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Attached is the Dept. of the Interior’s Semiannual Regulatory Agenda (9/22/2025). BSEE and BOEM decommissioning rules are excerpted below.

Of particular concern is the revised BOEM regulation (107) that “would reduce the amount of supplemental financial assurance required from oil gas, and sulfur lessees operating on the OCS.” See our previous post on this regulatory action. Note that a proposed rule is expected to be published by year end.

  1. REVISIONS TO DECOMMISSIONING REQUIREMENTS ON THE OCS [1014–AA53]
    Legal Authority: Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1331 to 1356a
    Abstract: This proposed rule would address issues relating to (1) idle iron by adding a definition of this term to clarify that it applies to idle wells and structures on active leases; (2) abandonment in place of subsea infrastructure by adding regulations addressing when BSEE may approve decommissioning-in-place instead of removal of certain subsea equipment; and (3) other operational considerations.
    Timetable:
    NPRM ……………… 07/00/26
    NPRM Comment Period End: 10/00/26
  1. RISK MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL ASSURANCE FOR OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE AND
    GRANT OBLIGATIONS [1010–AE26]
    Legal Authority: 43 U.S.C. 1331, OCS Lands Act; E.O. 14154, Unleashing American Energy
    Abstract: This proposed rule would rescind BOEM’s final rule ‘‘Risk Management and Financial Assurance for OCS Lease and Grant Obligations.’’ The proposed rule would revise the criteria for determining whether oil, gas, and sulfur lessees, right-of-use and easement grant holders, and pipeline right-of-way grant holders are required to provide financial assurance above the current minimum bonding levels to ensure compliance with their Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act obligations. This rule, if finalized, would reduce the amount of supplemental financial assurance required from oil gas, and sulfur lessees operating on the OCS and would support the goals of E.O. 14154; Timetable: NPRM ……………… 01/00/26

A long-time colleague is very familiar with Judge Lamberth, a Reagan appointee, and thinks highly of him. Orsted has a lease contract, and no matter where you stand on offshore wind, you have to have a compelling case to halt a project that is in the advanced stages of development. Judge Lamberth ruled that the govt doesn’t have such a case. Per the judge:

  • The govt presented insufficient evidence to support alleged permit noncompliance and national security concerns.
  • The govt acted in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner.
  • “If Revolution Wind cannot meet benchmark deadlines, the entire project could collapse.”
  • “There is no doubt in my mind of irreparable harm to the plaintiffs.”

Projects under development will be difficult to pause or stop. The Administration should focus on requiring sufficient decommissioning financial assurance, monitoring and mitigating project impacts, making incident data publicly available, issuing the report on the Vineyard Wind blade failure (finally!), and improving the availability of dispatchable power (i.e. natural gas and nuclear).

Judge Royce Lamberth granted an injunction allowing Orsted to resume work on the Revolution Wind project. BOEM halted work on the project one month ago.

The International Regulators’ Forum Offshore Safety Conference, Oct. 9-10 in St. John’s Newfoundland, has an impressive agenda focusing on safety through innovation. Among the topics that caught my eye:

  • Human Factors & AI
  • Managing New Tech with Old Regulations
  • Regulatory Sandboxes: Capture vs. Collaboration
  • How can AI and emerging technologies be used in risk management trending and operations?
  • Why are we not learning from accidents?
  • Breakthroughs in investigation techniques and sharing

The first IRF Conference was held 20 years ago in London followed by the 2007 conference at the Trump International Resort in Miami (little did we know 😀). More historical background.

The informed, diverse viewpoints about managing and regulating offshore operations sets these conferences apart from your typical professional events. The 2025 conference is highly recommended for those interested in offshore operations, risk mitigation, and regulatory policy.

Gov. Newsom and Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen

As is the case for most MOUs, the attached 8/22/2025 agreement between California and Denmark is long on promotion and short on substance. No funds are obligated and there are no work commitments.

The MOU made sense for Gov. Newsom in that he strengthened his green credentials by aligning with the country that is the spiritual leader for climate activists.

The benefits for Denmark were unclear, but the risks should have been apparent. The White House is fundamentally opposed to the climate and energy objectives identified in the MOU. Ørsted (50.1% govt owned) and other Danish business interests are very much dependent on decisions made by the US Federal govt.

Work on Ørsted’s Revolution Wind project has been halted by Interior Secretary Burgum. His decision is being challenged in court, but no matter what the outcome, offshore wind development will be difficult for Ørsted and other foreign companies going forward. The Secretary has broad regulatory authority under the OCS Lands Act, under which there is no such thing as “a fully permitted project.”

