The press release and full program are linked. It looks like the most recent leaks were accurate. See the maps below with the locations and dates. This will stir the pot!
Posted in Alaska, California, energy policy, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, Uncategorized | Tagged Alaska, California, Draft Proposed OCS Leasing Program, Florida, Gulf of America | 2 Comments »
We can scream all we want (with some justification) about the California Coastal Commission, Santa Barbara County, and intractable environmental organizations, but the Santa Ynez Unit would still be producing today were it not for an ugly, preventable pipeline spill.
At approximately 10:55 a.m. Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on May 19, 2015, the Plains Pipeline, LP (Plains), Line 901 pipeline in Santa Barbara County, CA, ruptured, resulting in the release of approximately 2,934 barrels (bbl) of heavy crude oil. An estimated 500 bbl of crude oil entered the Pacific Ocean.
1) Ineffective protection against external corrosion of the pipeline
ο· The condition of the pipelineβs coating and insulation system fostered an environment that led to the external corrosion.
ο· The pipelineβs cathodic protection (CP) system was not effective in preventing corrosion from occurring beneath the pipelineβs coating/insulation system.
2) Failure by Plains to detect and mitigate the corrosion
ο· The in-line inspection (ILI) tool and subsequent analysis of ILI data did not characterize the extent and depth of the external corrosion accurately.
3) Lack of timely detection of and response to the rupture
ο· The pipeline supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system did not have safety-related alarms established at values sufficient to alert the control room staff to the release at this location.
ο· Control room staff did not detect the abnormal conditions in regards to the release as they occurred. This resulted in a delayed shutdown of the pipeline.
ο· The pipeline controller restarted the Line 901 pipeline after the release occurred.
ο· The pipelineβs leak detection system lacked instrumentation and associated calculations to monitor line pack (the total volume of liquid present in a pipeline section) along all portions of the pipeline when it was operating or shut down.
ο· Control room staff training lacked formalized and succinct requirements, including emergency shutdown and leak detection system functions such as alarms.
Plains Pipeline was the responsible party, but that doesn’t absolve the companies that were dependent on Plains to transport their production. Given the organized opposition that emerged following the Santa Barbara blowout in 1969 (the result of a reckless well plan), the integrity of that pipeline was critical to their business strategy and they should have exercised some oversight.
Offshore disasters have had enormous consequences for the oil and gas industry in terms of lost opportunities. Think about this: prior to the Macondo blowout, the Obama administration had proposed an oil and gas lease sale in the Atlantic and the Florida Senate was holding hearings about leasing in Florida State waters. Such lease sales are now completely out of the question.
Regulations and standards are not enough. We need open discussion about incidents, large and small, and a willingness to be critical of the responsible parties.
Posted in accidents, California, Offshore Energy - General, oil spill response, pipelines | Tagged Plains, Refugio pipeline spill, Santa Barbara, Santa Ynez Unit | Leave a Comment »
Excerpts from a stunning Sable update issued by Hunterbrook Media LLC (“Hunterbrook“) on November 14, 2025:
- SEC filingΒ reveals Sable entered October about a month from potential bankruptcy. The company had $41.6 million as of September 30, with $39.7 million in average monthly burn in 3Q25. Β
- When SableΒ announcedΒ its $250 million financing on November 10 at $5.50 per share, the company likely had single digit millions in the bank based on its reported burn, against over $163 million in accounts payable and accrued liabilities. Sable does not generate any revenue.
- Sable needs to raise significantly more money: According toΒ leaked audioΒ of Sableβs CEO briefing for select investors, the company will require $2.3 billion to achieve commercial production of oil and gas from its three platforms off the coast of Santa Barbara.
- That includes at least $900 million to buy out Exxon, to which Sable must pay 15% interest on debt due by March 31, 2027. By then, the loan would be about $1.1 billion, accruing $200 million in added debt.
- One of Sableβs only known assets other than the oil and gas project is a private plane the company purchased from its CEO, Jim Flores. The plane recently flew round-trip from Houston, where Flores lives, to Louisiana, in time for a football game at the CEOβs alma mater.
