Notably, BOEM’s jurisdiction on the OCS has recently changed. A new planning area offshore Alaska—the High Arctic—is being established as the 27th OCS planning area. Additionally, boundaries of other existing planning areas are being updated to align with BOEM’s revised jurisdiction. Details on these changes will be included in a forthcoming Federal Register notice and posted to BOEM’s website.
I am again sharing this touching tribute to the 11 men who lost their lives on the Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010. The video is introduced by country singer Trace Atkins, a former Gulf of Mexico rig worker. The video and Trace’s song serve as a memorial to the 11 Deepwater Horizon workers and others who have died exploring for and producing oil and gas around the world. Please take a moment to watch.
According to a Financial Times report, the White House is drafting an executive order that will facilitate the stockpiling of critical metals found in the Pacific. The Administration is intent on countering China’s rare earth supply chains and battery mineral dominance.
The Government Accountability Office report on Offshore Wind Energy (full report attached) does a good job of summarizing the potential impacts from offshore wind development. They are categorized in the report as follows:
Marine Life and Ecosystems (see table pasted below)
Fishing Industry and Fisheries Management
Economic Development and Community Impacts
Tribal Resources, Including Sacred Sites and Established Fishing Grounds
Defense and Radar Systems
Maritime Navigation and Safety
Unfortunately, GAO’s recommendations, which focus on consultation and staffing (perennial favorites), are rather meaningless. Does GAO really think more consultation will resolve the fundamental concerns of the tribes and fishing industry? Does GAO really think increasing BOEM/BSEE staff is a solution? Wind was the signature offshore energy program of the previous Administration, and it was well resourced.
When the legislation authorizing offshore wind energy development was drafted, we envisioned energy alternatives that could complement thermal energy sources like gas, coal, and nuclear plants. Natural gas plants are particularly important to intermittent energy sources, because their power can be readily dispatched on demand.
Never did we expect attempts to ban the dispatchable energy sources on which renewable energy goals were dependent. Policies that limit gas production, transportation, and consumption don’t boost offshore wind development, they doom it.
In a rush to achieve the Administration’s energy goals, the wind leasing program brushed aside important economic, safety, national security, and environmental issues. Coastal residents, tribes, fishing interests, power customers, and other affected parties have rebelled. Their concerns won’t be smoothed over by increasing consultation.
So now the wind program is in a dark and windless place (a regulatory dunkelflaute?). Five projects are under construction or in the early stages of operation. Construction has been authorized for 6 other projects. Five more projects are in various stages of permitting. What next?
Meanwhile, we still haven’t seen a report on the ugly and embarrassing Vineyard Wind blade failure offshore Nantucket last July. Shouldn’t that report be a precursor to further offshore wind development in the US Atlantic? Also of note, that same turbine was struck by lightning 2 months ago.
Should directed suspension orders be issued pending a complete review of the wind program? If so, for which leases and for how long? Suspension of projects still in the permitting phase would be relatively painless and maybe even attractive given the current state of the wind industry. However, financial impacts for projects in the construction phase would be significant. These important next-step decisions need to be made soon. Muddling along is not a strategy.
Construction and survey activities produce underwater noise that can disturb sensitive marine species. Offshore wind projects take measures to mitigate underwater noise, including the use of bubble curtains to dampen pile driving sound and pausing operations if protected species are sighted.
Changes to marine habitat
Installation of infrastructure, such as turbine foundations and transmission cables, introduces new structures and causes changes to the ocean floor that can alter marine habitat and affect the distribution, abundance, and composition of marine life in the area. These new structures can create artificial habitat that may benefit some species while displacing others and could affect bottom-dwelling species through disturbing the seabed. Artificial habitat effects of wind turbines are well documented, but research is ongoing to monitor and understand impacts on marine life.
Hydrodynamic effects
Operation of wind turbines can affect hydrodynamics and ocean processes such as currents and wind wakes, but little is known about regional effects of widescale deployment on ecosystems.
Vessel disturbance
Vessels can disturb some species and pose strike risks to large marine animals, but the increase in offshore wind vessels is projected to be small compared to the total volume of vessel traffic. Offshore wind vessels are required to take measures such as following speed restrictions and employing protected species observers.
