I’m not typically aligned with the sponsors of the attached “Plug Offshore Wells Act,” but the call for transparency is understandable given that taxpayer funds are, for the first time, being used to decommission offshore platforms in the Matagorda Island area of the Gulf of Mexico, massive liabilities associated with the Cox bankruptcy loom, and the Hogan and Houchin saga drags on without resolution.
The bill would require an annual report on well, platform, and pipeline decommissioning including applications, deadlines, and enforcement actions. BSEE does have a good facility infrastructure page for the GoM, but much of the information called for in H.R. 9168 is not publicly available.
A media report informs that, as expected, Orsted is marketing the suspended Ocean Wind 1 and 2 leases. BOEM should deny any request to assign these leases. Here’s why:
As discussed in a previous post, those leases should have been terminated when Orsted announced that they would “cease development of the Ocean Wind 1 and Ocean Wind 2 projects.”
For the first time in the history of the US OCS program, the lease suspensions were approved without any work commitment on the part of the operator.
Per the approval letter (attached), the suspensions were granted so Orsted could get “full enjoyment” of the leases by waiting for economic conditions to improve.
The approval relieves Orsted from complying with any deadlines in their approved Construction and Operations Plan.
Under the approved suspensions, Orsted’s only obligations are to reply to requests for information and participate in meetings or consultations as requested. Note that for suspensions of operations on oil and gas leases, the operator must provide “a reasonable schedule of work leading to the commencement or restoration of the suspended activity.”
Suspensions of Operations are for the purpose of providing additional time, where necessary, for diligent operators to meet development milestones and initiate energy production. They are not for the purpose of waiting for improved economic conditions or providing time to sell your leases.
Any request by Orsted to assign these leases should be denied. If BOEM wants to reissue the leases, they may do so at a future sale in accordance with their regulations at 30 CFR Part 285.
A new NOAA biological opinion finds that that pile-driving noise associated with the Vineyard Wind project is likely to adversely affect, but not likely to jeopardize, the continued existence of whales, fish or sea turtles listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
This opinion was predictable. On the one hand, denying the adverse effects from extensive pile driving would have been unacceptable to NOAA scientists. On the other hand, a jeopardy finding would have been unacceptable to their political leadership.
If you are wondering how NOAA managed to thread that needle, you will have to wait until their report is publicly available. On Aug. 23, NOAA said the opinion would be available in their library in about 10 days, but the opinion has still not been posted. How do you announce such significant findings without, at the same time, releasing the report?
Understandably, the Nantucket environmental organization ACK for whales is not pleased with either NOAA’s announcement or their failure to release the report:
“We are disappointed NOAA announced the conclusions of its bi-op on the Vineyard Wind 1 construction without releasing the report or the data on which it relied,” ACK For Whales stated. “NOAA’s own data show that in 2023, there were 151 marine mammal strandings in Massachusetts alone with 75 occurring from Jun 2023 to Dec 2023, the months that pile driving was active. This compares to 77 strandings for all of 2015, before OSW activity started – essentially a 100 percent increase. Most of those strandings in 2023 (n=55) occurred from Oct to Dec when VW was racing to get foundations installed. Out of the 47 bases installed in 2023, 68 percent were installed in the last three months of the year.”
In January, BOE raised concerns about the collaborative BOEM-NOAA-wind industry strategy to protect the right whale. Per that strategy, BOEM and NOAA view themselves as partners with the wind industry. Is this biological opinion an example of NOAA working with their partners in accordance with their joint strategy? While regulator-industry collaboration is essential for effective offshore development, be it wind or oil and gas, regulators and operating companies have distinctly different missions and responsibilities, and should not be viewed as partners.
10/31/2023: Citing economic factors, Orsted announces they “will cease development of the Ocean Wind 1 and Ocean Wind 2 projects.” (This should have resulted in termination of the leases.)
1/19/2024: Orsted requests a 2 year “suspension of operations” to extend the leases they had ceased developing. (Presumably, this was a hedge with hopes of marketing the leases or getting better terms.)
2/29/2024: True to form, BOEM approves the questionable 2 year suspension request. The approval letter was dated one day before the leases’ 8th anniversary when they would have presumably expired. (This is unconfirmed because the lease document and BOEM’s wind regulations lack clarity regarding lease expiration.)
BOEM’s approval letter (attached) curiously asserts that “suspension of the operations term is necessary for the Lessee’s full enjoyment of the lease in this circumstance to ensure sufficient time for project operations in support of the Project’s economic viability.” (Interesting wording that expresses the accommodative and promotional philosophy of the Federal wind program.)
