Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Archive for the ‘Gulf of Mexico’ Category

I had the pleasure of working with Jason Mathews when he was a young MMS engineer. He truly cared about our safety mission and has taken that commitment to the next level at BSEE. Jason shared this important, heartfelt message on the anniversary of the Macondo blowout.

One of the greatest gifts I ever received in life is having a little girl and having the opportunity to go home every evening and spending time with her at cheer, softball, doing homework, etc. I have a great deal of respect for the men and women who work offshore and put their lives on hold for 14-28 days to deliver much needed OCS production to meet US demand. Undoubtedly, they are better / tougher people than me.

Over the last year, my team has seen multiple incidents that had a high potential severity that could have led to a fatal / serious injury or major incident in the GOM. Although we can sit and debate the causal factors for hours, one that jumps to the top of the discussion is the Human Factor – Complacency. Of all the things a leader should fear, complacency heads the list. There is no doubt success breeds complacency, and complacency breeds failure.

To this day, I am still shook by the mindset and complacency of many onboard the Deepwater Horizon prior to the incident. During testimony in the public hearings, John Guide, the BP well team leader for the Horizon, believed that the rig crew had become “too comfortable” because of its good track record for drilling difficult wells. Ross Skidmore, a BP contractor on the rig on April 20, testified that the crew became complacent after completing drilling because “when you get to that point, everybody goes to the mindset that weʹre through, this job is done.”  To me, the complacency on the Deepwater Horizon could be attributable to the crew not having access to all of the well data (OptiCem reports – cement job risk) available to BP personnel onshore and the well site leaders on the rig. Our investigation concluded, the overall complacency of the Deepwater Horizon crew was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

As regulators, we have special roles in the GOM as it relates to safety:

  • Driving the avoidance of complacency and risk-free mindsets of the offshore employees
  • Understanding we can’t be selfish – Our success is not our individual personal growth / gains, but it is being unwavering in your promotion of offshore safety to ensure all offshore employees return home to their families safely
  • Holding each other (internally) and industry (externally) accountable when necessary

In order to achieve greatness offshore, we ,as a regulator,  have to believe we can, and never sit still until we achieve it. 

Everyone on this email has a very critical function and role. Never underestimate the value of what you do, have the proper mindset, and avoid complacency.

Do whatever it takes to ensure the people offshore are gifted the same gift we receive every day – going home to our families.

All In –

Jason P. Mathews, Petroleum Engineer, Field Operations – OSM

Friday Night LIghts: Coach Mathews and his daughter

Read Full Post »

The final decommissioning financial assurance rule has been published and is largely unchanged from the proposed rule that we reviewed last summer.

Major concerns:

  • Despite ample evidence regarding the importance of compliance and safety performance in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance, BOEM has dropped all consideration of these factors. Did BSEE field personnel concur with this decision?
  • Proved reserves should not be a basis for reducing supplemental assurance. The uncertainty associated with reserve estimates and decommissioning costs can easily negate the assumed buffer in BOEM’s 3 to 1 reserves to decommissioning costs ratio. That approach failed completely at the Carpinteria Field in the Santa Barbara Channel (Platforms Hogan and Houchin). See other points on this issue.
  • Given that the reverse chronological order process for determining predecessor liability was dropped from consideration last April, there is no defined procedure for issuing decommissioning orders to prior owners. The absence of such a procedure increases the likelihood of confusion, inequity, and challenges, particularly when orders are first issued to companies that owned the leases decades ago, in some cases prior to the establishment of transferor liability in the 1997 MMS “bonding rule.”

BOEM’s concern (below) about investment in US offshore exploration and production is interesting given that their 5 year leasing plan strongly implies otherwise.

