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Archive for the ‘Offshore Energy – General’ Category

World Bank flaring data have some limitations as discussed in a previous BOE post. However, they provide an objective means of estimating and comparing flaring volumes worldwide, and therefore merit close attention.

The latest World Bank data tell us that significant gas flaring issues persist. Worldwide, 138,549 million m3 of gas were flared in 2022. This equates to a massive 4 tcf, the equivalent of the reserves in a major gas field and more than 5 times the total gas production in the Gulf of Mexico in 2022.

The top ten “flarers” are listed below. Each of these fields flared from 19 to 42 bcf. For comparison, the top ten GoM gas producers in 2022 produced 10 to 57 bcf, so single fields are flaring more than GoM companies are producing in total. Assuming for discussion purposes a gas-oil ratio of 1000 cu ft/bbl, all of the gas associated with 19 million to 42 million barrels of oil production was wasted from each field.

Posted below are the World Bank’s flaring intensity data (m3 of gas flared per bbl of oil produced) for the 10 countries with the highest flaring volumes. Venezuela’s flaring intensity rose to 44.6 m3/bbl in 2020, before declining moderately the following 2 years. 44.6 m3/bbl equates to 1575 cu ft/bbl. This gas flaring to oil production ratio implies that a very high percentage of Venezuela’s associated gas production was flared.

Here in North America, we have flaring issues of our own. Mexico’s Cactus Field is a top ten flarer (first table above) with 534.5 million m3 flared in 2022. The World Bank also lists 6 Permian Basin fields with >50 million m3 of gas flared in 2022.

Zeroing in on the US/Canada offshore sectors, fields with >1 million m3 of gas flared (2022) are listed below. Four of the top 7 are offshore Alaska and Newfoundland where the gas cannot currently be marketed and reinjection, field use, and flaring are the only options. Can production from these fields be better managed to reduce flaring volumes?

fieldoperatorm3 (millions)f3 (millions)
White Rose (Nfld)Cenovus41.691472
Hibernia (Nfld)HMDC40.991448
ShenziBHP31.341107
Northstar (AK)Hilcorp11.23397
ConstitutionOxy10.76380
PompanoTalos10.54372
Endicott (AK)Hilcorp10.07356
UrsaShell8.19289
MarmalardMurphy6.62234
LuciusOxy3.09109
MarlinOxy3.08109
MarsShell2.278
HolsteinOxy1.4852

The extraordinary 1.1 bcf of gas that was flared at the Shenzi field may help explain the large (1 bcf) increase in oil well gas flaring in the Gulf of Mexico in 2022. Based on the World Bank data and ONRR data for the GoM, Shenzi accounted for 16% of GoM oil-well gas flaring in 2022. As noted in that post, more regulator/industry transparency on lease and field specific flaring is needed. ONRR’s posting of flaring and venting data is a positive step, but it doesn’t include lease specific data and doesn’t explain major flaring episodes.

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“The farm-out campaign remains a key focus for United, as we seek to take this potentially transformational project forward into the next phase of the Licence. In order to do so, a commitment to drill a well will need to be made by end January 2024.

We have continued to engage with potential partners to participate alongside us in drilling this exploration well, and earlier in the year, a deadline for indicative offers had been set for the end of H1. We are encouraged by the number and quality of companies that are in the process of completing their evaluations, and as they have requested additional time, we have agreed to extend the deadline. Additional updates will be provided in due course.”

United Oil and Gas

Questions:

  • January 2024 is fast approaching. What constitutes a commitment to drill? How soon must a well be spudded?
  • Could Jamaica extend the deadline? Should they?
  • United Oil and Gas is “encouraged by the number and quality of companies that are in the process of completing their evaluations.” We’ll soon find out how serious that interest is.

For those following the Barbados Offshore Licensing Round, no updates have been posted by the Ministry of Energy and Business; nor has the BOE team received any feedback on our comprehensive bid 😉

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Pioneering subsea engineer, Jean Louis Daeschler, is also an acclaimed artist. He recently shared two paintings that are very much on-topic for this blog. The paintings depict a wind turbine installation with support from a jackup vessel, and a drilling operation with jackup rig. The paintings give a sense of the commonality of these mutually supportive industries.

