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Archive for the ‘Gulf of Mexico’ Category

As previously posted, 14 of the 244 (not counting the 69 CCS bids) Sale 259 high bids were rejected. BOEM has published their bid evaluations for all of the tracts, and the 14 rejections are listed below.

lease #blockhigh bid ($)BOEM MROV ($)no. of bids
G37496DC 6222,101,8369,100,0001
G37515GC 173307,1071,300,0001
G37534GC 5471,783,49812,000,0001
G37538GC 5911,291,9935,200,0001
G37543GC 642605,5053,400,0001
G37548GC 777583,1034,200,0001
G37562AT 51,551,1304,700,0003
G37565AT 133607,1072,600,0001
G37616KC 745707,7773,600,0001
G37617KC 789707,7772,100,0001
G37647WR 750724,7443,500,0001
G37646WR 794724,7443,200,0001
G37648WR 795774,2425,000,0001
G37649WR 796774,2424,000,0001
MROV – Mean of the Range-of-Value

Observations:

  • Keathley Canyon (KC) Block 96, the tract receiving the highest bid in the entire sale ($15,911,947 by Chevron), had a BOEM MROV of only $576,000. Clearly, Chevron and the government have a very different view of the value of this tract. BP was the second bidder for KC 96, and their bid ($4,003,103) was also considerably higher than BOEM’s MROV. This one will very interesting to follow.
  • The only bid that was rejected in Sale 257 was the BP/Talos bid of $1.8 million for Green Canyon Block 777. BOEM’s MROV in the Sale 257 evaluations was $4.4 million. BP again bid on GC 777 in Sale 259, but their bid was only $583,000 (even though BOEM’s Sale 257 evaluation was public information). BOEM’s MROV was reduced only slightly to $4.2 million, and they again rejected BP’s bid. We’ll see what happens in the next sale.
  • 51 of the 230 accepted bids were >$1 million, all for deepwater tracts. All of the rejected bids were for deepwater tracts, and a higher percentage (4/14) were >$1 million. This makes sense given that the higher potential prospects are in deepwater.
  • These results demonstrate again that resource evaluation is far from an exact science. BOEM is not selling barrels of oil and cubic feet of gas. BOEM is evaluating prospects, and companies are bidding on the opportunity to explore these prospects.
  • Bidding strategies differ; the more companies participating, the better the long-term prospects for the OCS program.

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ENERGYWIRE has reported that the Department of the Interior will publish the legislatively mandated carbon sequestration rule later this year. Given that even close followers of the OCS program were completely unaware of the enabling legislative provisions prior to their enactment, the proposed DOI rule will provide the first opportunity to formally comment.

Within the oil and gas industry and the environmental community, there are considerable differences of opinion about carbon sequestration in general, and more specifically, offshore sequestration. All interested parties are encouraged to submit comments on these important regulations.

Some background information on the sequestration legislation and subsequent actions:

Exxon and other companies intend to commercialize carbon sequestration, and Exxon projects an astounding $4 trillion CCS market by 2050. Such a market will of course be dependent on mandates and subsidies, and the costs will ultimately be borne by taxpayers and consumers.

Is it not a bit unsavory and hypocritical for hydrocarbon producers to capitalize on the capture and disposal of emissions associated with the consumption of their products? Perhaps companies that believe oil and gas production is harmful to society should exit the industry, rather than engage in enterprises that sustain it.

More:

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For the first time in the history of the US offshore oil and gas program, taxpayers will be funding the plugging of OCS wells. This should be viewed as a collective failure by government and industry. Nearly 34 years have passed since the Alliance bankruptcy, the first of many wake-up calls, and we still haven’t figured this out.

Per BSEE’s recent announcement, Federal funds will be used to plug wells in the Matagorda Island (MI) area of the Gulf of Mexico (see map below). Based on a BSEE presentation and BSEE borehole data, these wells were drilled by Matagorda Island Gas Operations LLC, a company that filed for bankruptcy in 2014.

Prior to the bankruptcy filing, Matagorda Island Gas was cited for 112 violations on 108 inspections. This INC/inspection rate is approximately double the Gulf of Mexico (all operators) rate in a typical year (0.52 in 2022), and is 4 to 25 times higher than the rate for the 2022 Honor Roll companies.

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In a draft rule published on June 29, 2023, BOEM proposes to discontinue using a company’s record of compliance in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance for decommissioning. BOEM’s full explanation for this surprising change is pasted at the end of this post.