BOEM’s goal for its financial assurance program continues to be the protection of the American taxpayers from exposure to financial loss associated with OCS development, while ensuring that the financial assurance program does not detrimentally affect offshore investment or position American offshore exploration and production at a competitive disadvantage

final decommissioning rule, p. 40

I’m just guessing here, but my sense is that BOEM was pressured to finalize this rule in a timely manner (<10 months is timely for such a complex rule) and was thus reluctant to make any significant changes to the proposal published last summer. A public workshop during the comment period would have been a good idea to facilitate informed discussion on the important issues addressed in this rule. Such workshops were once commonplace for major rules.

Read Full Post »

JL Daeschler is a pioneering subsea engineer and artist extraordinaire who is a native of France (Brittany) and lives in Scotland. He has shared 2 more of his exceptional drawings. (Click on the images to enlarge.)

This is a drawing of the Ocean Viking (Odeco) in the Norwegian North Sea in 1968. The rig was built in Oslo as a sister ship to the Ocean Traveler, which was already working at the same location. The Ekofisk field was discovered later in 1969.
The mast-type derrick could be lowered for long ocean tow or bridge clearance. It would have been difficult to evacuate a 100 + personnel to the standby vessel, a decommissioned trawler. Things have changed so much in 56 years!
Inclined jack up legs with rack and pinion drive ( Marathon Le Tourneau), Gulf of Mexico

Read Full Post »

Platform Houchin, Santa Barbara Channel

Important article by E&E News reporter Heather Richards.

BOE blog post: “The troubling case of Platforms Hogan and Houchin, Santa Barbara Channel”

Decommissioning uncertainty

Read Full Post »

The table in the Sale 259 bid rejections post has been corrected below. That table incorrectly reported that subsequent bids for Keathley Canyon Blocks 745 and 789 were rejected at Sale 261. Those bids were in fact accepted. Houston Energy was identified as the submitter rather than Beacon Offshore Energy, the company that, per the bidding data, had the largest ownership share. (See the bidding partnership pasted below.)

The acceptance of those 2 bids significantly increases the net gain to the government as a result of the Sale 259 bid rejections. See the corrections in red to the table:

area and blockSale 259 rejected high bid – companySale 261 high bidbid acceptedgovt gain (loss*)
DC 6222,101,836 – Shell615,628 – Shellyes(1,486,208)
GC 173307,107 – Woodsideno bidNA(307,107)
GC 5471,783,498 – Chevronno bidNA(1,783,498)
GC 5911,291,993 – Chevronno bidNA(1,291,993)
GC 642605,505 – Anadarkono bidNA(605,505)
GC 777583,103 – bpno bidNA(583,103)
AT 51,551,130 – Anadarko5,215,628 – Shellyes3,664,498
AT 133607,107 – Woodsideno bidNA(607,107)
KC 745707,777 – Beacon2,422,222 – Beacon Houstonno yes(2,422,222)
1,714,445
KC 789707,777 – Beacon2,143,299 – Beacon Houstonno yes(2,143,299)
1,435,522
WR 794724,744 – Beacon1,487,624 – Beaconyes762,880
WR 795774,242 – Beacon5,301,107 – Woodsideyes4,526,865
WR 796774,242 – Beacon3,310,107 – Woodsideyes2,535,865
WR 750724,744 – Beacon1,498,555 – Beaconyes773,811
total govt. gain1,032,877
8,748,365

More on the Sale 261 bidding next week.

Read Full Post »

The active rig count in the GoM in 2001 was 148 (AL-4, LA-119, TX-25), which is >8 times the current Baker Hughes rig count of 18. The 2001 rig count was not a one year blip; the number of rigs active in the GoM exceeded 100 for the ten year period from 1994-2003.

While the current rig count is anemic by comparison, the capabilities of the fleet are anything but. Below is a list derived from drilling contractor status reports of deepwater rigs now operating in the Gulf.

All of these rigs are dynamically positioned and are capable of drilling in 12,000′ of water. They have dual derricks and 15,000 psi rated BOP rams (one has a 20,000 psi stack, and another can be upgraded to 20,000 psi). The annular preventers are rated at 10,000 psi. All have impressive storage and hook load capacities, the latest tubular handling equipment, advanced control systems, and efficient power generation.

