Some northeast states and their public utilities may be in a bit of a bind. Either they accept higher electric rates and the likely public backlash, or they deviate from their staunch anti-gas, anti-nuclear orthodoxy. Similarly, oil companies that have invested heavily in offshore wind may find that they are not just less profitable, but (even) less popular.
Something here does not remotely add up. If New York state succeeds by 2030 in closing its natural gas plants — the plants that account for 60% of the State’s generation capacity — that would bring our total installed capacity down from 37.5 GW to as little as 15 GW. But we need almost 60 GW to meet projected demand. And that’s 60 GW that can be called on any time as needed to meet peak usage. The 9 GW of projected offshore wind turbines wouldn’t make much of a dent even if they operated all the time and could be dispatched to meet peak demand, which they can’t. Instead, they will operate only about a third of the time, and at their own whim. At best they will provide about 3 GW on average, when what we need for this full electrification project is more like 45 GW of dispatchable power to add to our existing hydro and nuclear. Â
Offshore platforms: In some regions, there is a push to power platforms with renewable energy transported by electric cable. Currently, most platforms are efficiently powered by gas turbines which satisfy energy needs even when demand spikes during well operations like tripping out of the hole. The extent to which renewables can reliably support platform operations during these and other operations, when power interruptions are unacceptable from a safety standpoint, is a risk that must be assessed prior to committing to alternative energy sources.
The environmental benefits of powering platforms with renewable energy also have not been clearly documented. In most cases, offshore platforms produce sufficient gas to support their power demands. Should platforms be powered by imported electricity, gas that is not used for platform operations would presumably be marketed for consumption elsewhere or reinjected.
If the gas is marketed and consumed elsewhere, there is essentially no net (global) CO2 emissions reduction benefit. Gas that is reinjected is wasted unless there is an enhanced oil recovery benefit. So, the net environmental benefit from importing electric power seems questionable, and the operational risks could be significant.
The civil penalties provision in the 1978 OCS Lands Act (OCSLA) Amendments was flawed in that it stipulated that operators must be given time to take corrective action before a civil penalty could be assessed. The “time to take corrective action” requirement was confirmed by a 1983 Federal Court decision in Louisiana:
The Court agrees with Chevron’s construction of Section 24(b) and holds that civil penalties may only be imposed under Section 24(b) for violations which continue after the violator has been notified of the breach and has failed to correct it within a reasonable period allowed. This conclusion is based primarily upon a careful review of the pertinent statute. The first sentence sets forth the conditions of liability:
If any person fails to comply with any [provision of the Act] after notice of such failure and expiration of any reasonable period allowed for corrective action, such person shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each day of the continuance of such failure.
The court decision gutted the Minerals Management Service (MMS) civil penalties program. Civil penalties could no longer be assessed until the operators had been given time to correct their violations, even those that endangered workers and the environment.
Ironically, Congressman George Miller (D-CA), an ardent opponent of the offshore oil and gas program, proved to be an important MMS ally by adding language to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that amended the OCSLA civil penalties provision. The first draft of that language expanded the civil penalties authority to include violations that may constitute a threat of serious, irreparable, or immediate harm or damage to life, property, or the environment.
We were able to revise that draft by adding the words “or constituted” after “constitute” to cover situations where the threat was no longer present. For example, if an inspector found that a well had been drilled without required elements of the well control system in place, the threat may no longer be present at the time the violation was detected but it certainly was when the well was drilled.
The revived MMS civil penalties program was fair and effective, and BSEE seems to be administering the program in a similar manner. Civil penalties data for the past 4 years will be posted next week.
The plaintiffs assert “insufficient and arbitrary environmental analyses, in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).” The court filing is attached.
All of this will have to be resolved in the next 3 weeks, as the congressionally mandated sale, scheduled for 27 September, (presumably) cannot be postponed.
According to the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, this would result in an average 54% price hike across their portfolio. The strike prices would rise from $118.38 to $159.64/MWh for Empire Wind 1, from $107.50 to $177.84/MWh for Empire Wind 2, and from $118.00 to $190.82/MWh for Beacon Wind.
This Court should grant Plaintiffs—the State of Louisiana, the American Petroleum Institute (“API”), and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (“Chevron”)—a preliminary injunction and prevent those unlawful provisions from permanently disrupting the result of the fast-approaching lease sale (which Congress has directed must occur by September 30, and which cannot be delayed without causing Plaintiffs even more serious injury).
From a regulatory policy standpoint, this appears to be a strong filing. Operationally, the most important points pertain to the costly and premature Rice’s whale restrictions first discussed on this blog.
Most notably, the plaintiffs seek (p.39):
A preliminary and permanent injunction striking, setting aside, and enjoining BOEM from implementing the specific challenged provisions of the Final Notice of Sale and Record of Decision for Lease Sale 261;
An order vacating the specific challenged provisions of the Final Notice of Sale and Record of Decision for Lease Sale 261;
An order compelling Defendants to proceed with Lease Sale 261 on September 27, 2023, without the challenged provisions;
The expanded Rice’s whale area is based on a single 2022 study that concluded that Rice’s whales were “the most plausible explanation” for moan calls observed in the northwest GoM shelf break area. No Brice’s whales were sighted in the expanded area during this study. Is this sufficient basis for restrictions that threaten operations that are critical to our economy?
Stipulations are part of the lease contract and can be difficult to modify, even when the lessor and lessee are in agreement.
Why not rely on voluntary measures until further studies have been completed? The offshore industry has a good record of cooperation with the government to protect sensitive biological resources. The Flower Garden Banks is a good example of such cooperation.
In addition to the lease stipulation, the entire expanded Brice’s whale area has been excluded from the lease sale. Senator Manchin strongly criticized that decision:
Let me be clear, the exclusion of more than 6 million productive acres from the upcoming offshore oil and gas lease sale in the Gulf of Mexico based on a settlement reached in the name of protecting Rice’s whale while conveniently only targeting oil and gas is yet another example of this Administration’s intentional undermining of the strong energy security provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act.