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Given the intermittency, space preemption, aesthetic, and wildlife issues associated with wind and solar power, more attention has been shifting to geothermal energy. Quaise’s plan to tap ultradeep heat resources has been on our radar for several years and has been attracting private funding and a bit of media buzz.

Quaise is exciting not only because of the unlimited energy potential, but because of the fascinating gyrotron technology that vaporizes hard rock and could enable wells to be drilled to depths of 20-30 km and temperatures of >1000° C. Nabors, a leading drilling contractor, is one of the Quaise investors, and will be involved with the test drilling.

Demonstrating the gyrotron technology in the field is a big step up from doing so in the lab. Those of us in the “peanut gallery” are awaiting more definitive information on the lab tests that have been conducted to date and the important field tests, which are scheduled for this year.

As we enter the third month of 2024, BSEE has finally updated the incident tables to include 2022 data.

The OCS program managers I was privileged to work for would never have accepted such delays in posting fundamental safety data. Carolita Kallaur (RIP) wouldn’t tolerate a delay of 14 days in publishing quarterly incident statistics, let alone a delay of 14 months for annual data with no quarterly updates. Transparency and timeliness in informing the public about offshore safety performance was her highest priority. Cynthia Quarterman, Tom Readinger, and other OCS program leaders were similarly insistent on timeliness and transparency in the reporting of incident data.

The belated 2022 BSEE tables also include a glaring error. The most important figure, the number of fatalities, is incorrect. Five workers died from US OCS incidents in 2022, not one. The fatal helicopter crash at the West Delta 106 A helideck on 12/29/2022 that killed four workers (photos below) is inexplicably not included. 

Is the failure to include this fatal incident a regulatory fragmentation issue? OCS safety data should be reported holistically and should not be parsed based on perceived regulatory jurisdiction? In any event, the tragic accident at the West Delta 106 A platform occurred at the helideck, which per the MOA with the Coast Guard is under BSEE jurisdiction.

It’s unfortunate that 2023 data are not available, even in summary form. At a minimum, BSEE should be proudly reporting that 2023 was the first zero fatality year on the US OCS since at least 1963! While acknowledging that this outstanding achievement will be difficult to repeat, it most certainly deserves public attention.

Lastly, what about incident data for the offshore wind program? When will these data be posted?

A Fortune article about Autry Stephens, Endeavor Energy Resources CEO, pegs him as the world’s richest oilman following the sale of his company to Diamondback Energy. His story reinforces many of the success messages previously discussed on BOE:

  • Humble beginnings: As the son of peanut-and-melon farmers, his work ethic was no doubt established at a young age.
  • Diverse experience starting with entry level positions: He “wore nearly every hat in the oil industry, from trucker to driller to engineer.”
  • Private land: Stephens started buying Texas Permian rights early in his career.
  • Technology leader: His company embraced the horizontal drilling and advanced well stimulation practices critical to Permian success.
  • Contrarian who stuck with his plan: When major oil companies left for more lucrative opportunities overseas, he continued adding Permian leases acquiring a total of 344,000 acres.
  • Low debt: His insistence on using cash to acquire drilling rights helped him survive the 2008 financial crisis, which crushed oil demand and bankrupted some US operators.
  • Lean organization: He focused on maintaining a lean staff and efficient operations, which no doubt facilitated effective communication and instilled common values.
  • Take care of your employees: He insisted that none of Endeavor’s 1200 employees be let go after the merger with Diamondback.
  • Support the community: Served Midland and merged with the company that was located right across the street.
  • Former Federal employee 😉: Not known as a key to success, but I’ll take it 😀. (Stephens once worked for the Army Corps of Engineers.)
from EIA data

Reports in Nov. indicated that ~60,000 bopd were shut-in as a result of the presumed Main Pass Oil Gathering system pipeline leak. The Coast Guard subsequently reported that other pipelines in the area were shut-in as the search for a leak continued. The bulk of the Nov./Dec. production decline of ~80,000 bopd (from Oct. levels) was probably attributable to those pipeline system shut-ins.

The Sikorsky S-92 helicopter is the most advanced aircraft in Sikorsky’s civil product line, certified to the most stringent safety requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).” 

One person has died following the helicopter crash outside Bergen in Norway on the night of Wednesday 28th February. The helicopter was on a training assignment for Equinor ’s SAR service for the Oseberg area in the North Sea.

Equinor

Search and rescue service is critical to offshore safety, and North Sea operators have excellent SAR capabilities. Sadly, one person died and five were injured (two seriously) when a Sikorsky S-92 helicopter, owned by Bristow and under contract to Equinor, crashed offshore Bergen last night. The crew was training to serve offshore workers in need.

