A helideck incident killed 4 workers in 2022. Why are we still waiting for the final NTSB report?
The most recent Coast Guard – BSEE MOA for fixed platforms added to helideck regulatory uncertainty by assigning decks and fuel handling to BSEE and railings and perimeter netting to the Coast Guard. How does that make sense?
As is the case with all safety regulations, a systems based approach is needed.
Despite the muddled regulatory regime, BSEE is showing strong leadership in addressing helideck safety.
The broader issue of regulatory fragmentation is an important risk factor that needs to be addressed.
David Scarborough, Island Operating Co., was one of the 4 workers who died in the 2022 crashat a West Delta 106 platform.
Particularly noteworthy is Nord Stream’s response to the insurers’ claim (par. 22.2 (a) of their filing) that the pipeline damage was the result of “the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.” In par. 13.1 of their response (attached), Nord Stream called the insurers’ assertion “embarrassing for want of particularity.” (clever wording that may prove useful in the future 😉)
Nord Stream AG calls the insurers (Lloyd’s and Arch) failure to provide evidence for the country that blew up the pipelines “embarrassing.” (See above comment.)
Mahmoudi: “The defendants’ argument is prima facie irrelevant if one cannot prove that the damage is caused by a named government that has been directly involved in a war in the area. The burden of proof in this case is…on the defendant.”
Mahmoudi: “Even if the sabotage is an act of terrorism, the author of the act can be a state or a private entity.”
Mahmoudi: “If a private entity, the insurance company, is the only source for the compensation; if a state is responsible for the terrorist act, it is the insurance company & that state that have a legal obligation to compensate for the damage.”
Related comment by Erik Andersson: Nord Stream AG has consistently claimed they should receive compensation regardless of whether or not a government was responsible for the sabotage. Nord Stream AG does not seem interested in providing an alternative to Lloyds’ claim that Ukraine did thisas an act of war. (That horse might be too big to ride 😉)
New Bedford Light: The Rolldock Sun leaves New Bedford on Friday with two blades visible. Credit: Courtesy of West Island Weather
Per the New Bedford Light, the turbine blade delivery vessel Rolldock Sun was seen on Friday carrying at least two blades out of New Bedford. It was not headed for the Vineyard Wind site. According to vessel tracking websites, the Rolldock Sun was en route to the Port of Cherbourg, where GE Vernova has a blade manufacturing facility.
The most likely explanation for returning the blades to Cherbourg is that defects were detected or suspected. The blade that failed, reportedly as a result of a manufacturing issue, is probably not the only one that was defective.
The New Bedford Light asked GE Vernova, Vineyard Wind, and the Federal regulator BSEE why the blades were being transported to Cherbourg. They received the following responses (my comments in parentheses):
GE Vernova: “No comment on this matter.” (This is the worst possible response. In the absence of information, people are left to speculate. If there was no problem with the blades, why wouldn’t GE simply provide an explanation? Their non-response simply reinforces suspicions that the blades were defective. If that is the case, why not take credit for procedures that identified the suspect defects, albeit belatedly?
Vineyard Wind:“The weekend has gotten in the way of the information flow,” and they would share information should they hear anything. Another request for information was not answered as of noon Monday. (Not exactly confidence inspiring from the company whose blade failure littered beaches and the offshore environment. They are deservedly being watched, and need to be more transparent and responsive.)
BSEE:A BSEE spokesperson did not answer questions and said by email that the agency has no new information. (Disappointing, but not surprising.)
Swedish engineer Erik Andersson has personally investigated the September 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines. He is perhaps the most informed independent investigator of the incident and the associated legal and political drama.
Andersson provided an updated defense document filed by the pipelines’ insurers (attached) and posted his observations on X. His X comments are consolidated below.
Nord Stream insurers Lloyds & Arch just filed an amended defense document (attached) which reveals technical details confirming a fifth Nord Stream bomb, which failed to break the NS1B line, placed just 90 meters from the successful bomb on NS1 line A.
Lloyds & Arch intend to prove in court that the government of Ukraine ordered the destruction.
The insurers have access to classified information in the criminal investigation which not even the victims have had up to now.
The locations of the northern Nord Stream bombs are marked on the nautical chart (pasted below). The previously known bombs have orange markers and the new bomb we learned about in the NS vs Lloyds filing is marked red.
I (Andersson) have repeatedly said that I dismissed Seymour Hersh claim of 8 bombs after my expedition, and have assumed there were exactly four bombs. This has now been proven false, and I think that we again have to account for the possibility that there were perhaps 8 bombs, and that Sy Hersh is perhaps right in his claim that “the Americans sped back to the crime scene to remove the unexploded bombs.”
Andersson’s personal view is that it doesn’t matter much if Team USA trusted and protected the Ukrainian sailboat crew so they could place the bombs, or if they just waited for the sailboat cover operation to finish before detonating the bombs they had placed there by other means (making sure they didn’t do anything that couldn’t have been done from a sailboat).
The presence of American, Danish and Swedish warships in the area, with all their surveillance capabilities, including the underwater surveillance, makes it a very hard sell that the Ukrainians did this alone without American participation.
American warships were also present at the crime scene when it was closed off (justified by an erroneous interpretation of international law) and cleaned up by the Swedish investigation. If any materials were found which contradicted the sailboat narrative, these materials could have been removed.
It’s impossible to trust the investigations when (1) the crime scene was illegally blocked & cleaned with US military protection, (2) international investigation was blocked, and (3) the Swedish and Danish investigations were closed with a bogus justification contradicting the premise of “jurisdiction” which was used to seize control of all information in the first place. (Very interesting point about Sweden and Denmark. After 16+ months of investigation, they both punted. Sweden suddenly didn’t have jurisdiction and Denmark decided they didn’t have sufficient grounds to pursue a criminal case.)
