Posted in accidents, Gulf of Mexico, offshore, Offshore Energy - General, tagged Gulf of Mexico, John Borne, MMS, State Command, USGS on September 30, 2021| Leave a Comment »
This comment by the late John Borne, an outstanding USGS and MMS engineer/philosopher, reflects on the persistent vessel allision incidents over the years. The reporting of these incidents was spotty, but some could not be denied. Pictured below is the State Command arriving in Morgan City (~1973?) topped by a platform deck. Fortunately, the platform was unmanned and there were no injuries to vessel personnel. You could say this was the first floating production platform 😃
Posted in drilling, Gulf of Mexico, well control incidents, tagged blowout, bp, LSU, macondo, Mayank Tyagi, top kill on September 28, 2021| Leave a Comment »
While the official BOEMRE-USCG and National Commission/Chief Counsel investigation reports were quite good and there are countless court documents and ad hoc reviews of the blowout, some important Macondo issues have not been fully addressed. BOE will touch on these issues periodically starting with the decision to terminate the top kill operation on 5/28/2010.
The top kill operation (see diagram above) was intended to overcome and halt the flow of oil by pumping heavy mud into the well bore. The operation was not successful because the pumping rate and mud weight did not generate sufficient pressure. Per an excellent paper by Dr. Mayank Tyagi and colleagues at LSU (Analysis of Well Containment and Control Attempts in the Aftermath of the Deepwater Blowout in MC252):
It is very likely that if the top kill had been designed to deliver more than 109 bpm of 16.4 ppg drilling fluid below the BOP stack for a sustained period, the Macondo blowout could have been stopped between May 26-28, 2010. Given that the well was successfully shut-in with the capping stack in July, and that the subsequent bullhead (static) kill was successful, certainly a higher rate top kill would have been successful at that time.
The American Thinker, citing the New York Times, reports that Energy Secretary Chu stopped the top kill operation over the objections of some BP engineers. While it was reasonable to be concerned about possible casing leaks and the fracturing of subsurface formations, the subsequent (7/15/2010) closure of the capping stack demonstrated that the well had sufficient integrity to support the top kill operation. Questions regarding why a higher rate top kill effort was not attempted and how that decision was made are therefore important and merit discussion. Did the Macondo well flow unnecessarily into the Gulf for an additional 48 days (5/28-7/15)? Did the National Incident Command facilitate or delay source control?
Keep in mind that the NIC almost made a similar mistake in July. Even after the capping stack successfully shut-in the well on 7/15, Incident Commander Thad Allen (USCG) continued to call the closure of the capping stack a temporary test and threatened to require BP to resume flow from the well. Fortunately, informed input from experienced engineers prevailed. The well remained shut-in and the static well-kill operation was successful.
Posted in accidents, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, tagged BSEE, Gulf of Mexico, incidents, safety, trends on September 27, 2021| Leave a Comment »
Attached is an outstanding presentation by Jason Mathews that reviews the latest Gulf of Mexico incident data and trends. The collection and analysis of incident data are critical to safety achievement and continuous improvement, and are among an offshore energy regulator’s most important functions. Kudos to BSEE’s Gulf of Mexico Region for their timely and comprehensive reviews and alerts.
Posted in Gulf of Mexico, hurricanes, tagged Hurricane Ida, Shell, WD 143 on September 21, 2021| Leave a Comment »
Shell’s damage assessment of the West Delta 143 (WD 143) platforms revealed significant structural damage. Shell estimates that that the WD-143 “A” platform facilities will be off line for repairs until the end of 2021, and that the facilities on our WD-143 “C” platform will be operational in Q4 2021. Shell expects to resume production from their Olympus platform, which flows across the WD-143 “C” platform, in Q4 2021, and from their Mars and Ursa facilities, which flow across the WD-143 “A” platform, in Q1 2022.
Mars, Olympus, and Ursa account for most of the GoM production that remains shut-in as a result of Hurricane Ida.
Posted in Gulf of Mexico, hurricanes, Offshore Energy - General, oil, tagged Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Ida, oil production on September 20, 2021| Leave a Comment »
Posted in Gulf of Mexico, hurricanes, Offshore Energy - General, oil, tagged Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Ida, oil production on September 17, 2021| Leave a Comment »
Posted in energy policy, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, oil, tagged BOEM, Gulf of Mexico, oil and gas reserves on September 14, 2021| 1 Comment »
BOEM just released their update of Gulf of Mexico OCS oil and gas reserves as of 12/31/2019. Oil reserves increased by 35.2% as a result of 6 new fields being added.
The reserve additions are necessary and welcome given the high depletion rates from 2002 to 2018 when reserves (plotted above) declined steeply while production rates held steady or increased. The concerns about the sustainability of current GoM production rates, as expressed in our 7/26/2021 post, remain given the historically low levels of exploratory drilling. For the reasons presented in that post, our view is that the importance of GoM production will increase, not decrease, over the next decade.
Posted in Gulf of Mexico, hurricanes, Offshore Energy - General, oil, tagged Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Ida, oil production on September 7, 2021| Leave a Comment »
As expected given the magnitude and track of Ida, the necessary inspections, and the onshore damage, most GoM production remains shut-in. (BSEE data)
Posted in accidents, Gulf of Mexico, hurricanes, tagged Globetrotter II, Hurricane Ida, Noble, safety culture on September 7, 2021| Leave a Comment »
| Noble’s Aug. 29 statement | Noble’s Sept. 2 statement |
| “Each rig successfully secured its respective well in progress and took evasive actions to avoid the storm’s path.” (No mention of the delay in relocating the Globetrotter II or the rig, riser, and LMRP damage already reported on social media.) | “several riser joints and the lower marine riser package separated from the rig during the storm and sank to the seabed.” (Confirms social media reports.) |
| “All personnel are safe and accounted for.” (No mention of the injuries alluded to in social media reports.) | “A small number of crew members were treated for minor injuries.” (The actual number was 9, i.e. not a small number, 4 of whom had to be transported to shore for further evaluation.) |
| “One of the ship’s cofferdams in the moonpool area sustained damage.” (Update: The storm broke part of the hull, which allowed water into some compartments. Per the ship’s master, the vessel was not in distress and not actively taking on water.) | |
In a proper safety culture, you don’t downplay serious incidents and you never declare victory. Spin control is for politicians, not safety leaders. The Globetrotter II, with 140 workers aboard, was slammed by a major hurricane, perhaps unnecessarily. After the frightening social media reports, Noble released an “all is well” statement that minimized the significance and potential consequences of the delayed rig relocation. Noble continued to downplay the incident when they update their statement 5 days later.
The Coast Guard and BSEE will be investigating the Globetrotter II relocation, and their findings will be of great interest. Noble has historically been a very good drilling contractor with a strong commitment to safe operations. Hopefully, they and others will learn and apply lessons from this and similar events that have occurred in the Gulf and elsewhere. Companies may also want to assess the compatibility of their messaging practices with their commitment to a robust safety culture and continuous improvement.