Note that the Stabroek block is equivalent in size to 1,150 Gulf of Mexico lease blocks and contains multiple outstanding prospects.

Are Exxon and Chinese partner (CNOOC) attempting to use Chevron’s acquisition of Hess to improve their already lucrative position in Guyana’s prolific Stabroek block?

From OilNow Guyana:

  • The Stabroek operating agreement outlines terms for Hess, Exxon, and CNOOC to explore and develop the block.
  • This Stabroek agreement includes a right of first refusal (ROFR) provision which allows the parties to buy out the stake of one of them in the event of a ‘change of control’ transaction.
  • Chevron and Hess argue that the merger’s structure does not trigger the ROFR clause.
  • Exxon and CNOOC argue that the clause applies. This could force Hess to offer its stake in the Stabroek block to its partners first. 

The Exxon/CNOOC position seems to be a stretch. Chevron did not buy the Stabroek share; they bought the company that holds that share. Hess is to be part of Chevron and there would be no change of control from the standpoint of the partnership.

As an offshore operator, Exxon has been highly responsible from a safety standpoint. However, the company has a shown tendency to stretch the envelope when it comes to contract rights. The most recent example was their acquisition of 163 GoM oil and gas leases for carbon disposal purposes, contrary to the terms of the sale notice and lease contracts.

John Smith, a decommissioning specialist who retired from BOEM, has published numerous professional papers on the topic. He has kindly shared his comments (below) on the new GAO report.

The Appeal Process is Broken – The GAO should have emphasized this point.  Companies routinely appeal orders to decommission platforms to forestall having to spend money on plugging wells and removing platforms, pipelines and other facilities. The appeal process commonly takes 5 or more years to reolove (e.g., DCOR appeal of BSEE order to decommission Platform Habitat).

Well P&A – BSEE has been negligent in requiring operators to plug and abandon wells no longer useful for operations. I’m shocked BSEE has curtailed or stopped issuing Inc’s for the failure of operators to P&A wells.  That’s a major failure on the part of BSEE management. That may explain why operator performance criteria was proposed to be eliminated for financial assurance.

Failure to Issue Civil Penalties for Well P&A – From GAO Report “BSEE officials explained that their reluctance to pursue civil penalties stems in part from concerns about whether inducing financial harm against an operator is an effective approach to compel decommissioning. They expressed reservations about taking actions—such as issuing civil penalties—that might strain the financial resources of operators to the point of pushing them into bankruptcy.”   This attitude underscores a real problem – an abrogation of regulatory and enforcement responsibility by BSEE. 

POCS Well P&A –  More than 700 wells have been drilled from the 23 California OCS platforms. The GAO report notes that approximately 200 are in the process of being plugged and abandoned – about 50% of those are probably associated with Gail, Grace, Harvest, Hermosa, Hidalgo, where P&A work has largely been completed by Chevron and Freeport McMoRan.  The vast majority of the remaining 500 wells are no longer useful for operations and have been idle for several decades.  Note POCS was never part of the Idle Well and Idle Iron Program, which was exclusive to the GOM. GAO gave POCS BSEE a pass by not highlighting that problem in POCS. It would have been interesting to know how many of the remaining 500 POCS wells are considered no longer useful for operations, and how many of those have been temporarily plugged and abandoned pursuant to regulations.  The GAO report broke that down for the GOM.

Footnote 46 of GAO Report – “Two of the eight platforms due for decommissioning in the Pacific—platforms Hogan and Houchin—have posed serious safety, environmental, and financial risks, including poor safety compliance records, severe corrosion, and ongoing disputes about who will assume decommissioning liabilities for the platforms and their associated wells, according to BSEE officials and documentation. According to BSEE, these platforms are currently being attended, monitored, and maintained as part of an agreement between BSEE, BOEM, Interior’s Office of the Solicitor, and the three predecessor operators pending a decision from the Interior Board of Land Appeals on the predecessors’ appeal. BSEE estimates that approximately $5 million of the estimated costs to decommission 21 orphaned sidetrack wells associated with these platforms are uncovered by financial assurances.”    $5 million divide 21 = $238,000 per well  – extremely conservative cost estimate given age of wells, likely collapsed casing, and downwhole equipment that needs to be removed.  The cost could easily be 3-4 times higher and there is no bonding so the federal government and taxpayers are on the hook for those costs.

