The quote below is encouraging. Hopefully, the technical team will be able to function independently, and will have strong leadership. I would like to see participation by the Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway.
“There are good teams in place to handle pipeline accidents, there are emergency pipe inventories and experts for onshore and offshore,” Jens Schumann, managing director of gas pipeline grid company Gasunie Deutschland, said.
Nord Stream AG has started mobilization of all necessary resources for a survey campaign to assess the damages in cooperation exchange with relevant local authorities. Currently, it is not possible to estimate a timeframe for restoring the gas transport infrastructure. The causes of the incident will be clarified as a result of the investigation.
Contrary to some post-Macondo commentary, well control has always been the highest priority of the US offshore regulatory program. This was the case regardless of the administration, party in power, responsible bureau, or politics of the day. The first specific well control requirements were in OCS Order No. 2 (Drilling) which dates back to 1958.
Continuous improvement must always be the objective; hence the many revisions to these regulations over the years.
BSEE’s recently proposed Well Control Rule includes updates that should be reviewed by all who are interested in drilling safety and well control regulations. I will be submitting comments to the docket and will post some of those comments on this blog. I hope others take the time to review the relatively brief BSEE proposal and submit comments
Industry comments are typically consolidated which limits the technical discussion and diversity of input. Consensus industry recommendations tend to be less rigorous from a safety perspective than some companies might submit independently. There are also far fewer operating companies than there were in the past. Most of you surely remember Texaco, Gulf, Getty, Amoco, Arco, Mobil, Unocal, and other important offshore operators that have merged into even larger corporations. This further limits the diversity of input.
Of course, the operating company is fully accountable for any safety incident at an OCS facility, including well control disasters like the 1969 Santa Barbara and 2020 Macondo blowouts. This should be ample incentive for comprehensive safety management programs. Unfortunately, risk management, culture, and human/organizational factors are complex, and good intentions don’t always lead to good results.
Although the operating company is legally accountable, the regulator and industry as a whole also bear some responsibility for safety performance. What is the purpose of the regulator if not to prevent safety and environmental incidents? Also, the industry can do better in terms of assessing data, updating standards, and publicly calling out poor performance.
On a more positive note, the offshore industry has collectively had some spectacular well control successes. Perhaps most impressive is this: Prior to 2010, 25,000 wells had been drilled in US Federal waters over the previous 25 years without a single well control fatality, an offshore safety record that was unprecedented in the U.S. and internationally. That number of offshore wells over a 25 year period is by itself a feat that will never again be achieved in any offshore region worldwide. The well control safety record makes that achievement extraordinary.
In addition to the penalty and reimbursement elements of the plea agreement, there are two Amplify commitments that may be of particular interest to BOE readers:
New leak detection system for the pipeline: More information on the leak detection improvements for this low pressure oil pipeline would be helpful.
Notification to regulators of all leak detection alarms:
Which regulators? DOT? BSEE? State? All?
Real time reporting or periodic compilations? With real time reporting for every alarm, the distinction between the pipeline operator and regulator(s) would be blurred and new organizational and competence risks would be added. The probability of communications errors and delayed decisions would increase, and the operator would no longer be accountable for bad decisions.
Also, given that the investigating agencies have still not issued their report on the October 2021 spill and no action has yet been taken against the shipping companies that caused the pipeline rupture, the congratulatory Coast Guard, EPA, FBI, and DOT quotes in the announcement seem rather premature and self-serving.
Martyn Willsher, Amplify’s President and Chief Executive Officer, commented, “We are pleased to have reached an agreement in principle regarding the civil litigation resulting from the Southern California Pipeline Incident last October. Although we are unable to provide additional detail at this time, we negotiated in good faith and believe we have come to a reasonable and fair resolution. We will continue to vigorously pursue our substantial claims for damages against the ships that struck our pipeline, and the Marine Exchange of Southern California that failed to notify us of the anchor strikes.”
Assuming no significant tropical storm shutdowns this month, we should get a good read on the impact of the pipeline outage when the EIA production data for August are posted.
This is a good example of the interconnectivity of deepwater projects with major Shell, Chevron, and Equinor facilities shut-in as a result of a relatively minor downstream pipeline incident.
Mars crude price appears to have reacted to the shut-in news:
A small pipeline leak (estimated 2 bbl spill) at an onshore booster station is having a major impact on Gulf of Mexico production. Per Reuters, as much as 600,000 bopd could be temporarily shut-in. GoM production averaged 1.6 million bopd in May.
These major platforms are reported to be shut-in:
Shell: Mars, Ursa, and Olympus
Chevron: Jack/St. Malo, Tahiti, and Big Foot
Equinor: Titan
Shell, the pipeline operator, did not provide an estimate on the resumption of production.
Chevron may be the only GoM operator to own its helicopter fleet. Data on their safety performance relative to GoM helicopter contractors do not appear to be available online.
Their news release focuses on hurricane preparedness and the benefits of owning their fleet. I’m not sure how significant these advantages are given that other companies can ensure similar availability through their contracts. A comparative analysis would be of interest.
“Other companies that depend on contracted helicopters to evacuate can’t create their own schedule and might have to start departing the platform days in advance,” said Jose Jaramillo, manager of Chevron’s aircraft operations in the Gulf of Mexico. “With our own helicopters on standby, we have more flexibility in determining when to safely shut down the platform, and after the storm passes, we can quickly remobilize, assess our facilities and bring production back online days faster.”
The leading causes, not all inclusive, of the accidents since 1999 are listed below, and secondary causes of these events include 13 related to helideck size or design related issues. • 21 engine related, • 25 loss of control or improper procedures, • 18 helideck obstacle strikes, • 13 controlled flight into terrain, and • 12 other technical failures
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 