8/14/2024: Cape May County comments that they are likely to amend their Federal Court filings “since the actions of the NJBPU would appear to have nullified Orsted’s federal permits.”
8/27/2024: Despite the fact that Orsted has ceased development and New Jersey has vacated its approvals, the Federal leases are still active.
Good luck keeping an oil and gas lease if you cease development and request a suspension of operations. BSEE will rightfully deny your request.
Additionally, ultimate authority over the wind farm remained unclear, with various federal agencies claiming responsibility over different portions of the permitting, licensing, review, and operation of the wind farm.
“Sometimes I have a hard time figuring out, who do we talk to? Who is going to keep us safe? Who is the responsible boss here? Who is going to make the hard decision?” Select Board member Matt Fee asked.
Separate legislation granting redundant or overlapping authority to different departments or agencies.
Legislation that is non-specific, assigning broad authority to the President or cabinet level level officials, leaving it up to the bureaus to resolve.
Bi- and multi-lateral agreements like MOA’s and MOU’s, which are intended to “coordinate the redundancy,” often cause more confusion than they prevent, creating gaps in the process.
“Fixing” problems by adding redundancy.
The Dept. of the Interior’s division of responsibilities for offshore wind, which was finalized in January 2023, inexplicably assigns review and approval of Construction and Operations Plans to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (i.e. the land manager, lessor, and wind energy promoter) rather than the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (i.e. the principal regulator of the activities described in those plans).
More significantly, the offshore wind responsibilities of the 2 bureaus are so intertwined (as is also the case for offshore oil and gas), that attempts to separate the functions have, at a minimum, created inefficiencies and increased regulatory and operational costs.
FTR, the idea that having the BOEM and BSEE functions combined in a single bureau, as was the case with the predecessor bureau (MMS), had anything to do with the Macondo blowout is a complete fallacy. Regarding the accusations that were made toward MMS, the Chief Counsel for the national commission that investigated the tragic incident found no evidence that ethical lapses on the part of MMS employees played any role in causing the blowout.
There were important regulatory changes made after the Macondo blowout. These included capping stack requirements, mandatory safety management systems, and updated rules and standards for cementing/zonal isolation and blowout preventer systems. None of these improvements were precipitated by or dependent on the division of MMS into two bureaus.
As the above examples illustrate, turbine blade failures, like the Vineyard Wind incident near Nantucket, are not unique to GE Vernova. GE’s rivals, Siemens Gamesa and Vestas, have also experienced serious quality control issues.
Per ReviewEconomy (2023), “Unexpected and increasing wind turbine failure rates, largely in newer and bigger models, are savaging the profits of some of the world’s biggest manufacturers, as Siemens Gamesa, GE and Vestas report heavy repair and maintenance losses.”
In light of the manufacturing challenges, all 3 companies report increased emphasis on quality control. Why has quality control to date been inadequate and how will the past problems be corrected?
Has the wind industry’s sense of entitlement, as evidenced in their tax credit, rate increase, and departure expectations, affected their safety and quality culture? Has industry and governmental wind energy promotion rushed development and compromised design and fabrication decisions? It’s time for wind developers, manufacturers, and regulators to make sure their priorities are in order.
Contrary to the regulations, Vineyard Wind was authorized to begin the fabrication of facilities beforeBOEM “received and offered no objections to the their Facility Design Report (FDR) and Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR).” The approval letter is attached, and excerpts (emphasis added) are pasted below. [Note: The requirement that was then at §585.700(b) is found at §585.632 in the current regulations.]
“Vineyard Wind requests a regulatory departure from §585.700(b) requiring that fabrication of approved facilities not begin until BOEM provides notification that it has received and has no objections to the submitted Facility Design Report (FDR) and Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR). Vineyard Wind proposes to fabricate, but not install the following project elements: 1) Monopile foundations; 2) Electrical service platform; 3) Export cable; 4) Inter-array cables; and 5) Wind turbine generator facilities.
….allowing these fabrication activities to take place earlier in time would allow Vineyard Wind to adhere to its construction schedule, maintain its qualification for the Federal Investment Tax Credit, and meet its contractual obligations under the Power Purchase Agreements with Massachusetts distribution companies.
30 cfr 585.103 requires that a departure provide safety and environmental protection equal to or greater than the provision in the regulations that is waived. BOEM’s letter fails to explain how allowing fabrication to begin before fundamental design and fabrication reports are submitted and reviewed meets this test.
Perhaps even more troubling is BOEM’s response to subsequent requests by other companies to waive the FDR and FIR requirement (example). In these responses, BOEM asserts that their “current interpretation” is that no departure is needed because “the regulation prohibits only fabrication and installation activities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) itself.” How does that make sense given the important activities, including the fabrication of turbine blades and other turbine components, that take place onshore?
