PHMSA’s public notice (attached) is required because Sable’s Emergency Special Permit expired on 21 FEB. Comments are due by 26 MAR. More background.
“PHMSA is publishing this notice to solicit public comments on a request for a special permit submitted by Sable Offshore Corp. (Sable). Sable is seeking relief from compliance with certain requirements in the Federal pipeline safety regulations. PHMSA has proposed conditions to ensure that the special permit is not inconsistent with pipeline safety. At the conclusion of the 30-day comment period, PHMSA will review the comments received from this notice as part of its evaluation to grant or deny the special permit request.“
As posted on 9/10/2025 (prior to PHMSA’s assertion of jurisdiction): Given that the Sable pipeline will carry OCS production, it would seem to fundamentally be an interstate line (Federal jurisdiction), as it was when owned by Plains. Could DOT reverse the 2016 letter agreement? That is conjecture for the attorneys and courts to consider.
A new Bloomberg Law article explains PHMSA’s position after a challenge by the California AG:
PHMSA said state-based hurdles are preempted by federal authorizations in the emergency permit notice letter the agency sent to Sable last year. Because the pipeline originates on the Outer Continental Shelf, the system automatically comes under federal oversight, the agency said.
The administration is invoking interstate commerce to classify the pipeline as a federal issue, “arguing that this is between a place in a state and outside that state,” said Hannah Wiseman, a professor at the Penn State Dickinson Law.
They are claiming this under their interpretational authority, as opposed to the actual language of the Pipeline Safety Act,” she said.
The language of the law only assigns PHMSA jurisdiction over oil operations that run outside or between state lines, but here the agency is arguing the pipeline’s start point is on the OCS, not at the onshore processing facility, she said.
Not mentioned in the article but pertinent:
In PHMSA’s favor, the onshore pipeline was initially under their jurisdiction.
In California’s favor, a court approved Consent Decree clearly identifies the California Fire Marshal as the sole oversight authority.
Meanwhile, Kruti Shah cleverly summarizes the Santa Ynez Unit story in a series of posts on X. Click on the post below to get the full thread. Great read for Sable/SYU followers:
A company bought a cursed oil field that ExxonMobil abandoned after 7 years of failure.
They financed the purchase mostly with a loan from… Exxon itself.
Now they're fighting California, the courts, the Coastal Commission, and their own investors — simultaneously.$SOC is… pic.twitter.com/rdGSNMQE1A
Updatedincident tables for OCS oil and gas operations. The most recent data are for 2023! Providing timely details on incidents is a fundamental responsibility of a safety regulator.
A summary of incidents associated with the OCS wind program. From press reports, we know about the fatality during Empire Wind construction. What other incidents have occurred to date?
Information on the mysterious sinking of the Aban Pearl semi-submersiblein May 2010. An investigation was conducted, but the report was never shared. In the interest of offshore safety, the new regime in Venezuela should release this report.
Attached isJohn Smith’s updated Sable litigation table. John is a BOEM retiree who has been closely monitoring Sable’s legal and regulatory challenges. His summary:
“Sable Offshore Corp. is involved either directly or indirectly in no less than 12 lawsuits that have been filed by environmental groups, state and county regulatory agencies, and the Attorney General of California, all of whom are committed to stopping Sable from restarting Santa Ynez Unit (SYU) oil and gas production. All of the lawsuits are active and many are likely to result in prolonged judicial proceedings extending over several years. Will Sable have the will and financial resources to continue these legal battles indefinitely? – that’s a multi-million dollar question.”
The anticipated State-Federal jurisdictional battle over Sable’s Las Flores Canyon Pipeline is on! See the attached letter from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) declaring that the pipeline is under Federal jurisdiction.
The major hurdle for PHMSA/Sable is thecourt approved Consent Decree that was executed following the 2015 Refugio pipeline spill. The Decree, which designates the California Fire Marshal as the sole regulator for the pipeline, is not mentioned in the PHMSA letter. Needless to say, another major legal battle looms.
Excerpt from the PHMSA letter:
PHMSA’s evaluation of the Las Flores Pipeline confirms that it transports crude oil from the OCS to an onshore processing facility at Las Flores Canyon and continues the transportation of crude oil from Las Flores Canyon to Pentland, California. Consistent with Appendix A, the Las Flores Pipeline is an interstate pipeline. As portions of the Las Flores Pipeline were previously considered to be intrastate and regulated by OSFM, PHMSA is notifying OSFM that the Las Flores Pipeline is subject to the regulatory oversight of PHMSA.
The pipeline spill just north of Refugio State Beach on May 19, 2015, coated miles of shoreline and marine habitat, and dolphins, elephant seals, sea lions, pelicans and other birds. | Santa Barbara Independent
We can scream all we want (with some justification) about the California Coastal Commission, Santa Barbara County, and intractable environmental organizations, but the Santa Ynez Unit would still be producing today were it not for an ugly, preventable pipeline spill.