Platform Hogan and Houchin Wells – approximately 75 wells were drilled from the platforms.  It would be interesting to know the status of those wells.  How many have been properly temporarily plugged and abandoned with long-term barriers installed to prevent leaks before decommissioning pursuant to OCS regulations?  Are the 21 orphaned wells mentioned above the Signal wells?  What about the other 54 wells?  Have the predecessor lessees agreed they are responsible for plugging and abandoning those wells?  

Platform Habitat – GAO could have noted this is another example of the broken appeal process. It would be interesting to know whether the 21 wells (primarily if not all gas wells) on Habitat have been temporarily abandoned. There are likely to be significant fugitive emission levels at the platform.  Hopefully the APCD is on top of that.  Note – the platform is unmanned and as I previously mentioned a potential catastrophe was avoided several years ago when a fire broke out on the platform.

Offshore facility decommissioning is a frequent target of Federal auditors given the complex financial and regulatory challenges. Unfortunately, the reviews have done little to better protect the public interest. As have previous inquiries, the new GAO report (attached for your convenience) calls for improved regulations and enforcement practices. That, of course, has been the objective for decades, but the problems have only worsened.

While the GAO recommendations are unsurprising, the body of the report is informative. Most notably, GAO (p. 29) raises a significant inconsistency on a key provision in the proposed decommissioning financial assurance regulations published last year:

One of the five criteria BOEM would no longer use under the proposed rule is demonstrated reliability, as shown by record of compliance with laws, regulations, and lease terms, among other factors. BOEM’s June 2023 regulatory analysis concluded this criterion is not a good predictive indicator of default on decommissioning obligations. However, BOEM and BSEE officials we spoke with told us that poor compliance records—such as safety and maintenance issues or delayed decommissioning obligations—can be an indicator of potential decommissioning noncompliance or financial stress.

Why was there such a disconnect between the opinions of BOEM and BSEE officials (who are directly involved with decommissioning) and BOEM’s decision not to include a company’s compliance record among the factors to be considered in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance? As pointed out here and here, safety performance is arguably the most important predictor of financial failure and decommissioning noncompliance.

The GAO report correctly acknowledges the difficulties in disqualifying operating companies. However, the regulations at 30 CFR § 250.135 specifically provide for disqualification for poor performance. While the regulations could be tighter, enforcing disqualifications regulations is dependent on persistence and strong support from management and DOI attorneys. Given the political risks associated with disqualifying operators, that support is often lacking.

Disqualification difficulties make it imperative that BOEM carefully consider past performance before approving lease assignments or determining financial assurance amounts. Provisions in 30 CFR §585.408 and §585.107 could have been used to disapprove assignments to Signal Hill, Fieldwood, Cox, and other problem operators. The failure to do so has significantly delayed decommissioning and increased public exposure to financial risks.

In some cases, lease assignments to unqualified companies have not only been approved but they have been facilitated by BOEM/MMS. The case of Platforms Hogan and Houchin, in the Santa Barbara Channel, is a particularly good example. (Did GAO inquire about the Inspector General report on this matter or ask why that report has still not been released?)

Most operating companies are responsible about planning for and fulfilling their decommissioning obligations. The problem is the exceptions, and they are not difficult to identify if you look at compliance data and obtain input from BSEE inspection personnel.

Other important decommissioning questions that need to be considered:

Additional comments on the GAO report from decommissioning specialist John Smith will be posted tomorrow.

Either the investigators were incompetent (unlikely) or the political pressure was too great (likely).

“The investigation has led the authorities to conclude that there was deliberate sabotage of the gas pipelines. However, the assessment is that there are not sufficient grounds to pursue a criminal case in Denmark,” a Copenhagen police statement said.

Reuters

After 17 months of investigation, that’s a pretty lame statement. Will we see their report?

The ball is now in Germany’s court. Should we expect more of the same?

Our June 2023 summary remains unchanged.

After 3 months of investigation, only a small connector leak has been identified in or near the Main Pass Oil Gathering system. According to the Coast Guard, that leak was not the source of the large November spill (pictured). The absence of findings raises many questions:

  • Is the Main Pass Oil Gathering system still being implicated? Surrounding pipelines?
  • Was a vessel or some other source responsible?
  • Were sheen samples fingerprinted and are those results definitive?
  • Given that the source has not been identified, what was the basis for the large (and rather sensational) spill volume estimate? The sheen was not indicative of a spill of that magnitude.
  • How much production has been shut-in since the slick was first identified? November production data indicate a GoM-wide oil production decline of ~80,000 bopd decline from September.

Given the public claims that were made about the size and potential implications of this spill, the authorities need to be more forthcoming regarding their findings to date.