Terrestrial Indonesian nickel mine site before and after miningBefore and after: terrestrial Chilean copper mine siteDeep-sea nodule field before and after collection by Impossible Metals
An Impossible Metals table (below) understandably favors their methods vs. those employed by deep-sea mining rival The Metals Company. However, both approaches are far preferable, environmentally and socially, to onshore metal mining.
Although President Trump rescinded Biden’s action via executive order on January 21, 2025, the court proceeded with the case, acknowledging the high likelihood of similar actions in the future.
Judge Cain concluded that Biden departed from historical executive practice and exceeded statutory limits under OCSLA Section 12(a), which allows the president to “withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf,” but does not explicitly authorize permanent or irrevocable bans.
The judge emphasized that prior withdrawals were typically temporary or modifiable, and attempts to make them permanent encroached on congressional powers.
The ruling reinforces that OCSLA withdrawals must be revocable by future presidents, limiting executive power to bind successors on public lands disposition. The ruling should prevent future reliance on leasing bans.
Judge Cain’s decision is important because leasing bans should be carefully considered and should not be executed casually at the end of a term for purely political purposes.
Every deepwater platform installed since Feb. 2018, when Chevron installed its Big Foot tension leg platform (TLP), has been a Floating Production Unit (aka FPU or production semisubmersible). During that period, no new SPARs, FPSOs, or TLPs were installed.
The list (below) of these simpler, safer, greener FPUs has grown by two with the initiation of production at Shenandoah and Salamanca. Note the water depth range from 3725 to 8600 ft.
platform
operator
water depth (ft)
first production
Appomattox
Shell
7400
May 2019
King’s Quay
Murphy
3725
April 2022
Vito
Shell
4050
Feb 2023
Argos
bp
4440
April 2023
Anchor
Chevron
4600
Aug 2024
Whale
Shell
8600
Jan 2025
Shenandoah
Beacon
5840
July 2025
Salamanca
LLOG
6405
Sept 2025
The efficiencies achieved with the simpler platform designs combined with the high pressure (>15,000 psi) technology developed over the past 2 decades is facilitatihg production from the highly prospective Paleogene (Wilcox) deepwater fans. (For those interested in learning more about the geology, see the excellent presentation by Dr. Mike Sweet, Univ. of Texas, that is embedded in this post.)
All of the operators note the cost-saving similarities in their FPU designs. For example, Vito and Whale are very much the same despite the 4550′ difference in water depth.
Phil also believes SYU production would reduce natural seepage: “UCSB and State Lands Commission studies (Quigley, Luyendyk, Hornafius, Peltonen, and others) have shown that when oil production is active, reservoir pressure is reduced and natural seepage declines by up to 50%. That means: •Cleaner beaches (less tar and oil) •Cleaner ocean surface (fewer sheens) •Healthier marine life with reduced chronic stress“
Note that those studies are specific to Platform Holly and the Coal Oil Point area. To the best of my knowledge, no studies have associated SYU production with a reduction in natural seepage.
While Platform Holly may be a negative spillage facility (i.e. Holly’s seep reduction may significantly exceed the platform’s production spillage), this type of seepage reduction has not been demonstrated at other platforms. Decisions on offshore exploration and development should be driven by the economic, energy security, and environmental benefits. To the extent that production reduces natural seepage, all the better. However, seepage reduction is not a primary reason for producing offshore oil and gas.
Option 1 (use of existing onshore infrastructure) is preferable from cost, air emissions, spill risk, State and local revenue, and regional energy supply standpoints. This is the only option that makes sense despite the enormous permitting challenges.
Option 2 (floating processing facility and tankers) would literally be an “in your face” act of defiance given the coastal visibility of the offshore facilities. Supporters of this option should be aware that there was no Coastal Zone Management Act when Exxon produced from Platform Hondo (the only SYU platform at the time) to the Offshore Storage and Treatment (OS&T) vessel in the 1980s. An EIS would not favor this option, and the California Coastal Commission would surely rule that this option was inconsistent with their CZM plan. The Secretary of Commerce could overrule the Commission’s decision, but legal objections to the override would seem to have a good chance of success.