Entanglement risk
Structures, such as mooring cables from floating wind turbines, could snag fishing gear and other marine debris and create entanglement risk to marine animals. Wind projects employ measures to minimize entanglement (e.g., mooring systems designed to detect entanglement), but there is uncertainty about the extent of the risk from floating turbines because of limited deployment.a
Collision risk to birds and bats
Turbine blades pose a collision risk to some sea birds, but little is known about offshore collision risk to bats. Research on collision risks and mitigation measures (e.g., lighting and curtailment) is ongoing.
The EO requires agencies to issue a rule, effective not later than September 30, 2025, that inserts a sunset date into each “covered regulation.” The sunset date must be 1 year after the effective date of the sunset rule, but may be extended multiple times for a total of up to 5 years.
From an offshore energy perspective, the confusion starts with the EO’s applicability. One section of the order exempts regulatory permitting regimes authorized by statute. Another section specifies that the order “applies to all regulations issued pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Act of 1953 and any amendments thereto.” This is a fundamental contradiction given that OCSLA is a statutory planning and permitting regime. Which regulations are subject to the EO?
Comments:
For some reason (too complicated?), EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers are given 30 days to provide a list of statutes that are subject to the EO. Perhaps all affected regulators should have been given 30 days to comment on the draft EO before it was finalized.
The EO is sure to create chaos as regulators, under the direction of managers keen on complying with the President’s directive, attempt to determine the EO’s applicability and establish implementation procedures.
The EO, which is intended to provide order and certainty, will do exactly the opposite. How does the regulated industry plan for future operations while this vague and controversial “zero based regulatory budgeting” exercise is ongoing? What are the chances of this directive being sustained?
Reducing the number of pages in the US Code, while desirable, is not regulatory reform.
The order assumes that most regulations are meaningless, which is not the case. What is the plan for filling the void after regulations are deleted?
The EO should embrace, rather than circumvent, the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. The tedious and sometimes burdensome APA has protected the public and the energy industry from countless unjustified, unauthorized, and poorly considered regulatory initiatives.
Eliminating rules is not synonymous with establishing a regulatory framework that will improve efficiency and stimulate innovation.
Other factors are paramount in improving regulatory effectiveness and efficiency. These include regulatory fragmentation, effective goal setting, management systems, culture, data gathering, performance monitoring, continuous improvement, collaboration, and the adoption of industry standards.
Quality regulators are more important than quality regulations. Regulating with fewer rules requires skilled regulators.
Agencies should be directed to consider how they can best reduce the regulatory burden without compromising safety and environmental performance. Page reduction should be secondary.
If regulatory efficiency is the goal, this EO is likely to do more harm than good. Federal agencies are largely comprised of bright people with good intentions. Challenge them to propose innovative reforms that will simplify and improve their regulatory regimes.
“The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management’s analysis reveals an additional 1.30 billion barrels of oil equivalent since 2021, bringing the total reserve estimate to 7.04 billion barrels of oil equivalent. This includes 5.77 billion barrels of oil and 7.15 trillion cubic feet of natural gas—a 22.6% increase in remaining recoverable reserves.”
Year
Number of fields
Original Reserves
Historical Cumulative Production
Reserves
Oil Bbbl
Gas Tcf
BOE Bbbl
Oil Bbbl
Gas Tcf
BOE Bbbl
Oil Bbbl
Gas Tcf
BOE Bbbl
1975
255
6.61
59.9
17.3
3.82
27.2
8.66
2.79
32.7
8.61
1980
435
8.04
88.9
23.9
4.99
48.7
13.66
3.05
40.2
10.20
1985
575
10.63
116.7
31.4
6.58
71.1
19.23
4.05
45.6
12.16
1990
782
10.64
129.9
33.8
8.11
93.8
24.80
2.53
36.1
8.95
1995
899
12.01
144.9
37.8
9.68
117.4
30.57
2.33
27.5
7.22
2000
1,050
14.93
167.3
44.7
11.93
142.7
37.32
3.00
24.6
7.38
2005
1,196
19.80
181.8
52.2
14.61
163.9
43.77
5.19
17.9
8.38
2010
1,282
21.50
191.1
55.5
17.11
179.3
49.01
4.39
11.8
6.49
2015
1,312
23.06
193.8
57.6
19.58
186.5
52.78
3.48
7.3
4.78
2016
1,315
23.73
194.6
58.4
20.16
187.5
53.58
3.57
6.8
4.79
2017
1,319
24.65
195.2
59.7
20.78
188.9
54.21
3.87
6.3
5.00
2018
1,319
24.86
195.5
59.7
21.42
189.8
55.21
3.44
5.7
4.45
2019
1,325
26.77
197.0
61.8
22.12
190.9
56.09
4.65
6.1
5.74
2023
1,336
30.43
201.2
66.2
24.66
194.0
59.19
5.77
7.2
7.04
Oil and gas reserves and cumulative production at end of year, 1975-2023, Gulf of America, Outer Continental Shelf and Slope. “Oil” includes crude oil and condensate; “gas” includes associated and non-associated gas. Reserves estimated as of December 31 each year.
