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Archive for the ‘Regulation’ Category

The anticipated State-Federal jurisdictional battle over Sable’s Las Flores Canyon Pipeline is on! See the attached letter from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) declaring that the pipeline is under Federal jurisdiction.

The major hurdle for PHMSA/Sable is the court approved Consent Decree that was executed following the 2015 Refugio pipeline spill. The Decree, which designates the California Fire Marshal as the sole regulator for the pipeline, is not mentioned in the PHMSA letter. Needless to say, another major legal battle looms.

Excerpt from the PHMSA letter:

PHMSA’s evaluation of the Las Flores Pipeline confirms that it transports crude oil from the OCS to an onshore processing facility at Las Flores Canyon and continues the transportation of crude oil from Las Flores Canyon to Pentland, California. Consistent with Appendix A, the Las Flores Pipeline is an interstate pipeline. As portions of the Las Flores Pipeline were previously considered to be intrastate and regulated by OSFM, PHMSA is notifying OSFM that the Las Flores Pipeline is subject to the regulatory oversight of PHMSA.

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7/13/2024 Vineyard Wind turbine blade failure offshore Nantucket

The attached Memorandum of Understanding between Vineyard Wind (VW) and the Town of Nantucket is long on bureaucratic procedures and short on risk mitigation and penalties.

The agreement details requirements for monthly reports, liaisons, written correspondence, plan reviews, and participation on incident management teams, but excludes any monetary penalties for past or future incidents. (With regard to penalties, should BSEE have assessed civil penalties for the 2024 turbine incident in accordance with 30 CFR § 285.400 (f)? This was a major pollution event.)

This MOU provision gives the impression that the Town is subordinate to VW:

“The Town will provide Vineyard Wind 1 up to 4 business days, if required, to identify and correct errors in the Town’s intended public communications about the Project.”

The responsible party should not be exercising oversight over the communications of an affected local government. Can you imagine Santa Barbara County reaching such an agreement with Sable Offshore?

Finally, the MOU further establishes the Town as a de facto partner in the project. VW, not the Town, is the responsible party and must be held fully accountable for project performance.

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Seconds matter – training, equipment maintenance, and effective leadership are critical!

Several BSEE Safety Alerts have just been released. Of particular importance to those interested in deepwater drilling is the attached alert describing two separate Emergency Disconnect Sequence (EDS) incidents.

The EDS (see the diagram above) is a critically important safety protocol that ensures that a well is sealed and the riser and rig are disconnected from the blowout preventer in the event of a well control emergency, unforeseen weather/ocean conditions, loss of power, or positioning system malfunction. Note that the Macondo blowout could have been prevented if the Deepwater Horizon crew had activated the EDS in a timely manner.

The two EDS events cited in the Safety Alert were presumably the March 28, 2025 and March 5, 2024 incidents investigated by BSEE district offices. The drillships were the Stanley Lafosse and the Deepwater Poseidon The investigation reports provide detailed information on these incidents.

Unintended riser disconnects not associated with EDS activations are a related safety and pollution concern that necessitated the issuance of a 2000 Notices to Lessees that was subsequently updated:

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Sable Offshore is attempting to restart the same pipeline that caused the Refugio Oil Spill in 2015. | Credit: Paul Wellman File Photo

Sable Offshore oil believes the federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) , not the California Fire Marshal, should have jurisdiction over the company’s onshore pipeline.

I once had the same opinion as Sable. Their pipeline is, by definition, an interstate line because it carries OCS production. Then I read Appendix D of the court approved Consent Decree that was executed following the 2015 Refugio pipeline spill. That Decree is quite clear regarding regulatory jurisdiction, and would have to be overturned to transfer authority to PHMSA.

The full Consent Decree is attached. Pasted below is an excerpt from Appendix D:

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Vineyard Wind turbine blade that was damaged on July 13, 2024, captured by a New Bedford commercial fisherman. Photo courtesy of Anthony Seiger

Excellent New Bedford Light piece on the unacceptable delay in completing the blade failure investigation report.