Opposing view:

  • BOEM should be more attentive, not less, to safety performance and compliance data. If they were, taxpayers would have been better protected from the risks associated with the lease acquisitions by Fieldwood, Cox, Black Elk, Signal Hill, and others, and their subsequent bankruptcies.
  • Safe operations, as reflected in compliance and performance data, are critical to a company’s financial success.
  • BOEM wrongly infers that Incidents of Noncompliance (INCs) are solely dependent on the number and complexity of facilities. Decades of normalized compliance data have told us that there are marked differences among operators in terms of compliance and safety performance. Companies at the bottom of the performance table don’t usually survive.
  • Accidents are not mere matters of chance; management and culture matter.
  • Honor Roll companies, large and small, have superior compliance records, and in 2022 these companies had 50-90% fewer INCs/facility-inspection than the Gulf of Mexico average.
  • Does BOEM expect noncompliance leaders to be concerned about decommissioning obligations? The record shows that they are not.
  • Cox’s 2023 bankruptcy was predictable given their past safety performance. In 2022, Cox was a violations leader by any measure, and was responsible for 9 of the 30 safety incidents that were significant enough to require investigation by BSEE.
  • Fieldwood’s terrible 2021 safety performance has been discussed, and there was ample evidence of performance problems prior to their bankruptcy declaration in 2018. In 2016 and 2017 Fieldwood was, by far, the GoM violations leader with 818 INCs, 401 of which required a facility or component shut-in.
  • Ironically (or maybe not), the only other company that was even in the same noncompliance ballpark as Fieldwood in 2016 and 2017 was future Cox affiliate Energy XXI GOM. Energy XXI earned 465 INCs (240 shut-ins) during that 2 year period. Did BOEM object to or otherwise comment on the 2018 Cox-Energy XXI merger?
  • Black Elk Energy was new in 2007 and quickly became a violations leader. Between 2010 and 2012, BSEE cited Black Elk 415 times. 218 of these violations were serious enough to require facility or component shut-ins. On November 16, 2012, explosions at Black Elk’s West Delta 32 platform killed 3 workers, and 2 others suffered severe burns. Criminal charges and a complex bankruptcy followed. BSEE records show 1107 INCs during the company’s short history, 464 of which required facility or component shut-ins.
  • The rapid growth of Fieldwood, Cox, and Black Elk was in part facilitated by lax lease assignment and financial assurance policies. Operating companies should have to demonstrate that they can operate safety and comply with the regulations before they are approved to acquire more properties.
  • The Signal Hill saga was documented nearly 2 years ago, and none of the questions raised in that post have been answered. Violations data and inspector feedback predicted the Signal Hill/POOI failure. Nonetheless, and despite the objections of regional staff, Signal Hill was allowed to tap into its decommissioning account to cover operating expenses. Responsibility for decommissioning Platforms Hogan and Houchin is still uncertain.
  • Bankruptcy has been used to avoid or transfer decommissioning obligations. In that regard, Chevron’s comprehensive objection to Fieldwood’s restructuring plan is telling.
  • Given that BSEE, not BOEM, is responsible for safety and compliance, I sincerely hope that regulatory fragmentation was not a factor contributing to BOEM’s decision to discontinue the use of compliance data in determining financial assurance needs.

BOEM’s explanation for the proposal to eliminate the record of compliance criterion:

BOEM also proposes to eliminate the existing “record of compliance” criterion found in the current version of § 556.901(d)(1)(v). BOEM has determined that the number of INCs a company receives correlates with the number of OCS properties it owns, not its financial stability, and therefore, BOEM has concluded that it is not an accurate predictor of its financial health. BOEM reviewed BSEE’s Incidents of Non-Compliance (INCs) records and its Increased Oversight List, which represent BSEE’s cumulative records of violations of performance standards on the part of OCS operators and lessees and determined that the number of incidents of non-compliance typically increases with the size and complexity of the operator’s or lessee’s operations, including the ratio of incidents to number of components. Because larger companies (regardless of credit score) tend to have more properties and components and therefore more INCs, BOEM determined that record of compliance criterion does not accurately predict financial default. BOEM’s review of this information confirmed the feedback BOEM received in response to the 2016 NTL, namely that companies with a large number of properties and facilities tended to receive a large number of INCs and had more individual properties on the Increased Oversight List. BOEM specifically requests comments regarding the use of fines and violations as a criterion in the determination of a company’s ability to fulfill decommissioning obligations, and any data or analysis addressing any correlation between the number of violations and the risk of financial default. BOEM also requests comments on whether the elimination of the INC’s criteria would create a disincentive to comply with regulations. BOEM also requests comment on whether or not the cost of decommissioning is likely to increase based on the type, quantity, and magnitude of previous violations.

On a related note, BOEM/BSEE should consider a followup to the John Shultz thesis which found that INCs are a very good predictor of accidents and spills.