This increase in reserves will not please those responsible for the current 5 Year Oil and Gas Leasing Plan. They told us that we don’t need more OCS lease sales and that our biggest concern is producing too much oil and gas for too long!
The long-term nature of OCS oil and gas development, such that production on a lease may not begin for a decade or more after lease issuance and can continue for decades, makes consideration of net-zero pathways relevant to the Secretary’s determinations on how the National OCS Program best meets the Nation’s energy needs.“
“Crude reserves are being found and developed at a much slower pace than they’ve been in the past. Specifically, she said the world has only newly identified less than half the amount of crude it’s consumed over the course of the past 10 years. Given the current trends, this means demand will exceed supply before the end of 2025.“
A bit off-topic, but Jeff Walker, a former colleague and the MMS Regional Supervisor in Alaska, had the best quip about reserve numbers. In explaining an operator’s revised reserve numbers for a producing unit which had leases with different royalty rates, Jeff noted that “oil always migrates to the lower royalty leases.”😉
Yesterday, the California Coastal Commission voted 8-3 to fine Sable Offshore $18,022,500 for performing pipeline repairs necessary to minimize operating risks and comply with the FIre Marshall’s requirements.
“We have not gotten a foothold with Sable, and we’ve not gotten a foothold with Santa Barbara County either. So, we are where we are, and because of this absolute failure of communication and Sable’s, to be frank, absolute failure to follow the law, this hearing has become necessary,” Harmon said.
We’ll see how this gets sorted out in the courts. Sable appears to have a strong case against the Commission, but litigation in California courts is not exactly ideal for oil companies.
China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) has surrendered its 21% interest in the Appomattox (Mississippi Canyon 391, 392, and 393) project and its 25% stake in Stampede (Green Canyon 468, 511, and 512). Those ownership positions were acquired in CNOOC’s takeover of Calgary-based Nexen in 2013.
BSEE incident investigations are another window into OCS safety performance.
Panel reports are published for the most significant OCS incidents (e.g. fatalities, serious injuries, significant pollution). Unfortunately, these reports have been unacceptably delayed in recent years. Status reports are not provided leaving the public in the dark as to what is being investigated and why.
The more common investigations, conducted by BSEE’s district offices, are timely and informative. The Districts typically investigate lost time (>72 hours) injuries, crane and lifting equipment incidents, small fires, pollution events, property damage > $25k, gas releases, and other incidents requiring workers to muster for possible evacuation.
The number of District investigations in 2024 declined significantly to 31, one-third fewer than the average of 46.25 for the past 4 years.
Violations were not identified for 2/3 of the incidents.
A complete list of the 2024 District investigations follows. Hyperlinks are provided for those who want to review the reports.
BOE contributor John Smith has shared (attached) his highlighted version of the 89 page California Coastal Commission staff report recommending imposition of a $15 million fine.
John finds it noteworthy that the report documents that Santa Barbara County did not concur with the CCC, and that the California State Lands Commission approved the span remediation work. John thinks this raises legitimate questions as to whether the CCC is overreaching in terms of asserting permitting authority for the repair and maintenance work.
John thinks it will be interesting to see how the Courts rule on this and expects an appeal regardless of the outcome. He points to the Court ruling against the CCC on Pismo Beach offroading case as being pertinent to the Sable-CCC dispute. (“Is the Friends of Oceano Dunes court victory a good omen for Sable?“)
In particular, note the text John has highlighted in green. These issues will likely be central to the Court deliberations.