The Nantucket non-profit ACK for Whales (ACK is the FAA abbreviation for Nantucket Airport) has petitioned the Supreme Court to review the 1st Circuit’s ruling on the Vineyard Wind project. Per the Supreme Court filing (full document attached):
Despite the agencies’ explicit statutory duty to consider all “best information available,” regarding the impacts its actions might have on an endangered or threatened species and those habitats, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), did not consider the cumulative impacts of other planned projects when they authorized and issued permits to construct the Vineyard Wind 1 Project.
Will the Supreme Court accept the case?
“Hail Mary:” Per the Nantucket Current, the odds that the Supreme Court justices will accept the case are exceedingly slim. Of the 7,000 cases that the Supreme Court is asked to review each year, only 100 to 150 of them – about 2 percent – are accepted.
“Really good chance:” Per Val Oliver, ACK for Whales founding director, “In light of the recent Chevron decision, we think we have a really good chance. That was about government overreach and that is what this (Vineyard Wind) has felt like since the beginning: go, go, go, and we’ll figure it out as we go. That’s just not responsible.“
Regardless of the outcome of this case, there is a profound inconsistency in the administration of the Endangered Species Act as evidenced by our comparison of the operating restrictions for the Right whale (Atlantic wind) and Rice’s whale (Gulf of Mexico oil and gas). Note that the more onerous Rice’s whale restrictions were removed by court order.
Just when the media seemed to be settling on rogue Ukrainians in a rented yacht being responsible for the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, comments by a Danish harbor master have muddied the waters.
On the second anniversary of the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage, the Danish publication Politiken posted comments from John Anker Nielsen, harbor master on Christiansø, the small Danish Island near the explosion sites.
“For the first few days, the harbor master said he was “not allowed to say a thing”. But today, John Anker Nielsen can reveal that four or five days before the Nord Stream blasts, he was out with the rescue service on Christiansø because there were some ships with switched-off radios. They turned out to be American naval vessels, and when the rescue service approached, they were told by Naval Command to turn back.Therefore, the harbor master has some faith in the theory that American star journalist Seymour Hersh, among others, has put forward without any documentation: that the US was behind the sabotage. The Americans have these small unmanned submarines that can solve any task, John Anker Nielsen has been told.”
Erik commented further:
The harbor master isn’t making this up. He wasn’t alone on the rescue vessel ordered to stay clear of the American warships.
Update: BSEE reports that as of 9/29/2024, essentially all production had been restored.
As of 9/28, 210,000 BOPD remained shut-in with only 4 platforms still evacuated. Presumably, production had not resumed (or had only partially resumed) on some high rate deepwater platforms.
BSEE shut-in, evacuation, and relocation data in the table below are as of 12:30 p.m. ET on the specified date.
“I am disappointed that BOEM’s accelerated process over the last year has further divided stakeholder communities, and put the Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians in the position of challenging BOEM in federal district court. Oregon’s legislative Coastal Caucus is likewise now in full opposition to BOEM’s proposed lease.“
Despite the usual hype about the number of homes that could be powered and “good-paying jobs,” the upcoming Oregon wind lease appears to be very much in doubt. If legal action by Oregon tribes doesn’t halt or delay the sale, the absence of bidders may.
OregonLive reports that only one company, NewSun Energy, continues to be interested in participating in the sale. NewSun is primarily a solar energy developer with no apparent offshore wind experience.
Note: I have attached a PDF for those who want to download the charts and table.I have also added a “flaring and venting” category for easy access to these posts.
Minimizing flaring and venting is important from both environmental and resource conservation standpoints.Flaring and venting volumes are also good indicators of how well production systems are designed, managed, and maintained.
The best performance indicators are the percentages of produced gas that are flared and vented both for oil-well gas (OWG, also known as associated gas or casinghead gas) and gas-well gas (GWG or non-associated gas).
I compile monthly flaring and venting volumes for the Gulf of Mexico using data submitted to the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR). Reporting these data is mandatory and strictly enforced. Violators are subject to civil and criminal penalties.
In assessing performance trends, it’s important to segment venting and flaring volumes for both OWG and GWG production. Venting produced gas (mostly methane) is a more significant environmental concern from both air quality and greenhouse gas (GHG) perspectives. Reductions in methane emissions are a priority for regulators and leading operators.
Flaring and venting data for 2019-2023 are summarized in the charts and table below. All volumes are in millions of cubic feet (MMCF). For the last chart (% of total gas production vented), I added ONRR data for 2015-2018 to provide a longer term perspective on overall venting performance.
Observations:
OWG venting has declined significantly both in terms of the total volume and % flared. Most OWG is now produced at modern deepwater platforms equipped with efficient flare stacks. Venting from these facilities is minimal. A performance target of <0.2% for OWG venting should therefore be achievable.
GWG venting volumes have declined sharply. However, given the parallel decline in GWG production, the % of GWG vented has actually increased. Most gas wells are on older shelf platforms where flare booms cannot be safely and economically added. Nonetheless, it’s disappointing that the % of GWG vented increased to > 0.3% in both 2022 and 2023.