Given the absence of industry and government data on wind turbine incidents, Scotland Against Spin (SAS) has done yeoman’s work in filling the void. SAS gathers information from press reports and official releases. A PDF of the latest SAS update summary is attached. You can view their complete incident compilation (318 pages) here. Kudos to SAS for their diligence.
As good as their work has been, SAS acknowledges that their information is far from complete and may only represent the tip of the wind turbine incident iceberg. Per SAS:
In 2011, RenewableUK confirmed that there had been 1500 wind turbine incidents in the UK alone in the previous 5 years.
In July 2019, EnergyVoice reported a total of 81 cases where workers had been injured on UK windfarms since 2014. The SAS table includes only 15 of these incidents (<19%).
In February 2021, the industry publication Wind Power Engineering and Development admitted to 865 offshore accidents during 2019. SAS captured only 4 (<0.5%).
A 13 August 2018 publication by Power Technology reported 737 incidents from UK offshore windfarms during 2016 alone, with the majority occurring during operations rather than development. 44% of medical emergencies were turbine related. In comparison, only 4 UK offshore incidents are listed in the SAS data – equivalent to 0.5%.
Lars Herbst had previously reported, based on the Wind Power article cited above, that “with an estimated 700,000 blades in operation globally, there are, on average, 3,800incidents of blade failure each year.” Lars noted that the annual blade failure rate of about 0.5% translates to 1.5% of all operating wind turbines experiencing a blade failure every year, a remarkably high failure frequency.
“This marks a turning point in the clean energy transition. After many decades of advocacy, research, policymaking, and finally construction, America’s offshore wind industry has gone from a dream to reality,” said Governor Maura Healey. “Across Massachusetts, in 30,000 homes and businesses, when you turn on the light, you will now be using clean, affordable energy. This will make the air we breathe safer and healthier, save customers money, and bring us one step closer to achieving net-zero emissions.”
Just when the media seemed to be settling on rogue Ukrainians in a rented yacht being responsible for the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, comments by a Danish harbor master have muddied the waters.
On the second anniversary of the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage, the Danish publication Politiken posted comments from John Anker Nielsen, harbor master on Christiansø, the small Danish Island near the explosion sites.
“For the first few days, the harbor master said he was “not allowed to say a thing”. But today, John Anker Nielsen can reveal that four or five days before the Nord Stream blasts, he was out with the rescue service on Christiansø because there were some ships with switched-off radios. They turned out to be American naval vessels, and when the rescue service approached, they were told by Naval Command to turn back.Therefore, the harbor master has some faith in the theory that American star journalist Seymour Hersh, among others, has put forward without any documentation: that the US was behind the sabotage. The Americans have these small unmanned submarines that can solve any task, John Anker Nielsen has been told.”
Erik commented further:
The harbor master isn’t making this up. He wasn’t alone on the rescue vessel ordered to stay clear of the American warships.
Chevron slide: Advances in seismic imaging help characterize deepwater development opportunities
A new JPT article features comments from BOE contributor Lars Herbst on advances in HPHT technology, control systems, sensors and transmitters, and automation that are facilitating the next era of deepwater development.
Well capping technology, which provides a tertiary well control capability, is an essential element of post-Macondo exploration and development. Lars points to the importance of BSEE’s unannounced drill program to verify that capping stacks can be transported and installed in a timely manner. Chevron expresses pride in leading a team that deployed and installed a capping stack in 6,200 feet of water in a drill monitored by BSEE. During that drill, a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) closed 10 valves to shut in a simulated well.
Exxon’s Jayme Meier aptly characterizes the challenge and excitement of deepwater development:
“You are floating on a surface, and you have to be able to pinpoint exactly where you’re going to land subsea hardware, exactly where you’re going to moor an FPSO and hit target boxes that are a few feet by a few feet, and they’re 6,000 ft below you,” she said. “It is the most exciting thing that I’ve ever been involved in. And it involves technology, technical know-how, and an ability to really plan the base plan and the contingency plan.”
Advances in deepwater technology are indeed impressive, but continuous improvement must always be the objective. In that regard, Lars rightfully emphasizes the importance of sustaining research through the industry’s up and down cycles.
This real-life Spider-Man, seen on a Vineyard Wind turbine blade, is Tyler Paton. Tyler is an independent composite specialist who inspects and repairs blades on site. The Nantucket Current shared these images on X.
We sent our drone up to get a better look at what remains of the damaged blade on one of GE Vernova’s Haliade-X turbines at the Vineyard Wind lease area 15 miles southwest of Nantucket: pic.twitter.com/yynXpsunCv
The offshore safety regulator (BSEE) has a very capable technical staff and should produce an informed report on the Vineyard Wind blade failure. The concern is with the internal review process that has seriously delayed the publication of accident investigation reports and safety alerts.
Presumably, DNV, the Vineyard Wind CVA, will provide input into the BSEE investigation. Perhaps the effectiveness of the CVA process and quality control procedures should be separately considered.
Will Equinor, a major oil and gas producer, Dogger Bank partner, and offshore wind advocate, be investigating the Dogger Bank failures?
A comprehensive International data base on turbine incidents and performance is needed.
As previously noted, offshore substations are large structures. A closeup of the Vineyard Wind 1 substation is pasted below.
The operator of the wind farm released this short statement yesterday (8/22/2024):
We are aware of a blade failure which occurred this morning on an installed turbine at Dogger Bank A offshore wind farm, which is currently under construction. In line with safety procedures, the surrounding marine area has been restricted and relevant authorities notified. No one was injured or in the vicinity at the time the damage was sustained.
We are working closely with the turbine manufacturer, GE Vernova, which has initiated an investigation into the cause of the incident.
Further updates will be issued in due course as more information becomes available.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 