Note that most of the rigs fly the flag of the Marshall Islands. This “flag of convenience” registration is preferred for reasons related to taxation and operational freedom. For the record, the fact that the Deepwater Horizon was registered in the Marshall Islands had little to do with the Macondo blowout. The DWH was subject to all Coast Guard and MMS regulations under the OCS Lands Act.

The main cause of the Macondo blowout was the poorly planned and executed well suspension operation. Certain equipment capability, maintenance, and employee training issues were contributing factors. However, with that said, the Marshall Islands report on the blowout candidly acknowledges that “the complexity of and interdependence between the drilling and marine systems and personnel suggests a need for increased communication and coordination between the flag State and coastal State drilling regulators.” Hopefully, that coordination is being achieved and the risks associated with the fragmented regulation of mobile drilling units are being effectively managed.

ContractorRigOperatorEst. end dateFlag
TransoceanDeepwater TitanChevron3/2028Marshall Islands
TransoceanDeepwater AtlasBeacon4/2025Marshall Islands
TransoceanDeepwater PoseidonShell4/2028Marshall Islands
TransoceanDeepwater PontusShell10/2027Marshall Islands
TransoceanDeepwater ConquerorChevron3/2025Marshall Islands
TransoceanDeepwater ProteusShell5/2026Marshall Islands
TransoceanDeepwater ThalassaShell2/2026Marshall Islands
TransoceanDeepwater AsgardHess4/2024Marshall Islands
StenaEvolutionShell4/2029Marshall Islands
NobleStanley Lafosse???11/2024Liberia
NobleValiantLLOG2/2025Marshall Islands
NobleGlobetrotter IShell5/2024Liberia
NobleGlobetrotter IIShell5/2024Liberia
ValarisDS-18Chevron8/2025Marshall Islands
ValarisDS-16Oxy6/2026Marshall Islands
Diamond Offshore BlackHawkOxy10/2024Marshall Islands
Diamond OffshoreBlackHornetbp3/2027Marshall Islands
Diamond OffshoreBlackLionbp9/2026Marshall Islands

Short video about the Stena Evolution, the newest entry to the Gulf of Mexico fleet:

Read Full Post »

After 5 months of investigation, the Main Pass Oil Gathering (MPOG) system has finally been cleared for production. (The Coast Guard update only says that the pipeline passed the integrity test, but I assume the operators may resume production though the MPOG system.)

Only a small connector leak that was previously reported was identified during the extensive integrity testing. The Coast Guard had advised that the connector leak was not the source of the large sheen that was observed in November.

So what was the source of the November sheen and what was the basis for the 1.1 million gallon spill volume estimate? The sheen was not indicative of a spill of that magnitude. Did the Coast Guard et al assume a worst case loss from the MPOG system, even though no leak had been identified?

Is this the most oversight ever for a pipeline integrity test?

The removal and replacement of the spool piece and the subsequent integrity test of the MPOG line were conducted under the close supervision of the Unified Command and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. During both operations, spill response vessels were on site, along with divers, remotely operated vehicles, helicopters equipped with trained oil observers and multi-spectral imaging cameras, and other containment and recovery equipment. No material discharge of oil was observed during these operations.

Unified Command

The NTSB has the lead in the investigation into the source of the sheen. Don’t expect any findings soon.

Read Full Post »

Houston, TX, March 29, 2024. Beacon Offshore Energy LLC (“Beacon”) announced today the completion of the divestment of its non-operated interests in certain fields in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico in accordance with a previously executed definitive agreement with GOM 1 Holdings Inc., an affiliate of O.G. Oil & Gas Limited. The divestment includes Beacon’s 18.7% interest in the Buckskin producing field, 17% interest in the Leon development, 16.15% interest in the Castile development, 0.5% interest in the Salamanca FPS/lateral infrastructure, and 32.83% interest in the Sicily discovery.