Meanwhile, California’s green status has taken a hit with the passage of S 237, which pragmatically authorizes new onshore drilling.

Lastly, as the chart below illustrates, Orsted’s problems didn’t begin in 2025.

The table below captures the shorter public comments and provides links to the longer ones. They are listed in the order they were posted on Regulations.gov.

commentersummary/link
anonymousI recommend under no circumstance that we allow the onsite worker to approve the commingling of bore holes because there is extreme significant safety and environmental hazards that exist.
The best alternative is to have an environmental engineer and environmental scientist approve any commingling
Our Children’s Trust…your regulatory proposal is inconsistent with the federal law, the best available science on protecting the health and lives of children, and the legal mandate that agency decision-making does not deprive children of their fundamental constitutional rights…
E.P. DanenbergerSee BOE post
anonymousI support updating the regulations to align with the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, but I encourage BSEE to ensure that safety standards and environmental protections remain the highest priority in all commingling approvals. Clear guidance for industry compliance and transparent public reporting would also strengthen confidence in this rule.
Ananda FosterRegulations need to catch up with technology and we have not had a chance to do that yet. If you allow them on throttle access, they will destroy it. We all rely on the ocean, how can you do this to your own constituents?
APISupports direct final rule
bp AmericaSupports direct final rule

Legislatively dictating well construction, completion, or operational approvals is a redline for me, and I continue to strongly believe the downhole commingling rule should be published as a draft for public review and comment.

The only industry comments are from API and bp America. Both support the direct final rule, and I respect their position. My main quarrel is with the legislative action that put us in this position.

I have had many disagreements with API members over the years, but the dialogue has always been professional. Technical and policy disagreements are healthy for the OCS program, and I will continue to raise potential issues and concerns on this blog.

With regard to bp, I have been impressed by their commitment to the Gulf of America, as summarized in this excerpt from their comments:

EIA: Per capita CO2 emissions from primary energy consumption decreased in every state from 2005 to 2023, according to recently released data in our State Energy Data SystemTotal energy-related CO2 emissions in the United States fell 20% over that time, and the population grew by 14%, leading to a 30% decrease in per capita CO2 emissions.

John Smith shared the attached letter from Senators Adam Schiff and Alex Padilla, and members of the California congressional delegation. The letter questions BSEE’s inexplicable announcement about the resumption of Santa Ynez Unit (SYU) production. That announcement boasted:

This is a significant achievement for the Interior Department and aligns with the Administration’s Energy Dominance initiative, as it successfully resumed production in just five months.

BSEE’s announcement, which has not been explained and is still featured on their homepage, served only to further complicate the resumption of production from the SYU, which has reserves in excess of 500 million barrels.

FPSO Almirante Tamandaré; Source: SBM Offshore

ANP (Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis) nicely organizes and presents Brazil’s production data. Their 30-page monthly bulletin includes field specific information. The US does not have an equivalent publication.

Brazil produced 5.16 million boe/day in July, 97.7% of which was from offshore fields. Oil production was 3.959 million bopd, making Brazil the no. 1 offshore producer. Brazil’s offshore oil production is approximately the equivalent of the combined offshore production of the US and Norway.

How important is Brazil’s offshore sector? Their offshore production is from 568 wells. Assuming all 568 wells were actively producing oil wells (no gas or service wells), the average production rate was ~7000 bopd plus associated gas. More than 10 times as many wells (6033) produced Brazil’s limited onshore production. So <10% of Brazil’s wells (all offshore) account for nearly 98% of their production.

How important is pre-salt exploration and production technology? Pre-salt production (only 169 wells) accounted for 79.1% of the national total of 5.16 million boe/d. This means that pre-salt wells averaged 24,000 boe/d.

Room for improvement? 2.9% of the produced gas was flared (queima) in July (first chart). Over the past year, Brazil’s flaring volumes ranged from 2.2 to 3.9% of gas production. The fact that nearly all of their gas production is from oil wells, the growth in production (2nd chart), and the higher upset potential (perhaps) for FPSOs, may help explain the relatively high flaring numbers. 1.3% of Gulf of America gas production was flared or vented in 2024 (still too high). <1% flaring rates should be the target for all offshore producers.



Tool choices matter…

and should be an integral part of Job Safety Analyses!

According to BSEE, there is a recurring trend of equipment misuse contributing to fire and explosion hazards during offshore oil and gas operations in the Gulf of America.

Workers have used tools not rated for electrical work on live circuits (Figure 1) and mismatched hydraulic or pneumatic tools for high-pressure systems (Figure 2). In several cases, non-intrinsically safe hand tools were used in explosive atmospheres, including mudrooms and drilling floors.

The Safety Alert is attached.