… Union Oil Company’s reckless well plan forever scarred the U.S. offshore program. Learn more about the details.
Santa Barbara blowout
Examinations of the Santa Barbara, Montara, and Macondo blowouts, the Piper Alpha fire, and other major incidents should be a part of every petroleum engineering curriculum, and should be mandatory for those who conduct and regulate offshore oil and gas operations.
There is no better learning experience than studying the failures that had such enormous human and economic consequences.
Shetland News received a number of photos from the site, with the person who sent them – who wished to remain anonymous – saying there was “truly a monumental mess of fibreglass and plastic blowing through the hills.”
They said “some of the debris was as far as 700m away from the turbine.”
Shouldn’t the operators have contingency plans (ala oil spill response plans) that provide for prompt and complete cleanup after turbine system failures?
“Debris can still be seen strewn around, some distance from the turbines.”
The NTSB has still not issued a final report, which is troubling. However, the detailed Operations Group Factual Report (including attachments) can be accessed in the case docket This and other items in the docket should be of interest to those involved with offshore operations and helicopter safety.
From the factual report, below are graphics showing the helideck damage and assumed final position of the helicopter.
Excerpts from the testimony of a worker at the platform who was part of an attempted search and rescue operation in the platform’s Whitaker escape capsule:
Given the absence of industry and government data on wind turbine incidents, Scotland Against Spin (SAS) has done yeoman’s work in filling the void. SAS gathers information from press reports and official releases. A PDF of the latest SAS update summary (through 2024) is attached. You can view their complete incident compilation (324 pages) here. Kudos to SAS for their diligence.
Be sure to see the introductory text at the top of the attached table. Some key points:
The table includes all documented cases of wind turbine incidents which could be found and confirmed through press reports or official information releases.
SAS believes that this compendium of accident information may be the most comprehensive available anywhere.
SAS believes their table is only the “tip of the iceberg” in terms of numbers of accidents and their frequency:
On 11 March 2011 the Daily Telegraph reported that RenewableUK confirmed that there had been 1500 wind turbine incidents in the UK alone in the previous 5 years.
In July 2019 EnergyVoice and the Press and Journal reported a total of 81 cases where workers had been injured on the UK’s windfarms since 2014. SAS data includes only 15 of these (<19%).
In February 2021, the industry publication Wind Power Engineering and Development admitted to 865 offshore accidents during 2019. SAS data include only 4 of these (<0.5%).
SAS includes other examples supporting their “tip of the iceberg” claim.
Although SAS is committed to reforming the Scottish government’s wind energy policy, their incident data summaries are credible. It’s disappointing that the wind industry is unwilling to publish comprehensive incident data that would help protect lives and the environment, and improve the performance of all participants.
After a zero fatality year in 2023, the first in at least 60 years, Jason Mathews of BSEE advises that one worker was killed during US OCS oil and gas operations in 2024.
The fatality occurred during decommissioning operations on the Helix D/B EPIC HEDRON at Talos Energy’s Ship Shoal Block 225 “D” platform in the Gulf. The platform was to be reefed in Eugene Island Block 276.
The victim, who worked for Triton Diving Services, was moving hoses on the port side of the barge and got caught between the bulwark and counterweight of the crawler crane (see picture below).
The victim’s family have filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Helix Energy Services and Triton Diving Services. The plaintiffs assert that prior to the crane movement the crane operator and crew had not undertaken measures to assure that the crane’s swing area was clear of other crew members. Per their filing, Triton and Helix were negligent as follows:
Timeframe for government and industry actions following the 2005 hurricane season.
Optimally, the regulator establishes clear objectives for the operating companies and a schedule for achieving those objectives. This approach was demonstrated with great success following the 2005 hurricane season (Katrina and Rita) when numerous mooring system and other stationkeeping issues were identified.
Minerals Management Service Director Johnnie Burton sent a letter (attachment 1) to industry leaders calling for a face-to-face meeting with Department of the Interior Secretary Gale Norton. The Secretary outlined her concerns and informed offshore operators that there would be no drilling from moored mobile drilling units or jackup rigs during the next hurricane season until the issues identified during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were addressed.
The collaborative effort that followed was a resounding success (2nd attachment). In addition to addressing station keeping concerns, a comprehensive list of hurricane issues was developed. Industry and government then worked together to assess mitigations and develop new standards and procedures. The essential MODU standards were completed before the 2006 hurricane season, and all of the related concerns were effectively addressed prior to the 2009 hurricane season. Had the government elected to promulgate regulations to address all of these issues, much of this work would have never been completed.
