Chevron slide: Advances in seismic imaging help characterize deepwater development opportunities
A new JPT article features comments from BOE contributor Lars Herbst on advances in HPHT technology, control systems, sensors and transmitters, and automation that are facilitating the next era of deepwater development.
Well capping technology, which provides a tertiary well control capability, is an essential element of post-Macondo exploration and development. Lars points to the importance of BSEE’s unannounced drill program to verify that capping stacks can be transported and installed in a timely manner. Chevron expresses pride in leading a team that deployed and installed a capping stack in 6,200 feet of water in a drill monitored by BSEE. During that drill, a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) closed 10 valves to shut in a simulated well.
Exxon’s Jayme Meier aptly characterizes the challenge and excitement of deepwater development:
“You are floating on a surface, and you have to be able to pinpoint exactly where you’re going to land subsea hardware, exactly where you’re going to moor an FPSO and hit target boxes that are a few feet by a few feet, and they’re 6,000 ft below you,” she said. “It is the most exciting thing that I’ve ever been involved in. And it involves technology, technical know-how, and an ability to really plan the base plan and the contingency plan.”
Advances in deepwater technology are indeed impressive, but continuous improvement must always be the objective. In that regard, Lars rightfully emphasizes the importance of sustaining research through the industry’s up and down cycles.
This real-life Spider-Man, seen on a Vineyard Wind turbine blade, is Tyler Paton. Tyler is an independent composite specialist who inspects and repairs blades on site. The Nantucket Current shared these images on X.
We sent our drone up to get a better look at what remains of the damaged blade on one of GE Vernova’s Haliade-X turbines at the Vineyard Wind lease area 15 miles southwest of Nantucket: pic.twitter.com/yynXpsunCv
The offshore safety regulator (BSEE) has a very capable technical staff and should produce an informed report on the Vineyard Wind blade failure. The concern is with the internal review process that has seriously delayed the publication of accident investigation reports and safety alerts.
Presumably, DNV, the Vineyard Wind CVA, will provide input into the BSEE investigation. Perhaps the effectiveness of the CVA process and quality control procedures should be separately considered.
Will Equinor, a major oil and gas producer, Dogger Bank partner, and offshore wind advocate, be investigating the Dogger Bank failures?
A comprehensive International data base on turbine incidents and performance is needed.
As previously noted, offshore substations are large structures. A closeup of the Vineyard Wind 1 substation is pasted below.
The operator of the wind farm released this short statement yesterday (8/22/2024):
We are aware of a blade failure which occurred this morning on an installed turbine at Dogger Bank A offshore wind farm, which is currently under construction. In line with safety procedures, the surrounding marine area has been restricted and relevant authorities notified. No one was injured or in the vicinity at the time the damage was sustained.
We are working closely with the turbine manufacturer, GE Vernova, which has initiated an investigation into the cause of the incident.
Further updates will be issued in due course as more information becomes available.
Additionally, ultimate authority over the wind farm remained unclear, with various federal agencies claiming responsibility over different portions of the permitting, licensing, review, and operation of the wind farm.
“Sometimes I have a hard time figuring out, who do we talk to? Who is going to keep us safe? Who is the responsible boss here? Who is going to make the hard decision?” Select Board member Matt Fee asked.
Separate legislation granting redundant or overlapping authority to different departments or agencies.
Legislation that is non-specific, assigning broad authority to the President or cabinet level level officials, leaving it up to the bureaus to resolve.
Bi- and multi-lateral agreements like MOA’s and MOU’s, which are intended to “coordinate the redundancy,” often cause more confusion than they prevent, creating gaps in the process.
“Fixing” problems by adding redundancy.
The Dept. of the Interior’s division of responsibilities for offshore wind, which was finalized in January 2023, inexplicably assigns review and approval of Construction and Operations Plans to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (i.e. the land manager, lessor, and wind energy promoter) rather than the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (i.e. the principal regulator of the activities described in those plans).
More significantly, the offshore wind responsibilities of the 2 bureaus are so intertwined (as is also the case for offshore oil and gas), that attempts to separate the functions have, at a minimum, created inefficiencies and increased regulatory and operational costs.
FTR, the idea that having the BOEM and BSEE functions combined in a single bureau, as was the case with the predecessor bureau (MMS), had anything to do with the Macondo blowout is a complete fallacy. Regarding the accusations that were made toward MMS, the Chief Counsel for the national commission that investigated the tragic incident found no evidence that ethical lapses on the part of MMS employees played any role in causing the blowout.
There were important regulatory changes made after the Macondo blowout. These included capping stack requirements, mandatory safety management systems, and updated rules and standards for cementing/zonal isolation and blowout preventer systems. None of these improvements were precipitated by or dependent on the division of MMS into two bureaus.
Above: Pigable Y connector for the 6.5-mile 18-inch pipeline extending from a subsea connection in MP289 to a subsea connection with MPOG in MP268 with a capacity of up to 80,000 barrels per day.
A colleague shared his research on the November 2023 Main Pass Oil Gathering (MPOG) connector leak in the Gulf of Mexico. Given the extraordinary amount of time it takes to produce accident reports these days, it may be a while before we see the NTSB report. (Keep in mind that we are still waiting for their final report on the December 2022 helicopter crashat the West Delta 106 A platform.)
“The pipeline associated with the leak is BSEE Segment No. 11015, an 18” oil line permitted under Panther Operating Company, LLC . MPOG and Panther are owned by Third Coast ( MAIN PASS OIL GATHERING PROJECT COMPLETION (third-coast.com) . Information on this company website shows that a project was completed for the installation of a new segment 20793 and the new line placed in service on August 20, 2022.