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As previously posted, 14 of the 244 (not counting the 69 CCS bids) Sale 259 high bids were rejected. BOEM has published their bid evaluations for all of the tracts, and the 14 rejections are listed below.

lease #blockhigh bid ($)BOEM MROV ($)no. of bids
G37496DC 6222,101,8369,100,0001
G37515GC 173307,1071,300,0001
G37534GC 5471,783,49812,000,0001
G37538GC 5911,291,9935,200,0001
G37543GC 642605,5053,400,0001
G37548GC 777583,1034,200,0001
G37562AT 51,551,1304,700,0003
G37565AT 133607,1072,600,0001
G37616KC 745707,7773,600,0001
G37617KC 789707,7772,100,0001
G37647WR 750724,7443,500,0001
G37646WR 794724,7443,200,0001
G37648WR 795774,2425,000,0001
G37649WR 796774,2424,000,0001
MROV – Mean of the Range-of-Value

Observations:

  • Keathley Canyon (KC) Block 96, the tract receiving the highest bid in the entire sale ($15,911,947 by Chevron), had a BOEM MROV of only $576,000. Clearly, Chevron and the government have a very different view of the value of this tract. BP was the second bidder for KC 96, and their bid ($4,003,103) was also considerably higher than BOEM’s MROV. This one will very interesting to follow.
  • The only bid that was rejected in Sale 257 was the BP/Talos bid of $1.8 million for Green Canyon Block 777. BOEM’s MROV in the Sale 257 evaluations was $4.4 million. BP again bid on GC 777 in Sale 259, but their bid was only $583,000 (even though BOEM’s Sale 257 evaluation was public information). BOEM’s MROV was reduced only slightly to $4.2 million, and they again rejected BP’s bid. We’ll see what happens in the next sale.
  • 51 of the 230 accepted bids were >$1 million, all for deepwater tracts. All of the rejected bids were for deepwater tracts, and a higher percentage (4/14) were >$1 million. This makes sense given that the higher potential prospects are in deepwater.
  • These results demonstrate again that resource evaluation is far from an exact science. BOEM is not selling barrels of oil and cubic feet of gas. BOEM is evaluating prospects, and companies are bidding on the opportunity to explore these prospects.
  • Bidding strategies differ; the more companies participating, the better the long-term prospects for the OCS program.

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ENERGYWIRE has reported that the Department of the Interior will publish the legislatively mandated carbon sequestration rule later this year. Given that even close followers of the OCS program were completely unaware of the enabling legislative provisions prior to their enactment, the proposed DOI rule will provide the first opportunity to formally comment.

Within the oil and gas industry and the environmental community, there are considerable differences of opinion about carbon sequestration in general, and more specifically, offshore sequestration. All interested parties are encouraged to submit comments on these important regulations.

Some background information on the sequestration legislation and subsequent actions:

Exxon and other companies intend to commercialize carbon sequestration, and Exxon projects an astounding $4 trillion CCS market by 2050. Such a market will of course be dependent on mandates and subsidies, and the costs will ultimately be borne by taxpayers and consumers.

Is it not a bit unsavory and hypocritical for hydrocarbon producers to capitalize on the capture and disposal of emissions associated with the consumption of their products? Perhaps companies that believe oil and gas production is harmful to society should exit the industry, rather than engage in enterprises that sustain it.

More:

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The Jones Act, protectionism at its finest, was enacted 113 years ago, and stipulates that vessels which transport merchandise or people between two US points must be US built, flagged, owned, and crewed. Congress tightened the screws further by ordaining that offshore energy facilities, including wind farms, are US points. That precludes the transportation of wind turbine components from US ports to offshore wind farms.

The Jones Act has thus provided an opportunity for the Port of Argentia, a former US Navy base in southeast Newfoundland, and the port is set to become a key node in the offshore wind supply chain. Monopiles constructed in Europe will be stored in Argentia, until they are delivered to US wind farms in the North Atlantic. Kudos to the folks at the Port of Argentia for taking advantage of this opportunity.