At approximately 10:55 a.m. Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on May 19, 2015, the Plains Pipeline, LP (Plains), Line 901 pipeline in Santa Barbara County, CA, ruptured, resulting in the release of approximately 2,934 barrels (bbl) of heavy crude oil. An estimated 500 bbl of crude oil entered the Pacific Ocean.
1) Ineffective protection against external corrosion of the pipeline The condition of the pipeline’s coating and insulation system fostered an environment that led to the external corrosion. The pipeline’s cathodic protection (CP) system was not effective in preventing corrosion from occurring beneath the pipeline’s coating/insulation system. 2) Failure by Plains to detect and mitigate the corrosion The in-line inspection (ILI) tool and subsequent analysis of ILI data did not characterize the extent and depth of the external corrosion accurately. 3) Lack of timely detection of and response to the rupture The pipeline supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system did not have safety-related alarms established at values sufficient to alert the control room staff to the release at this location. Control room staff did not detect the abnormal conditions in regards to the release as they occurred. This resulted in a delayed shutdown of the pipeline. The pipeline controller restarted the Line 901 pipeline after the release occurred. The pipeline’s leak detection system lacked instrumentation and associated calculations to monitor line pack (the total volume of liquid present in a pipeline section) along all portions of the pipeline when it was operating or shut down. Control room staff training lacked formalized and succinct requirements, including emergency shutdown and leak detection system functions such as alarms.
Plains Pipeline was the responsible party, but that doesn’t absolve the companies that were dependent on Plains to transport their production. Given the organized opposition that emerged following the Santa Barbara blowout in 1969 (the result of a reckless well plan), the integrity of that pipeline was critical to their business strategy and they should have exercised some oversight.
Offshore disasters have had enormous consequences for the oil and gas industry in terms of lost opportunities. Think about this: prior to the Macondo blowout, the Obama administration had proposed an oil and gas lease sale in the Atlantic and the Florida Senate was holding hearings about leasing in Florida State waters. Such lease sales are now completely out of the question.
Regulations and standards are not enough. We need open discussion about incidents, large and small, and a willingness to be critical of the responsible parties.
Attached is John Smith’s comprehensive summary of lawsuits related to Sable Offshore’s attempts to restart Santa Ynez Unit production.
If you are keeping score, there are 10 separate cases including a class action lawsuit filed by investors. New legal battles are sure to follow given Sable’s OS&T strategy. Per John:
“The combined legal challenges, injunctions, and restraining orders have significantly delayed Sable’s restart plans and prompted the company to pursue an Offshore Storage and Treatment Vessel (OS&T) strategy, which was utilized to process SYU production in federal waters from 1981 – 1994, and transport oil to markets using tankers.“
In essence, the 3 Supervisors from South County (Districts 1-3) voted to euthanize an industry that is largely in North County (Districts 4 and 5). Those 3 supervisors, not the marketplace, are terminating a historically important industry. See the maps below.
District BoundariesOil Wells
Supervisors Laura Capps of the Second District, Joan Hartmann of the Third District and Roy Lee of the First District voted for the ordinance.
Ah, but it’s the industry’s fault according to Supervisor Hartmann. She asserted that companies have known since the 1950s about the dangers of climate change, and could have led the way to be part of the solution. How dare they respond to market forces instead of climate ideologues!
Of course, this is the same three vote coalition that is aligned with the Coastal Commission in opposition to the restart of the Santa Ynez Unit, which would benefit the County significantly.
Finally, note that the three supervisors voting for the ordinance represent the districts with the highest income levels and lowest poverty rates. Those opposing the ordinance represent the districts that will be most affected, and have the lowest income levels and highest poverty rates. (See the table below; Information courtesy of Grok AI.)
District
Approx. Median Household Income (2022)
Key Areas Included
Notes
1
$120,000–$140,000
Carpinteria, Summerland, Montecito, parts of Santa Barbara
Affluent coastal communities; high home values (~$1.5M+ median)
2
$95,000–$115,000
Santa Barbara city, Goleta, Isla Vista
Mix of urban professionals, students, and tech; university influence lowers median slightly.
3
$80,000-$95,000
Santa Ynez Valley, Buellton, Solvang, Lompoc
Rural/agricultural with tourism; moderate incomes from wine industry and military base
4
$70,000–$85,000
Lompoc, Vandenberg area, parts of Santa Maria
industrial and defense-related; higher poverty rates (~15–20%).
5
$60,000–$75,000
Santa Maria, Guadalupe
Agricultural North County; majority Latino population; lowest incomes due to farm labor.
Poverty rates: ~8–10% in Districts 1–2 vs. 18–25% in Districts 4–5
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 