“Ørsted is evaluating all options to resolve the matter expeditiously. This includes engagement with relevant permitting agencies for any necessary clarification or resolution as well as through potential legal proceedings, with the aim being to proceed with continued project construction towards COD in the second half of 2026.”
I never liked the label “slips, trips, and falls” (STFs) because the words “slips and trips” trivialize the most common cause of serious offshore casualties. Perhaps, the name of this category should be simplified to “falls,” because that is the consequence of concern.
Unfortunately, STFs persist at an unacceptably high rate. In the attached Safety Alert, BSEE informs that between May 2024 and April 2025, 22% of all injuries were attributed to STFs. Many of these injuries were classified as major.
BSEE conducted focused inspections of 19 facilities (17 different operators) to better assess the STF problem. They found common deficiencies in training, hazard identification, and other preventive measures. These deficiencies and the associated safety management recommendations are listed in the Safety Alert.
Kudos to BSEE for their excellent Safety Alert program. Unfortunately, unacceptable delays in updating their incident tables and OCS performance measures data make it difficult to assess industry wide safety performance trends. The most recent data are for 2023, and some of those data raise concerns. For example, the number of fires (152) was the highest in the history of the performance measures data set (dates back to 1996) by some margin. What happened in 2024 and the first half of 2025? These data should be readily available and posted in a timely manner. No offshore facility fire is trivial.
In addition to the Johnson filing, at least 7 other law firms (links below) have announced class action litigation alleging that Sable Offshore made false or misleading statements regarding the restart of Santa Ynez Unit production.
“This is a significant achievement for the Interior Department and aligns with the Administration’s Energy Dominance initiative, as it successfully resumed production in just five months.“
Will the Dept. of Justice intervene on behalf of Sable?
Meanwhile, Sable’s share price rebounded in mid-July and is holding up surprisingly well (see below). Perhaps investors don’t see the class action suits as a significant incremental threat given the risks associated with decisions by 8 California agencies, Santa Barbara County, and various judges, and the persistent challenges by well-organized opponents of offshore production.
BOEM’s streamlining rule codified the deferred financial assurance option. The rule authorizes the transfer of decommissioning risks from developers to taxpayers and consumers by (1) not requiring any additional supplemental financial assurance at the Construction and Operations Plan (COP) approval stage, (2) not requiring supplemental assurance at the installation stage, and (3) providing for incremental supplemental assurance post-installation (e.g. for Vineyard Wind, the full amount is not due until 15 years after installation). See the rule’s previous and current language in the table below (emphasis added).
30 CFR 585.516 – What are the financial assurance requirements for each stage of my commercial lease?
financial assurance required before BOEM will:
language prior to 4/24/2024 “modernization” rule
current language
Approve your COP
A supplemental bond or other financial assurance, in an amount determined by BOEM based on the complexity, number, and location of all facilities involved in your planned activities and commercial operation. The supplemental financial assurance requirement is in addition to your lease-specific bond and, if applicable, the previous supplement associated with SAP approval.
There is no supplemental bond requirement at the COP approval stage.
Allow you to install facilities approved in your COP
A decommissioning bond or other financial assurance, in an amount determined by BOEM based on anticipated decommissioning costs. BOEM will allow you to provide your financial assurance for decommissioning in accordance with the number of facilities installed or being installed. BOEM must approve the schedule for providing the appropriate financial assurance coverage.
A supplemental bond or other authorized financial assurance in an amount determined by BOEM based on anticipated decommissioning costs of the proposed facilities. If you propose to incrementally fund your financial assurance instrument, BOEM must approve the schedule for providing the appropriate financial assurance.
The current financial assurance language is fuzzy enough that BOEM could deny deferred funding requests and require full financial assurance at the time facilities are installed. However, revising the language to clearly require that assurance be fully demonstrated prior to installation would provide clarity and eliminate the deferral option going forward.
The more difficult challenge may be adjusting financial assurance requirements for the projects already under construction. It’s also important to ensure that parent corporations are not shielded from decommissioning and other liability risks.
A new court filing (attached) informs that the Dept. of the Interior is reconsidering the Construction & Operations Plan (COP) approval for US Wind’s Maryland Offshore Wind (“MarWin”) Project (maps above). That approval is the subject of litigation filed by Ocean City MD and others.
The key section of the Federal government’s filing is pasted below.
An extension in this case is necessary as Interior intends to reconsider its COP approval and move in the District of Maryland—the first-filed case—for voluntary remand of that agency action. See, e.g., Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 901 F.3d 414, 436 (D.C.Cir. 2018) (recognizing that administrative agencies have the authority to reconsider their decisions). The outcome of Interior’s reconsideration has the potential to affect the Plaintiff’s claims in this case.
MV Times: “The recent site visit raised questions on the production of the wind farm. The Times has been able to neither verify the report independently nor confirm disparities between visuals on the ground and the Iberdrola report.”
Avangrid, an Iberdrola subsidiary and one of Vineyard Wind’s developers, reported that 17 out of 62 turbines were currently sending power to the Massachusetts grid.
The MV Times counted between five and nine turbines spinning at different points, and for different intervals, in their two hour visit.
BOE comment: Although there are many possible reasons for this discrepancy, it’s reasonable to question the absence of turbine output data. Developers assert that generator specific data are sensitive and could have market implications. However, these turbines are operating on public lands and were in part publicly funded. Output data and other performance metrics clearly have policy implications.
Note that Iberdrola “expect[s] no impact from new federal budget legislation, as it doesn’t impact 1,000 megawatts under construction.”