Beacon

According to BOEM records, GOM 1 HOLDINGS INC, a Delaware company, registered with BOEM effective 3/15/2024. The parent entity, O.G. Oil & Gas Limited, is a privately held E&P company incorporated in 2017 and based in Singapore.

O.G. Oil & Gas Ltd is part of the Ofer Global Group, “a private portfolio of international businesses active in maritime shipping, real estate and hotels, technology, banking, energy and large public investments.”

After a partial takeover by O.G Oil & Gas Limited in 2018, New Zealand Oil and Gas is now 70% owned by the Ofer Global Group. Among other interests, NZ Oil and Gas produces from fields offshore Taranaki, NZ.

Because they are jointly and severally liable for safe operations and decommissioning, minority investors should take a strong interest in safety management and financial assurance. Investors should remember that partners are adversely affected by the mistakes of the operating company. Anadarko and Mitsubishi took a hit following the Macondo blowout. To what extent had they been monitoring bp’s risk and safety management programs for drilling operations?

Read Full Post »

… and you deniers are fully responsible. There’s a reason why Texas is the most affected state 😉

But fear not, we will line our shores with wind turbines, restrict offshore oil and gas leasing, and subsidize carbon disposal in the Gulf of Mexico. All of this “help” will have a negligible effect on the climate, which will continue to change as it always has and always will.

Read Full Post »

14 of the high bids at Gulf of Mexico Lease Sale 259 were rejected. Did those tracts receive bids at sale 261? What was the net gain or loss of revenue? See the summary bullets and table below

  • 6 of the 14 tracts received no bids whatsoever
  • 5 of the 14 tracts received higher bids that were accepted.
  • 2 tracts received substantially higher bids that were again rejected
  • 1 tract received a lower bid that was accepted
  • net bonus revenue gain to the govt from the bid rejections (pending re-offering at future sales): $1,032,877
  • net bonus revenue gain = 0.27% of the total high bids at sale 261
  • net loss in future rental and royalty payments: ????

For a net bonus revenue gain to date of only 1/4 of one per cent, 8 of the 14 sale 259 tracts with rejected high bids remain closed to exploration. The timing of any future sales is very much in doubt given the minimalist 5 year leasing plan and the associated legal challenges.

Current bid evaluation practices only make sense if regular lease sales are held on a predictable schedule, as has historically been the case.

Meanwhile, 100% of the improper CCS bids (199/199) were accepted at the last 3 oil and gas lease sales.

area and blockSale 259 rejected high bid – companySale 261 high bidbid acceptedgovt gain (loss*)
DC 6222,101,836 – Shell615,628 – Shellyes(1,486,208)
GC 173307,107 – Woodsideno bidNA(307,107)
GC 5471,783,498 – Chevronno bidNA(1,783,498)
GC 5911,291,993 – Chevronno bidNA(1,291,993)
GC 642605,505 – Anadarkono bidNA(605,505)
GC 777583,103 – bpno bidNA(583,103)
AT 51,551,130 – Anadarko5,215,628 – Shellyes3,664,498
AT 133607,107 – Woodsideno bidNA(607,107)
KC 745707,777 – Beacon2,422,222 – Beaconno(2,422,222)
KC 789707,777 – Beacon2,143,299 – Beaconno(2,143,299)
WR 794724,744 – Beacon1,487,624 – Beaconyes762,880
WR 795774,242 – Beacon5,301,107 – Woodsideyes4,526,865
WR 796774,242 – Beacon3,310,107 – Woodsideyes2,535,865
WR 750724,744 – Beacon1,498,555 – Beaconyes773,811
total govt. gain1,032,877
*Loss based on rejected sale 261 high bid. If no sale 261 bid, loss based on sale 259 high bid. These tracts could receive bids at a future sale.

Read Full Post »

« Newer Posts - Older Posts »