: $16 year 6: $32 year 7: $48 year 8+: $64
years 1-5: $11 year 6: $22 year 7: $33 year 8+: $44
400+ m
years 1-5: $16 year 6: $22 year 7: $22 year 8+: $22
years 1-5: $11 year 6: $16 year 7: $16 year 8+: $16
Will the bidding reflect the very favorable lease terms?
To date, BSEE has used carryover funds and offsetting collections from inspection, rental, and cost recovery fees to continue their priority permitting and inspection programs during the govt shutdown. However, these funds are limited.
At some point, BSEE will have to stop issuing new permits. If the shutdown continues, the next step could be to curtail drilling and production operations. Needless to say, this would not be completely unacceptable.
In the meantime, BSEE employees continue to work without pay. Flying offshore everyday to inspect operations is no picnic and can be hazardous. I lost a colleague in a helicopter crash and others have been injured. It’s shameful that these people are not being paid while members of congress are!
Tyler Priest, the leading historian on US offshore oil and gas operations, has published another gem. His book, Offshore Oildom, is a fascinating account of the history of the technologically innovative and economically important, yet highly controversial, OCS Oil and Gas program. His bookis highly recommended.
Consider this recommendation by Daniel Yergin:
“Tyler Priest, a preeminent historian of energy and the environment, explores how a single well drilled off a pier near Santa Barbara in 1898 gave rise to a major American industry—offshore oil and gas. In spirited prose, Priest demonstrates how this U.S. industry was created not only by innovation, creative engineering, and complex execution; it was also the result of fierce political battles.” ~Daniel Yergin, Pulitzer Prize–winning author of The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power and The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations
Gas production, which is now overwhelmingly from oil wells, also ticked up. However, gas production remains at historically low levels. (See charts below.)
Time to take another look at ultradeep shelf gas? More on this in a later post.
A leaked Dept. of the Interior (DOI) document will likely have little in common with the Draft Proposed Program (DPP, step 2 above). The DPP decisions will be made by the President, not by DOI staffers or managers.
According to media reports, the leaked document includes lease sales offshore New England, the Carolina’s and California. Unless the President revokes his own 2020 withdrawals, the Carolina’s are off-limits until 2032. Ditto for the Eastern Gulf within 125 miles from Florida. (See the map below.)
Including North Atlantic and offshore California in the DPP would unleash a firestorm of opposition. In the case of the North Atlantic, the acreage may not be sufficiently prospective to justify the fight.
To the extent that marine sanctuary determinations do not preclude California offshore leasing, the litigation and legislative battles probably would. In the unlikely event that a sale could be held, who would bid? Who wants to be the next Sable?
The Beaufort Sea is the most likely frontier area to be included in the DPP given plans to open ANWR, operational history, resource potential, and State support.
Assuming the South Atlantic withdrawal could be partially lifted, a small, targeted lease sale would be of great interest to petroleum geologists and could have significant economic and national security implications. The late Paul Post, the foremost expert on the petroleum geology of the US Atlantic, saw great potential in the paleo deep- and ultra-deepwater areas. He advocated exploration concepts proven successful in analogous West African and South American settings where massive discoveries have been made. Samuel Epstein, another prominent petroleum geologist, also believes the deepwater Atlantic has great resource potential.
Finally, the extent of the Florida buffer needs to be considered given the high resource potential of the Eastern Gulf. Be it 75, 100, or 125 miles, leasing beyond that buffer should be a priority.