OWG flaring has remained relatively constant both in terms of the volume and % flared. Given that most OWG is produced at deepwater facilities, reduction of the flaring % to <1.0 should be achievable.
The % of the total gas flared or vented has remained relatively constant at >1.0%. Again, a target of <1.0% should be achievable.
In the table, the figures in blue are particularly encouraging and the figures in red are the most disappointing.
Overall, the numbers are good, but continuous improvement should be the objective. Reductions in GWG venting and OWG flaring should be prioritized.
As previously discussed, flaring/venting performance could be better assessed if information on large flaring/venting episodes was made publicly available. Explanations are needed for spikes in monthly ONRR flaring/venting volumes. Are these spikes associated with production startups, tropical storm restarts, major compressor issues, administrative/accounting corrections, or something else?
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
OWG flared
7727
7385
5919
6987
6342
OWG vented
2578
1984
1405
1638
1230
OWG produced
670,699
582,254
582,824
581,235
598,005
% OWG flared
1.15
1.27
1.02
1.20
1.06
% OWG vented
0.38
0.34
0.24
0.28
0.21
GWG flared
405
432
311
213
212
GWG vented
958
578
548
722
468
GWG produced
364,082
224,808
209,558
203,342
152,400
%GWG flared
0.11
0.19
0.15
0.10
0.14
%GWG vented
0.26
0.26
0.26
0.36
0.31
total flared and vented
11668
10233
8183
9559
8252
total gas production
1,034,782
807,062
792,382
784,577
750,405
% flared or vented
1.13
1.27
1.03
1.22
1.10
total vented
3536
2416
1953
2360
1698
% vented
0.34
0.30
0.25
0.30
0.22
total flared
8132
7817
6230
7200
6554
% flared
0.79
0.97
0.79
0.92
0.87
OWG=oil well gas; GWG=gas well gas; all volumes are in MMCF
2024 will be the first year since 1958 without a single OCS oil and gas lease sale. There would not have been a sale in 2023 either were it not for a legislative mandate. The only 2022 lease sale was a micro-sale in the Cook Inlet that resulted in only a single bid. So, at the end of 2024 three years will have elapsed with only one meaningful sale, and that sale was mandated by Congress.
The current plan is for these de facto sanctions on US offshore production to continue. The Dept. of the Interior’s 5 year leasing plan includes a maximum of 3 sales, by far the fewest sales in any 5 year plan in OCS program history.
Meanwhile, the sanctions on Venezuelan production were further eased with the understanding that the Maduro regime would hold fair elections. To the surprise of no one, the evidence strongly suggests that those elections were not fair. Nonetheless, the sanctions on production have not been reimposed.
Apparently, the climate activists who have imposed their will on the OCS oil and gas program have less influence over our policy toward Venezuela. Or perhaps the production (and consumption) of Venezuelan oil is cleaner and greener (🙃 sarcasm intended!)
“The Tribe has consistently urged that BOEM delay moving forward with wind energy development until a better understanding is made of the impacts to fish, wildlife, the marine environment, and cultural resources important to the Tribe,” said Tribal Council Chair Brad Kneaper. “No one, including BOEM has an understanding on how wind development will impact the fragile marine environment. BOEM developed an environmental assessment document that narrowly focused on the impacts of the lease sale and completely turned a blind eye to the inevitable impacts that construction and operation of these private energy facilities will have on Coastal resources, the Tribe, and other residents.”
“The timeframe for wind development appears to be driven by politics, rather than what is best for Coastal residents and the environmental,” said Chair Kneaper.
BOEM’s front-loaded 5 year wind leasing plan (graphic below) may have been influenced by (1) the possibility that the upcoming elections could affect offshore wind policy, and (2) the legislative prohibition on issuing wind leases after 12/20/2024 unless an oil and gas lease sale is held prior to that date.
Given that the next oil and gas lease sale will be in 2025 or later, BOEM was perhaps motivated to hold wind sales prior to the 12/20/2024 deadline (with a bit of a buffer to issue the lease documents). Indeed, the wind leasing plan proposed 4 sales between August and October of 2024 and only a single 2025 sale. That 2025 wind sale is in the Gulf of Mexico, where industry interest in wind leases is, at best, tepid.
JL Daeschler reports that there has been no wind for the past 4 days at his home in Scotland, and his wind gauge is droopy. (See his sketch below and read the fine print 😉)
As previously noted, these power generation realities cannot be ignored:
Wind and solar power are intermittent, such that demand must respond to variable supply (not a prescription for economic growth).
Assuming sufficient capacity, gas power plants respond to variable demand.
Power grids can function effectively with only natural gas, but not with only wind/solar.
Integrated wind, solar, and gas systems can reduce, but not eliminate, demand for gas-generated power.
This graphic by Australian Cliff Hall explains the importance of “dispatchable” power. Of course, imported electricity, on which wind-leader Denmark relies heavily, is an alternative to dispatchable power. However, that option is less than optimal from economic growth and energy security standpoints.