An MV Times photo of a Vineyard Wind substation is pasted below. These substations are large structures. Per the Construction and Operations Plan (COP) for Vineyard Wind, the topsides for a conventional electrical service platform (ESP) (also known as an offshore substation or OSS) are 45 x 70 x 38 m, which is larger in surface area than a typical 6-pile oil and gas platform (~30 x 30 m), and is comparable in size to a large jackup drilling rig.
On July 25, 2025, more than 2 months after Sable’s brief production restart and 7 weeks after a court decision halted further production, BSEE surprisingly announced the resumption of Santa Ynez Unit (SYU) production boasting:
“This is a significant achievement for the Interior Department and aligns with the Administration’s Energy Dominance initiative, as it successfully resumed production in just five months.“
Were the authors of the press release unaware that the SYU production, which was largely from well tests, was halted by court order shortly after it began? More philosophically, is such cheerleading appropriate for the principal safety regulator, particularly given that BSEE is engaged in litigation over its practices in facilitating SYU production?
Ironically, just 3 days after BSEE hailed the resumption of production, the attached lawsuit was filed on behalf of investors who purchased Sable Offshore securities between May 19, 2025 and June 3, 2025. BOE contributor John Smith shared the filing.
The plaintiffs allege misleading statements regarding the resumption of production. Some of the key points cited in the filing:
On May 19, 2025, before the market opened, the Company issued a press release entitled “Sable Offshore Corp. Reports Restart of Oil Production at the Santa Ynez Unit and Anticipated Oil Sales from the Las Flores Pipeline System in June 2025.”
The release informed that Sable expected to fill the ~540,000 barrels of crude oil storage capacity at LFC (Los Flores Canyon onshore processing facility) by the middle of June 2025 and subsequently recommence oil sales in July 2025.
Following the May 19 Press Release, Sable Offshore stock climbed from a closing price of $28.86 per share on May 16, 2025 to $33.02 per share on May 19, 2025, a 14.4% climb in share price.
Contrary to Defendants’ representations, Sable Offshore had not resumed commercial production off the coast of California.
Defendants then used the share price appreciation following the May 19 Press Release to conduct a secondary public offering (or “SPO”) at a higher offering price per share than would have otherwise been possible.
State Lands Commission staff informed the Lt. Gov./Commission Chair that the limited oil flows were the result of well-testing procedures required by BSEE prior to restart. These activities did not constitute a resumption of commercial production or a full restart of the SYU.
Characterizing testing activities as a restart of operations is not only misleading but also highly inappropriate –particularly given that Sable has not obtained the necessary regulatory approvals to fully resume operations at SYU.
Any attempt to restart commercial operations at the SYU without final regulatory approvals may place the company in violation of its lease terms and jeopardize the status of Sable’s holdover State lease.
Santa Barbara County Judge Thomas Anderle granted a preliminary injunction requested by the California Coastal Commission against Sable Offshore for alleged violations of The California Coastal Act.
NRW contracted with Array Petroleum to operate the former Cox Assets. Array subsequently sued NRW, asserting that NRW received $78,000,000 in revenue, but disbursed only about $48,000,000 to pay Array’s invoices and those of the subcontractor.
The court filing claimed that NRW failed to pay Array $2.5 million, the subcontractors $10.7 million, and the United States $12 million. A large share of the subcontractor costs were probably for well operations given that 21 Array workover applications were approved in 2024 and 2025. The $12 million due to the Federal government is reportedly for royalty payments. Were any revenues set aside for decommissioning liabilities?
Array’s lawsuit was dismissed by the court on January 3, 2025, after a joint motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. Information on the reasons for the dismissal is not publicly available.
Old platforms: According to BOEM records, Array operates 154 platforms previously owned by Cox. These platforms are in the Ship Shoal, South Marsh Island, and West Delta areas of the Gulf of America. Most are >30 years old and four are more than 70 years old (see chart below). 41 are classified as major structures including 15 of the 26 platforms installed in the 1950s and 1960s. 44 are manned on a 24 hour basis. 79 have helidecks. Massive decommissioning liabilities loom.
Violations: NRW/Array ranks 37th out of 42 companies in GoA oil production (2025 YTD) and 36th out of 42 companies in gas production, but leads the pack in Incidents of Noncompliance (INCs):
Array accounted for nearly half of all GoA INCs issued in the first half of 2025 (chart below).
Array was issued 9 times more warning INCs (311) than any other operator. Apache was second with 34.
There are many small and mid-sized companies that are responsible operators. Their participation in the OCS program should be encouraged. However, others have demonstrated, by their inattention to financial and safety requirements, that they are not fit to operate OCS facilities.
The growth of Fieldwood, Cox, Signal Hill, and Black Elk was in part facilitated by lax lease assignment and financial assurance policies.
Operating companies should have to demonstrate that they can operate safety and comply with the regulations before they are approved to acquire more properties.
Expect the ultimate public cost of the Cox bankruptcy, in terms of decommissioning liabilities and the need for increased oversight, to be large.
The Federal govt (Justice/Interior) should strongly oppose bankruptcy court asset sales that increase public financial, safety, and environmental risks.
The attached petition from Save the East Coast Inc. et al requests that NOAA revoke the Empire Wind Letter of Authorization using the emergency authority delineated at 50 C.F.R. § 216.106(f).
This is a strong filing, but revocation would be difficult given the extensive development activity to date and the Administration’s decision in May to allow the project to go forward.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 