Comments from Santa Barbara County Supervisor Steve Lavagnino, an oil industry supporter, that explain his opposition to the transfer of Exxon’s pipeline permit to Sable:
βThe final straw for me was a Hunterbrook article, which was as disturbing as anything Iβve read. I have many friends in the oil industry and I will continue to support efforts to access our natural resources, but it has to be done responsibly by operators who put safety above profits.β
Sable’s limited response to the Hunterbrook report includes information on decommissioning financial assurance:
- Sable’s original SYU Purchase and Sales Agreement (PSA) with Exxon required Sable to post a $350 million decommissioning bond “150 days following the resumption of production from the wells.”
- According to Sable, production resumed on May 15, 2025. The bond would have thus been required in October. (SYU production was halted by court order on June 6, so that “resumption date” may be irrelevant. Regardless, the Oct. financial assurance deadline is immaterial given the recent update to the PSA.)
- The PSA update extended the date for posting the decommissioning bond to three business days following the new Exxon Loan Maturity Date of March 31, 2027 or 90 days after first sales of hydrocarbons, whichever comes first. (Note the change in language from “resumption of production” to “first sales.” Brief well test production does not trigger posting of the decommissioning bond.)
- Under certain circumstances after the bonding is in place Exxon may seek an increase in the bonding amount to $500 million.
The decommissioning obligations are moot if Sable runs out of funds or is unable to resume SYU production prior to the 3/31/2027 PSA deadline. Exxon would remain fully responsible for SYU decommissioning.
Is it time for a public statement from Exxon on the SYU and Sable?
Posted in California, decommissioning, Offshore Energy - General | Tagged decommissioning, financial responsibility, Hunterbrook, Sable Offshore, Santa Barbara County, Santa Ynez Unit, Steve Lavagnino | Leave a Comment »
The Center for Offshore Safety (COS) was established in response to a recommendation by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling for improved self-regulation by the offshore industry. The Commission supported the creation of a non-profit, industry-funded organization similar to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, to promote the highest levels of safety and operational excellence.
The COS has been effective in strengthening corporate Safety and Environmental Management Systems, influencing the industry’s safety culture, and sharing best practices and lessons learned. These are important accomplishments.
The COS has fallen short in gathering the data needed to assess the offshore industry’s safety performance. As is the case with most voluntary reporting programs, data completeness and accuracy issues limit the significance of COS performance reviews.
Observations regarding the most recent COS Offshore Safety Performance Report follow:
- The COS uses accepted performance indicators and a logical classification scheme.
- COS reports that their members accounted for 78% of OCS oil and gas activity in 2024. This is accurate when cross-checked with BSEE hours worked data. However, the % of hours worked is not a good measure of the % of incidents reported in any category.
- Companies not participating included important operators like LLOG, Cantium, Walter, and W&T, a host of smaller Gulf independents, the 2024 violations leader (by a wide margin) Cox, and troubled Fieldwood. (See Fieldwood’s 2021 and 2022 performance.)
- Only two drilling contractors – Helmerich & Payne and Valaris – are members. Major contractors like Noble, Transocean, and Seadrill are not members. Their incidents will thus not be reported if they are not working for a COS member.
- No production contractors are COS members. These companies conduct most of the platform operations on the shelf, where many of the lease operators are not COS members.
- Pacific and Alaska Region operators do not participate.
- Looking only at fatalities (table below), the most important and easily verified incident category, there are troubling omissions:
- COS reports no 2024 fatalities when in fact there was a fatality during an operation for a COS member.
- COS reports no 2022 fatalities when there were actually five. A workover incident took the life of one worker, and four died in a helideck crash on an OCS platform. In both cases, the facility operator was a non-member company.
- COS records one 2021 fatality, but fails to include a 2021 Fieldwood fatality. There were also 6 “non-occupational” fatalities on OCS facilities in 2021, as classified by BSEE. Given the importance of worker health (the H in HSE), such a high number of non-occupational fatalities should be of interest industry-wide.
- The COS report includes only two of the six 2020 fatalities, 2 of which were classified by BSEE as non-occupational.