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Some preliminary thoughts about BOEM’s proposed revision to the decommissioning financial assurance regulations for US offshore oil and gas operations:

  1. BOEM has rather surprisingly proposed to eliminate consideration of a company’s compliance record in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance. An opposing view will be posted tomorrow.
  2. If a lease has proved reserves with a value of at least three times that of the estimated decommissioning cost, no supplemental financial assurance would be required. Comparing two imprecise and variable estimates is neither a simple nor reliable method for determining the need for supplemental financial assurance. BOEM should look at the history of the Carpenteria field (Santa Barbara Channel) and the reserve estimates that were provided to discount decommissioning risks. More on this at a later date.
  3. Transferor liability applies only to those obligations existing at the time of transfer; new facilities, or additions to existing facilities, that were not in existence at the time of any lease transfer are not obligations of a predecessor company and are considered obligations of the party that built such new facilities and its co- and successor lessees. This is a good policy, but is difficult to implement. Some of the complexities may need to be addressed. More later.
  4. The “reverse chronological order” provision was withdrawn in April, so there is no defined process for issuing decommissioning orders to predecessor lessees. Is it good policy to first issue such orders to companies who may have owned leases decades ago, in some cases prior to the establishment of transferor liability in the 1997 MMS “bonding rule?”
  5. The proposed rule would clarify that BOEM will not approve the transfer of a lease interest until the transferee complies with all applicable regulations and orders, including the financial assurance requirements. BOEM needs to be firmly enforce this policy. See tomorrow’s post.
  6. The proposed rule would not allow BOEM to rely upon the financial strength of predecessor lessees when determining whether, or how much, supplemental financial assurance should be provided. This is a good provision.
  7. BOEM proposes to use the P70 probabilistic value to set the amount of any required supplemental financial assurance. These estimates do not seem sufficiently conservative to protect other parties and the public in the event of default. This is particularly true after storm damage which can increase plugging costs more than tenfold.
  8. The probabilistic cost estimates were updated in 2020 and are based on data submitted subsequent to 2016 and 2017 NTLs. How often will these estimates be updated?
  9. The final rule should specify that funds may not be withdrawn from decommissioning accounts for operational purposes, and that BOEM approval is required for such withdrawals.

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The Piper Alpha fire was the worst disaster in the history of offshore oil and gas operations and sent shock waves around the world. Eight months later another interactive pipeline-platform fire killed 7 workers at the South Pass 60 “B” facility in the Gulf of Mexico. A US Minerals Management Service task group reviewed the investigation reports for both fires and recommended regulatory changes with regard to:

  1. the identification and notification procedures for out-of-service safety devices and systems,
  2. location and protection of pipeline risers,
  3. diesel and helicopter fuel storage areas and tanks,
  4. approval of pipeline repairs, and
  5. location of ESD valves on pipelines.

Paul Schneider and I wrote a paper on the task group’s findings and that paper was published in Offshore Operations Post Piper Alpha (Institute of Marine Engineers,1991). The proposed regulations that followed summarized these findings and can be be found at this Federal Register link.

Lord Cullen’s comprehensive inquiry into the Piper Alpha tragedy challenged traditional thinking about regulation and how safety objectives could best be achieved, and was perhaps the most important report in the history of offshore oil and gas operations. Per Cullen:

Many current safety regulations are unduly restrictive because they impose solutions rather than objectives. They also are out of date in relation to technological advances. Guidance notes lend themselves to interpretations that discourage alternatives. There is a danger that compliance takes precedence over wider safety considerations and that sound innovations are discouraged.

Cullen advocated management systems that describe the safety objectives, the system by which those objectives were to be achieved, the performance standards to be met, and the means by which adherence to those standards was to be monitored. He called for safety cases that describe major hazards on an installation and provide appropriate safety measures. Per Cullen, each operator should be required in the safety case to demonstrate that the safety management systems of the company and the installation are adequate to assure that design and operation of the platform and its equipment are safe.

Links for the full Piper Alpha Inquiry: volume 1 and volume 2

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This is a surprisingly high number of rejections given that only one Sale 257 bid was rejected and all 69 of the carbon sequestration bids were accepted (even though such bidding was not authorized).

Specifics on the Sale 259 rejections have not yet been posted, but one of the rejections was bp’s bid for Green Canyon Block 777. This is not terribly surprising given that the bp/Talos GC 777 bid was the sole Sale 257 rejection, and bp’s sale 259 bid was less than 1/3 of their Sale 257 bid.

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As we approach the 4th of July, remember this:

In 1979 Gulf of Mexico oil production had declined to 263 million barrels and many believed that further declines were inevitable. 40 years later, a record 693 million barrels were produced.

Onshore, lateral drilling and hydraulic fracturing capabilities are continuing. As a result, Exxon and others are predicting projecting higher recovery factors in the Permian Basin. Per Exxon CEO Darren Woods: “We are beginning to see the signs of some very promising new technologies that will significantly improve recovery.”

Opportunity + Ingenuity ➡ Energy Independence + Prosperity

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Meanwhile, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is down to 348.6 million barrels as of June 23, but 6 million barrels, a relative drop in the bucket, are to be added in the fall.

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Just posted in the Federal Register.

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