The picture shown in the website for this project (pasted above) shows what looks like a subsea pigable Y connection, which means the main line had to be cut for this connector to be installed. The location of this subsea tie-in for the new segment is in MP 268 and the approximate distance from the Mississippi River delta is 44 miles.
As for other subsea connections, the nearest to shore is in MP 144 about 27 miles from the delta. The report on the leak says that it occurred 19 miles from delta, so not sure if there are any connectors. This distance from the delta would be in the vicinity of MP 72 and mapping information shows no connections in this area, only pipeline crossings. See attached map for PSN 11015.“
The Town of Nantucket would like to provide you with an important update regarding the controlled detachment of the Vineyard Wind turbine blade and the ongoing efforts to manage any resulting debris.
August 11, 8:00 PM – Early this morning, portions of the remaining hanging sections of the Vineyard Wind turbine blade detached from the hub. The controlled detachment follows a series of exercises conducted late last week to pitch the blade, which, in combination with storm winds, led to the safe separation of the sections below the root of the blade.
Vineyard Wind and GE Vernova are currently assessing the situation to determine if any remaining sections pose a risk of detachment. The root of the blade, still attached to the turbine, is being monitored, and we are informed that plans are in place for its removal. Vineyard Wind has maritime crews on site to secure and contain any debris immediately.
The U.S. Coast Guard continues to enforce a 500-meter safety exclusion zone around the turbine. Vineyard Wind is utilizing ocean current and wind pattern models to predict potential debris movement. Depending on wind direction, more debris could potentially arrive on Nantucket beaches over the next hours or days. The Town of Nantucket will provide updates when necessary.
Under a federal preservation order, Vineyard Wind is responsible for retaining all debris, and only their employees, contractors, or those appointed by town officials are authorized to handle and recover debris materials. We urge the public to avoid handling any debris.
REMINDER TO THE PUBLIC
DO NOT put any debris in your home garbage.
DO NOT bring the debris to the landfill.
DO notify the proper authorities immediately if you have debris so they can remove it for analysis and proper disposal.
Only trained employees or contractors are responsible for collecting and removing the debris. To report any remaining debris, please contact:
Phone: 833-609-5768
Reports of debris can also be sent to the cleanup contractor here.
2 sentence summary: The well’s degraded 20″ structural casing could not support the hydraulic workover unit (HWU), which included an oversized BOP stack. The HWU began to sway and fell into the water with the victim attached by his fall protection to the top of the unit.
The full report is attached. The report is quite good, but something is seriously amiss when it takes 28 months to finalize a panel report. I suspect that the work of the panel and the regional reviewers was completed in a fraction of that time. Where are the bottlenecks?
As the above examples illustrate, turbine blade failures, like the Vineyard Wind incident near Nantucket, are not unique to GE Vernova. GE’s rivals, Siemens Gamesa and Vestas, have also experienced serious quality control issues.
Per ReviewEconomy (2023), “Unexpected and increasing wind turbine failure rates, largely in newer and bigger models, are savaging the profits of some of the world’s biggest manufacturers, as Siemens Gamesa, GE and Vestas report heavy repair and maintenance losses.”
In light of the manufacturing challenges, all 3 companies report increased emphasis on quality control. Why has quality control to date been inadequate and how will the past problems be corrected?
Has the wind industry’s sense of entitlement, as evidenced in their tax credit, rate increase, and departure expectations, affected their safety and quality culture? Has industry and governmental wind energy promotion rushed development and compromised design and fabrication decisions? It’s time for wind developers, manufacturers, and regulators to make sure their priorities are in order.
Contrary to the regulations, Vineyard Wind was authorized to begin the fabrication of facilities beforeBOEM “received and offered no objections to the their Facility Design Report (FDR) and Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR).” The approval letter is attached, and excerpts (emphasis added) are pasted below. [Note: The requirement that was then at §585.700(b) is found at §585.632 in the current regulations.]
“Vineyard Wind requests a regulatory departure from §585.700(b) requiring that fabrication of approved facilities not begin until BOEM provides notification that it has received and has no objections to the submitted Facility Design Report (FDR) and Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR). Vineyard Wind proposes to fabricate, but not install the following project elements: 1) Monopile foundations; 2) Electrical service platform; 3) Export cable; 4) Inter-array cables; and 5) Wind turbine generator facilities.
….allowing these fabrication activities to take place earlier in time would allow Vineyard Wind to adhere to its construction schedule, maintain its qualification for the Federal Investment Tax Credit, and meet its contractual obligations under the Power Purchase Agreements with Massachusetts distribution companies.
30 cfr 585.103 requires that a departure provide safety and environmental protection equal to or greater than the provision in the regulations that is waived. BOEM’s letter fails to explain how allowing fabrication to begin before fundamental design and fabrication reports are submitted and reviewed meets this test.
Perhaps even more troubling is BOEM’s response to subsequent requests by other companies to waive the FDR and FIR requirement (example). In these responses, BOEM asserts that their “current interpretation” is that no departure is needed because “the regulation prohibits only fabrication and installation activities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) itself.” How does that make sense given the important activities, including the fabrication of turbine blades and other turbine components, that take place onshore?
In their letters approving the Vineyard Wind and other departures, BOEM implies that their review of these reports is unnecessary because “the design and fabrication of these components would occur under the supervision of the approved CVA” (Certified Verification Agent). That assertion misconstrues the role of the CVA. These agents, nominated and funded by the operator, provide third party oversight that is complementary to, not a substitute for, BOEM/BSEE project reviews.
According to this memo, DNV was the CVA for Vineyard Wind. Their insights on the turbine blade failure will presumably be included in BSEE’s investigation report.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 