Dutch company Boskalis will be transporting the monopiles, which are expected to land in the Port of Argentia in a few weeks. (Boskalis)

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OilNow, an informative and boldly named media outlet that covers the oil and gas sector in Guyana, reports that “the Guyana government expects crude oil exports this year to generate US$11.3326 billion in 2023, a 14% increase from the 2022 figure.

Of course, the 3 Stabroek Block partners who are responsible for this production – Exxon (45%), Hess (30%), and CNOOC (25%) – are also doing quite well. If you are wondering about this curious mix of companies – a US supermajor, a large US independent, and a state-owned Chinese mega-company – this OilNow post explains what happened.

Initially, Exxon and Shell were 50/50 partners in the Stabroek Block. Shell thought the chances for success were slim and opted out a year before the world class Liza discovery (ouch!). After Shell departed, Exxon sent “at least 35 letters” to prospective partners and only Hess and CNOOC responded favorably (actually, it was Nexen, not CNOOC that responded). The Liza discovery followed and the rest is history.

Will exploration offshore Jamaica and Barbados also prove successful? Stay tuned.

OilNow

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Pioneering subsea engineer, JL Daeschler, brought to my attention the little known sinking of the Sedco 135 B semisubmersible drilling rig (pictured above) while in transit from Hiroshima to Borneo in 1965. 13 workers died in this tragedy. Miraculously, a single survivor, dehydrated and floating on a wooden pallet, was found days later by a passing Japanese trawler. 

The bottle shape of the columns with the tapered top section was intended to reduce the influence of sea conditions when the rig was on the bottom. These early semisubmersibles sometimes operated in shallow water and sat on the seafloor. However, when buoyant, this type of column reduced the rig’s dynamic stability.

The 135 B tragedy resulted in stricter stability requirements by the American Bureau of Shipping (1968 ABS Rules for Building and Classing Offshore Mobile Drilling Units.)

JL informs me that the Alexander Kielland was a symmetrical pentagon design. Unfortunately, with this design, the failure of a major diagonal brace results in the complete loss of structural integrity.

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For the first time in the history of the US offshore oil and gas program, taxpayers will be funding the plugging of OCS wells. This should be viewed as a collective failure by government and industry. Nearly 34 years have passed since the Alliance bankruptcy, the first of many wake-up calls, and we still haven’t figured this out.

Per BSEE’s recent announcement, Federal funds will be used to plug wells in the Matagorda Island (MI) area of the Gulf of Mexico (see map below). Based on a BSEE presentation and BSEE borehole data, these wells were drilled by Matagorda Island Gas Operations LLC, a company that filed for bankruptcy in 2014.

Prior to the bankruptcy filing, Matagorda Island Gas was cited for 112 violations on 108 inspections. This INC/inspection rate is approximately double the Gulf of Mexico (all operators) rate in a typical year (0.52 in 2022), and is 4 to 25 times higher than the rate for the 2022 Honor Roll companies.

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In a draft rule published on June 29, 2023, BOEM proposes to discontinue using a company’s record of compliance in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance for decommissioning. BOEM’s full explanation for this surprising change is pasted at the end of this post.

Opposing view:

  • BOEM should be more attentive, not less, to safety performance and compliance data. If they were, taxpayers would have been better protected from the risks associated with the lease acquisitions by Fieldwood, Cox, Black Elk, Signal Hill, and others, and their subsequent bankruptcies.
  • Safe operations, as reflected in compliance and performance data, are critical to a company’s financial success.
  • BOEM wrongly infers that Incidents of Noncompliance (INCs) are solely dependent on the number and complexity of facilities. Decades of normalized compliance data have told us that there are marked differences among operators in terms of compliance and safety performance. Companies at the bottom of the performance table don’t usually survive.
  • Accidents are not mere matters of chance; management and culture matter.
  • Honor Roll companies, large and small, have superior compliance records, and in 2022 these companies had 50-90% fewer INCs/facility-inspection than the Gulf of Mexico average.
  • Does BOEM expect noncompliance leaders to be concerned about decommissioning obligations? The record shows that they are not.
  • Cox’s 2023 bankruptcy was predictable given their past safety performance. In 2022, Cox was a violations leader by any measure, and was responsible for 9 of the 30 safety incidents that were significant enough to require investigation by BSEE.
  • Fieldwood’s terrible 2021 safety performance has been discussed, and there was ample evidence of performance problems prior to their bankruptcy declaration in 2018. In 2016 and 2017 Fieldwood was, by far, the GoM violations leader with 818 INCs, 401 of which required a facility or component shut-in.
  • Ironically (or maybe not), the only other company that was even in the same noncompliance ballpark as Fieldwood in 2016 and 2017 was future Cox affiliate Energy XXI GOM. Energy XXI earned 465 INCs (240 shut-ins) during that 2 year period. Did BOEM object to or otherwise comment on the 2018 Cox-Energy XXI merger?
  • Black Elk Energy was new in 2007 and quickly became a violations leader. Between 2010 and 2012, BSEE cited Black Elk 415 times. 218 of these violations were serious enough to require facility or component shut-ins. On November 16, 2012, explosions at Black Elk’s West Delta 32 platform killed 3 workers, and 2 others suffered severe burns. Criminal charges and a complex bankruptcy followed. BSEE records show 1107 INCs during the company’s short history, 464 of which required facility or component shut-ins.
  • The rapid growth of Fieldwood, Cox, and Black Elk was in part facilitated by lax lease assignment and financial assurance policies. Operating companies should have to demonstrate that they can operate safety and comply with the regulations before they are approved to acquire more properties.
  • The Signal Hill saga was documented nearly 2 years ago, and none of the questions raised in that post have been answered. Violations data and inspector feedback predicted the Signal Hill/POOI failure. Nonetheless, and despite the objections of regional staff, Signal Hill was allowed to tap into its decommissioning account to cover operating expenses. Responsibility for decommissioning Platforms Hogan and Houchin is still uncertain.
  • Bankruptcy has been used to avoid or transfer decommissioning obligations. In that regard, Chevron’s comprehensive objection to Fieldwood’s restructuring plan is telling.
  • Given that BSEE, not BOEM, is responsible for safety and compliance, I sincerely hope that regulatory fragmentation was not a factor contributing to BOEM’s decision to discontinue the use of compliance data in determining financial assurance needs.

BOEM’s explanation for the proposal to eliminate the record of compliance criterion:

BOEM also proposes to eliminate the existing “record of compliance” criterion found in the current version of § 556.901(d)(1)(v). BOEM has determined that the number of INCs a company receives correlates with the number of OCS properties it owns, not its financial stability, and therefore, BOEM has concluded that it is not an accurate predictor of its financial health. BOEM reviewed BSEE’s Incidents of Non-Compliance (INCs) records and its Increased Oversight List, which represent BSEE’s cumulative records of violations of performance standards on the part of OCS operators and lessees and determined that the number of incidents of non-compliance typically increases with the size and complexity of the operator’s or lessee’s operations, including the ratio of incidents to number of components. Because larger companies (regardless of credit score) tend to have more properties and components and therefore more INCs, BOEM determined that record of compliance criterion does not accurately predict financial default. BOEM’s review of this information confirmed the feedback BOEM received in response to the 2016 NTL, namely that companies with a large number of properties and facilities tended to receive a large number of INCs and had more individual properties on the Increased Oversight List. BOEM specifically requests comments regarding the use of fines and violations as a criterion in the determination of a company’s ability to fulfill decommissioning obligations, and any data or analysis addressing any correlation between the number of violations and the risk of financial default. BOEM also requests comments on whether the elimination of the INC’s criteria would create a disincentive to comply with regulations. BOEM also requests comment on whether or not the cost of decommissioning is likely to increase based on the type, quantity, and magnitude of previous violations.

On a related note, BOEM/BSEE should consider a followup to the John Shultz thesis which found that INCs are a very good predictor of accidents and spills.

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