The Town of Nantucket’s attorney, Greg Werkheiser of Cultural Heritage Partners, told The Light last month that “it’s taken far too long” to get a final report on the blade failure. 

It’s noteworthy that there have also been unacceptable delays in issuing panel reports for serious offshore oil and gas incidents:

ncident datereport dateelapsed time (months)incident type
5/15/202110/31/202329.5fatality
1/24/20217/24/202330fatality
8/23/20202/15/202330fatality
7/25/20202/15/202331spill

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On my favorite holiday, I’m sending best wishes to BOE readers of all persuasions. Offshore energy issues can be divisive, even among friends, and I’m grateful for the opportunity to share information and opinions.

My wife and I will be spending Thanksgiving with my daughter’s family including our 6 grandchildren, none of whom have expressed interest in being offshore safety regulators (no higher calling 😉).

Belated holiday wishes to our friends in Canada where Thanksgiving is celebrated in October, and cheers to those living where a similar fall holiday is observed.

Bud

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To date, BSEE has used carryover funds and offsetting collections from inspection, rental, and cost recovery fees to continue their priority permitting and inspection programs during the govt shutdown. However, these funds are limited.

At some point, BSEE will have to stop issuing new permits. If the shutdown continues, the next step could be to curtail drilling and production operations. Needless to say, this would not be completely unacceptable.

In the meantime, BSEE employees continue to work without pay. Flying offshore everyday to inspect operations is no picnic and can be hazardous. I lost a colleague in a helicopter crash and others have been injured. It’s shameful that these people are not being paid while members of congress are!

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Attached is John Smith’s comprehensive summary of lawsuits related to Sable Offshore’s attempts to restart Santa Ynez Unit production.

If you are keeping score, there are 10 separate cases including a class action lawsuit filed by investors. New legal battles are sure to follow given Sable’s OS&T strategy. Per John:

The combined legal challenges, injunctions, and restraining orders have significantly delayed Sable’s restart plans and prompted the company to pursue an Offshore Storage and Treatment Vessel (OS&T) strategy, which was utilized to process SYU production in federal waters from 1981 – 1994, and transport oil to markets using tankers.

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The Dept. of the Interior is currently reconsidering approval of the Construction and Operations Plan for the Maryland Offshore Wind Project (US Wind).

Attached is a court filing challenging Delaware’s approval of the Coastal Construction Plan for that project. Some interesting points from the filing:

  • Maryland local governments declined to allow the transmission lines from the Maryland Offshore Wind Project to come ashore in their jurisdictions.
  • The Governor of Delaware agreed to allow the transmission lines to make landfall at the Delaware Seashore State Park.
  • The transmission pipelines would then traverse the adjacent Delaware Bays, to an inland substation, from which the power would be sent to Maryland.
  • US Wind applied for a number of permits from the Delaware Department of Natural Resources (DNREC) specific to horizontal directional drilling, laying cable pipelines, and other coastal construction activity.
  • The approval process, including provisions for public input, was not consistent with State regulations.
  • The Secretary’s decision to issue the beach construction permit is supported virtually exclusively by documents which were submitted by US Wind after the close of public comment.
  • Decommissioning and financial assurance information, a favorite BOE topic for both wind and oil/gas, was submitted after the close of the public record.

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US offshore wind policy went from this (12/11/2023):

To this (9/16/2025):

US offshore wind update:

  • Govt cheerleading is out. Govt scrutiny is in.
  • Fast tracking is out. Revisiting past approvals is in.
  • Concessions and waivers are out. Financial assurance is in.
  • Wind advocacy is out. Grass roots opposition is in.
  • Intermittency is out. Dispatchable power is in.
  • Subsidies are out. Component tariffs are in.
  • Shell and bp are out. Equinor is still in.
  • Pile driving is out. Whale protection is in.
  • Space preemption is out. Energy density is in.
  • Navigation hazards are out. Commercial fishing is in.
  • Towers and flashing lights are out. Viewshed preservation is in.

The long list of US offshore wind projects has diminished:

Yale Environment 360 diagram

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