The NTSB has finally issued their report (attached) on the 12/29/2022 helicopter crash that resulted in 4 fatalities at Walter’s West Delta 106 A platform. The NTSB report on the Huntington Beach pipeline spill took a comparable amount of time (26 months) to complete. By comparison, the lengthy and complex National Commission, BOEMRE, Chief Counsel, and NAE reports on the Macondo blowout were published 6 to to 17 months after the well was shut-in.
The gist of the NTSB’s findings is pasted below.
The report summarizes operations standards, but does not consider the associated operator/contractor safety management systems that are intended to prevent such incidents. The report notes that:
Was the contractor/operator aware of these deviations from company policy? Should they have been?
The report implies that human (pilot) error was the cause of the dynamic rollover, but fails to assess the organizational controls that are intended to prevent such errors. How was a pilot with 1667.8 flight hours (1343.8 as the PIC), who had made 23 trips to this platform, repeatedly making fundamental positioning and takeoff errors?
The report also notes that:
This is interesting wording given that the perimeter light was identified as the pivot point, one of the 3 requirements for a dynamic rollover. Why wasn’t that violation observed by the operator/contractor and corrected? What helideck inspection procedures were in place? Did NTSB consider the fragmented regulatory regime for helicopter safety, particularly with regard to helidecks?
Pioneering offshore engineer J.L. Daeschler, a Frenchman who lives in Scotland and has worked on drilling rigs worldwide, shared his 1974 training certificate signed by Bill Hise, the first director of the Blowout Prevention and Well Control Training Center at LSU. JL recalls his training:
The LSU well control course was new and very well organized. Training options were limited at that time. LSU took a step forward and incorporated equipment donated by Cameron Iron Works, Armco Steel /National, VETCO, and others.
The course was split between indoor class room style and outdoor trainingon a live well to remind us of the real things, like hard hats, tally books, and safety shoes.
LSU had a 1200 ft vertical well and a small 2″ diameter gas injection line to create a bottom hole gas kick, using a nitrogen truck as the supply. (note: the live well was a first for any well control school.) You had a choice of several manual chokes. I selected the Cameron Willis choke to circulate the gas kick out with no increase in mud weight (drillers method).
The mud return level, kick detection, and general management of the operation were realistic as if on a rig. The gas would whistle and escape thru a vent line.
The training was simple and effective in that proper well control procedures were learned. In the process, there were many errors. Mud was seen flying out of the mud shaker/pits. School management would bring things under control and explain the errors that were made !!!
Given the importance of minimizing drilling risks, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) was the primary funder of the LSU facility. MMS predecessor, the Conservation Division of USGS, first established well control training requirements in 1975 (pasted below).
… Union Oil Company’s reckless well plan forever scarred the U.S. offshore program. Learn more about the details.
Santa Barbara blowout
Examinations of the Santa Barbara, Montara, and Macondo blowouts, the Piper Alpha fire, and other major incidents should be a part of every petroleum engineering curriculum, and should be mandatory for those who conduct and regulate offshore oil and gas operations.
There is no better learning experience than studying the failures that had such enormous human and economic consequences.
Shetland News received a number of photos from the site, with the person who sent them – who wished to remain anonymous – saying there was “truly a monumental mess of fibreglass and plastic blowing through the hills.”
They said “some of the debris was as far as 700m away from the turbine.”
Shouldn’t the operators have contingency plans (ala oil spill response plans) that provide for prompt and complete cleanup after turbine system failures?
“Debris can still be seen strewn around, some distance from the turbines.”
The NTSB has still not issued a final report, which is troubling. However, the detailed Operations Group Factual Report (including attachments) can be accessed in the case docket This and other items in the docket should be of interest to those involved with offshore operations and helicopter safety.
From the factual report, below are graphics showing the helideck damage and assumed final position of the helicopter.
Excerpts from the testimony of a worker at the platform who was part of an attempted search and rescue operation in the platform’s Whitaker escape capsule:
Given the absence of industry and government data on wind turbine incidents, Scotland Against Spin (SAS) has done yeoman’s work in filling the void. SAS gathers information from press reports and official releases. A PDF of the latest SAS update summary (through 2024) is attached. You can view their complete incident compilation (324 pages) here. Kudos to SAS for their diligence.
Be sure to see the introductory text at the top of the attached table. Some key points:
The table includes all documented cases of wind turbine incidents which could be found and confirmed through press reports or official information releases.
SAS believes that this compendium of accident information may be the most comprehensive available anywhere.
SAS believes their table is only the “tip of the iceberg” in terms of numbers of accidents and their frequency:
On 11 March 2011 the Daily Telegraph reported that RenewableUK confirmed that there had been 1500 wind turbine incidents in the UK alone in the previous 5 years.
In July 2019 EnergyVoice and the Press and Journal reported a total of 81 cases where workers had been injured on the UK’s windfarms since 2014. SAS data includes only 15 of these (<19%).
In February 2021, the industry publication Wind Power Engineering and Development admitted to 865 offshore accidents during 2019. SAS data include only 4 of these (<0.5%).
SAS includes other examples supporting their “tip of the iceberg” claim.
Although SAS is committed to reforming the Scottish government’s wind energy policy, their incident data summaries are credible. It’s disappointing that the wind industry is unwilling to publish comprehensive incident data that would help protect lives and the environment, and improve the performance of all participants.
After a zero fatality year in 2023, the first in at least 60 years, Jason Mathews of BSEE advises that one worker was killed during US OCS oil and gas operations in 2024.
The fatality occurred during decommissioning operations on the Helix D/B EPIC HEDRON at Talos Energy’s Ship Shoal Block 225 “D” platform in the Gulf. The platform was to be reefed in Eugene Island Block 276.
The victim, who worked for Triton Diving Services, was moving hoses on the port side of the barge and got caught between the bulwark and counterweight of the crawler crane (see picture below).
The victim’s family have filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Helix Energy Services and Triton Diving Services. The plaintiffs assert that prior to the crane movement the crane operator and crew had not undertaken measures to assure that the crane’s swing area was clear of other crew members. Per their filing, Triton and Helix were negligent as follows:
Timeframe for government and industry actions following the 2005 hurricane season.
Optimally, the regulator establishes clear objectives for the operating companies and a schedule for achieving those objectives. This approach was demonstrated with great success following the 2005 hurricane season (Katrina and Rita) when numerous mooring system and other stationkeeping issues were identified.
Minerals Management Service Director Johnnie Burton sent a letter (attachment 1) to industry leaders calling for a face-to-face meeting with Department of the Interior Secretary Gale Norton. The Secretary outlined her concerns and informed offshore operators that there would be no drilling from moored mobile drilling units or jackup rigs during the next hurricane season until the issues identified during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were addressed.
The collaborative effort that followed was a resounding success (2nd attachment). In addition to addressing station keeping concerns, a comprehensive list of hurricane issues was developed. Industry and government then worked together to assess mitigations and develop new standards and procedures. The essential MODU standards were completed before the 2006 hurricane season, and all of the related concerns were effectively addressed prior to the 2009 hurricane season. Had the government elected to promulgate regulations to address all of these issues, much of this work would have never been completed.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 