- The bottom line is that COS accounted for only 3 of 12 (25%) occupational fatalities during the 2020-24 period. There were at least 20 fatalities if you include the non-occupational incidents.
| fatalities per COS | occupational fatalities (from BSEE data) | non-occupational fatalities (from BSEE data) | |
| 2024 | 0 | 1 | ? |
| 2023 | 0 | 0 | ? |
| 2022 | 0 | 5 | ? |
| 2021 | 1 | 2 | 6 |
| 2020 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
The offshore industry is only as good as its worst performer, so complete participation is essential. Voluntary reporting is seldom complete reporting, because some companies are more concerned about confidentiality than completeness and information sharing.
For industry reporting programs to be comprehensive and credible:
- The entity receiving the reports and managing the data must be independent and not affiliated with an industry advocacy organization.
- All operating companies must participate and complete reporting must be required. This can be accomplished contractually. If necessary, the regulator can require participation (either as a separate regulation or as a SEMS element).
- Company incident submittals should be audited by the independent entity.
- Fees should be solely for the purpose of supporting the independent reporting system.
- For SP1 and SP2 incidents (per the COS classification scheme), the names of the responsible companies should be included in the performance reports. The current COS system prioritizes confidentiality over accountabiity and information sharing.
Posted in accidents, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General | Tagged Center for Offshore Safety, Cox Operating, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, fatalities, Fieldwood Energy, incident data, incident reporting, offshore industry performance, SEMS | Leave a Comment »
The Canada-Newfoundland Labrador Offshore Energy Regulator (C-NLOER) informs that once again no bids were received for tracts in the Eastern Newfoundland or Labrador South regions. According to this article, the outcome (no bids)was the same from 2021-2024.
Difficult operating conditions, high costs, and relatively modest oil price projections are no doubt factors contributing to the absence of bids. Energy NL has also pointed to the βcomplex, inconsistent and burdensome regulatory systemβ as a contributing factor.
Newfoundland’s newly elected Premier, Tony Wakeham, has said his Progressive Conservative Government will advocate for the cancellation of the emissions cap as it is a cap on production. He also supports incentives for offshore oil and gas projects such as an investment tax credit or the former Petroleum Incentive Program and indicated he would work with Energy NL to review incentives that could be implemented provincially.
The C-NLOER is committed to “review its land tenure system in collaboration with governments and others, to identify opportunities to enhance competitiveness in the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area.”
On a separate policy matter, C-NLOER is applauded for announcing offshore safety/environmental incidents, including significant near misses, without delay. In the US, you have to scour BSEE investigation reports to find out about significant incidents or wait a year or more until the incident table is updated. This is inexcusable!
Posted in accidents, Canada, energy policy | Tagged C-NLOER, incident reporting, Newfoundland, no bids | Leave a Comment »
BOEM completed the area identification (outlined in diagram above) for marine minerals offshore American Samoa. The full decision memorandum is attached.
In response to BOEM’s Request for Information, Impossible Metals confirmed their interest in the identified area. Several other companies also expressed interest. The Governor and a number of other parties submitted interesting comments, which are summarized on p. 2 of the attachment.
The first two steps in a process that could ultimately lead to a mineral lease sale have thus been completed. Steps 3 to 6 remain. (See below)
- Request for Information and Interest (RFI) published in the Federal Register. complete
- Identification of Areas to be considered for leasing. complete
- Environmental Analysis for the lease sale.
- Proposed Leasing Notice Published in the Federal Register.
- Leasing Notice Published in the Federal Register.
- Competitive Lease Sale
Meanwhile, Odyssey Marine has requested a critical minerals lease sale in the Atlantic.
The proposed lease area, located within the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS) off the Mid-Atlantic coast, is highly prospective for heavy mineral sands rich in titanium, zirconium, rare earth elements (REEs), and phosphate.
This would be a shelf dredging operation rather than the deepwater module collection being proposed for the Pacific.
Posted in energy policy | Tagged American Samoa, area identification, Atlantic, heavy mineral sands, Impossible Metals, lease sale request, marine minerals, Odyssey Marine, RFI | Leave a Comment »
Friday’s turbine blade failure in Plymouth MA is perhaps getting added attention given its proximity to the 7/13/2024 Vineyard Wind blade failure offshore Nantucket. The Plymouth blade landed in a nearby cranberry bog (video and picture below).