“GE Vernova is aiming to deploy small nuclear reactors across the developed world over the next decade, staking out a leadership position in a budding technology that could play a central role in meeting surging electricity demand and reducing carbon dioxide emissions.“
Just when we were settling on Der Spiegel’s account of the Nord Stream sabotage, Michael Kobs provides reasons for skepticism. Are the detailed revelations in Der Spiegel part of a coordinated effort to relieve governments of any responsibility and glorify the destruction of economically important pipelines?
“Since the German arrest warrant for a participant in the Nord Stream terrorist attack, efforts have also increased in Germany to portray the terrorist attack as a “legitimate” or even “admirable” war effort. However, the greatest effort is to relieve the burden on state actors. And so, since recently, the alleged perpetrators seem to be chatting without reservation, spreading out every little detail in front of journalists, and putting every (already revealed) fact in the “right” non-governmental light.” ~Michael Kobs
Meanwhile, independent journalist Jeffrey Brodsky continues to delve deeply into Nord Stream issues. A recent interesting and detailed piece refutes assertions that Gazprom and Russia somehow benefited from the Nord Stream attack. Mr. Brodsky provides evidence to the contrary concluding that the destruction of the pipelines has contributed significantly to Gazprom’s financial problems. He noted that:
Gazprom announced a loss of $6.9 billion for 2023, marking its first annual loss in more than two decades.
Nord Stream 1 supplied EU nations with a whopping 35% of all Russian gas imports.
Gazprom contributed $80 million of Russia’s $407 million in Federal govt revenues in 2022, and was a source of revenue that Russia would not want to jeopardize.
Unsurprisingly, the “experts” and politicians who argued that the Nord Stream sabotage would benefit Gazprom and Russia have failed to modify or correct their assertions. Mr. Brodsky concludes his detailed analysis as follows:
“However, despite the numerous facts that have emerged since the attack, the damage caused to Russia and Gazprom by the sabotage remains willfully ignored. Politicians and experts who claimed that the sabotage would be beneficial to Russia or Gazprom financially, legally or geopolitically seem to have merely skimmed the first chapters of the Nord Stream story. So far, almost none of them have publicly corrected themselves after hastily familiarizing themselves with its complex plot. But since the perpetrator of the sabotage has not yet been unmasked, they still have the opportunity to pre-order the unfinished sequel to the book. Perhaps it will end up being an international bestseller. ~ Jeffrey Brodsky
Production from Equinor’s important Johan Sverdrup field, which accounts for 755,000 bopd (36% of Norway’s oil production), was shut-in on Monday as a result of a power outage. Production was in the process of being restored on Tuesday.
According to Equinor, the outage was caused by overheating at an electric converter station onshore.
A 2022 BOE post questioned Norway’s push to power offshore platforms with electricity transmitted from shore. This incident reinforces those concerns. Summary:
Most offshore platforms produce sufficient gas to support their power demands
Assuming gas that is not used to power a platform is marketed and consumed elsewhere, the net (global) reduction in CO2 emissions from electrifying offshore platforms is negligible. (Perhaps there is actually a small increase in net emissions given the power required to transport the gas to markets and the emissions associated with onshore power generation).
Offshore power demands are highly variable, especially when drilling operations are being conducted.
Gas turbines are reliable, and capable of responding to variable power demand. Excess generation capacity is typically provided.
Power from shore increases the cost of platform operations and could decrease ultimate recovery of oil and gas resources.
Per NPD, electrification of the shelf will increase electricity prices for onshore consumers and increase the need for onshore facility investment.
Gas turbines or diesel generators are still necessary to satisfy emergency power needs at the platforms.
Long power cables are vulnerable to damage (accidental or intentional), as are onshore power stations.
I hope the investigation of this incident considers some of these broader electrification policy issues.
Equinor diagram: The purple cable shows power from shore to Johan Sverdrup phase 1, established in 2018. The yellow power cable shows power from shore to Johan Sverdrup phase 2 and the Utsira High area solution, from 2022. The orange cable shows power from shore to the Sleipner field centre and connected fields from late 2022. Black cable shows existing power cables at Sleipner field centre and to the Gudrun installation.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 