In their letters approving the Vineyard Wind and other departures, BOEM implies that their review of these reports is unnecessary because “the design and fabrication of these components would occur under the supervision of the approved CVA” (Certified Verification Agent). That assertion misconstrues the role of the CVA. These agents, nominated and funded by the operator, provide third party oversight that is complementary to, not a substitute for, BOEM/BSEE project reviews.
According to this memo, DNV was the CVA for Vineyard Wind. Their insights on the turbine blade failure will presumably be included in BSEE’s investigation report.
Hercate lease request – C & D. Wind areas that were considered for 2nd GoM sale – I, J, & K. Active RWE lease – blue.
GoM wind leasing update:
BOEM’s highly promoted 2023 GoM wind sale was a bust. The sole bidder, the German company RWE, acquired a single lease.
BOEM’s second GoM wind sale failed to get off the ground. Because only one company expressed interest in participating, that sale has been cancelled.
BOEM is now surveying interest in other GoM areas as a result of an unsolicited lease request from Hercate Energy.
If BOEM does not receive competing indications of interest, they may (and probably will) issue a noncompetitive lease to Hecate.
BOEM calls Hercate an “industry leader.” However, per their website, Hecate is mainly a solar energy company with only 2 wind projects. Both of those wind projects are onshore (Kentucky), and are “in development” (i.e. not yet operating). Hercate is no doubt a fine company, but have they demonstrated the technical expertise and financial strength needed for offshore wind development?
BOEM’s aggressive wind leasing policy stands in stark contrast to their current oil and gas policy. Not a single oil and gas sale will be held in 2024. Were it not for a provision in the “Inflation Reduction Act,” the last 3 GoM sales (257, 259, and 261) would probably not have occurred.
The new 5 year oil and gas leasing plan confirms that the Dept. of the Interior (DOI) has no intention of fulfilling their statutory oil and gas leasing mandate. In announcing the new 5 year plan, DOI boasted that the plan includes the fewest sales (3) of any plan in the history of the program. DOI strongly implied that the only reason those 3 sales were included was to sustain the wind program.,
When we drafted the OCSLA amendments that authorize offshore wind leasing, we envisioned complementary and synergistic programs, not a dogmatic pro-wind bias. As experts like Daniel Yergin have repeatedly warned, the notion that wind energy can eliminate the need for oil and gas is pure folly.
The Vineyard Wind turbine incident, which littered Nantucket beaches, has also tarnished the US offshore wind program. BSEE has prudently halted Vineyard Wind operations and construction pending an investigation into the blade failure.
Offshore wind development is structure rich, so public confidence in the design of turbines and support platforms is critical. BOEM lists 37 active wind leases on the US OCS. Most of these leases have not yet reached the construction phase. A hold on the approval of any Construction and Operations Plans would seem to be appropriate pending completion of the Vineyard Wind investigations.
Per the leasing schedule below, BOEM intends to hold 4 wind sales during the remainder of 2024, all within a 3 month period. Only 1 sale is scheduled for each of the following 2 years. Deferring the 2024 sales until the investigations are complete would assist potential lessees by ensuring that the issues of concern were fully understood.
Unfortunately, BOEM’s failure to conduct a 2024 oil and gas lease sale has boxed in the wind program. The Inflation Reduction Act prohibits BOEM from issuing wind leases unless an oil and gas sale has been held within the previous year. Lease Sale 261 was held on 12/20/23 meaning that no wind leases may be issued after 12/20/24. BOEM has compressed the wind leasing schedule, presumably to beat the legislative deadline. It would have been better for both the oil and gas and the wind programs if at least one oil and gas sale had been held in 2024 as has been customary since the 1950s.
Comments on the 3 risk reduction factors cited in the letter:
Factor 1: Those “robust insurance policies” may soon be tested given the costs associated with the turbine blade incident and potential law suits. (The notice pasted below informs that Nantucket officials will meet on Tuesday to consider litigation. A question for attorneys is the extent to which Nantucket is compromised by their good “Good Neighbor Agreement” with Vineyard Wind. That agreement essentially calls on Nantucket to promote the Vineyard Wind projects in return for payments that seem modest relative to the economic benefits from tourism and fishing.)
Factor 2: To the extent that GE Vernova Haliade-X 13 megawatt turbines are proven technology (and that is very much in doubt), the use of proven technology doesn’t prevent premature abandonment associated with unexpected incidents.
Factor 3: Reliable power generation and predictable long-term income remain to be demonstrated.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 