Per the MV Times, the turbines for the Plymouth project were manufactured by Gamesa, which is now part of Siemens Gamesa. Both the South Fork Wind and Revolution Wind projects off the coast of the Martha’s Vineyard are being developed by Γrsted using turbines from Siemens Gamesa. Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind, the largest offshore wind project in the United States, is also being developed with Siemens Gamesa turbines. This is not to imply a higher degree of risk for those turbines. Vineyard Wind, where the only US offshore failure has occurred to date, is using GE Vernova turbines.
Unfortunately, turbine blade failures are much too common. Last October, Lars Herbst reported, based on a Wind Power article, that βwith an estimated 700,000 blades in operation globally, there are, on average, 3,800 incidents of blade failure each year.β Lars noted that the annual blade failure rate of about 0.5% translates to 1.5% of all operating wind turbines experiencing a blade failure every year, a remarkably high failure frequency.
Scotland Against Spin data indicate that blade failure is the second most common accident type in the wind industry, and the most common cause of accidents at operational wind turbine sites. SAS reports further that pieces of blade are documented as travelling up to one mile, and have gone through the roofs and walls of nearby buildings.
Lastly, we are still awaiting BSEE’s report on the Vineyard Wind failures so we can better understand what happened and why.
Posted in accidents, energy policy, Offshore Wind | Tagged Lars Herbst, Plymouth, Scotland Against Spin, Siemens Gamesa, turbine blade failure, Vineyard Wind | Leave a Comment »
Per the Washington Post, the Administration’s 5 Year Oil & Gas leasing plan will include (in addition to the Central and Western Gulf):
- Six offshore lease sales between 2027 and 2030 in areas along the California coast
- Expansion of leasing into the Eastern Gulf of America (Gulf of Mexico per the Post)
- 20 sales offshore Alaska through 2031 (presumably this includes the mandated Cook Inlet sales)
Posted in energy policy, Offshore Energy - General | Tagged 5 year leasing plan, Alaska, California, eastern Gulf of Mexico, Gov. Newsom | Leave a Comment »
The first ever Gulf of America oil and gas lease sale π will be held on Dec. 10, 2025. Instead of numbering the sale sequentially (i.e. Sale 262), the sale has been designated OCS Oil and Gas One Big Beautiful Bill Act Lease Sale 1 (BBG1). π This change is a bit too cute for some of us old-timers, but we’ll judge the sale by its results, not its name.
The Notice of Sale is attached. The terms are very attractive, with the lowest allowable royalty rate (1/8th) on all shelf and deepwater leases. Note the comparison of royalty rates in the table below. The 6.25% difference for deepwater leases is substantial when you consider their high production potential.
| Gulf Sale No. | Date | % royalty: <200m water depth | % royalty: >200m water depth |
| 256 | 11/18/2020 | 12.5 | 18.75 |
| 257 | 11/17/2021 | 12.5 | 18.75 |
| 258 | 12/30/2022 | 18.75 | 18.75 |
| 259 | 3/29/2023 | 18.75 | 18.75 |
| 261 | 12/20/2023 | 18.75 | 18.75 |
| BBG1 | 12/10/2025 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
The rental rates for the BBG1 Sale are also very attractive compared to Sale 261:
| Water Depth | Sale 261 rental rates ($/ac) | BBG1 Sale rental rates ($/ac) |
| 0 to <200m | years 1-5: $10 year 6: $20 year 7: $30 year 8+: $40 | years 1-5: $7 year 6: $14 year 7: $21 year 8+: $28 |
| 200 to <400m | years 1-5: $16 year 6: $32 year 7: $48 year 8+: $64 | years 1-5: $11 year 6: $22 year 7: $33 year 8+: $44 |
| 400+ m | years 1-5: $16 year 6: $22 year 7: $22 year 8+: $22 | years 1-5: $11 year 6: $16 year 7: $16 year 8+: $16 |
Will the bidding reflect the very favorable lease terms?
Posted in energy policy, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General | Tagged BBG1, big beautiful Gulf of America, Gulf of America lease sale, low rental rates, low royalty rates | Leave a Comment »
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 