The only reasonable path forward is to do the right thing and continue to pursue the State pipeline/onshore approvals. Although these approvals are substantively warranted, more litigation is probably inevitable. It will be far better to defend a good project (option 1) than a contrived workaround (option 2).
Meanwhile, two new floating production units, Beacon’s Shenandoah and LLOG’s Salamanca are now on line. More on this and bp’s Tiber announcement in an upcoming post.
Those of us who were involved with OCS oil and gas operations in the 1970s remember the heated battles between Exxon and Santa Barbara County that led to the installation of the infamous Offshore Storage & Treatment (OS&T) facility in Federal waters. This was the first floating production, storage, and offloading facility (FPSO) in US waters by 3 decades!
In light of Sable’s difficult (bordering on impossible) onshore permitting challenges, the company resurrected the OS&T option in a recent presentation to investors (pertinent slide pasted above). The extent to which this is purely a tactical maneuver remains to be seen, but this option would be very difficult to execute, even with a supportive Federal regulatory environment.
NOAA is touting marine aquaculture and has published Programmatic Environmental Impact Statements for Aquaculture Opportunity Areas (AOAs) in the Gulf of America and offshore Southern California. This is a positive step.
While the focus of these EIS documents is on distinct AOAs separated from oil and gas facilities, NOAA might also have discussed the potential for synergy with existing platforms. The reef effect of platforms can be sustained and new fishery ventures supported by converting older platforms to aquaculture facilities (Rigs-to-Roe/Redfish/Rockfish) rather than decommissioning them.
According to a paper published in 2014 by marine ecologist Dr. Jeremy Claisse of Cal Poly Pomona, the oil and gas platforms off the coast of California are the most productive marine habitats per unit area in the world. “Even the least productive platform was more productive than Chesapeake Bay or a coral reef in Moorea,” said Dr. Love. (Milt Love, UCSB biologist)
Updatedincident tables for OCS oil and gas operations. The most recent data are nearly 2 years old. The public has a right to timely information on the type of incidents that are occurring, the operating companies, and the resulting casualties, pollution, and property damage.
A summary of incidents associated with the OCS wind program. From press reports, we know about the fatality during Empire Wind construction. What other incidents have occurred to date?
This study provides the first evidence that EMFs typical of SPCs elicit sex-specific behavioral responses in C. maenas. Females exhibited significantly greater attraction to EMF zones and avoidance of low-field zones, suggesting higher exposure risk. These differences could affect migration, mating, and larval release, with consequences for population dynamics.
Earlier this week a tree service company was removing some large branches in our backyard. The 2 young workers stopped the job before they finished. They knocked on our door and told me that their foreman was off and they were uncomfortable tackling a large, high branch without him and a crane operator. They would come back with a full crew.
I congratulated them and told them they did exactly the right thing. I told them I was involved with offshore safety and many serious incidents would have been prevented if workers, with their employers encouragement, had been more assertive in stopping work. Developing that type of culture takes time and requires strong leadership and consistent, unambiguous messaging. Leadership matters, both at the site and in the office!
The Macondo well is a worst case example on many fronts, including the reluctance or inability of management and workers to stop taking actions that increased well control risks. Given the narrow pore pressure/fracture gradient, the prudent decision would have been to set a cement plug in the open hole and carefully assess next steps. However, delays and cost overruns were the overriding concerns, and well construction continued despite the long list of issues described here. Sadly, we know how that worked out.
Even after the well started to flow, the crew had time to actuate the emergency disconnect sequence and avert disaster. However, some combination of deficient training, uncertain authority, and fear of repercussions prevented that from happening.
Be it a small tree service company or a major oil company, safety culture development is a journey that has no end point and requires continuous leadership from everyone in the organization.